

The Effect of Some Insecticides on the  
Histopathology of the Midgut of Different Stages of  
*Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus* Bol. (Acrididae : Orthoptera)

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This is to certify that Mr.S.Shakeel Ahmad Rizvi, worked under my supervision on "The effect of some insecticides on the histopathology of the midgut of different stages of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus Bol. (Acrididae: Orthoptera)", for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Zoology, in the Department of Zoology, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. The present thesis is an original contribution containing observations and results made independently by him.



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Adults of Hieroglyphus nigroripletus Pol. on maize crop.



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## I. INTRODUCTION

In the first two decades of the present century, lime sulphur, petroleum oil, arsenicals and nicotine were the only chemicals in use to destroy the insect pests. Before the outbreak of the Second World War fluorine compounds, organic substances such as dinitrocompounds (4,6-dinitro-o-cresol; and their sodium, potassium and ammonium salts; 2,4-dinitro-6-cyclohexylphenol; its amine salts like dicyclohexylamine, ethanolamine and triethanolamine; dinitrocarprylphenyl crotonate), thiocyanates (lauryl thiocyanate commonly known as Lethanes and isobornyl thiocyanoacetate) etc., as well as, pyrethrum and rotenone as insecticides of plant origin were added to the list of useful insecticides. During the Second World War chlorinated hydrocarbons such as dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), benzene hexachloride (BHC) were synthesized and recommended for the effective control of insect pests. Later on, chlorinated camphene (Toxaphene) Octachloro-dihydro-dicyclopentadiene (Chlordane), 1.2.3.-4.10.10-hexachloro-1:4, 5:8-diendomethano-1.4.4a.5.8.8a-hexahydronaphthalene (Aldrin) and 6,7-epoxy derivative of aldrin (Dieldrin) were added to the list of chlorinated hydrocarbons. Simultaneously, organophosphorus compounds such as hexaethyl tetraphosphate (HETP), tetraethyl pyrophosphate (TEPP) and O,O-diethyl-O-p-nitrophenyl thiophosphate (Parathion) were also synthesized as most powerful insecticides. Since then the different

chlorinated hydrocarbons and the organophosphorus compounds have been extensively used as insecticides against different species of insects. A number of modern insecticides have been used in the control of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus Bolivar (Rao and Cherian, 1940; Bhatia, 1949; Pruthi, 1949; Ramchandran and David, 1951; Narayanan, 1953; Narayanan and Samuel, 1954; Peswani, 1960 and Pradhan and Peswani, 1961).

These insecticides happen to be selective in their action on different groups of insects. Such selectiveness of the insecticides has been generally assessed by the degree and intensity of their action leading to the rate of mortality. However, in view of the enormous population of insects and fast increasing number of insecticides, the information on the pathological effects of insecticides on different systems of insects is rather fragmentary. Further, most of such observations are related to the nervous system (Hartzell, 1934 and 1945; Hartzell and Scudder, 1942; Hartzell and Strong, 1944; Hartzell and Wexler, 1946; Witt, 1947 and Roeder and Weiant, 1954). Similar observations on other tissues of insect body are comparatively less and have been reviewed by Brown (1963).

However, Pilat (1935) pioneered the investigations on the histopathological effects of insecticides on the digestive tract of insects. For this purpose, he used a number of insecticides on caterpillars of Aglaia urticae Linn., (Small Tortoiseshell Butterfly), Prothetria dispar Linn., (Gypsy moth) and Pieris brassicae Linn., (Cabbage butterfly) as well

as on the nymphs of Locusta migratoria Linn., (Migratory locust). In 5th instar caterpillars of A. urticae following the ingestion of sodium fluoride, sodium silicofluoride, sodium arsenite and calcium arsenite, only the midgut epithelium was damaged. Whereas, its connective tissue and muscular coat remained unchanged. The most profound effect was in the anterior most part of the midgut which was completely deprived of its epithelium. However, the remaining portions of the midgut were comparatively less affected. Such histological effects were generally observed in those caterpillars which showed violent symptoms of poisoning before dissection.

Following the ingestion of sodium fluoride, sodium silicofluoride and calcium arsenite by the adults of L. migratoria, the histological picture was almost identical and the midgut epithelium was destroyed. Whereas, its connective tissue was only denuded. The degree of epithelial destruction was related to the interval of time following the ingestion of each poison. Further, the epithelium of the anterior region of the midgut was most affected than that of the following regions. The nymphal stages of L. migratoria were given weak doses of paris green, sodium arsenite and sodium silicofluoride. Paris green did not cause any damage to the epithelium of the midgut even after fortyone hours following its ingestion. However, the ingestion of sodium arsenite and that of sodium silicofluoride generally caused complicated changes in the epithelium which was exfoliated either in small portions or in large sheets leaving connective

tissue and the muscularis layer undamaged. Pilat (1935) concluded that, in the nymphs of L. migratoria, the intake of small doses of the poisons required long periods to damage the intestinal epithelium severely.

In the 5th instar caterpillars of P. dispar, fed on sodium silicofluoride (often mixed with nicotine, bismuth or sodium sulphate), the midgut epithelium was unchanged even after seven days following intake of the poison. In all treated caterpillars the epithelium remained intact throughout the length of the midgut. The only noticeable change was in the chromatin granules of the cytoplasm, which in some cases became loose. According to Pilat (1935) the P. brassicae larvae which ingested sodium arsenite and sodium silicofluoride, like those of P. dispar had no significant histological changes in the midgut. However, ingestion of sodium silicofluoride had some effect on the epithelial nuclei. The midgut epithelium of P. brassicae proved to be more resistant to sodium arsenite.

The effect of lethal or unusually large doses of certain arsenicals (lead arsenate, paris green, calcium arsenite, calcium arsenate and arsenic trioxide), barium fluosilicate, sodium fluoride, sodium fluoaluminate, phenothiazine and rotenone were studied by Woke (1940) on the midgut wall of 6th instar larvae of an armyworm, Prodenia eridania Cram. It was observed that there was a general breakdown and disintegration of the midgut epithelium by the intake of

high doses of arsenicals. Such damages were more pronounced after long intervals following the intake of these poisons. The sequence of pathological changes in the midgut epithelium involved vacuolization in the cytoplasm, fusion of cellular substances of adjacent cells, disappearance of the striated border, disorganisation in epithelial cells and finally disintegration of entire epithelium. However, paris green caused slight disintegration of the epithelium in comparison to lead arsenate. The effect of calcium arsenate was in the form of more or less solid mass of epithelial layer often with fragments of recognizable cell structures. On the contrary, calcium arsenite proved to be more effective and within three hours of its ingestion, the midgut epithelium was completely disintegrated. Whereas, the ingestion of approximately 1.0 mg. of arsenic trioxide did not cause any appreciable damage to the midgut epithelium. But a dose of 5.0 mg. of this poison severely damaged the midgut epithelium in which there was a general disorganisation of the cellular structure. A dose of 0.5 mg. to 1.0 mg. of barium fluosilicate had no adverse effect on the midgut epithelium of these larvae. But, ingestion of sodium fluoride between 2.0 mg. to 5.0 mg. was enough to cause disintegration of the epithelial cytoplasm and the nuclei. Similarly, the intake of 1.0 mg. of sodium fluoaluminate was also effective to cause disorganisation in the epithelial cells and finally exfoliation of the entire epithelial layer from the basement membrane. But the same quantity of



phenothiazine was quite ineffective to the midgut epithelium. Likewise, intake of as much as 5.0 mg. of rotenone was found to be harmless to the midgut of southern army worm larvae.

Richards and Cutkomp (1945) could not observe any change in the midgut epithelium of Periplaneta americana L., which were poisoned by DDT.

Salkeld (1950) orally administered the graded doses of lead arsenate, DDT and parathion to the honey bee and found definite histological abnormalities. These abnormalities were confined only to the middle region of the midgut. The arsenic poisoned bees indicated severe vacuolization and degeneration of the epithelial cells. Whereas, the DDT poisoned bees mostly contained a large transparent gas bubble in the midgut. In such cases, the epithelium was stretched and had intensive vacuolization as well as secretion in the epithelial cells. In bees which had no bubble in the midgut, the epithelium was insignificantly stretched; but the epithelial cells showed vacuolization and secretory activity. Parathion produced neither macroscopic nor microscopic changes in the midgut of the bees. Further, Salkeld (1951) published elaborated account of his observations with respect to the histopathological effects of acid lead arsenite, parathion, pure para-isomer of DDT and 50% wettable powder of DDT as stomach poisons in the midgut of the honey bee. According to him the hyperactivity in DDT and parathion poisoned bees was due to the action of these insecticides as nerve poisons.

The effect of calcium arsenate, DDT and dieldrin was studied on the midgut tissue of the larval forms of Heliothes armigera (Hbn.) by Chaudbourne and Rainwater (1953). Calcium arsenate suspension was administered orally by hypodermic syringe. Whereas, DDT and dieldrin were topically applied to the first pair of abdominal prolegs. The presence of calcium arsenate inside the midgut of the larvae completely disorganised and disintegrated the midgut epithelial cells. In the most damaged conditions almost entire epithelium was sloughed off into the gut lumen. But DDT failed to cause any significant histological changes in the midgut epithelium. The effect of dieldrin was more severe than that of calcium arsenate and the midgut epithelium was invariably degenerated and sloughed off.

Further, Mukerji and Hardass (1954) reported the effect of parathion, BHC, chlordane and dieldrin on the 3rd instar hoppers of Schistocerca gregaria Forsk. These insecticides caused great disintegration and exfoliation of the midgut epithelium. The nuclei of the epithelial cells were also damaged. However, parathion and BHC were further effective to disintegrate the peritrophic membrane as well.

Soliman and Soliman (1958) made detailed observations on the effect of parathion, DDT, toxaphene and cotton dust on tissues of the 5th instar larvae of Prodenia litura F. These insecticides were dusted on the larvae. It was observed that parathion treated larvae had complete detachment of their

midgut epithelium from the basement membrane and the membranes of the epithelial cells were destroyed. The cytoplasm of the cells developed vacuoles followed by degeneration; whereas, the nuclei were clumped. Further, the turgidity and striations of the muscles were lost and empty spaces appeared between the fibres. In the DDT treated larvae the circular muscle layer of the midgut became folded and detached from the connective tissue. In some cases, although the midgut epithelium was detached from the basement membrane, it did not lose its normal structure except little changes in the nuclei and appearance of vacuoles in the cytoplasm. The toxaphene treated Prodenia larvae were also affected. Their midgut epithelium showed vacuolization, exfoliation and finally disintegration. The epithelial nuclei clumped and also disintegrated. The sarcolemma of the muscle fibres was also destroyed by the break down of muscle bundles. In the cotton dust treated larvae the midgut epithelial cells lost their cell membrane and some portions of the epithelium were dropped in the gut lumen. The nuclei became compact and were fragmented into intensely coloured separate lumps of different sizes. However, there was no change in the muscular coat.

The larvae and adults of Leptinotarsa decemlineata Say., were given DDT, methyl-parathion and about eighty plant alkaloids on potato leaves (Koch, 1960). It was found that the intake of the arsenic compound caused complete dissolution of the midgut epithelium; whereas, the ingestion of DDT or methyl-parathion produced excessive secretion of

cytoplasmic material, formation of vacuoles and enlargement of epithelial nuclei. Of the plant alkaloids, only the colchicine and veratrine were highly toxic to the midgut epithelium which was completely damaged. The ingestion of atropine formed epithelial tumours.

The pathological effects of sodium arsenite, lead arsenate, sodium fluosilicate, zinc phosphide, chlordane and BHC were also observed on the midgut of Leogryllus bimaculatus Sauss., Periplaneta americana Linn. and Gryllodes sigillatus Walk. (Srivastava, 1962). These insects were fed on bran which was mixed with each of the used insecticide. The ingestion of sodium arsenate, lead arsenate, sodium fluosilicate and zinc phosphides caused great disintegration of midgut epithelium, often with detachment from the basement membrane and its shedding into the gut lumen. But epithelial nuclei showed only mild effect. However, in the zinc phosphide treated larvae epithelial nuclei showed the arrangement of their granules towards the nuclear membrane. The ingestion of chlordane caused lesser disintegration than the first four insecticides. Whereas, BHC was almost ineffective to the midgut epithelium although in some cases cytoplasmic globules appeared.

Blazejewska (1964) observed the pathological effects of 0.1% thiometon on the midgut epithelium of the larvae of Nematus (Pteronidea) ribesii Scop., in the form of degeneration and detachment of the epithelium. Further, the larvae of

cabbage butterfly, Pieris brassicae (Blazejewska, 1964) fed on tritox dust (mixture of DDT, BHC and methoxy-DDT) showed the destruction of midgut epithelial cells. Similar histological changes were recorded when these larvae were released on this dust and the insecticide acted as contact poison.

McMullen (1965) studied the histopathology of various tissues of Oncopeltus fasciatus Dallas., nymphs after spraying them with technical maneb (98.7% manganous ethylene bisdithiocarbamate). The dosage of the spray was lethal to 100% mortality. The most profound effect of this treatment was recorded on the midgut epithelium and malpighian tubules. The anterior midgut was filled with large gas bubble which was attributed to the effect of DDT present in this region. In other regions of the midgut the epithelium was extremely vacuolized and cytolysis was significant.

Sharma (1966) topically applied allethrin, dieldrin, nuvan and parathion on male Poecillocerus pictus F. and observed vacuolization and degeneration of the epithelial cells of the midgut. But there was no exfoliation of the epithelium. However, the histological damage was more pronounced in the foregut than in the midgut of this grasshopper.

Toppozada et al. (1968) observed the effect of carbaryl, parathion, DDT and endrin on the midgut epithelium of the larvae of Spodoptera littoralis Boisd. These insecticides were given orally as well as applied topically. It was found that in the midgut the ingestion of these insecticides caused rapid and

maximum pathological effect than by topical application. However, in all cases the histopathological changes were manifested by vacuolization, fading of cell boundaries, clumping of cytoplasmic granules and finally shedding of cytoplasm and degeneration of epithelial cells.

The above resume indicates that with respect to the pathological effects of insecticides on the digestive tract of insect, an insecticide may not be equally effective on different species. Further, the method of application of the insecticides and their dilutions are important factors in causing varied type of damages to the fine structures. Thus, further knowledge on these lines would greatly help in the assessment of relative usefulness of different insecticides on various insect pests. Such information would form the basis of rational control of insects. Besides, it would contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the field of insect pathology. To attain this objective detailed observations were made on the histopathology of the midgut and caeca of 3rd, 4th and 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus Bol., as a result of ingestion of sodium silicofluoride, copper aceto-meta-arsenite (paris green), some chlorinated hydrocarbons (DDT, lindane, endrin and aldrin) and an organophosphorus compound (parathion). The first two insecticides are the classical stomach poisons. Whereas, the remaining insecticides are both stomach and contact poisons.

These chlorinate hydrocarbons and the organophosphorus compound are usually applied as contact poisons; but in the present work on Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus which is a serious pest of Zea mays (Maize), Sorghum vulgare (Jowar) and Pennisetum typhoidium (Bajra) in the Northern India (Chaturvedi, 1945; Roonwal, 1945; Bhatia, 1949; Pruthi, 1949; Pradhan and Peswani, 1961 and Bhatia et al., 1964). Their pathological effects have been studied by using them as stomach poisons. The reason is that in the crop fields, there is every chance for the different stages of this grasshopper to eat the poison along with the leaves of host plant which become affected by spraying and thus a contact poison may also act as a stomach poison simultaneously. The histopathological changes as a result of insecticidal actions are confined to the midgut and caeca because in the preliminary experiments it was found that following the ingestion of the aforesaid insecticides, there was neither macroscopic nor microscopic damage to the fore-and hindgut. Further, in the present work, observations were made on the females of macropterous form of H. nigrorepletus.

## II. MATERIAL AND METHODS

### (1) Maintenance of stock culture:

All the experiments were performed on a stock of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus collected from the field and subsequently maintained in the laboratory at controlled conditions. For this purpose, on the onset of monsoon i.e. in the first and second week of July young hatchlings of H. nigrorepletus were collected from maize crop and the grasses adjoining this crop. These hatchlings belonged to the first and second instars and were maintained in circular rearing jars measuring 6" X 4" with 2" thick damp soil at the bottom. These rearing jars were kept at  $30^{\circ}\text{C} \pm 1^{\circ}\text{C}$  and 70% to 80% relative humidity. Fresh maize leaves were provided to the hoppers every day as food. When the second instar hoppers moulted to third instar hoppers, the latter were transferred to another jar and their subsequent age was recorded in terms of days. Likewise, the newly moulted hoppers of 4th and 5th instars were separated and maintained age wise. Similarly, the newly emerged fledgling were isolated from the 5th instar hoppers and maintained age wise. The effect of insecticides was observed on the individuals of the same age with respect to each instar.



(ii) Dilution of insecticides:

In the present work on H. nigrorepletus, 5% DDT, 0.5% lindane, 2% endrin, 5% aldrin and 2% parathion were used. Whereas, sodium silicofluoride and copper aceto-meta-arsenite (paris green) were not diluted. The respective concentrations of different insecticides are based on their effectiveness to cause mortality in different stages of this grasshopper. It was ascertained in preliminary experiments. The preparation of aforesaid concentrations of dust of the respective insecticide was based on the method recommended by Pradhan et al. (1959), except that in the present dilutions acetone has been used instead of benzene as solvent. Because, acetone has the advantage of dissolving all the above mentioned hydrocarbons and the organophosphorus compound. Further, for all these dilutions kaolin has been used as inert material. The source and form of each insecticide is mentioned in Table 1.

(iii) Feeding of insecticides:

Each insecticide was fed along with the natural food i.e. the maize leaf to a number of individuals of the same age of an instar. The technique of feeding the poison and determining the eaten quantity of each poison was based on the modification of the sandwich method described by Elisor and Floyd (1938).

To prepare a sandwich of an insecticide, a piece of maize leaf measuring 3.75 x 1.25 cm. was applied with a sticker

substance (containing equal quantity of blood albumen and dextrin) and it was weighed. Then the insecticide was dusted on the surface of this leaf piece by a dusting apparatus which was a modified form of that recommended by Pradhan and Srivastava (1951). The dusted leaf piece was weighed. The difference between the two weights gave the quantity of the insecticide spreading over the above mentioned piece of maize leaf covering 75 squares of a graph paper, each square being 0.25 cm. x 0.25 cm. in dimension. Thus the quantity of insecticide over a single square was calculated. Then the insecticide applied piece of maize leaf was superimposed with another piece of maize leaf of the same size. Thus a sandwich was ready to offer for eating to each insect which was isolated in separate rearing jar and was previously starved for 12 hours so as to stimulate feeding. It was observed that many insects had an immediate response for eating. Only such insects were used for further observations which had eaten considerable part of the sandwich. Half an hour after the provision of the sandwich, from each rearing jar, the uneaten portion of each sandwich was kept on a graph paper, having smallest square 0.25 cm. x 0.25 cm. and this portion was traced out to determine the area of uneaten sandwich in terms of total square. The difference between this area and that of the complete sandwich gave the area of eaten sandwich in terms of squares. Thus the quantity of eaten insecticide was calculated by multiplying the number of squares eaten with previously calculated quantity of dust on each square. Similar sandwiches containing Kaolin dust were also prepared and fed to control

insects. Later, these insects were given fresh maize leaves as usual. But, generally, they did not pay attention to this food.

(iv) Histological preparations:

Following the ingestion of each insecticide, the insects were dissected at regular intervals and their midgut and caeca were transected. At each interval atleast 3 insects were dissected for the histological preparation and observation. Then, the transected regions of the digestive tract were fixed in alcoholic Bouin's fixative which was found most satisfactory than Carnoy and Yao-Nan's fluid. These regions were embedded in paraffin wax B.D.H. (63° C m.p.) and their transverse sections were cut at 6  $\mu$  by Cambridge Rocking Microtome. Serial sections of both the regions were obtained in order to study the effects of insecticides throughout the length of midgut and caeca. The sections were stained in Heidenhain's iron haematoxylin and eosin. The staining procedure was followed from Pantin (1959). Similarly, histological preparations of midgut and caeca of hoppers of different stages and those of adults were made from such individuals which were fed on Kaolin instead of an insecticide, or starved along with insecticide fed insects. Such preparations were used as controls to determine the effect of different insecticides on the midgut and caeca of H. nigrorepletus.

Table 1. The source and form of the insecticides used in the present work.

Names of the insecticides	Source of Supply	Form of insecticide obtained
Sodium silico-fluoride	E. Merck Darmstadt & Co. Germany	Technical 72%
Copper aceto-meta-arsenite (Paris green)	John Elliott & Sons N.Y., (U.S.A.)	As <sub>2</sub> O <sub>3</sub> 57%
DDT (Dichloro diphenyltri-chloro-ethane)	Glegy Chemical Corporation, Saw Mill River Road Andsley, N.Y. (U.S.A.)	Technical pp <sup>1</sup> isomer 99.2%
Lindane (99.9% gamma isomer of hexachloro-hexane)	Flintrock Product Private Ltd. Belveders Road Mazagaon Bombay-10 (India)	Technical 99.9%
Endrin (hexa-chloroepoxy-octahydro-endo-endo demethano-naphthalene)	Shell Chemical Corporation Burmah Shell Ltd. Bombay (India)	Technical 100%
Aldrin (hexa-chloro hexahydro dimethano-naphthaline)	Shell Chemical Corporation Burmah Shell Ltd. Bombay (India)	Technical 87%
Parathion (Diethyl p-nitro-phenol thiophosphate)	Bharat Pulverising Mills Private Ltd. Sayane Road Bombay-28 (India)	Paramar (50% Parathion emulsion concentration)

### III. ANATOMY OF THE DIGESTIVE TRACT AND HISTOLOGY OF THE MIDGUT AND CAECA OF DIFFERENT STAGES OF HIEROGLYPHUS NIGROREPLETUS.

#### (i) Anatomy of the digestive tract.

The anatomy of the digestive tract of Acrididae (Locusts and grasshoppers) has been studied in a number of species by different authors. This aspect has been briefly reviewed by Uvarov (1966). However, detailed observations on the anatomy of the digestive tract have been published on Dissosteira carolina L. (Mez, 1923), Locusta migratoria L. (Nenyukov and Parfent'ev, 1929; Pilat, 1935; Hodge, 1939; Albrecht, 1953 and Liu and Leo, 1955), on Melanoplus differentialis Thoms (Hodge, 1936 and 1937), on Rhadinotatum carinatum var. pennisulare Rehn., Leptysma marginicollis Serv. and Opshomala vitreipennis Marsch. (Hodge, 1940 and 1943), on Nomadaeris septumfasciatus (Albrecht, 1956), on Acrida pellucida Klug. (Hafez and Ibrahim, 1959), Chrotogonus lugubris Blanchard. (Ibrahim, 1963).

In the present work a description of the anatomy of the digestive tract of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus is given mainly as a pre-requisite for observations on the normal histology of its midgut and caeca. Nevertheless, this description may add to the existing knowledge on acrididae.

#### (a) Adult (Fig. 1)

The digestive tract of adult Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus anatomically resembles with that of Locusta migratoria (Albrecht,

1953), except that it is shorter than that of latter species. The entire digestive tract is almost a straight tube except in the region of the proctodaeum (Prct.) where it is slightly convoluted. It measures about 40 mm. in males and 50 mm. in females. The stomodaeum (Stom.) is approximately 16 mm. and it is a straight tube differentiated into oesophagus (Oe.), crop (Cr.) and proventriculus (Pvent.). Internally these regions are demarcated by the different patterns of chitinized armature. The stomodeal valve (Svlv.) is simple because the stomodaeum (foregut) is not invaginated into the midgut. In this respect the stomodeal valve of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus differs from that of Blattidae (Snodgrass, 1935), and resembles with that of Locusta migratoria (Albrecht, 1956 and Khan, 1964).

The midgut (Mesen.) is shorter than the fore-and the hindgut and it approximately measures 14mm. It is a cylindrical tube of uniform diameter. Its anterior end is marked by the origin of gastric caeca (GCa.) which are six in number. Each caecum is a finger like and bilobed structure. The anterior lobe is about 12 mm. long, whereas the posterior lobe is quite small and measures only 2 to 3 mm. in length.

The hindgut (Prct.) is approximately equal to the fore-gut in length and its origin is marked by the openings of malpighian tubules (Mal.) in the digestive tract. It is externally differentiated into ilium (Il.), colon (Cln.) and rectum (Rect.).

(b) Hoppers

The anatomy of the digestive tract of 3rd, 4th and 5th instar hoppers of H. nigrorepletus resembles with that of

the adult except the variation in its length. The complete digestive tract in the 3rd, 4th and 5th instar hoppers is about 22, 25 & 30 mm. respectively. The average size of the anterior caeca in these stages is 3, 5 & 7 mm. respectively. The posterior caeca are very small.

(ii) Histology of the midgut and caeca.

The histology of the midgut of Acrididae has also been studied in a number of species by different workers (Nenyukov and Parfent'ev, 1929; Woodruff, 1933; Pilat, 1935a; Newell and Baxter, 1936; Hodge, 1936 and 1939; Beams and Anderson, 1957; Hafez and Ibrahim, 1959; Ibrahim, 1963; Baccetti, 1960, 1961c and 1962 and Khan, 1964). The histology of the digestive caeca of Acrididae has only been studied in Locusta migratoria (Khan, 1964). However, there is no information on the histological structure of midgut and caeca of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus. Therefore, detailed observations on the histology of midgut and caeca of the hoppers and adult H. nigrorepletus have been made to appreciate the pathological effects of the poisons.

(a) Midgut of adult (Plate I, Fig. 1).

The gut wall is invested by a thin membrane called peritoneum (Pr.) which has clear cytoplasm with elliptical nuclei. These nuclei are widely spaced and have a few fine granules.

The outer layer of the midgut wall is composed of bundles of longitudinal muscle fibres (Lmcl.) which are regularly spaced.

Each longitudinal muscle bundle consists of 2 to 3 muscle bands which are closely applied together. In cross section each muscle band has a centrally placed nucleus (Nu.) which bears a few basophilic granules. Inner to the longitudinal muscle layer is a compact layer of circular muscle fibres (Cmcl.). Each muscle fibre is enclosed in a structureless membrane known as sarcolemma and bears striations or fibrillar arrangement. Immediately beneath the sarcolemma there are nuclei which lie at irregular distances. These nuclei are either irregular or elliptical in shape and possess a few basophilic granules.

The connective tissue (Ct.) layer is highly elastic and it binds the epithelium with the muscularis layer. The width of the connective tissue layer varies according to the conditions of the midgut. In partially full condition of the midgut the connective tissue is more stretched inward than in the completely full condition of the midgut. The outer margin of the connective tissue which is contiguous with the circular muscle layer, has a row of oblique muscle fibres (Obmcl.). Such muscle fibres have not been generally reported in the midgut of other insects. However, in the midgut of Locusta migratoria, Pilat (1935) regards them as inner longitudinal muscle fibres, whereas, Khan (1964) is of opinion that these fibres are of delicate nature. The inner margin of the connective tissue is bounded by a basement membrane (Bmb.) which is thicker in consistency than the connective tissue. The connective tissue appears to have a uniform reticular arrangement with nuclei, which may be formed by fine structureless



membranes. The nuclei are mostly oval in shape and are smaller than the nuclei of the muscularis layer. These nuclei also possess a few basophilic granules.

When the midgut is empty or partially full, its epithelium is thrown into well marked folds and the entire epithelium gives the appearance of alternately arranged lobes (Lb.) and furrows (Fr.). The inner margin of the epithelium is bounded by a distinct striated border (Sb.) which has a uniform depth of about 34  $\mu$ . Basally, each striation is supported by a fine granule which is embedded in the cytoplasm of the epithelial cells. Secretion and formation of peritrophic lamellae (Pml.) are also seen in the striated border. The epithelium consists of digestive and regenerative cells. The digestive cells (Dg.) are generally columnar with distinct cell membranes and their nuclei vary in shape. In the central part of each lobe of the epithelium the digestive nuclei are laterally compressed and elongated measuring between 18  $\mu$  x 12  $\mu$  to 26  $\mu$  x 14  $\mu$ . Whereas, in the lateral part of each lobe these nuclei are elliptical and measure between 16  $\mu$  x 12  $\mu$  and 18  $\mu$  x 12  $\mu$ . However, in the furrows the digestive nuclei are oval and their average size is 16  $\mu$  x 14  $\mu$ . Generally, all of these nuclei are richly packed with scattered and fine granules which fill the entire nuclear space. The cytoplasm of the digestive cells is full of fine granules which form fine streaks running parallel to the long axis of the cells. Thus the entire cytoplasm appears to be fibrillar in nature. These streaks of cytoplasmic granules

are thicker in the inner and outer margins of the digestive cells than in its central portion.

The regenerative cells are grouped to form nidi which are placed adjacent to the basement membrane in the region of the furrows. In each cross section approximately 25 to 40 nidi are found. Each nidus (Ni.) has four to eight cells. The cytoplasm of the regenerative cell is largely occupied by its nucleus and it is clear. These nuclei are mostly elliptical and their size varies between  $12\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  to  $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ . These nuclei also contain fine basophilic granules which are uniformly scattered in the nuclear space.

(b) Midgut of hoppers (Plate I, Fig. 2,3 & 4)

The histological details of the midgut of various stages of hoppers resemble with those of the adult except the dimensions of various layers of the midgut wall as well as the size of the epithelial cells and their nuclei. The striated border has the average depth  $4.5\ \mu$ ,  $6.5\ \mu$  and  $6.5\ \mu$  in 3rd, 4th and 5th instar hoppers respectively. The average size of the digestive nuclei is  $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ,  $15\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $15\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  whereas, that of the regenerative nuclei (Rgn.) is  $9.3\ \mu \times 7.7\ \mu$ ,  $9.3\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  in 3rd, 4th and 5th instar hoppers respectively.

(c) Caeca of adult (Plate II, Fig. 1)

The caecal wall is also wrapped by means of a peritoneum which is almost similar to that of the midgut except that it is more delicate and thin in case of caeca. The nuclei of the

peritoneal membrane are  $18\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  in size and mostly have six or more basophilic granules.

The muscularis is composed of outer longitudinal muscle (Lmcl.) layer and the inner circular muscle (Cmcl.) layer. The longitudinal muscle bundles are arranged similar to that of midgut. Each bundle of longitudinal muscle consists of two or three muscle bands which measure  $21\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  in cross section. The nuclei of these muscle bands are centrally placed and their approximate size is  $9.3\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ . The layer of the circular muscle fibres is also thinner and weaker than that of the midgut and its thickness is  $18\ \mu$  approximately. The histological details of this muscle are similar to that of the midgut.

Unlike the midgut, the connective tissue (Ct.) of the caeca is poorly developed. However, in some portions, especially in the region of the villi, the opposing basement membranes (Bmb.) are bound with distinct connective tissue. The basement membrane is well developed and supports the epithelium.

The epithelium of caeca is thrown into villi and crypts. The villi are distinctly developed throughout the length of the caeca except in the basal and apical regions where these gradually become flattened to form a smooth epithelium. The inner margin of the epithelium has a well developed striated border (Sb.). The digestive cells (Dg.) of the epithelium are tall and columnar in shape with distinct cell membrane. Each digestive cell has a centrally placed nucleus (Nu.). These nuclei are elliptical and measure  $18\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  in the region of the villi, whereas, in the basal part of the villi and in the

region of crypts all the nuclei are spherical and are about  $15\ \mu \times 15\ \mu$  in size. These nuclei are packed with fine granules which are also basophilic.

The caecal epithelium does not form the peritrophic lamellae. In this respect the caecal epithelium resembles with those of other Acrididae. However, in Acridium aegyptum, Berretta (1935 & 1937) has reported the presence of a peritrophic membrane (Pmb.) in the gastric caeca as well.

The regenerative cells (Rg.) are grouped to form nidi which are regularly spaced in the basal region of the epithelium. Each nidus (Ni.) normally consists of 4 to 8 cells which have scanty cytoplasm but distinct nuclei. These nuclei are spherical in shape and have the average size of  $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ .

(d) Caeca of hoppers (Plate II, Fig. 2, 3 & 4).

The histological details of caeca of hoppers of different stages of H. nigrorepletus are similar to those of adult. The differences generally occur in the size of various constituent layers of caecal wall, epithelial cells and their nuclei. The number of villi is the least in the 3rd instar hoppers. This number is comparatively higher in the 4th and 5th instars. The same sequence applies to their lengths. The peritoneum is quite feeble in the caeca of 3rd instar hoppers, whereas in those of 5th instars, it is quite well developed. The striated border has a uniform depth of  $4.5\ \mu$  in the caeca of 3rd and 4th instar hoppers and  $6.5\ \mu$  in that of 5th instar hoppers. The relative size of the digestive nuclei is  $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  to  $12\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  in

the 3rd instar, 18  $\mu$  x 12  $\mu$  to 24  $\mu$  x 12  $\mu$  in the 4th instar and 15  $\mu$  x 12  $\mu$  to 24  $\mu$  x 12  $\mu$  in the 5th instar hoppers. Likewise, the size of the regenerative nuclei also varies.

IV. PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AND CAECA OF ADULTS AND  
HOPPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARS OF HIEROGLYPHUS NIGROREPLETUS,  
BY THE INGESTION OF A FLUORINE COMPOUND  
(SODIUM SILICOFLUORIDE).

(A) Symptoms.

The ingested quantity of sodium silicofluoride by the individuals of different instars of the hoppers and the adults is given in Table 2. Following the intake of this poison, it was observed that the insects became sluggish and occasionally showed spasms. Nearly after 3 hours, almost all individuals showed uneasiness and irritability by raising their heads and thorax, as well as by twisting their body from side to side. They occasionally regurgitated brown fluid and after some time such fluid is also passed through the anus. On macroscopic examination midgut showed colour change as well as contraction. First the anterior midgut changed from light brown to blackish brown and then the process followed backward.

In 3rd instar hoppers, the entire midgut became blackish brown in nearly 12 hours following the intake of this poison and the insects died. Whereas, in 4th and 5th instar hoppers and in adults this condition occurred after 20 hours. In adults, caeca changed from yellow to blackish brown but in 3rd, 4th and 5th instar hoppers the caeca became only dark yellow.

Table 2. The quantity of sodium silicofluoride ingested by the individuals of different instars and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrореpletus.

Instars	Variation in the eaten quantity (mgs.)		Average eaten quantity (mgs.)
	Minimum	Maximum	
3rd Instar hoppers	0.811	0.957	0.8918
4th Instar hoppers	1.382	1.782	1.583
5th Instar hoppers	2.08	2.76	2.398
Adults	2.771	3.577	3.278

After the ingestion of this poison, 3rd instar hoppers survived only for 12 hours, whereas 5th instar hoppers lived upto 20 hours. However, the survival time of 4th instar hoppers and adults remained 24 hours.

(B) Histopathology of the midgut and caeca.

The major events of histopathological effects on midgut and caeca of various stages of H. nigrореpletus, following the ingestion of sodium silicofluoride have been summarized in Tables 3 & 4 respectively. However, the detailed description of these effects are given below.

(i) 3rd Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

The midgut epithelium is stretched inward. The striated border of the epithelial cells becomes indistinct owing to the discharge of a mass of cytoplasmic granules and globules. The cytoplasm of these cells is less granular and their nuclei are pushed towards the inner margin. However, the caecal epithelium does not show further change.

After 8 hours.

The epithelium in the anterior region of the midgut is detached at places, from the basement membrane and is completely disintegrated (Plate IV, Fig. 1). The nuclei present in the cell debris have a large and dark stained mass lying in the centre or near the periphery (Plate III, Fig. E). However, the nuclear



membrane of some nuclei is ruptured and their dark stained masses are lying in the cell debris (Plate III, Fig. F).

In the middle and the posterior regions of the midgut, epithelium is broken at its inner margin and thereby the cell contents are flowing into the gut lumen (Plate IV, Fig. 2 & 3). The discharged nuclei have a large and dark stained mass. Whereas, the digestive and the regenerative nuclei present in the epithelium are indistinguishable and their fine granules have mostly formed bigger granules (Plate III, Fig. C). However, in some nuclei these granules have fused to form a cluster which lies either in the centre or near the periphery of the nuclei. The cytoplasm is much vacuolized. Likewise, the caecal epithelium is also broken at its inner margin and cell contents are flowing into the lumen (Plate IV, Fig. 4). The discharged nuclei have a large dark stained mass and most of these masses are lying freely in the caecal lumen as dark specks (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The digestive and the regenerative nuclei of caecal epithelium are disorganized and their granules are fused. The cytoplasm of these cells is also vacuolized.

After 12 hours.

The detachment of the midgut epithelium from the basement membrane extends to the middle region of the midgut (Plate V, Fig. 1). However, posterior region of the midgut still shows the attachment of the broken epithelium. The cell debris shows the stage of degeneration in the nuclei (Plate III, Fig. E).

Most portions of the caecal epithelium are completely disintegrated (Plate V, Fig. 2). Most of the nuclei are degenerating (Plate III, Fig. E & F).

(ii) 4th Instar hopper.

After 4 hours.

In the anterior and middle regions of the midgut, mass of cytoplasmic granules are expressed out through the striated border which becomes indistinct. The cytoplasm of the epithelial cells is vacuolized. Both the digestive as well as regenerative nuclei are normal. In the posterior region of the midgut, the epithelial cells are stretched inward and the striated border only shows clumping. In the caecal epithelium the only appreciable change is the discharge of the cytoplasmic granules.

After 8 hours.

The epithelial cells are stretched inward and their nuclei are pushed towards the inner margin. Intensive discharge of cytoplasmic granules and often that of digestive nuclei takes place from the midgut epithelium. The striated border becomes obliterated. The discharged nuclei have the aggregation of their fine granules to form a large dark stained mass which lies either in the centre or on one side of the nucleus (Plate III, Fig. E). The nuclei present in the epithelium near its inner margin are spherical in shape and swollen  $12\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$ , showing fusion of their fine granules to form a few large granules (Plate III, Fig. B & C) which aggregate on

one side of the nucleus. The rest of the nuclei of epithelium have the normal granules. The epithelium of the posterior midgut is less affected than that of the anterior and the middle regions.

The caecal epithelium also becomes stretched inward and it is broken at its inner margin. Thus the cell contents are poured into the caecal lumen. The striated border is obliterated. The cytoplasm shows vacuolization. The discharged nuclei in the caecal lumen have fusion of the granules in a large dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. D & E). Both the digestive and the regenerative nuclei are swollen and measure  $15\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively. In these nuclei the fine granules have aggregated on their periphery.

After 12 hours.

In the anterior midgut, the epithelial cells are stretched inward. Their striated border is completely obliterated and inner margin is nipped off. The discharged nuclei in the gut lumen show various stages of fusion of their granules leading to the formation of a single dark stained mass. However, in some nuclei the membrane is ruptured and their contents are out (Plate III, Fig. C, D, E & F). The cytoplasm shows vacuolization. Both digestive as well as regenerative nuclei are pushed towards the inner margin of the epithelium and show peripheral arrangement of their aggregated granules. The caecal epithelium also shows breaking of its inner margin. The cytoplasm is vacuolized. The discharged nuclei only show a large and dark stained mass. The digestive and the regenerative nuclei are similar to those

observed in the caecal epithelium after 8 hours.

After 16 hours.

Further breaking of the inner margin of the midgut epithelium takes place. The cytoplasm is generally vacuolized. The nuclei in the cell debris form a large dark stained mass which is either present in the centre or near the periphery of the nucleus (Plate III, Fig. E). However, such nuclear masses are also lying freely in the cell debris. Empty and ruptured nuclear membranes are also seen in the gut lumen (Plate III, Fig. F). The digestive and regenerative nuclei show similar changes as observed after 12 hours. The caecal epithelium is largely nipped off and the cell contents are poured into the lumen. The nuclei in the discharged cytoplasmic contents have the same stages of degeneration as seen after 12 hours.

After 20 hours.

In the anterior midgut, the entire epithelium and the connective tissue disintegrate, leaving only the muscularis layer. The disintegrated epithelium lying in the gut lumen is in a state of dissolution (Plate V, Fig. 3). Most of the nuclei degenerate and only their dark stained masses lie in the gut lumen, whereas, in certain cases these masses are still inside the nuclei (Plate III, Fig. E & F). Such disintegration is not seen in the middle and the posterior regions of the midgut. However, in these regions, intensive breaking of the inner margin of epithelium takes place. The cell debris in

these regions of the midgut have nuclei as well, which show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The digestive and the regenerative nuclei show the condensation and fusion of their granules which either form a cluster or show peripheral arrangement. The caecal epithelium disintegrates and most of it is dissolved. However, at places, some cells are attached with the muscularis layer.

After 24 hours.

The entire midgut epithelium is completely disintegrated and that of the anterior midgut is dissolved. The cell debris contains only a few nuclei. Most of the nuclei are only represented by their dark stained masses. Often these masses are enclosed into their nuclear membranes (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The caecal epithelium is completely disintegrated. The cell debris lying in the caecal lumen are in a state of dissolution. Nuclei are hardly recognizable in this debris (Plate V, Fig. 4).

(iii) 5th Instar hopper.

After 4 hours.

In the entire midgut epithelium, the striated border is stretched inward and it is clumped at places. Cytoplasmic vesicles, often with nuclei are discharged. Most of the discharged nuclei have a large clumped mass which is darkly stained. The digestive nuclei of the epithelium also show condensation of granular material (Plate III, Fig. B & C). In the caeca, cytoplasmic contents mostly with granules are

squeezed out. However, at places digestive nuclei are also discharged into the caecal lumen.

After 8 hours:

The striated border of the midgut epithelium is completely obliterated. In the anterior region of the midgut, cytoplasmic contents with nuclei squeeze out from the epithelial cells and at places the epithelium is broken. The nuclei of the digestive cells have less granules and these are generally contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ). The cytoplasm of these cells is vacuolized. Most of the discharged nuclei show fusion of their granules to form a large dark stained mass. The middle and posterior regions of the midgut are comparatively less affected.

In the caeca, the inner margin of the epithelium is broken. Therefore, mass of cytoplasmic contents flow into the gut lumen and make up the cell debris. The nuclei in this debris mostly show advanced stages of condensation and fusion of granules (Plate III, Fig. D & E), whereas, the digestive nuclei still present in the epithelium are swollen ( $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ).

After 12 hours.

The anterior region of the midgut shows massive discharge of cytoplasmic contents including nuclei from the epithelial cells and the striated border is obliterated. The discharged nuclei mostly have a large dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig.E). The middle and posterior regions of the midgut are comparatively less affected than the anterior region; and in these regions,

the striated border is still distinctly present in some portions. In the caeca, the epithelium becomes detached from the basement membrane at places, but elsewhere, the inner margin of the epithelium is only broken. The cellular contents of detached epithelium make cell debris in which the nuclei present advanced stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E). Whereas, in the digestive nuclei, still present in the broken epithelium, their fine granules are fused to form a few large granules which are arranged on the periphery or on one side of the nuclei (Plate III, Fig. C & D).

After 16 hours.

In the anterior region of the midgut, the epithelium is stretched inward and its inner margin is broken. Thus a portion of the cellular contents is dropped in the gut lumen, which have nuclei either with a large dark stained mass lying on the periphery of the nucleus or the nuclei are empty or broken. The cytoplasm of the digestive cells is rich in vacuoles. The middle and posterior regions of the midgut have more stretched epithelium and only show profuse discharge of cytoplasmic contents. The inner margin of the epithelium is intact. Vacuolization of the cytoplasm is also less than in the anterior midgut. The caecal epithelium is mostly detached from the basement membrane or its inner margin is broken. Nuclei present in the detached epithelium have only a few large granules arranged on their periphery. Whereas, nuclei present in the caecal lumen have a large dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. E).

After 20 hours.

In the anterior midgut, the epithelial cells have been sloughed off from the basement membrane and these are under dissolution forming the cell debris. All the nuclei in the cell debris are degenerated (Plate III, Fig. E). Whereas, in the middle and posterior regions of the midgut the dissolution of the epithelium is less marked (Plate VI, Fig. 1). The caecal epithelium has completely disintegrated and only the muscularis layer is left (Plate VI, Fig. 2). Nuclei of these cells have completely degenerated and mostly their broken membranes are left in the caecal lumen.

(iv) Adult.

After 4 hours.

The epithelial cells of the midgut show the discharge of cytoplasmic granules through the striated border which becomes covered with these granules. However, the epithelial cells of the posterior midgut are slightly stretched. The caecal epithelium also shows only discharge of some cytoplasmic granules and the striated border is distinct at most of the places.

After 8 hours.

The epithelium is stretched inward. Now, discharge of cytoplasmic globules with digestive nuclei also takes place. Most of the discharged nuclei show early stages of degeneration. (Plate III, Fig. B & C). Whereas, some of these nuclei are in advanced stage of degeneration. The cytoplasm of the digestive



cells is vacuolized. The digestive nuclei become spherical and swollen ( $12\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$ ); and their granules arrange at the periphery. The granules of the regenerative nuclei also concentrate at the periphery. These changes are comparatively less marked in the middle and posterior regions of the midgut, where only discharge of cytoplasmic granules takes place. But in the digestive nuclei of the middle and posterior regions of the midgut, the granules form a cluster on one side of the nuclei. In the caeca, besides the discharge of cytoplasmic granules, at few places, the epithelium is nipped off at its inner margin. Generally, the discharged nuclei are in early stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. B). However, in few cases, a large and dark stained mass is present in the nuclei. The cytoplasm is less granular. The digestive and regenerative nuclei have scattered fine granules.

After 12 hours.

Discharge of massive cytoplasmic globules and vesicles takes place from the midgut epithelium and striated border is indistinct. In the digestive and the regenerative nuclei, granules aggregate and generally form a cluster lying on one side of the nucleus. In a few nuclei, these granules have formed a large and dark stained mass. Such effects are less marked in the middle and the posterior regions. The caecal epithelium has no further change.

After 16 hours.

The midgut epithelium is very much stretched and nipped off at its inner margin. Thus cell contents are poured

into the gut lumen. The nuclei lying <sup>in</sup> the gut lumen show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. D & E) in which the granules fuse to form a large and dark stained mass lying either in the centre or near the periphery of the nucleus. The digestive and the regenerative nuclei present in the stretched epithelium are mixed up and show the aggregation and fusion of granules. In the middle region of the midgut, the nipping of the epithelium takes place only at places. Whereas, in the posterior region, no nipping occurs and only intensive discharge of cytoplasmic contents takes place. In the caecal epithelium, breaking of the inner margin of the epithelium takes place more intensely. Some of the digestive nuclei also have a large and dark stained mass. Whereas, the remaining nuclei in the epithelium, however, show the condensation and fusion of their granules.

After 20 hours.

The epithelium of the anterior midgut is largely disintegrated and only its basal portion remains attached with the basement membrane. The nuclei present near the basement membrane, presumably the regenerative nuclei, show the peripheral arrangement of their granules, leaving a space in the nuclei. Whereas, the nuclei present in the cell debris undergo advanced stages of degeneration (Plate VI, Fig. 3). The disintegration of the epithelium is comparatively less marked in the middle and the posterior regions of the midgut. The bulk of the caecal epithelium disintegrates, but it is never detached from the basement membrane. In the degenerating

cellular mass, the nuclei have either a cluster of granules or a large dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. C & E). The digestive and the regenerative nuclei cannot be differentiated from one another and show the fusion of fine granules (Plate VI, Fig. 4).

After 24 hours.

In the anterior midgut, epithelium is detached from the basement membrane and undergoes dissolution. At places, connective tissue also breaks up and only muscularis layer is left (Plate VII, Fig. 1). In this degenerating mass, nuclei are generally obliterated and only dark stained specks represent their remains. However, only a few nuclei can be identified and these have a dark stained mass lying either in the centre or near the periphery of the nucleus. The epithelium of the middle region of the midgut also indicates degeneration but its detachment from the basement membrane is only partial. In the posterior region of the midgut degeneration of the epithelium is least in intensity. The caecal epithelium is mostly disintegrated and detached from the basement membrane and only muscularis layer is left. Generally all nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate VII, Fig. 2).

Table 3. Sequence of important histopathological effects ~~in~~ the midgut of 3rd, 4th, 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus nigroreplebus, after the ingestion of Sodium silicofluoride.

Intervals (hrs.) following the ingestion of Sodium silicofluoride						
Instars	4	8	12	16	20	24
3rd Instar hoppers	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules and globules	Anterior mid-gut epithelium detached from the base-ment membrane Disintegration begins	Detachment of epithelium up to middle mid-gut. Advanced nuclei degeneration	More severe damage	Disintegration of anterior epithelium. Advanced nuclei degenerative rate	Entire epithelium disintegrated. Necrosis intensifies
4th Instar hoppers	As above	Discharge of cytoplasmic contents with nuclei	Nipping of epithelium begins			
5th Instar hoppers	As above	As above. Breaking of epithelium begins	Profuse cytoplasmic discharge	Nipping of anterior mid-gut epithelium	Anterior epithelium detached. Disintegration partial detachment in the following regions	---
Adults	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules	Discharge of cytoplasmic contents	Intensive discharge	As above	Anterior epithelium partially detached	Complete detachment & disintegration of anterior epithelium

Table 4. Sequence of important histopathological effects in the caeca of 3rd, 4th, 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus, after the ingestion of Sodium silicofluoride.

Intervals (hrs.) following the ingestion of Sodium silicofluoride					
Instars	4	8	12	16	20 24
3rd Instar hoppers	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules	Intensive breaking of inner margin of epithelium	Mostly disintegration. Advanced necrosis		
4th Instar hoppers	As above	As above	Severe nipping of epithelium. Advanced necrosis	Same as before	Disintegration of epithelium. completely disintegrated & dissolved
5th Instar hoppers	As above	As above	Epithelial detachment begins	Further detachment & disintegration. Advanced necrosis	Complete disintegration
Adults	As above	Partial nipping of epithelium	Further nipping	Intense breaking of epithelium	Severe epithelial disintegration Advanced necrosis

V. PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AND CAECA OF ADULTS AND  
HOPPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARS OF HIEROGLYPHUS NIGROREPLETUS,  
BY THE INGESTION OF AN ARSENITE (COPPER ACETO-META-ARSENITE)

(A) Symptoms

Table 5 gives the maximum and minimum quantity of copper aceto-meta-arsenite (Paris green) eaten by the individuals of different instars and the adults. After eating this insecticide, for a few minutes the insects remain calm. Then they slowly rub their legs against the head and abdomen for a few minutes. Thereafter, they loose the equilibrium of their body and lie laterally. Finally, they generally become motionless except for occasional spasmodic twitching of their appendages. As in the case of sodium silicofluoride treated insects, these hoppers and adults also regurgitate a brown liquid. Presumably, this insecticide works as a purgative as well, because, there is more frequent expulsion of watery faeces.

In nearly all insects the midgut becomes contracted and in about four hours its colour becomes dark brown which gradually turns to black. The colour of the caeca also changes to brownish yellow from the normal yellow colour.

Following the intake of this poison, the hoppers of 3rd and 4th instars survive up to 12 and 24 hours respectively. Whereas, the 5th instar hoppers and the adults only live for 20 hours.

Table 5. The quantity of Paris green ingested by the individuals of different instars and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus.

Instars	Variation in the eaten quantity (mgs.)		Average eaten quantity (mgs.)
	Minimum	Maximum	
3rd Instar hoppers	0.651	0.857	0.757
4th Instar hoppers	0.931	1.356	1.215
5th Instar hoppers	1.303	1.596	1.469
Adults	1.96	2.52	2.246

(B) Histopathology of the midgut and caeca.

The sequence of important histopathological changes in the midgut and caeca of the different stages of H. nigrorepletus, following the intake of paris green has been given in Tables 6 & 7 respectively. However, the detailed account of these changes are given below.

(i) 3rd Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

In the anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the epithelium is stretched inward and it is disintegrated at its inner margin. Thus the striated border is not present. In some portions the epithelium is detached from the basement membrane and cell contents are also dropped in the gut lumen (Plate VII, Fig. 3). The discharged nuclei as well as the nuclei present in the stretched epithelium show aggregation of their granules to form either a cluster of granules, lying either on one side of the nuclei or these granules arrange themselves near the periphery (Plate III, Fig. C). The digestive as well as regenerative nuclei cannot be distinguished from one another. The cytoplasm is greatly vacuolized. In the posterior midgut the disintegration of the epithelium is less marked. In the caeca, discharge of cytoplasmic granules and a few nuclei takes place. These nuclei indicate early stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. B). The cytoplasm is less granular than the normal cells.



After 8 hours.

The entire midgut epithelium is completely detached from the basement membrane and it is being dissolved (Plate VII, Fig. 4). The cell debris has mostly dark stained masses which are the fused nuclear granules. Some ruptured and empty nuclear membranes are also present (Plate III, Fig. F). Caecal epithelium is also completely detached and disintegrated.

After 12 hours.

In whole of the midgut, the epithelium as well as connective tissue has completely disintegrated and dissolved (Plate VIII, Fig. 1). Similarly, caeca is left with only muscularis layer (Plate VIII, Fig. 2).

(11) 4th Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

The striated border of the midgut epithelium becomes indistinct owing to the discharge of cytoplasmic granules. Similarly, in the caecal epithelium secretion of cytoplasmic granules also takes place.

After 8 hours.

The epithelial cells of the midgut are stretched inward. In addition to the secretion of cytoplasmic granules, cytoplasmic globules and vesicles with nuclei are also oozing out. Thus the striated border becomes obliterated at certain places. The discharged nuclei show early stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C). The digestive as well as regenerative nuclei are swollen

(15  $\mu$  x 12  $\mu$  and 12  $\mu$  x 9.3  $\mu$  respectively) and their fused granules generally arrange near the nuclear periphery.

The discharge from the caecal epithelium is similar to that of the midgut.

After 12 hours:

In the anterior and the middle regions of the midgut, the oozing of the cytoplasmic contents with nuclei becomes more intensive. The cytoplasm of the epithelial cells are vacuolized. Both digestive and regenerative nuclei of the epithelium are contracted (12  $\mu$  x 9.3  $\mu$  and 6.2  $\mu$  x 6.2  $\mu$  respectively) and their scanty granules have peripheral arrangement. In the posterior region of the midgut, only the cytoplasmic granules are secreted.

The discharge of the nuclei from the caecal epithelium is further increased. The digestive and the regenerative nuclei in the epithelium have peripheral arrangement of their fused granules (Plate III, Fig. C).

After 16 hours.

In the anterior region of the midgut, the epithelium is detached from the basement membrane and it is in state of disintegration (Plate VIII, Fig. 3). The epithelium of the middle region of the midgut is still attached with the basement membrane but its inner margin is broken and cytoplasm is vacuolized. The digestive and the regenerative nuclei present in the attached epithelium are mixed and have early stage of

degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C). The epithelium of the posterior midgut is comparatively less damaged. The caecal epithelium is mostly detached from the basement membrane and it is disintegrating.

After 20 hours.

The epithelium in the anterior and middle regions of the midgut is in state of disintegration and dissolution. The nuclei have mostly degenerated and their granules are only represented by spherical and dark stained masses (Plate III, Fig. F) which escape out of the nuclei. In the posterior region of the midgut, epithelium is comparatively less damaged (Plate VIII, Fig. 4). The caecal epithelium is completely disintegrated. The nuclei have advanced stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E).

After 24 hours.

The epithelium of the entire midgut is completely disintegrated and it is mostly in state of dissolution (Plate IX, Fig. 1). The cell debris is amorphous with some spherical and dark stained masses. Similarly, the caecal epithelium is also completely disintegrated (Plate IX, Fig. 2).

(iii) 5th Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

No histological change is evident in the epithelium of either midgut or the caeca.

After 8 hours.

The striated border is slightly indistinct due to secretion of cytoplasmic granules and a few globules without nuclei. Similar discharge takes place from the caecal epithelium.

After 12 hours.

In the midgut, the striated border is indistinct at places, due to its clumping. There is intensive discharge of cytoplasmic contents. But there is no further change in the caecal epithelium.

After 16 hours.

The inner margin of the epithelium is broken at places in the anterior region of the midgut. Whereas, in the rest of the regions there is a large scale discharge of cytoplasmic globules and vesicles with nuclei. The epithelium is generally disorganized and distorted. In most of the discharged nuclei, the fine granules are fused to form large granules which are scattered in nuclear lumen. Whereas, in some nuclei such granules are arranged on the periphery. However, a few discharged nuclei have a large and dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. E). Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $6.2\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  respectively). Their granules are fused. The caecal epithelium is similar to that after 12 hours of the ingestion of this poison.

After 20 hours.

Almost entire midgut epithelium is detached from the basement membrane and disintegrated. In some portions, connective

tissue is also disintegrated (Plate IX, Fig. 3). The degenerating nuclei mostly show advanced stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E). Many of these nuclei are empty and ruptured. Such changes are also seen in the middle and posterior regions of the midgut. In the caeca, there is intensive flow of cytoplasmic granules. However, in some portions, cytoplasmic globules with nuclei are also discharged. The digestive nuclei are contracted ( $15\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ) and have only a few large and scattered granules (Plate IX, Fig. 4).

(iv) Adults.

After 4 hours.

The midgut epithelial cells mostly discharge cytoplasmic granules. But in the anterior region, cellular contents also ooze out and striated border becomes obliterated (Plate X, Fig.1). The discharged nuclei have only a few large granules. The digestive nuclei are contracted ( $15\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ). Similarly, the regenerative nuclei are also squeezed ( $7.7\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ ). In the caeca, the inner margin of the epithelium is nipped at some places; whereas, the general surface of the epithelium extrudes cytoplasmic globules and vesicles. In the cytoplasm, granules become scanty. Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $18\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  and  $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively).

After 8 hours.

In anterior region of the midgut, the epithelium is mostly detached from the basement membrane and the cells are

in a state of disintegration. In the rest of the midgut, the epithelium is only disorganised and shows break-down. Thus a mass of cell debris with degenerating nuclei is present in the gut lumen. Some of the nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The digestive nuclei are contracted ( $15\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$ ) and their granules are scanty and large. The regenerative nuclei are also contracted ( $6.2\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ ) but they still have fine scattered granules. In the caeca, the epithelium is mostly disorganized and disintegrates. Necrosis of the epithelial cells is prominent.

After 12 hours.

In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, entire epithelium is detached from the basement membrane and it is in a state of disintegration (Plate X, Fig. 2). In most of the nuclei a large and dark stained mass is present. However, some nuclei lying in proximity to the connective tissue still show their granular nature. The epithelium of the posterior region of the midgut has still some patches of epithelial cells attached to the connective tissue. The caecal epithelium is almost disintegrated and broken (Plate X, Fig. 3).

After 16 hours.

The whole midgut epithelium is completely disintegrated. The nuclei show the most advanced conditions of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). Similarly the epithelium of the caeca is also completely disintegrated and dissolved. The nuclei are in advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F).

After 20 hours.

The midgut lumen has mostly dark specks of degenerated nuclear material surrounded by the cytoplasmic debris. Some empty nuclei with ruptured membrane are also present. Similar mass of cell debris is present in the caeca.

Table 6. Sequence of important histopathological effects in the midgut of 3rd, 4th, 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus, after the ingestion of Copper aceto-meta-arsenite (Paris green).

Intervals (hrs.) following the ingestion of Copper aceto-meta-arsenite (Paris green)						
Instars	4	8	12	16	20	24
3rd Instar hoppers	Partial degeneration of epithelium	Epithelium detached completely	Complete dissolution of the epithelium			
4th Instar hoppers	Expression of cytoplasmic granules	Discharge of cellular contents	Intensive discharge of cellular contents	Epithelial detachment & disintegration begins	Intensive disintegration	Entire epithelium disintegrated
5th Instar hoppers	No appreciable change	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules	Intensive cytoplasmic discharge	Enhanced discharge of cellular contents	Almost entire epithelium detached and disintegrated	---
Adults	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules and vesicles	Epithelial detachment begins	Detachment extends further	Whole epithelium completely disintegrated	Complete dissolution of epithelium	---



Table 7. Sequence of important histopathological effects in the caeca of 3rd, 4th, 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus, after the ingestion of Copper aceto-meta-arsenite (Paris green).

Intervals (hrs.) following the ingestion of Copper aceto-meta-arsenite (Paris green)						
Instars	4	8	12	16	20	24
3rd Instar hoppers	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules	Epithelium mostly detached	Epithelium degenerated & dissolved			
4th Instar hoppers	As above	Discharge of cellular contents	Further intensive discharge	Epithelial detachment begins	Intensive detachment	Disintegration & dissolution
5th Instar hoppers	No appreciable change	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules and globules	Intensive discharge of cytoplasmic contents	As before	No further change	---
Adults	Extrusion of cellular contents. Partial nipping of epithelium	Epithelial disorganization & disintegration	Further deterioration	Severe deterioration	Complete disintegration & dissolution	---

VI. PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AND CAECA OF ADULTS AND  
HOPPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARS OF HIEROGLYPHUS NIGROREPLETUS  
BY THE INGESTION OF SOME CHLORINATED HYDROCARBONS  
(5% DDT, 0.5% LINDANE, 2% ENDRIN AND 5% ALDRIN).

(A) Symptoms.

The various stages of H. nigrorepletus took different quantity of 5% DDT, 0.5% lindane, 2% endrin and 5% aldrin (Tables 8, 9, 10 & 11 respectively). As regards the effect of these poisons, the ingestion of 5% DDT generally showed the external symptoms after 10 minutes of the feeding period. These symptoms include ~~shrivelling~~ and tremors of the entire body with appendages. Later, the insects became unusually active and irritated. Further, they indicated uncoordinated movements and fell on their back repeatedly. But, ultimately they were unable to orientate their body properly. For some time, the legs continued to show twitches. During this hyperactivity brown fluid was vomited from the mouth and a few straw coloured pellets were also expelled through the anus. It was followed by the excretion of brown fluid and the faeces was never in the form of pellets.

In the beginning, anterior midgut became dark brown. Then, the remaining portions of the midgut also turned dark. Simultaneously,

contraction in the midgut was also visible. Likewise, the caeca indicated darkening of its wall and contraction. The 3rd instar hoppers could not survive beyond twelve hours following the intake of this poison; whereas, other stages were able to live up to twenty four hours.

Twenty minutes following the intake of sandwich of 0.5% lindane the hoppers as well as the adults showed hyper-activity and uncoordinated dancing movements for some time. Later; their abdomen contracted lengthwise and thus the abdominal segments were telescoped. Often, they rubbed their abdomen by hind legs. Then tremors took place in the legs and the abdomen became distended. The mouth parts stretched out. Finally, the insects were completely paralysed and laid themselves laterally. As in case of 5% DDT ingested insects, these insects also vomited brown fluid from the mouth and had loose motions. Contraction and darkening of the midgut as well as caeca also took place. The survival time for 3rd instar hoppers was only twenty hours, whereas, other stages remained alive for about twentyfour hours.

Following the ingestion of 2% endrin, the hoppers and the adults of H. nigrorepletus did not behave as violently as DDT and lindane fed insects. However, endrin fed insects first started jumping. Then relaxed on their fore-and middle legs, whereas, the hind legs were used to rub the abdomen repeatedly. Sometimes, the fore-legs were used against the head. It was followed by discharge of faecal pellets and later, loose motions

Table 8. The quantity of 5% DDT ingested by the individuals of different instars and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus.

Instars	Variation in the eaten quantity (mgs.)		Average eaten quantity (mgs.)
	Minimum	Maximum	
3rd Instar hoppers	0.352	0.588	0.468
4th Instar hoppers	0.638	0.784	0.678
5th Instar hoppers	0.684	0.927	0.796
Adults	1.303	1.675	1.450

Table 9. The quantity of 0.5% lindane ingested by the individuals of different instars and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus.

Instars	Variation in the eaten quantity (mgs.)		Average eaten quantity (mgs.)
	Minimum	Maximum	
3rd Instar hoppers	0.598	0.758	0.676
4th Instar hoppers	0.771	0.970	0.801
5th Instar hoppers	1.436	1.788	1.591
Adults	1.675	1.941	1.796

Table 10. The quantity of 2% endrin ingested by the individuals of different instars and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrореpletus.

Instars	Variation in the eaten quantity (mgs.)		Average eaten quantity (mgs.)
	Minimum	Maximum	
3rd Instar hoppers	0.684	0.891	0.823
4th Instar hoppers	1.436	1.808	1.646
5th Instar hoppers	1.330	1.862	1.66
Adults	1.78	2.20	1.99

Table 11. The quantity of 5% aldrin ingested by the individuals of different instars and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus.

Instars	Variation in the eaten quantity (mgs.)		Average eaten quantity (mgs.)
	Minimum	Maximum	
3rd Instar hoppers	0.651	0.798	0.741
4th Instar hoppers	1.064	1.383	1.245
5th Instar hoppers	1.356	1.649	1.491
Adults	1.28	2.00	1.76

of brown colour. Finally, the insects fell laterally, remained motionless and regurgitated fluid from the mouth. With respect to this insecticide as well, the midgut and the caeca became contracted and turned black in colour. The survival time for all the stages remained approximately twentyfour hours following the intake of this poison.

The effect of the intake of 5% aldrin was slower than that of other insecticides. Because the external symptoms appeared only after two hours. In the beginning, the insects started moving their legs and then jumping repeatedly. Following this they fell laterally and orientation of the body became difficult. These insects also vomited brown fluid from the mouth and discharge from the anus was also loose. Both the midgut and the caeca gradually became dark but their contraction was little in comparison to those insects which ate DDT, lindane and endrin.

The survival time for all stages was only twenty hours following the intake of this poison.

(B) Histopathology of the midgut and caeca.

(a) Effect of 5% DDT.

The sequence of important histopathological changes in the midgut and caeca, following the ingestion of 5% DDT, has been summarized in Tables 12 & 13 respectively. Following is the details of the pathological effects on the histology of the midgut and caeca.



(i) 3rd Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

The midgut epithelium becomes stretched inward and besides the secretion of cytoplasmic granules large number of cytoplasmic globules are also discharged. Thus the striated border becomes partially obliterated. The cytoplasm is rather less granular and develops vacuoles, (Plate X, Fig. 4). In the caeca, epithelium only secretes cytoplasmic granules. The cytoplasm develops vacuoles. The digestive nuclei are swollen ( $18 \mu \times 9.3 \mu$ ) whereas, the regenerative nuclei are contracted ( $6.2 \mu \times 6.2 \mu$ ).

After 8 hours.

The anterior midgut epithelium is detached from the basement membrane and it is disintegrated. Only the connective tissue remains in contact with the muscularis layer (Plate XI, Fig. 1). The nuclei of disintegrating cells have only a large and dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. E). Whereas, in other nuclei, the fused granules form several particles which are either scattered or remain arranged peripherally (Plate III, Fig. C).

In the middle region of the midgut, the epithelium is only broken at its inner margin. The discharged nuclei show same stages of degeneration as seen in the anterior region of the midgut (Plate XI, Fig. 2). However, the digestive and regenerative nuclei present in the epithelium are mixed up and show fusion of their granules. In the posterior midgut, changes

are less marked (Plate XI, Fig. 3). The caecal epithelium shows complete disintegration and dissolution of the epithelium (Plate XI, Fig. 4). In most of the nuclei early stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. B & C) are seen. Some of these nuclei have only a large and dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. E).

After 12 hours.

The epithelium and the connective tissue of the anterior midgut is completely disintegrated and only the muscularis layer is left. The cell debris shows dissolution of the nuclei. However, in the middle and posterior regions of the midgut, connective tissue is still intact with the muscularis layer (Plate XII, Fig. 1). In the degenerating epithelium of the caeca, only dark stained and spherical masses show the remains of the nuclei (Plate XII, Fig. 2).

(ii) 4th Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

Throughout the length of the midgut epithelium, only cytoplasmic granules are coming out through the striated border which is quite distinct. Similar process occurs in the caecal epithelium.

After 8 hours.

Discharge of both cytoplasmic granules and globules with nuclei takes place. The discharged nuclei have only a few large granules which are scattered. The cytoplasm is vacuolized. The nuclei of the digestive cells are generally contracted ( $12 \mu \times 9.3 \mu$ )

and their granules aggregate and fuse to form a few granules which are scattered. The regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ) and also have scattered and large granules. The caecal epithelium has intensive discharge of cytoplasmic granules. Some epithelial nuclei are also expressed out. Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $18\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively).

After 12 hours.

In the anterior region of the midgut, the epithelium is infolded. As a result of that both the digestive as well as regenerative nuclei are mixed up. Otherwise, the histological details are the same as observed after 8 hours. The caecal epithelium is also like before.

After 16 hours.

Mass of cytoplasmic globules with nuclei are pushed out of the epithelial cells. The discharged nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. D & E). However, in some nuclei, the fine granules form more than one large granules which are scattered. The cytoplasm shows vacuolization. The digestive and regenerative nuclei are contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $6.2\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  respectively) and their fused granules are generally peripherally arranged or in some nuclei they are scattered. No further changes in the caecal epithelium could be observed.

After 20 hours.

The epithelium of anterior midgut is greatly stretched inward and the cell contents are flowing into the gut lumen.

The discharge of cellular contents is enhanced and discharged nuclei show last stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The cytoplasm is highly vacuolized. Both the digestive and the regenerative nuclei are contracted and their granules are fused to form a few granules which are arranged at the nuclear periphery. Most of the caecal epithelium disintegrates. The nuclei are like those of previous stage (Plate XII, Fig. 3).

After 24 hours.

The whole midgut epithelium is generally disintegrated and in some portions the connective tissue is also disintegrated (Plate XII, Fig. 4). The nuclei are in final stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The caecal epithelium also shows complete disintegration and detachment from the basement membrane. The disintegrating cells are similar to those mentioned above in the midgut after 20 hours.

(iii) 5th Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

In the midgut, oozing of cytoplasmic granules generally occurs from the epithelium. In the digestive cells, cytoplasm becomes less granular than the normal cells and vacuoles appear. In the caeca also, the epithelium secretes cytoplasmic granules.

After 8 hours.

In the anterior region of the midgut, secretion of cytoplasmic granules, globules and vesicles with nuclei takes place. The epithelium is stretched inward. The cytoplasm is

almost clear. The middle and posterior regions of the midgut are comparatively less affected. The caecal epithelium remains as before.

After 12 hours.

The entire midgut epithelium is folded and overlapped due to the contraction of the gut wall. The striated border becomes indistinct and intensive discharge of cytoplasmic contents takes place through large vesicles. There is no further change in the histological appearance of the caeca.

After 16 hours.

The midgut epithelium is more affected than before and there is more profuse discharge of cytoplasmic contents with nuclei. The discharged nuclei are in advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. D & E). The cytoplasm of the digestive cells have vacuoles. Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 4.6\ \mu$  respectively). The caecal epithelium does not deteriorate further.

After 20 hours.

In some portions of the anterior midgut the epithelium breaks at its inner margin (Plate XIII, Fig. 1). Most of the nuclei in the gut lumen have degenerated and only their ruptured membranes are present. Whereas, the nuclei in the epithelial cells have either a few large granules arranged on the nuclear periphery or only one large mass. In the caeca, some cytoplasmic vesicles are also discharged with nuclei. The discharged nuclei show most advanced stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E).

After 24 hours.

In almost entire midgut, epithelial cells are vacuolized and the inner margin of these cells is nipped off. In the cell debris majority of the nuclei are represented only by ruptured membranes (Plate III, Fig. F). In the caeca, discharge of cytoplasmic contents with nuclei takes place and the discharged nuclei are in the early stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. D & E).

(iv) Adults.

After 4 hours.

Almost entire epithelium of the midgut is stretched inward and striated border is indistinct due to secretion of cytoplasmic granules. In the anterior region of the midgut small droplets of cytoplasm also ooze out through the striated border. The digestive nuclei are contracted ( $18\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ ) and their fine granules fuse to form large granules which are often arranged at the nuclear periphery. The regenerative nuclei are also contracted ( $9.3\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ ). The caecal epithelium also discharges cytoplasmic granules and its striated border is indistinct. The digestive and regenerative nuclei are contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $6.2\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  respectively).

After 8 hours.

Abundant discharge of cellular contents takes place from the entire midgut. Small vacuoles appear near the inner margin of the epithelial cells. The digestive nuclei are disorganized and move towards the free margin of the cells. Similarly, there

is an increase in the cellular discharge from the caecal epithelium. The digestive nuclei are contracted ( $18\ \mu \times 15\ \mu$ ) and their fine granules fuse to form large granules. Regenerative nuclei are also contracted ( $9.3\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ ).

After 12 hours.

In anterior region of the midgut, the striated border is completely obliterated. However, in the middle and posterior regions of the midgut, patches of striated border are still present. The inner margin of the epithelium is ruptured. Therefore, the cellular contents are poured in the gut lumen. The broken cells have scanty cytoplasm which is clear. Mostly the discharged nuclei show early stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. B & C). However, the digestive nuclei are contracted ( $15\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$ ) and their fused granules are arranged on the nuclear periphery. Regenerative nuclei are also contracted ( $9.3\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ ) and their granules are also fused. In the caeca, no further change is observed.

After 16 hours.

In anterior region of the midgut, portions of epithelium are detached from the basement membrane and elsewhere its inner margin is nipped off (Plate XIII, Fig. 2). The cytoplasm of the broken cells is vacuolized. The nuclei in the cell debris have advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. D & E). However, some of these nuclei are empty with broken membranes. The digestive nuclei of the cells are contracted ( $15\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$ ) with fused granules on their periphery. Similar condition is seen

in the regenerative nuclei ( $9.3 \mu \times 6.2 \mu$ ). However, in the middle and posterior regions of the midgut the changes are less marked. The caeca are like before.

After 20 hours.

The epithelium of anterior and middle regions of the midgut is detached from the basement membrane and breaks up; whereas, that of posterior midgut is detached only at some places. The cell debris has nuclei in advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. D & E). The caeca shows intensive discharge of cellular contents with nuclei and partial breaking of inner margin of epithelium. The cytoplasm of the cells is vacuolized.

After 24 hours.

The anterior and middle regions of the midgut epithelium are completely dissolved and only the connective tissue and muscularis layer is left (Plate XIII, Fig. 3), whereas, in posterior region of the midgut, portions of the epithelium are still attached with the connective tissue. Almost all nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). In the caeca, the nipping of inner margin of the epithelium extends to large areas and there is profuse flow of cytoplasmic contents (Plate XIII, Fig. 4). The discharged nuclei are in advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F), whereas, the digestive nuclei have only a few granules in them.



Table 12. Sequence of important histopathological effects in the midgut of 3rd, 4th, 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus, after the ingestion of 5% D.D.T.

Intervals (hrs.) following the ingestion of 5% D.D.T.						
Instars	4	8	12	16	20	24
3rd Instar hoppers	Secretion of cytoplasmic granules and globules	Epithelial detachment & disintegration begins in anterior region	Epithelium & connective tissue degenerate in anterior midgut			
4th Instar hoppers	Expression of cytoplasmic granules	Discharge of cellular contents with nuclei	Vacuolisation in cytoplasm	Massive cellular discharge	As before	Epithelium mostly detached & disintegrated
5th Instar hoppers	Expression of cytoplasmic granules	Expression of cytoplasmic globules and vesicles	Intensive discharge	Profused discharge of cytoplasmic contents	Breaking of inner margin of epithelium	Nipping of epithelium & vacuolisation in cells
Adults	Expression of cytoplasmic granules	Discharge of cellular contents with nuclei	Rupturing of the inner margin of anterior epithelium	Anterior epithelium detached. Elsewhere nipping occurs	Epithelium detached in anterior and middle regions	Epithelium disintegrated in anterior and middle regions

Table 13. Sequence of important histopathological effects in the caeca of 3rd, 4th, 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus, after the ingestion of 5% D.D.T.

Intervals (hrs.) following the ingestion of 5% D.D.T.						
Instars	4	8	12	16	20	24
3rd Instar hoppers	Secretion of cytoplasmic granules and vacuoles in the cytoplasm	Epithelium detached and disintegrated	Dissolution of epithelium			
4th Instar hoppers	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules	Intensive discharge of cytoplasmic granules	As before	As before	Occasional breaking of epithelium	Complete detachment & disintegration
5th Instar hoppers	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules	As before	As before	As before	Extrusion of cytoplasmic vesicles	Excessive cytoplasmic discharge with nuclei
Adults	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules	Increase in cellular discharge	As before	As before	Intensive discharge of cellular contents	Mostly nipping of inner margin

(b) Effect of 0.5% Lindane.

The histopathological effects caused by the ingestion of 0.5% lindane in the midgut and the caeca of different stages of H. nigrorepletus have been summarized in Tables 14 & 15 respectively. However, the details have been described below.

(i) 3rd Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

The epithelial cells of anterior midgut are stretched inward and their inner margin is laden with cytoplasmic granules. The striated border becomes indistinct. Both, the digestive and regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $18\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively) and have scattered granules. In middle and posterior regions of the midgut, the striated border shows clumping at places and cytoplasm of epithelial cells have vacuoles. In the caeca also, the cytoplasmic granules are discharged.

After 8 hours.

In the entire midgut, discharge of cytoplasmic granules further increases and cytoplasmic globules are also expressed out. The digestive nuclei are contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ); whereas, regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ). Caecal epithelium does not show further change.

After 12 hours.

The striated border disintegrates. Portions of epithelium are nipped off and cell contents are dropped into

the gut lumen. The nuclei of the gut lumen show fusion of their fine granules to form large ones (Plate III, Fig. B). Both, digestive and regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $15 \mu \times 9.3 \mu$  and  $9.3 \mu \times 9.3 \mu$  respectively). These nuclei also indicate early stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C). No further change could be observed in the caecal epithelium.

After 16 hours.

The entire epithelium of anterior and middle regions of the midgut is stretched inward and its inner margin is broken (Plate XIV, Fig. 1). Consequently, the cell contents are poured in the gut lumen. At places, the epithelium is degenerating. The nuclei of the cell debris indicate advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The cytoplasm of the cells is vacuolized. The digestive and regenerative nuclei of the epithelium show early stages of degeneration. In posterior region of the midgut, nipping of the epithelium occasionally takes place. However, caecal epithelium is generally as before (Plate XIV, Fig. 2).

After 20 hours.

The entire midgut epithelium is broken and only its outer half with regenerative cells is attached with the basement membrane (Plate XIV, Fig. 3). The gut lumen is full of cell debris, which have nuclei showing most advanced stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E). The connective tissue is stretched. These changes are comparatively less marked in the posterior region. In the caeca, no further change takes place

except the appearance of vacuoles in the digestive cells. (Plate XIV, Fig. 4). Both, digestive and regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $18\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively) and have fused granules which aggregate towards the periphery of the nuclei.

(ii) 4th Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

The midgut epithelium generally secretes cytoplasmic granules and occasionally cytoplasmic globules. Similarly, the caeca discharges cytoplasmic granules.

After 8 hours.

In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, epithelial cells are stretched inward and their inner margins are nipped off. In the gut lumen, nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The cytoplasm of the digestive cells is vacuolized. Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are contracted ( $15\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $6.2\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  respectively). In posterior region, the changes are less marked. The caecal epithelium is also nipped off in portions and discharged nuclei show early stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. B & C).

After 12 hours.

In the midgut epithelium the histological picture is same as observed before. However, caecal epithelium is further nipped off.

After 16 hours.

The epithelium of entire midgut is stretched inward and its inner margin is completely broken. The nuclei of cell debris are in advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. D & E). The cytoplasm of the digestive cells have vacuoles. The digestive nuclei are contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ) and their granules have peripheral arrangement (Plate XV, Fig. 1). Whereas, some of these nuclei, are in early stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C & D). The regenerative nuclei are also contracted ( $6.2\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ ). There is no further change in the caecal epithelium.

After 20 hours.

The inner half of the entire midgut epithelium is broken. The nuclei of the cell debris are in the final stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. F). Both, digestive and regenerative nuclei are contracted.. The caecal epithelium shows the same nature of damage as mentioned above.

After 24 hours.

The midgut epithelium is completely detached from the basement membrane and it is being disintegrated. However, connective tissue is still present. The nuclei in the degenerating mass are in most advanced stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. F). Similarly, the caecal epithelium also shows detachment and degeneration of the epithelium (Plate XV, Fig. 2). The nuclei lying near the basement membrane are in early stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. D & E).

(iii) 5th Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

The epithelium of both midgut and caeca remains normal.

After 8 hours.

The entire midgut epithelium is stretched inward. Only discharge of cytoplasmic granules take place. Similar effect is observed in the caeca.

After 12 hours.

Throughout the midgut, the epithelium becomes more stretched than observed before. Secretion of cytoplasmic granules is increased. Further, cytoplasmic globules are also expressed out. The cytoplasm of the digestive cells develops vacuoles. Both, digestive as well as regenerative nuclei are mixed and flow in-to the gut lumen. The digestive nuclei are contracted ( $15\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ ). However, in the caeca, discharge of cytoplasmic granules enhances.

After 16 hours.

The epithelium, in anterior region of the midgut, is nipped off at its inner margin, resulting in the flow of the cell contents in-to the gut lumen (Plate XV, Fig. 3). The discharged nuclei show advanced stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E). In the rest of the portions, epithelium discharges cytoplasmic matter in the form of large globules and the cytoplasm of the cells shows vacuolization. The digestive as well as the regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $15\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively).

The caecal epithelium mostly shows nipping of its inner margin and flow of cell contents in-to the gut lumen (Plate XV, Fig. 4). The discharged nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The cytoplasm of the cells is vacuolized and both the digestive and the regenerative nuclei are swollen.

After 20 hours.

The entire midgut epithelium is nipped off and the cell contents flow into the gut lumen. The discharged nuclei are in advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). Some of these nuclei have completely degenerated and only their dark stained masses are lying in the gut lumen. The cytoplasm of the cells shows intensive vacuolization. The epithelial nuclei are in early stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C). The caecal epithelium shows nipping and massive discharge of cell contents. The discharged nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F) and cytoplasm have vacuoles. The digestive and regenerative nuclei of broken epithelium are swollen ( $15\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively) and these are in early stages of degeneration.

After 24 hours.

In anterior region of the midgut, a portion of the epithelium is detached from the basement membrane (Plate XVI, Fig. 1). Whereas, the rest of the epithelium is largely nipped off and the cell contents are poured in-to the gut lumen. The nuclei present in the cell debris are degenerated. (Plate III, Fig. F). The cytoplasm of the broken epithelial



cells have large vacuoles. Most of the nuclei present in these cells have a large and dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. E). The middle and posterior regions of the midgut are comparatively less affected. The caecal epithelium is completely disintegrated and the cell contents fill the gut lumen (Plate XVI, Fig. 2). The nuclei lying in the cell debris are completely degenerated.

(iv) Adults.

After 8 hours.

The first visible change in the histological structure of the midgut and the caeca is observed only after eight hours following the intake of lindane. The striated border becomes indistinct and partially disorganised due to expression of cytoplasmic granules and a few cytoplasmic globules. The entire epithelium is so stretched inward that inter-cellular membranes become indistinct. The cytoplasm is vacuolized and less densely granular than that of the normal cells. The digestive nuclei are mostly contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ) and their granules are aggregated on the periphery (Plate III, Fig. C). The regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ). The middle and posterior regions of the midgut are comparatively less affected. In the caeca, there is a profused discharge of the cytoplasmic granules throughout the striated border. Other histological details are normal.

After 12 hours.

In nearly one lateral half of the anterior region of the midgut the inner margin of the epithelium is nipped off. Some of the epithelial cells are disintegrated (Plate XVI, Fig. 3). The second lateral half of anterior midgut is infolded and epithelium is stretched inward. In this region there is intensive oozing of cytoplasmic globules with nuclei. Both, digestive and regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively). The cytoplasm of the digestive cells have vacuoles and possess thin concentration of granules. The middle and posterior regions of the midgut are comparatively less affected and mostly indicate the discharge of large cytoplasmic vesicles often with nuclei. The epithelial cells of the caeca show discharge of cytoplasmic globules and vesicles with nuclei. The nuclei of the digestive cells are in state of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. B & C).

After 16 hours.

The entire midgut epithelium is almost uniformly affected. The inner margin of the epithelium is broken. Majority of the nuclei in the cell debris have advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The nuclei of both digestive and regenerative cells are contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $6.2\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  respectively) and are in early stages of degeneration. The caeca is more affected than before and has intensive discharge of cytoplasmic vesicles and globules. The discharged nuclei are in early stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C & D). Both, digestive and regenerative

nuclei are swollen ( $15\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively).

After 20 hours.

The inner half of the midgut epithelium is completely broken and it is shed into the midgut lumen. The discharged nuclei are mostly degenerated and have broken nuclear membrane (Plate XVI, Fig. 4). The remaining portions of the digestive cells have vacuoles and their scanty cytoplasm is almost clear. The digestive nuclei of the broken cells are degenerating (Plate III, Fig. D). In the caeca, the epithelium is partially broken at its inner margin (Plate XVII, Fig. 1). The cell debris of the caecal lumen contain degenerating nuclei. The nuclei of both digestive and regenerative cells are swollen ( $16\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  and  $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively).

After 24 hours.

The midgut epithelium is largely sloughed off and it is in state of degeneration. Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are left with only broken nuclear membranes and their granular contents, in the form <sup>of</sup> a single large and dark stained mass, lie scattered in the midgut lumen (Plate III, Fig. F). The caecal epithelium is uniformly broken at its inner margin. The nuclei are mostly in advanced degenerating condition.

Table 14. Sequence of important histopathological effects in the midgut of 3rd, 4th, 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus, after the ingestion of 0.5% Lindane.

Intervals (hrs.) following the ingestion of 0.5% Lindane						
Instars	4	8	12	16	20	24
3rd Instar hoppers	Anterior midgut secretes granules	Entire mid-gut secretes cytoplasmic granules and globules at places	Inner margin of anterior and middle epithelium breaks	Inner margin of entire midgut epithelium breaks	Bulk of epithelium detached and broken	
4th Instar hoppers	Only a few cytoplasmic globules secreted	Breaking of inner margin of anterior and middle epithelium	As before	Further breaking of inner margin of epithelium	Entire epithelium nipped off	Entire epithelium detached and disintegrated
5th Instar hoppers	No change	Slight discharge of cytoplasmic granules	Enhanced granular discharge	Anterior epithelium nipped off	Entire epithelium nipped off	Partial detachment of anterior epithelium
Adults	No change	As above	Portions of anterior epithelium nipped off	Anterior mid-gut epithelium completely nipped	Inner half of the mid-gut epithelium completely broken	Epithelium largely sloughed off

Table 15. Sequence of important histopathological effects in the caeca of 3rd, 4th, 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus, after the ingestion of 0.5% Lindane.

Intervals (hrs.) following the ingestion of 0.5% Lindane						
Instars	4	8	12	16	20	24
3rd Instar hoppers	Slight discharge of granules	As before	As before	No further change	Intensive discharge of granules	
4th Instar hoppers	As above	At places epithelium is nipped off	Further nipping	As before	As before	Detachment of epithelium at most places
5th Instar hoppers	No change	Discharge of cytoplasmic granules	More discharge	Nipping of epithelium at most places	Nipping enhances	Complete disintegration of epithelium
Adults	No change	As above	Discharge of cytoplasmic globules and vesicles	Intensive discharge	Partially broken epithelium	Epithelium broken at its inner margin

(c) Effect of 2% Endrin.

The histological destruction caused to the midgut and the caeca of the various stages of H. nigrorepletus, following the intake of 2% endrin has been summarized in Tables 16 & 17 respectively. However, the damage caused by this poison is given below in details.

(i) 3rd Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

Cytoplasmic granules are secreted from the entire midgut epithelium and striated border becomes indistinct. The caecal epithelium also secretes cytoplasmic granules from its inner margin. But its striated border is mostly distinct.

After 8 hours.

Secretion of cytoplasmic granules further increases. The digestive and the regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $18 \mu \times 9.3 \mu$  and  $9.3 \mu \times 9.3 \mu$  respectively) and their granules aggregate on the periphery. Enhancement of the discharge of cytoplasmic granules also takes place in the caeca.

After 12 hours.

Cytoplasmic granules as well as cytoplasmic globules with nuclei are expressed from entire midgut epithelium. The discharged nuclei show early stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. B). The cytoplasm of epithelial cells becomes less granular. The digestive as well as regenerative nuclei are in early stages of degeneration. Posterior region of the midgut is comparatively less affected. Caecal epithelium does not show any further change.

After 16 hours.

In anterior portion, the midgut epithelium is infolded due to which the digestive and the regenerative nuclei are disorganized. The discharge of cytoplasmic granules is enhanced and massive expression of cytoplasmic vesicles also takes place. The digestive and the regenerative nuclei are almost like those at 12 hours. In the caeca also, massive secretion of cytoplasmic granules and vesicles with nuclei takes place. The discharged nuclei are in early stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. B). The nuclei remaining in the digestive and the regenerative cells are as before.

After 20 hours.

There is a massive discharge of cytoplasmic granules and globules from the entire midgut epithelium. The cytoplasm of the digestive cells has vacuoles. Whereas, the nuclei of both digestive and regenerative cells are contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  and  $6.2\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  respectively) and these are in early stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C). The caecal epithelium remains similar to that of 16 hours.

After 24 hours.

There is no further deterioration in the histological organization of the midgut epithelium (Plate XVII, Fig. 2). Whereas, the caecal epithelium is nipped off at its inner margin and thus cytoplasmic contents are poured into the caecal lumen (Plate XVII, Fig. 3). The discharged nuclei are in early stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C & D). Whereas, the digestive and the regenerative nuclei show the same changes as mentioned earlier.

(ii) 4th Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

The midgut epithelium is stretched inward and its striation is indistinct. The cytoplasm of these cells becomes less granular than normal cells. Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are pushed towards the gut lumen. The epithelial cells of the caeca also secrete granules and their cytoplasm develops vacuoles.

After 8 hours.

There is no further change in the midgut except the massive secretion of the granules. In the caeca striated border becomes indistinct.

After 12 hours.

In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, besides cytoplasmic granules, cytoplasmic vesicles are also expressed out. The striated border is disorganized and indistinct (Plate XVII, Fig. 4). The cytoplasm of the digestive cell becomes less granular than before. The posterior region of the midgut is comparatively less affected. The caecal epithelium indicates massive discharge of cytoplasmic granules and often the digestive nuclei are also expressed out. These nuclei have a few large granules which are scattered. The digestive as well as the regenerative nuclei of the epithelium are swollen ( $15\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively).

After 16 hours.

The anterior and middle regions of the midgut squeeze out cytoplasmic globules and vesicles with nuclei. A few of



these nuclei indicate advanced stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E). However, the digestive nuclei of the epithelium are contracted ( $12\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$ ) but the regenerative nuclei are swollen  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ). The caecal epithelium also discharges cytoplasmic vesicles containing nuclei which have different stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C, D & E) but mostly indicating the early stage of degeneration.

After 20 hours.

In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the epithelial cells are nipped off at their inner margin and cell contents are poured into the midgut lumen (Plate XVIII, Fig. 1). The discharged nuclei show different stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. B, C, D. & E). The posterior region of the midgut only secretes cytoplasmic vesicles. The caecal epithelium is nipped only at places and the cell contents are poured into the caecal lumen. The discharged nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E & F). The digestive nuclei are swollen ( $18\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$ ). Their granules are fused and lie on the periphery of the nuclei (Plate XVIII, Fig. 2).

After 24 hours.

In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the epithelium is completely detached from the basement membrane and it is in state of disintegration. However, at places, the epithelium is still attached with the basement membrane. The nuclei present in the degenerating mass of the epithelium have only a large dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. E). The

caecal epithelium is more damaged than before. But the epithelium is never detached from the basement membrane.

(iii) 5th Instar hoppers.

After 4 hours.

In the midgut, only small amount of cytoplasmic granules are secreted through the striated border. Similar effects are seen in the caeca.

After 8 hours.

In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the cytoplasmic granules and globules ooze through the striated border which becomes indistinct. The epithelial cells are stretched inward and their cytoplasm develops vacuoles. The digestive and the regenerative nuclei are swollen ( $18\ \mu \times 6.2\ \mu$  and  $12\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$  respectively) and both have scattered granules in them. Whereas, from the posterior midgut only cytoplasmic granules are discharged. In the caeca there is no further change.

After 12 hours.

The midgut epithelium secretes mass of cytoplasmic granules as well as globules and large vesicles. The epithelial cells are stretched inward and these are vacuolized. The digestive as well as the regenerative nuclei are contracted. The epithelial cells of caeca are also stretched inward, discharge mass of cytoplasmic granules and their cytoplasm has vacuoles. In both digestive as well as regenerative nuclei

the fine granules are fused and these are arranged on the periphery of the nuclei (Plate III, Fig. C).

After 16 hours.

In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the inner margin of the epithelial cells is nipped. Therefore, the cytoplasmic contents are dropped into the gut lumen. The digestive cells have generally developed vacuoles (Plate XVIII, Fig. 3). The nuclei in the gut lumen, have only a large dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. E). The digestive as well as the regenerative nuclei are in early stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. C). In the caeca, the inner margin of the epithelial cells is broken up and cell contents are poured into the caecal lumen. The cytoplasm of these cells develops vacuoles. Most of the discharged nuclei have the fusion of their fine granules into large ones which are scattered. However, some of these nuclei have a large dark stained mass (Plate III, Fig. E). The nuclei still present in the epithelium, have peripheral arrangement of their fused granules (Plate III, Fig. C).

After 20 hours.

Generally, the midgut epithelium is stretched inward and most of it is broken at its inner margin. The cytoplasm of the epithelial cells is vacuolized. The nuclei present in the gut lumen show advanced stage of degeneration (Plate III, Fig. E). Whereas, both digestive and regenerative nuclei of the epithelium are swollen ( $15\ \mu \times 12\ \mu$  and  $9.3\ \mu \times 9.3\ \mu$

upon North Vietnamese bases. In the Far East the situation was complicated by the increased intransigence of Communist China, which seemed determined to prevent any sort of detente with the West. Vietnam remains divided and the fighting is going on.

In June 1967 the Middle-Eastern crisis gave an open opportunity for East-West struggle. The United States supported Israel and the Soviet Union gave aid to the U.A.R. At present Vietnam, Formosa, Middle-East, Germany are the major Cold War issues. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in September 1968 had troubled the nations of the world. Nixon administration is trying its best to resolve these points of struggle since its inauguration in January, 1969.

From the above analysis it is obvious that Cold War has been a wide phenomenon in world politics. As the Cold War broke out, a new power relation pattern came into bold relief. Its chief features were: (1) The decline of Europe, (2) The rise of the United States as a leading Western power and as the leader of the Western group of nations, (3) The emergence of the Soviet Union as a military power equal to the United States and as an economic power only second to America, (4) The spread of communism, by whatever means, to a third of the whole world, thereby ending the pre-war position of the Soviet Union as the only Socialist country surrounded by capitalist 'enemies', and (5) The emergence of Asian and African countries to nationhood and

their declared objective of keeping away from the struggle for power between the two blocs.<sup>1</sup> The sixth point we may add in the present phase, the bipolarity being challenged by the rise of a militant Communist China.

The Cold War has been fought on the ideological, political, strategic and economic fronts and all the factors have been responsible for these struggles. The ideologies of the different blocs clashed for the domination of the world. The U.S. capitalism and the Soviet Communism are two entirely different ideologies. Russia and China want the extension of socialism so that the American capitalism should be ended by proletarian revolution while the U.S. wants to contain the Soviet Union in Europe and in Asia otherwise Russia would dominate both the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Sino-Soviet rift and the communist ideology of Yugoslavia are themselves responsible for this ideological struggle.

Nationalism and internationalism, and neutralism have been other ideologies which clashed with either of the two major ideologies. These forces ran parallel to and formed part of the power conflict.

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1. Chanakya Sen, Against the Cold War, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962, p.9.

(B). THE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE COLD WAR

Obviously, Cold War is the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for the friendship, good will, diplomatic support, allegiance, and alliance of other countries or we may put it as the struggle for the domination of the world. Therefore, the United States has been an inevitable major participant in the Cold War world strategy. Soon after the hostilities of the Second World War ended, the wartime Anglo-American partnership with the Soviets dissolved into the tensions now known as the Cold War. The weight of Russia increased in Europe. With Germany and Japan defeated, damaged, and disarmed, and with England and France gravely weakened, the Soviet Union emerged from the war as the strongest nation in Eurasia, where no country or group of countries could match Muscovite military might.<sup>1</sup> Only the United States could face it and keep the balance of power right in Europe. Hence there was American involvement in Europe.

Before the First World War, the Americans wedded to isolationism and hoping to remain aloof from world politics, expected to escape entanglement in the net of international affairs: the balance of power. Yet the U.S. fought in two world

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1. Louis Fischer, Russia, America and the World (Bombay, 1962), p. 1.

wars to avoid being the low man on the balance of power see saw. And today America is one of the two chief performers in the balance of power act called the Cold War.<sup>1</sup> And in the larger confrontation between the Communist bloc and the West, it has played a major part ever since the end of World War II.

For the United States the Big Power rivalry is qualitatively different from the power struggles of the past because it is not only the rivalry of the powerful nations but also that of two powerful systems. On October 23, 1962, the U.S. representative in the Security Council, Adlai E. Stevenson said: "Cold War ..... is not a private struggle; it is a world civil war, a contest between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world, a contest between the world of Charter and the world of communist conformity. Every nation that is now independent is involved in this grim, costly, distasteful division in the world, no matter how remote and how uninterested."<sup>2</sup> The Soviet bloc stands for a Communist world and is convinced that capitalism has arrived at the last phase of its survival. The U.S. on the other hand stands for the capitalist system with or without democratic institutions,<sup>3</sup> and is the leader of the Western bloc.

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1. Louis Fischer, Russia, America and the World (Bombay, 1962), p.4.

2. D.S.B., XVII (1220), November 12, 1962, p.729.

3. At home it is wedded to its own variety of democracy; in Europe, it is allied with democratic Britain, socialist Scandinavia and fascist Spain and Portugal; in Latin America, Africa and Asia it supports systems of government far removed from democracy.

But it is very difficult to say as to what is the ideology of the Western bloc. The leading countries in the Western bloc have often stated their belief in free institutions, democracy, etc. President Truman himself said in his 'Truman Doctrine' speech of March 12, 1947, that "our way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression."<sup>1</sup> Ideological conformity can not be the basis of the Western bloc as it includes the different types of States. Moreover it is a defensive grouping against Soviet threat rather than an ideological grouping.

Americans look upon communism as a moral abomination and treat it with clear cut and impatient indignation. They doubt the superior effectiveness of a totalitarian economy and regard it as discredited by its terrible human and social costs. President Eisenhower for instance, observed:<sup>2</sup> "The communist dictatorship, ruthless strong insatiable, is determined to establish its sway over all the world. The communist dictatorship is adroit in its selection and use of every imaginable weapon to achieve its ends. It uses force and the threat of force. It

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1. Documents on International Affairs 1947-48, (R.I.I.A., London p.6.

2. D.S.B., Vol.XXI (794), September 13, 1964, p. 369.



uses bribery, subversion, and sabotage. It uses propaganda." The U.S. suspicion and skepticism of Communism is based upon several convictions: that Communism misreads the historical processes that have fundamentally transformed the conditions against which Marx protested; that the Communist theories of war and imperialism similarly misread the process which has led to the withering away of colonialism, and indeed were expounded cynically to advance the group and national interests of Communist leaders; that far from promoting any withering away of the State or any protection to the citizen against official arbitrariness, a national Communist government by internal compulsions is totalitarian. Furthermore, to most Westerners the portrait of the Soviet Union as a disinterested anticolonial power seems highly simplified - ignoring as it did for example the zigzags of Soviet policy towards China in the 1920's and of Soviet policy towards Europe in the 1930's, as well as in later years.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from this ideological disapproval, there were other factors which added to the participation of the U.S. in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. After the end of the Second World War, the U.S. saw the control of the Soviet Union on the Eastern European countries, which in turn was taken as a direct threat

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1. Poplai and Talbot, India and America, op.cit., p. 39.

to the security of the United States. Therefore, the national interest of the U.S. required the containment of the expansion of Soviet power first in Europe and then elsewhere in the World. What was new since 1947, was the acceptance by the Western powers of the Russian challenge, and their determination to reciprocate in kind. Then the United States was neither at war nor at peace with the Soviet Union, but in a State of undeclared hostility.<sup>1</sup> "Reacting against Russian methods of power politics, we are beginning to base our own policy on the Leninist assumption that peace is only war prosecuted by other means. Upto 1917, the Russians waged ideological war against us, while we continued to treat them as though we were not doing so. Now both sides are active, and it is this fact which we describe as the Cold War"<sup>2</sup> - observed an American writer. No one was more opposed than Hull to Soviet control of East Europe, "interfering with her neighbours."<sup>3</sup>

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1. R.H.S. Crossman, 'Reflections on the Cold War', The Political Quarterly, Vol. XXII No.1, January-March 1961, London, p.7. Also see Hugh Seton - Watson, Neither Peace Nor War, The Struggle for Power in the Post-War World, Methuenans Co. Ltd., London, 1960, pp. 9-47.

2. R.H.S. Crossman, The Political Quarterly, op.cit., p.8

3. See Cordell Hull, Memoirs (London 1948), n.2, 1464-71, 1406-9.

Peace was the ultimate and urgent necessity in the world just after the war. The countries of the world had been ravaged by the Second World War, and the United Nations Organisation was set up 'to save the succeeding generations from the scourge<sup>of war</sup>'. The average American also expected at least a working arrangement with the Soviet Union for strengthening peace and promoting post-war recovery to continue on the basis of mutual respect engendered by the cooperation of the war period. Addressing the Congress on his return from Yalta in February 1945, President Roosevelt had pictured a new post-war world order based on cooperation through the United Nations, a world in which aggression and spheres of influence, exclusive alliances and balances of power would be things of the past.<sup>1</sup> But these were mere false hopes as the course of international politics later exhibited. It is true that a few specialists in international affairs had expressed a fear as John Foster Dulles then a private citizen, said: ".....that the believers in a free society should feel that their ideals would be unsafe if the world became preponderantly totalitarian and intolerant and that proponents of dictatorship of the proletariat should feel unsafe amid an environment of individual freedom."<sup>2</sup> Even, Winston

1. See the statement made by President before a joint session of the Congress on March 1, 1946, D.S.B., Vol. XII (297), March 4, 1946, p.361. Full Text in Ibid., pp.321-326, 361.
2. John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1946-1947, (New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations 1947); Preface by John Foster Dulles, p.viii. Later Dulles worked as U.S. Secretary of State from 1953-1959.

Churchill's alarming voice at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, that "Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organisations intend to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies .....<sup>1</sup>" was received with strong criticism in the United States. But, afterwards, the Soviet step-by-step expansion and unremitting pressure gradually compelled the United States to reconsider their assumptions that the end of the fighting had actually meant the beginning of genuine peace or not. It was in October 1946, that President Truman had warned the Congress that ".....never again can we count on the luxury of time with which to arm ourselves. In any future war, the heart of the United States would be the enemy's first target. Our geographical security is now gone-gone with the advent of the robot bomb, the rocket, aircraft carriers and modern airborne armies."<sup>2</sup>

Another remarkable thing was that the United States was in no mood of taking the risk of a war again while containing the Communist expansion in Europe. Peace and security were the prime objectives. Therefore, "Despite the confident anticipations of the chronic Anti-Americans, the response to Russian

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1. "A shadow has fallen on Europe and Asia", delivered at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 6, 1946, Vital Speeches of the Day, V.12 (March 16, 1946), p.331.
  2. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1946-1946, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, for the World Peace Foundation, 1946), p.496.

aggression has not been atom bombardment, but Marshall Aid in Europe, and United Nations' action in Korea ..... Since 1947 the cold war, by and large, has been a creative force, forcing the Western world to put its house in order and to attend to evils which otherwise would have been left to fester. It is only thanks to Russian pressure that we are organizing collective security on a world basis.<sup>1</sup> The U.S.S.R. came to be seen as a threat, rather than as a partner in the pursuit of peace. It was about mid-1947 that a consensus emerged on the necessity of containing Soviet expansionism through economic assistance, collective defense agreements or alliances, and if necessary military force. In order to foreclose the possibility of the U.S.S.R.'s gaining a technological advantage which it might use to advance its purposes in the later years America became engaged in a highly complex arms race.<sup>2</sup>

In the early post-war years, the containment of communism, thus became the prime objective of the foreign policy of the United States. The policy of containment, the only instrument in the U.S. hands, was advocated by President Truman when he said in the Congress on March 12, 1947, that :

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1. R.H.S. Crossman, op.cit., p. 13.

2. Jacobson, Harold Karan (ed.) America's Foreign Policy, Random House, New York, 1966, p. 246.

"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way."<sup>1</sup>

Britain's grave economic situation had forced it to discontinue economic and military support to Greece and Turkey against communist resurrections and when this information reached Washington after 1947, the U.S. faced a vital decision in terms of its own security and the security of Western Europe and West Asia. And the decision was the policy of containment, the Truman Doctrine (1947), which extended aid to Greece and Turkey. The Marshall Plan<sup>2</sup> (1947) in Europe and the Point Four for underdeveloped countries were also measures of huge economic aid to serve the two fold purposes of combating internal Communism on the economic level and offering some positive advantages in economic terms, in return for membership of the Western bloc, or simply to keep away countries from falling into the Communist orbit. About the U.S. economic assistance, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson said on November 29, 1950: "Our technical assistance is not philanthropy, for here our principles and self interest coincide. As the people of

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1. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1947, V.9 (1949) op.cit., p. 7.

2. The Marshall Plan was described by Andrei Zhdanov, a member of Soviet Politburo, at its meeting as an attempt to establish a "protectorate" over Europe.

undeveloped areas rise from poverty, not only will our own economy benefit, but also and even more important the real promise of freedom will expose the false promises of Bolshevik imperialism.<sup>1</sup>" Dulles also expressed his thinking in a similar view: "We did not decide in advance that it was wise to grant billions annually as foreign economic aid. We adopted that policy in response to the communist efforts to sabotage the free economies of Western Europe."<sup>2</sup> This was a fact that without heavy U.S. aid Europe's economic ills could not be cured.<sup>3</sup>

This aid was intended not only to the members of the Western bloc but to India and other neutralist countries considering that the lack of economic stability in these areas might well strengthen the hands of local communist movements. Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, described the Communist movement as a "combination of proselytizing fanaticism and conspiratorial apparatus."<sup>4</sup>

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Press

1. Department of State/Release 1195, November 29, 1960.
2. Department of State Bulletin, xxx (761), Jan. 26, 1964, op.cit., p. 107.
3. European Recovery Programme was passed by the American Congress on March 31, 1948, through which \$ 17,000,000,000 were to be channeled into the recovery of Western Europe over the next four years.
4. D.S.B., Vol. xxix (766), December 14, 1963, p. 816.

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Apart from economic assistance, the U.S. followed policy of military alliances. These alliances were the instruments for the implementation of the policy of containment of communism. "Any significant expansion of the communist world would, indeed be a danger to the United States, because international communism thinks in terms of ultimately using its power position against the United States", observed Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.<sup>1</sup> In view of the Soviet threat the U.S. thought that their "national security cannot rest on the strength of the United States alone." Therefore, they should have allies to join their strength and must also prevent the strength of these allies from falling into Soviet hands. Dulles feared that if the Soviets "take over the great land masses of Europe, Asia and Africa, the scales of world power would be heavily weighted against us."<sup>2</sup> His policy was that of 'entangling alliances' against the communists. It is upon these alliances that the policies of the U.S. and India had clashed bitterly. The principal alliances are as follows:

(1) The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)<sup>3</sup>, signed on the September 3, 1947 at Riode Janeiro

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1. D.S.E., Vol.XXXI (796), Sept. 27,1964, p.431.
  2. Ibid., XXIX (734), July 20, 1963, p. 88.
  3. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1947-48, pp. 773-778.



between the U.S.A. and all the twenty Latin American States.

(2) The Brussels Treaty,<sup>1</sup> signed on March 17, 1948 at Brussels between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

(3) The North Atlantic Treaty,<sup>2</sup> signed on April 4, 1949 at Washington between twelve powers namely: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the U.K. and the U.S. Greece and Turkey joined later on February 20, 1952, under a separate Protocol<sup>3</sup> of February 16, 1952 enabling them to join. Each signatory pledged itself to maintain and develop the capacity to resist armed attack, to consult together in the event of threats, and to regard an armed attack against one or more as an attack against all. This was the first European alliance to which the U.S. became a party. The Russian explosion of the Atom Bomb in 1949 paved the way for this alliance because this explosion alarmed the Western countries. This policy of banding together in a defensive coalition was not meant to shut the door against future negotiations; instead it was taken in the hope that situations of weakness might be replaced by positions of strength so that "they can be recognised and out of them can grow

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1. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1947-48, pp. 225-229. Though the U.S. was not a party to this Treaty it formed the precedent for the NATO.
  2. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1949-50, pp. 257-260.
  3. Text in Documents on American Foreign Relations, pp. 166-170.

agreement." Secretary of States, Dean Acheson, said on March 16, 1960:

"Our attitude is not inflexible, our opinions are not frozen ..... We are always ready to discuss, to negotiate, to agree, but we are understandably loath to play the role of international sucker. We will take the initiative in the future as we have in the past in seeking agreement whenever there is any indication that this course would be a fruitful one."<sup>1</sup>

NATO was one of the principal alliances which were created for the primary purpose of combating the threat from the communist world.<sup>2</sup> In a radio address on November 29, 1950, Dean Acheson said: "The Keystone of the defense system of the free world is being built in the North Atlantic Community and among States of the Western Hemisphere."<sup>3</sup>

(4) The Security Treaty<sup>4</sup> between the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A. (Anzus Pact), signed at San Francisco, on September 1, 1951.

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1. "Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union", speech at the University of California (Berkeley), Department of State Bulletin, V.22 (March 27, 1950), p. 477.
  2. See Report of William A. Draper (Jr.), U.S. Representative in Europe, to President Eisenhower, on August 22, 1950, Documents on American Foreign Relations 1952, p.176.
  3. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1950, p.13.
  4. Text in Documents on American Foreign Relations 1951, pp. 263-266.

(b) The South-East Asia collective Defence Treaty<sup>1</sup> (Manila Pact), signed at Manila on September 8, 1954 by eight powers, namely: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. In order to build wall against communist expansion in South-East Asia, Dulles sought to unite as many countries as possible in military alliances.

Apart from these multi-lateral pacts and alliances the United States had entered into agreements, pacts and defence arrangements on bilateral basis between the U.S.A. and some other countries which added more countries to the Western bloc. The U.S.A. has Mutual Defence treaties and agreements with the Republic of Philippines,<sup>2</sup> Japan,<sup>3</sup> the Republic of South Korea,<sup>4</sup> Formosa,<sup>5</sup> Pakistan<sup>6</sup> and Spain.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Department of State Publication No. 6446, General Foreign Policy series 117, I, pp. 912-915.
  2. Text in Document in American Foreign Relations 1951, pp. 262-63.
  3. Ibid., pp. 266-267.
  4. Text of Treaty initiated by President Ree and Secretary Dulles on 7 August and signed on October 1, 1953 in Department of State Bulletin, August 17, 1953, p. 204. For further official U.S. comments, D.S.B. January 26, 1954, pp. 131-134.
  5. Text of Treaty and Related Agreements in D.S.B. xxxi (807), December 13, 1954, pp. 895-99.
  6. Text of Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, signed on May 19, 1954, in Department of State Press Release 262-A, May 19, 1954.
  7. Text of Defence and Economic Aid Agreements in D.S.B. XXIX (745), October 6, 1953, pp. 436-442.

About these alliances, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs said:

"Our allies are those to whom we are bound, and who are bound to us, by specific treaty obligations. First speaking chronologically, we have the treaty of Rio de Janeiro which binds us in alliance with the 20 other American Republics in the Western hemisphere. Next we have the North Atlantic Treaty, which is a defensive alliance among the 14 nations who are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We have the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New Zealand. We have Security Pacts with the Philippines and with Japan. Putting all those together we are bound by treaties and alliances with 37 other free nations in the Western hemisphere, in Europe, and in the Pacific."<sup>1</sup>

This speech was delivered before the signing of the Manila Pact. In fact the Western bloc became in the words of Dr.J.C.

<sup>2</sup>  
Kundra:

"The largest grouping of nations and the most formidable that history has ever known to meet, what it considers, a common danger. These nations are capable of wielding an enormous economic, political and psychological pressure on those who may choose to stand apart from them. Isolationism can hardly be practised by any nation toward such a bloc."

These military Pacts added to the strength of the United States against the Soviet threat. In its view, "No nation's security and well being can be lastingly achieved in isolation

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1. "Our European Allies", D.S.B. xxxi (793), September 6, 1964, p. 328.
  2. Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1964, op.cit., p.85.

but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations", said President Eisenhower.<sup>1</sup> The fact was that in a world threatened by communist expansionism and shrunken by technology, the United States "cannot, dare not, stand alone."<sup>2</sup> The U.S. was interested in doing whatever it may to prevent these (uncommitted) countries from falling prey to communist imperialism which brought its involvement in Korea, Hungary, Suez, and Vietnam. For this purpose, a United effort was needed and the U.S. searched for allies. Its policy was based on the understanding that peace and security for the free nations "can be found only in United effort. The United Nations, our various regional agreements in Europe, Latin America and in the Pacific, the mutual security programme - all of these things testify to the importance of the unity principle", was the view of Stevens, special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs.<sup>3</sup>

#### OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

International communism, from the U.S. view point, used "nationalism" as a slogan for gaining control and then "imposes its own brutal form of imperialism which is the negation of

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1. D.S.B., April 27, 1953, p. 599.

2. Ibid., XXIX (735), July 27, 1953, p. 111.

3. Ibid.

nationalism," Dulles remarked.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet methods and tactics were rejected and condemned by the Americans. One of the most striking characteristic of Soviet Strategy and tactics "is their combination of blandishment and coercion ..... Persuasion and pressure are of course universally human means of getting other people to act in desired ways. What is peculiar about the Soviet is the extreme manner in which these opposite methods are combined, sometimes simultaneously, sometimes in succession, and often with a brazenness which, while impressing some people tends to be self-defeating with others", said George A. Morgan, Director of the Foreign Service Institute at Washington.<sup>2</sup>

Secretary Dean Rusk viewed the Cold War as the direct expression of the announced determination of the Sino-Soviet bloc to extend their "historically inevitable" world revolution by every available means.<sup>3</sup> Hence, he reiterated that "we must maintain our ability to deter Communist aggression in all its forms." But how the Americans could do it. He spoke, "with our allies, we have that ability and we have the will to use it."<sup>4</sup>

The Americans do not see an end to the Cold War until the Soviets, who started it "decide to abandon it."<sup>5</sup>

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1. D.E.B., XXXI (795), 20 September 1954, p.392.
  2. Ibid., XLVII (1218), October 29, 1962, p.651.
  3. Ibid., September 25, 1961, p. 507.
  4. Ibid., XLVII (1219), November 6, 1962, p. 683.
  5. Ibid., September 25, 1961, p. 507.

### INDIA AND THE COLD WAR

It is about the issue of the Cold War that the United States and India have quite different views and see from widely differing angles. In effect this divergence has led them to disagree sharply over several issues, specially on the matter of military pacts and other major issues of world politics i.e. Korean, Formosa, Suez, Vietnam, West Asia, etc. India was aware that every American action and decision was a move to gain an advantage over the Communist bloc, regardless of the genuine interests of India and the Asian peoples.

The first and foremost thing is that as far as the Cold War is concerned, unlike the United States India wanted to free herself from the coils of Big Power diplomacy since the day she became independent. Indian leaders were convinced that to become embroiled in this bipolar struggle would be tantamount to losing everything that India had gained in her long struggle for national independence. P.M. Nehru declared in 1962: "If there is a Cold War today, certainly we are neutral. It does not matter who is right and who is wrong. We will not join in this exhibition of mutual abuse<sup>1</sup>." This attitude was not only based upon moral conviction but also

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1. Speech in the House of the People, June 12, 1962, Parliamentary Debates, Vol.II, No.1, Col.1662.

to a great extent upon the concrete facts of India's position in international society. India was militarily weak. Indian leaders knew the strategic implications of her geographic proximity to the two most powerful communist states — the Soviet Union and China and that partiality towards the West would lead to uncontrollable tensions on the Asian continent. Therefore, India logically chose not to entangle herself in the Cold War.

Nehru the Chief architect of India's foreign policy believed that the ideological struggle between East and West was the result of different economic and political systems, suited to different societies.<sup>1</sup> On March 22, 1949 he observed:

"We must realize that there are different types of economic policy in the world today in different countries and they are believed in by their people. Well, the only thing to do is to leave them to work out their destiny. It may be that one of them justifies this policy, another justifies another. It may be that a third follows the middle course<sup>2</sup>..... We must proceed on the basis of leaving every country to shift itself in regard to its internal affairs. Any effort to change the economic policy, or any other internal policy, forcibly or to

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1. Independence and After, pp. 269-260.

2. India was following that course, Nehru's Press Conferences 1950 (Indian Information Service, New Delhi), p. 36.



bring pressure to bear upon it, leads to counter-pressure and to continuous conflict ..... We have had a type of philosophy which is a live-and-let-live philosophy of life. We have no desire to convert other people to any view or thought.<sup>1</sup>

India has been against the Cold War ever since her independence and was not ready to see world in terms of communism and anti-communism. She believed in the democratic way of life and is the largest democracy of Asia. In his speech of October 3, 1960, at the Lucknow Conference of the American Institute of Pacific Relations (New York), Nehru said:

"I am often asked : what is communism doing in this country. How does it affect us? We have to think about deeper questions.....We have to deal with deeper problems of every country — more difficult questions than questions of communism or anti-communism, as if that were the only question left in the world."<sup>2</sup>

In spite of differences with regard to their creeds, beliefs and ideologies, the only way to exist peacefully together was to give up the policy of hatred and violence, Nehru advocated and further emphasized that countries cannot convert each other by force or threats of force, for any such attempt would lead to catastrophe for all.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Independence and After, p. 216.

2. 'India and Communism', International Journal, (Tromto), Winter, 1960-61, p.8.

3. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 202.

On another occasion he said: "I believe that it is in the power of America and Russia to solve this crisis and save humanity from the ultimate disaster which faces it.<sup>1</sup>" In the same speech Nehru tried to reveal the importance of those countries who did not belong either to capitalists or communists and said:

"Millions of people believe in what is called Western Capitalism; millions also believe in Communism. But there are many millions who are not committed to either of these ideologies, and yet seek, in friendship with others, a better life and more hopeful future."<sup>2</sup>

According to the United States and the Western Bloc countries' thesis the whole basis of the Western bloc was that Soviet Russia and Communist China along with other smaller Communist countries, had hostile and aggressive intentions towards non-Communist world. But India rejected this thesis on the basis that India did not see any direct threat or danger to herself from the Communist world.<sup>3</sup> India did not believe that Soviet Union would attack India rather she had friendly relations with Russia. It was because of non-recognition of this threat that India has not supported the defence

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p.201. Nehru was giving his arguments in favour of disarmament to save humanity from extinction.

2. Ibid., p. 202.

3. Bowles, Ambassador's Report (New York, 1954), p.107.

arrangements and actions of the Western bloc and avoided the external pressures.

India's policy towards the Cold War has been one of keeping out of it. In her view it came because the West and the Soviet Union found themselves engaged in a grim competition for world power and position and that Asia and Africa are not in the picture except as play things of the Big Powers. As G.L.Mehta, Indian Ambassador to the U.S.A. wrote:

"The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Russia which has thus become basic is partly ideological and partly a reflection of power politics. In any case distrust, and fear of the Soviet Union (now accentuated by Soviet technical achievements) are at the root of American Strategy and tactics. It is these feelings which make the Government give the first priority to building up an alliance against Soviet and communist Powers in both military and economic spheres. It is the cleavage which makes them think in terms of "bipolarisation" of the world. And from this top priority given to making the world safe from the communist menace arise many of the difficulties of American foreign policy."<sup>1</sup>

India was not prepared to support the Western bloc on the ideological basis because it included all sorts of countries and it was a military alliance rather than an ideological alliance. H.B.Mayo wrote: "To say that the Cold War is a

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1. G.L.Mehta, "As others see Us" An Indian view, Foreign Affairs, Vol.37, No.1, October, 1958, New York, p.109.

conflict of two clear-cut ideologies, one of which embraces all the West, is simply not true.<sup>1</sup>" Nehru believed that it was the military point of view that was dominant in either camp.<sup>2</sup> Even two British historians, Professor Toynbee and Prof. Butterfield, supported the view that the Western alliance was not ideological but defensive. Professor Toynbee, seeing the East-West struggle in terms of power politics, said: "United States and Soviet Union - the two powers - who would be antagonists in a final round of naked power politics. They are safe-guarding themselves .... in the old fashioned way, in a game of power politics, which, if persisted in, can only lead to a third world war and a 'knock-out blow'.<sup>3</sup>" Furthermore, he wrote that "neither the Capitalist world ..... is the Earthly Paradise that it claims to be ..... What the world needs above all now is to get the issue of free enterprise versus socialism off its ideological pedestal and to treat it not as a matter of Semi-religious faith and fanaticism, but as a common sense, practical question of trial and error; or more or less of circumstances and adoption.<sup>4</sup>"

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1. See H.B. Mayo : "The Western Alliance - Ideological or Defensive", International Journal (Toronto), Spring 1954, pp. 87-96.
  2. Nehru's Press Conferences 1953, by The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1954, p.79.
  3. A.J. Toynbee; 'The International Outlook', International Affairs, XXIII, 4 (October 1947), p.469.
  4. See Ibid., pp. 474-76.

India held that the problems of the Cold War cannot be seen in terms of Communism and anti-Communism; one evil and the other virtuous. Moreover, India was not in favour of either side trying to impose its own ideology on the rest of the world because it may cause a third world war. In the words of Nehru it can be explained as such:

"I doubt if, after the terrible disaster of a world war, democracy can survive. The democratic nations may win the war-mind you, I have little doubt that they will-but I doubt if after the disaster of a world war democracy can survive at all."<sup>1</sup>

G.L.Mehta, India's Ambassador to the U.S.A., tried to explain why he felt that the Americans think their "way of life" the best possible in the world. Because of their outstanding success in building up a new country from a wilderness, their high standards of living and their pre-eminence in the technological sphere, Americans believe that their constitution, their economic system and what they call their "way of life" are the best possible in the world. Many find it difficult to reconcile themselves to other ways and means of living and working. For instance they can not understand why Britain with her traditions of laissez-faire and her imperial responsibilities should prefer any thing approximating

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1. Speeches of Nehru 1949-63, p. 191.

"socialism" or why India resorts to state-planning instead of giving free scope to private enterprise. And it came as a shock to most people in the United States that the Communist system in Soviet Russia could excel their own technological achievements, as with the sputnik and the inter-continental ballistic missile. Their bewilderment and disappointment at this achievement was proportionate to their unbounded confidence in the Capitalist order's capacity to yield scientific no less than financial dividends.<sup>1</sup>"

There is some evil and some virtue in each bloc whether it is communist or capitalist. The Vice President of India Dr.S.Radhakrishnan pointed out in a U.N.Day broadcast from Delhi on October 24, 1963, that "their might be some good in communism along with the bad and that, in any event, communism had brought material improvements to formerly hopeless millions and had therefore found favour with abused populations in many countries ..... We need not assume that the people who profess other ideas are quite different from or more wicked than ourselves."<sup>2</sup>

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1. G.L.Mehta, Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p. 108.

2. The Statesman, October 25, 1963; Also see Independence and After, p. 241.

India did not and does not join either of the two blocs and remains neutral. India did not see any immediate threat of the communist attack on her territory and assumed, if attacked the West would come to her aid in any event.<sup>1</sup> In a B.B.C. interview on June 12, 1963, Nehru said: "I see absolutely no danger - external danger - to India from Communism or any other source."<sup>2</sup> India believed that the chances of a Western attack on India, unless she becomes allied with the Communist bloc, were very remote, because India had been maintaining close relations with the Western powers and she knew that it was not in the interests of the U.S.A. to crush India. Instead it would like India to become economically and militarily stronger. India chose to remain neutral if a war brokeout, under the prevailing military and political situation, so that the basic aim of her foreign policy i.e. non-involvement in a world war, might be served and her security preserved. Indeed it was not in the national interest of India to side with either of the two blocs. The former Secretary General of India's External Affairs Ministry, the late Mr.G.S. Bajpai wrote correctly:

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1. "The security of India 1947-54", Eastern Economist, August 13, 1954, p.243. Also see "India in World Strategy", Ibid., December 26, 1952, p.999.

Actually this happened to be right cent percent when Communist China attacked India in October 1962, the U.S.A. came to the rescue and gave both economic and military aid even without a written alliance with India.

2. India News, June 20, 1963.

"It can not be argued that any immediate Indian interests will be served by this country implicating herself by 'artificial ties, in ordinary combinations or coalitions' of 'friendships or enmities' of the two camps in which the major part of the world is to-day unfortunately divided."<sup>1</sup>

This thinking can be made more explicit from the instance of the U.S. Military Pact with Pakistan in May 1954. India opposed this Pact because in her view this brought the cold war to the door of Indian subcontinent and posed direct threat to India's peace and security, strengthened Pakistan on her borders and made the solution of Kashmir problem more complicated. India's middle of the road policy was intensified by the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950-51 and the military alliance of Pakistan with the West.

According to Nehru, the psychosis of fear prevailing among the two blocs of nations who are often fearing aggression from each other might lead to war.<sup>2</sup> That fear increases by each military alliance which must necessarily, under the circumstances, be against one or the other group and this vicious circle eventually leads to war. World peace is threatened and armed conflict becomes inevitable. India's position

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1. G.S.Bajpai : "India and the Balance of Power", Indian Year Book of International Affairs, Vol.II (1952), p.4. He suggested India should build her own strength so that neither side would like to lose India's neutrality.
  2. "Psychosis of Fear" in Speeches of Nehru 1949-53, pp.243-258. Nehru's speech in the Indian Parliament on Feb.18, 1953.



has been that war is not inevitable. Therefore, India has been very active in conducting that role of peacemaker. She has been trying to save the world from an approaching disaster and holocaust.

Peace is the ultimate aim of India's foreign policy. Nehru was amazed to learn that even the leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union always talked about world peace on one hand and were increasing the tensions by their policies on the other hand. He said in the Lok Sabha on 17 December 1967: "I cannot understand how people talk about peace and the necessity for the avoidance of war, but at the same time indulge in the Cold War, which brings about a situation which is progressively becoming more dangerous and may burst at any moment.<sup>1</sup>"

India wanted to create a 'temper of peace' and thereby to lead the world away from a sense of paralyzing fear of the inevitability of war. India thought that in between the two blocs, there must be somebody to act as sort of 'go between or mediator.' This role was explained by Krishna Menon, Nehru's principal foreign aide: "India has not tried so much to steer the middle course as to be a factor which, we hope, might act

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 204.

as a kind of catalytic agent.<sup>1</sup> Nehru made a similar statement in 1949: "India will lose the vantage of great influence by aligning herself with one group of nations. That influence is growing and it is in the favour of world peace."<sup>2</sup> Nehru rejected a middle of the road policy and made it clear: "It is not a middle-of-the-road policy. It is a positive, constructive policy deliberately aiming at something and deliberately trying to avoid hostility to other countries, to any country as far as possible."<sup>3</sup>

India advocated that peaceful co-existence between the nations of the world is the only way to live in peace. Nehru argued as follows in the Lok Sabha on April 9, 1958:

"If the people are desirous of putting an end to the Cold War, it seems to us that the approach should not be hostile. Countries differ from one another in their policies, in the structure of their governments and in their economic approaches. We cannot put an end to these differences by war, because war will exterminate the human race, and not put an end to these differences ..... We may hold to our principles and to our idea of security, but let us recognize the fact that we have to live in this world together in peace. We have to find a way of co-existence. The only way is by peaceful methods and not by thinking or acting in terms of the Cold War which means constant appeals to hatred, violence and fear."<sup>4</sup>

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1. The Hindu, April 20, 1954.
  2. Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, Vol. XXX, 2 (1949), (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association), p. 334.
  3. Independence and After, p. 254.
  4. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp. 209-210.

India did not like Dulles' policy in the Cold War of "Speaking from strength." Because it added to the growing tensions in the world between the two power blocs. Nehru said: "When one side grows a little stronger, the then other side grows stronger also, so that any reference to strength induces the other party to build up its strength as rapidly as possible."<sup>1</sup>

Nehru became very bitter in commenting upon the Cold War while speaking before the U.N. General Assembly on December 20, 1956: "I submit to you that this idea of the Cold War is essentially and fundamentally wrong. It is immoral. It is apposed to all ideals of peace and cooperation. Therefore, let us be clear in our minds as to what the right way is."<sup>2</sup> His feeling was: "Unfortunately we have had what is called the Cold War. The Cold War is better than a hot war or a shooting war. But the idea of the Cold War is a very negation of what the constitution of UNESCO says: that wars begin in the minds of men. Cold Wars mean nourishing the idea of war in the minds of men. Gandhiji was devoted to non-violence and preached this principle all through the life, and yet he said: "If you have a sword in your mind, it is better to use it than to nurse and nourish it in your mind all the time.

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 205.

2. Ibid., p. 177.

Take it out, use it and throw it away, instead of being frustrated in yourselves and always thinking of the sword or the use of the sword and yet superficially trying to avoid it.<sup>1</sup>"

The above analysis makes it clear that unlike the U.S.A. which is a competitor in the Cold War world forum India has been against it. The only instrument in the hands of India to avoid the Cold War entanglements was and is the policy of non-alignment with either of the two blocs and sometimes this policy has been suspected by either of the blocs leaders. India hopes to create an 'area of peace' in Asia and also to bring the moral pressure of that 'area' of like minded nations against actions of the two blocs that <sup>might</sup> hurt that area. Nehru's address<sup>2</sup> to the 69th session of the Indian National Congress on January 23, 1964, is noteworthy here. He said:

"Two powerful blocs of nations confront each other, each trying to play a dominant role. Those who refuse to join either of these groups are criticised as sitting on the fence, as if there could be only two extreme positions to take up. Our policy has been one of non-alignment and one of friendly relations with all the countries.....We are convinced that the problems of today can be solved by peaceful methods and that each country can live its own life as it chooses without imposing itself on the other.....Peace is not merely an absence of war. It is also a state of mind. The state of mind is completely absent from this world of Cold War today. We have endeavoured not to succumb to this climate of war and fear and consider our problems as well as problems of the world as dispassionately as

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp. 176-177.

2. India News, January 30, 1964.

possible. We have felt that even if some terrible tragedy should overtake the world, it is worth while to keep some area of the world free from it to the extent possible. Therefore, India had declared that India will be no participant in a war and we have hoped that other countries in Asia would likewise keep away from it thus building up an area of peace. The larger that area is the more the danger of that war recedes. If the whole world is divided into two major and hostile camps, then there is no hope for the world and war becomes inevitable."

The U.S.A. had the idea of "free world" to contain the spread of communism and India hoped for an area of peace so as to deter the flow of the Cold War whether it came from the West or from the East.

#### India and Communism

India and the United States view international communism from entirely different perspectives, which affects in turn their attitudes towards the Cold War.

India's national interest had nothing to do to give specific content to the Western picture of the Soviet leadership and its international Communist movement as insatiably aggressive and a threat to the independence of nations and to human freedom. Furthermore, Indians, throughout their long history, have had little direct contacts with the Russians. Differences in personal experience also added a great deal to difference in Indian and American outlook. Americans are related by descent and common tradition to the victims of

communist oppression in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, while Indians have no such link with the misfortunes of these people.

During early post war years India did not see any threat of communist attack on her territory. Though India has been fighting communism at home and Nehru went so far as to call the communist movements in the whole of South-East Asia as "reactionary" and "anti-nationalistic", using "extreme violence" and "terroristic methods"<sup>1</sup> but his attitude to internal communist movements was that they were fed on inner economic difficulties and were not the result of a "conspiracy" engineered from abroad. In the words of Werner Levy:

"Leading Indian statesmen have shown full understanding of the communist danger within India and utter repugnance to communist political practices inside Russia and China. But their recognition of the nature of communism does not commensurately affect their relations with Communist countries or the interpretation of communists' international behaviour."<sup>2</sup>

About internal communism in India former Ambassador Chester Bowles wrote: "there can be no doubt about the Government's determination to take any steps to defeat communism in India."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Jawaharlal Nehru : Press Conferences 1950, p.22.

2. "Nehru's Foreign Policy", The Hindu, June 2, 1954.

3. Bowles : Ambassador's Report, p.107.

Thus India's approach towards communism has been sociological, if one may use that expression here, a rationalisation born out of the experiences of a society with appallingly low standards of living that breed mass discontent.<sup>1</sup> In Asia, where India was mainly interested, the danger came from internal economic conditions and from the communist appeal as a liberating movement whether from colonialism, where a country was not free i.e. Malaya, Indo-China, or from internal poverty and unjust social and economic systems.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, India stood against the U.S. policy of entangling alliances, and suggested that the best way to fight communism was not military containment, but through building economic stability and fulfilling legitimate nationalistic aspirations. This was the main reason given by Nehru for his opposition to the Pacific Pact in 1949.<sup>3</sup> Nehru gave two suggestions, in an interview with Robert Trumbul in March, 1951, as far as the ways to fight communism in Asia were concerned: (1) by encouragement of nationalism; and (2) by helping economic progress. He pointed out: "That is to say, the people should not be made by circumstances to think of communism as a liberating force, which they sometimes do."<sup>4</sup>

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1. J.C.Kundra : Indian Foreign Policy 1947-64, p.86.

2. Palmer and Perkins: International Relations(Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), p.66.

3. Ibid., p. 806.

4. New York Times, April 1, 1951. Also see : External Affairs April 1951, Published by the Canadian Department of External Affairs, p. 123.

L.K. Rosinger has rightly remarked confirming this view that" There is ample evidence to show that for most Asians the main issue is not Moscow versus Washington, or Capitalism versus Communism, but rather nationalism, a real voice for the people in government and economic progress, versus colonialism, despotic government and economic backwardness.<sup>1</sup>

In this light Indian opinion has been impressed by the Soviet Union's long term propaganda support for anticolonialism and in particular by its well-publicized support to the freedom movements in Indonesia, Indo-China and Malaya. India, on the contrary, has been irritated by the U.S. commitment of financial and military support to allies who in their role as colonial powers were trying to crush nationalistic resistance. For instance, the U.S. did not oppose the policy of apartheid in South Africa and supported Portugal's claims in Goa, a part of India.

But the leaders of the Western bloc, particularly the U.S.A. saw in international communism a new form of imperialism and tyranny tending towards world domination, trying to subvert

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1. India and the United States, op.cit., p.146. That was for the economic development that India accepted foreign aid, joined the Colombo Plan and aided and desired internal stability in Burma<sup>A</sup> and Nepal<sup>B</sup>. A. Balmer and Perkins, op.cit., p.703. B. Speeches of Nehru 1949-1953, p.147.
  2. The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, (U.S. 82nd Congress, House Document No. 619, Washington 1948), pp. 24-25.



democratic and non-communist regimes, wherever possible with the help of local communists loyal to them.<sup>1</sup> They cited the examples in their support-the phenomenal post war expansion of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, and the Communist attack on South Korea in 1950. Americans took communism as a world movement which was aggressive, operating through its Moscow and Peking Centres. Moreover, in their view the communist powers were single-minded and united, armed with sufficient power and weapons to induce them to achieve their aims through war and aggression, so the West should be strengthened militarily.

<sup>2</sup>  
John Foster Dulles observed:

"The Soviet Bloc of Communist controlled countries, a new form of imperialist colonialism, represents a vast central land mass with a population of 800,000,000. About 10,000,000 men are regularly under arms with many more trained millions in reserves. This land force occupies a Central position which permits of striking at anyone of about 20 countries along perimeter of some 2000 miles. It is supplemented by increasing air power equipped with atomic weapons able to strike through northern Arctic routes which bring our industrial areas in range of quick attack. The threat is not military. The Soviet rulers dispose throughout the world the apparatus of international Communism. It operates with trained agitators and a powerful propaganda organisation.....It seeks to harass the existing order and pave the way for political coups which will install communist controlled regims."

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1. The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, (U.S. 82nd Congress, House Document No.619, Washington 1948), pp.24-26.
  2. "Policy of Security and Peace", Foreign Affairs, April 1954, pp. 354-55.

Against this the Indian view has been that the Soviet programme for Asia rests on political, cultural and economic penetration rather than on military conquest. It follows that communists' best gambit is to infiltrate the ranks of Asian political parties for their own purposes. In Asia the communist appeal has not been in terms of the overawing force of Soviet armed might - its atomic weapons and huge armies and airpower - but in terms of ending colonialism and of promoting economic plenty through drastic land reform, collectivized agricultural and nationalized industry. So it is not because of strategic fears but at the aspirations of governments as well as their people that they gave ear to the Soviet appeal. Many Indians thought that Americans had misread the significance of Asian communist movements because they have thought of communists as conspiratorial gamblers for power rather than as leaders who offer answers, which may be honest or misleading, to some of the pressing questions facing Asian peoples.<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, in India it has been a widely accepted view of the conflict as basically a clash of power rather than of ideals. In fact, India has been subjected to intensive propaganda efforts from both sides in the conflict. And these

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1. Poplel and Talbot, India and America, p. 55.

factors have encouraged India to fight shy of involvement in the Cold War.<sup>1</sup>

#### INDIA AND THE POLICY OF ENTANGLING ALLIANCES 0

Contrary to the U.S. policy of entangling alliances, India followed the policy of non-alignment with either of the two power blocs for maintaining peace and security in the post-war world. From the very beginning of her independence India was against the formation of any power bloc in opposition to the other. In her view these alliances intensified the Cold War tensions and rivalries rather than putting an end to them. India followed her policy of non-alignment because, firstly, she viewed world with certain basic principles - she was willing that imperialism must end every where and in all its manifestations. Secondly, India wanted to live in peace and friendship with her neighbouring countries, and with all countries; she had nothing to fear from anybody because she had no designs against any one. Thirdly, India would try to avoid any foreign entanglements especially when these were not in her national interests. Fourthly, India believed in, and was prepared to support, whole heartedly a system of international order and collective security. Fifthly, a free India would try to

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1. Poplai and Talbot, India and America, p. 54.

reduce world tension, soothe world conflicts and work vigorously for international peace.<sup>1</sup>

Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations felt, when he met Nehru in Paris on January 18, 1951, that the Indian leader had differed from his own approach to world affairs. "Asia first", Lie recorded<sup>2</sup> Nehru's impression of the conversation, "The peoples of Asia themselves would have to decide the future of Asia, he (Nehru) repeated." Lie wanted to convince Nehru that in the global conflict between international Communism and the West, Asian countries must make their choice. But Nehru was not moved by references either to the global aims of Communism, or to the interdependence of all continents and the United Nations' concern for them all. His mind seemed to be imprisoned by the concept of Asia as a special entity. When I followed his narrow trend of thought and mentioned the overwhelming military superiority of China and the Soviet Union on the Asian continent, he still maintained that he was not concerned about the security of his own country; he was interested in making peace in Korea and settling the differences between the United States and the Communist powers, and the immediate objective was to persuade Peking to withdraw

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1. See Sun Chankya, Against the Cold War, p. 165.

2. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, The MacMillan Company New York, 1954, pp. 359-62.

from Korea. Then Formosa should be given to Peking." Actually the Nehru-Lie parting of minds provided the key to an appreciation of the impulses as well as the compulsion of Asian non-alignment and the inability of the West to accept it as a positive force in favour of international peace.<sup>1</sup>

India abhorred military alliances between nations on the ground that this same led to the creation of a 'war psychosis', increasing fear and a race of armaments leading to the fear of total war.<sup>2</sup> Nehru's view was that though he would not deny the right of nations<sup>2</sup> to take legitimate precautions for self defence, but that defensive alliances openly aiming against some other country or countries defeat their own purpose or trying to 'maintain peace through strength'.<sup>3</sup> In this regard Nehru gave expression to his thoughts at a press conference in 1953 on July 27:<sup>4</sup>

".....Large organizations have grown up for what is called mutual defense ..... It is open for any country to have such organisations. But if I may say so, with all respect to them my own approach to this question is without creating any hostile alliance. I do not deny the necessity of any country or group of countries protecting themselves or taking steps to protect themselves against possible danger. They may do so by all means. At the sometime again and again what a country should decide is, whether

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1. Sen Chanakya, op.cit., p. 158.

2. Survey of International Affairs 1949-50, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), p.32.

3. Nehru's Press Conferences 1953, p.7.

4. Ibid., p. 50.

its policy generally leads towards promoting a peace or war atmosphere."

"Sometimes I find very little difference-people talk of defence-whether it is defence or something else ..... One country calls it defence and the other country says that this defence is aimed against it. The other country also talks about defence and takes some other measures. So they go on mounting armaments."

India and the U.S.A. differed from each other as far as their attitudes towards the military alliances were concerned because of the fact that they did not have similar views, on the issue of the nature of the communist threat. To the U.S. Cold War is a conflict between two ideologies, between the Communist world and the "free" world between a "Godless creed" and the Cherished values of liberty and freedom. But the Indian mind refuses to accept this definition. It sees the Cold War as a struggle for power between two blocs. The Asian countries find the countries of the West coming together not because they believe in a Charter or positive programmes for the welfare of mankind but because of their fear of the U.S.S.R. To Indians Cold War is a renewed battle for world domination by two powers, each with its own group of lesser powers dependent upon it for safety and sustenance.

India opposed the policy of forming military alliances because she wanted to minimize the possibility of a World War which might be caused by the increasing international tensions. She did not believe in the U.S. view that peace could be maintained only through such alliances, so that the Communist bloc would not dare to risk a war if the West was strong.

Nehru could understand, although did not approve, military alliances between great powers which would have some meaning. But he said, "I do not understand military pacts and alliances between a huge giant of a power and a little pigmy of a country. It has no meaning in a military sense to me. In this nuclear age the only countries that count, from the point of view of nuclear war, are those great countries which are, unfortunately, in a position to use these bombs. But to attach small countries to themselves in alliances really means .....that they are becoming very much dependant on those countries.<sup>1</sup>"

India believed these pacts and alliances had made disarmament in the world more and more difficult. Nehru while addressing the United Nations General Assembly at New York on December 20, 1966, declared<sup>2</sup> that "these pacts and alliances do not add to the strength of any nation. They only create hostility, leading to a piling up of armaments and making disarmament more and more difficult. If it is our objective that we must have peace, then it follows necessarily cold war, it follows necessarily that we must not buttress our idea of peace by past military establishments and pacts and alliances."

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p.66. Speech in Lok Sabha, February 25, 1966.

2. Ibid., p. 177.

Later on, Nehru warned, while addressing the Rajya Sabha on December 12, 1957 that: "This constant wrestling, this cold war, this piling up of armaments, this frantic search for a more powerful weapon, the ultimate weapon where does it all lead to? Nowhere except destruction."<sup>1</sup>

Indian national interest was concerned with the Asian countries largely and not with that of Europe. That was the reason why Indians did not particularly object to NATO as a European defence system. NATO was the chief defensive measure of the Western bloc. Soviet Union had been reacting to it extremely unfavourably. India opposed colonialism strongly in any form, so she was particularly interested only in those provisions of the North Atlantic pact which could be interpreted to mean that this huge bloc of the Western nations might intervene on behalf of those of its members, which were colonial powers, to protect their colonial establishments. And in fact, we see that France and Portugal had small colonial possessions on Indian mainland itself. Therefore if India objected to that part of NATO, it was in her self interest. It was in 1964 on April 14, that in a statement Dr. Salazar, Portuguese Prime Minister made a reference to NATO that Portugal would invoke in Goa the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty and the North Atlantic Pact.<sup>2</sup> That gave chance to the Indian objections.

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p.76.

2. Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, Vol. XXXV, (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association), p.304.



What Nehru thought of NATO was expressed in the following words by him on 21 June, 1962:<sup>1</sup>

"I do not know if NATO affected India, may be very distantly. We are not worried about the Atlantic Pact. I was thinking of certain general trends like the Atlantic Pact based very rightly on self-defence, mutual defence against aggression. Obviously, they have every right to do that. But geographically it spreads. I have no objection to that. Turkey and Greece come in which are hardly Atlantic countries. But what is more important is the tendency for the pact to include in its scope the protection of colonial territories<sup>2</sup> of Atlantic Powers. The Pact does not contain this but subsequent conversations between Foreign Ministers and others gradually bring that in, thus changing its character. With regard to that, I thought that there was something essentially opposed to the basic Charter of the United Nations."<sup>3</sup>

In the early stages of NATO, the Indian response was favourable to the U.S. Nehru was content that "we were kept informed, but there was no question of consultation because we are not in it at all" and he explained that India was given to understand that it was a regional arrangement within the meaning of the U.N. Charter. Furthermore he told the Indian Parliament that the Commonwealth link did not in any way connect India with the North Atlantic Pact.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps, India thought that the

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1. Nehru's Press Conferences 1962, p.49.

2. In fact, Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty covers the "Algerian Departments of France" among the area to be defended.

3. Earlier also, Nehru had given the above explanation in reference to NATO while addressing the Indian Parliament on June 12, 1962. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-63, p.223.

4. Nehru was speaking in the Indian Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on April 6, 1949 one day after the signing of North Atlantic Pact; J.O.P.C. Vol.XXX,2, pp.332-333.

pact was necessary and being forged for the West's own defence and had no aggressive purposes. "In fact, in her criticism of some of the Western defence measures India never implied that the Western powers were motivated by any other consideration than their fear of the Communist bloc, although in her view that very fear, often exaggerated, created a war psychology".<sup>1</sup> Any way India's opposition was not so strong because she was not concerned with NATO, a European defensive alliance.

But India openly opposed the formation of ANZUS Pact, a Pacific Pact on the ground that the state of South-East Asia was unsettled and thus the time was not ripe for such a step. India did not think such a step desirable unless the situation in Indonesia and Indo-China had been resolved. The U.S.A. agreed with India's view point at that stage.<sup>2</sup> Australia and Great Britain desired this pact mainly and wanted India to join it. But India did not like it and, at the Colombo meeting of Commonwealth in 1960, declared that she had no intention to join such a pact.<sup>3</sup> The only fear seemed to be that it might bolster the shrinking strength of the colonial power in South-East-Asia for which India was not ready at all. Before the

1. Kundra, J.C., Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-1964, p.91. Even when the U.S. Pakistan Military Pact was signed in 1954, though India opposed it very strongly, Nehru did not doubt the motives of the U.S.A., he said in the Parliament: "It is not a question of motives but rather of certain results which inevitably follow." India News, March 6, 1954.
2. See Statement of Dean Acheson on a Pacific Pact May 18, 1949. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1949-50, pp. 93-94.
3. Werner Levi : Free India in Asia (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1953), p. 67.

signing of this pact, India tried to discourage it in the first instance. After the defeat of Nationalists in China, Nehru told press representatives:

"So far as the Pacific Pact is concerned ..... we have not encouraged it. In fact, we thought that any such move was not a right move."<sup>1</sup>

But, later, when the pact was signed, India did not show any active hostility to it and regarded it somewhat disinterestedly, which was clear from the statement made by Nehru at a press conference on June 21, 1952, with regard to the Pacific Pact:

"I am not particularly interested. There are some countries associating themselves for self-defence etc. It does not develop in the same way as the other (NATO). If the Pacific Pact also has the same trends, that is in regard to colonialism, in regard to other matters then it is not good."<sup>2</sup>

India opposed the proposed Middle-East Defence Organisation<sup>3</sup> for which the discussions were held between the U.S.A. and Britain in the fall of 1952 and in which Pakistan was to be included. In view of Chester Bowles, the then U.S. Ambassador in India, the project was dropped on account of Indian opposition, although it seemed that the Middle East-States' own lack of agreement was the main cause of its failure.<sup>4</sup> India's

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1. Nehru's Press Conferences 1950, p. 213.

2. Nehru's Press Conferences 1952, p. 61.

3. The MEDO idea did not materialize.

4. Chester Bowles: Ambassador's Report (New York 1964), p. 254.

vigorous opposition was because of the fact that the proposed MEDO threatened to come very close to India's borders. Nehru protesting against this, at the Hyderabad session of the Indian National Congress, said, that the Anglo-U.S. move to make Pakistan a member of the proposed MEDO was of grave concern to India and that it would affect all kinds of balances and equilibrium in India and Pakistan and South Asia.<sup>1</sup> Pakistan's inclusion would have not only made Pakistan stranger in her conflict with India, but also frustrated India's aim of building an area of peace and keeping the cold war as far as possible from her borders.<sup>2</sup> Another reason might have been the fact that the move came from the Anglo-American bloc which seemed to be trying to take steps opposed to India's interests.<sup>3</sup> Nehru's view was that India opposed the proposed MEDO not because of the fear that Pakistan would become stronger but on account of cold war coming nearer. He made it clear on January 16, 1953: "Obviously, if any such development takes place in that region the cold war comes right to our border if Pakistan joins. It is not the possibility of war between India and Pakistan, but it is the possibility of world war coming right up to our doors which is of concern to us."<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, India's vehement opposition was expressed over SEATO<sup>6</sup> and Baghdad Pact. Thus the U.S. and India followed quite divergent policies as far as the regional Pacts were concerned.

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1. India News, January 17, 1953.

2. Kundra, J.C. : Indian Foreign Policy (1947-54), p.93.

3. Satish K.Arora : American Foreign Policy towards India, New Delhi 1954, p.129.

4. India News, January 26, 1953, p. 26.

5. It has been dealt with in detail in the following chapter separately as a cold war issue.

### CHAPTER 3

#### THE OTHER COLD WAR ISSUES

##### (A) THE KOREAN CRISIS:

Korea became a cold war issue after the termination of the World War II. This was the defeat of Japan in the war which brought the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel by the Russian forces and south of the 38th parallel by the American forces. Thus Korea was divided into two - North Korea and South Korea and this parallel became an 'iron curtain' separating North and South Korea.<sup>1</sup>

It was the failure of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to agree on steps to implement the wartime promise<sup>2</sup> of independence for Korea, which led the United States to submit the Korean question to the General Assembly. Despite the protests of the U.S.S.R., the General Assembly voted a resolution<sup>3</sup> to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea with authority to observe elections for a national assembly which in turn would establish a national government for Korea. The Commission could not function

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1. For details see, Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, The Far East 1942-1946, (H.I.I.A., 1955), pp. 428-30. Also see Ibid., 431-473.

2. The United States, United Kingdom and China declared in the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 that 'in due course Korea shall become free and independent.' See U.S.A., Department of State, Occupation of Japan pp. 51-52 (Appendix 1). The Declaration was reaffirmed by the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July, 1945. See Ibid., pp. 53-54 (Appendix 3).

3. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1947-48 (H.I.I.A., 1952) pp. 699-701.

effectively because they were refused facilities to enter North Korea.<sup>1</sup>

Both North Korea and South Korea wanted to reunite the country under their respective leadership. On June 25, 1950 came the catastrophe when North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and fighting started.<sup>2</sup> But the Communists alleged that the South Koreans first crossed the frontier. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., A.A. Gromyko stated: "The present events in Korea began on June 25 in consequence of a provocative attack launched by forces of the South Korean authorities on frontier areas of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. This attack was the result of a pre-meditated plan."<sup>3</sup> This issue of the incursion from North Korea into South Korea was brought to the United Nations by the United States. Consequently, the Security Council met and demanded<sup>4</sup> the immediate withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38th parallel. The Council also described the incursion, in the absence of the U.S.S.R., as an act of aggression. A unified command under the U.N. flag was set up by the Council on 7 July 1950 and General MacArthur was

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1. Details in Survey of International Affairs 1947-1948, pp. 311-328.

2. Full details in Ibid., (1949-50), pp. 471-489.

3. Pravda, 4 July 1950 and supplement to New Times, 12 July, 1950, p. 2.

4. Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year No. 15, pp. 7-8- (1/1501)

appointed Supreme Commander of the U.N. Korean forces.<sup>1</sup>

On 7 October 1950, the U.N. authorized MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the U.N. Korean forces, to extend the war into North Korea, if necessary. The crisis reached its climax when the U.N. forces approached the Yalu River (which divides Korea from Manchuria) and the Chinese Volunteers in large numbers entered Korea. On 11 October, 1950 a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared that the Chinese people could not 'stand idly while Korea was invaded by the United States and its accomplices.'<sup>2</sup> The intervention of the Chinese 'Volunteer' forces, as a reaction to the crossing of the parallel line by the U.N. Command, made the U.N. condemn China as 'aggressor'.<sup>3</sup> The heavily out-numbered troops under the command of MacArthur fell back and were unable to restore the line until the Chinese were some seventy miles inside South Korea.

After serious reverses, the U.N. forces began to advance again early in 1951. But there came another heavy North Korean-Chinese counter attack in April 1951, which developed into a virtual stalemate at the 38th parallel.<sup>4</sup>

It was early in July 1951 that the negotiations

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1. S/1588; D.A.B., 17 July 1950, p. 83.

2. (quoted, U.N. in World Affairs 1950, p. 302.

3. S/1894; Documents on International Affairs 1949-50, p.674.

4. For details, see Survey of International Affairs 1951, pp. 435-453.

between the two sides began but could not prove to be a success as they were twice broken off.<sup>1</sup> The exchange of prisoners was a serious problem before the parties concerned. However, they reached an agreement<sup>2</sup> on the repatriation of prisoners on June 8, 1953 and, later on, signed an armistice agreement<sup>3</sup> on 27th July, 1953. The agreement, with other things, provided also for the voluntary repatriation of the prisoners of war under the supervision of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Since then neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union could agree on the terms for reuniting Korea and it still remains divided.

#### INDIA AND THE U.S.A.

Korea is situated so strategically that it could be a centre for Chinese and Soviet influence into the sea of Japan or a bridgehead for Japanese penetration of the Asian mainland. Thus for the U.S.A. it has a strategic importance and has been a centre of major Far Eastern Conflicts.<sup>4</sup> Since the Korean Crisis in 1950, the centre of gravity of international politics shifted to the Far East

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1. Text of the U.N. Memorandum on the Break Down of talks with the Communists, 12 July 1951, in D.S.E., 23 July 1951, pp. 151-2.
  2. Ibid., 22 June 1953, pp. 866-8.
  3. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1953, pp.386-407.
  4. For instance, The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.



from Europe and this was the beginning of the cold war in the area concerned and a threat to the world of a third world war. Because of the fear of the expansion of Communism in Korea, the U.S. determined to establish a Government in Korea-friendly to the Western countries and a challenge to the Communists and made Korea pawn in the game of power politics and a field where the conflicting ideologies and ways of life raised their heads.<sup>1</sup> But India thought otherwise. It was in 1945, even prior to the real crisis of 1950, that Indian public opinion was reflected by the Hindu in the following editorial on the Moscow Declaration:

"Big power diplomacy still dominates the settlement of post-war problems; the interests and just rights of smaller peoples have to be subordinated to the prestige and power of the major nations. That rule by Big Powers does not conduce to a widening of freedom through the world, ... rivalry between the mighty powers postpones the dawn of Independence to small peoples ... The end of the Far Eastern war and the occupation by Allied forces that followed have given rise to Russo-American rivalry in Korea. The proper solution for such a tangle would be complete withdrawal of the forces by both Russia and America, which would be consistent not only with the promise made during the war, but also just under the circumstances. ... Korea suffers because two major powers imagine that their strategic interests clash in her territory."<sup>2</sup>

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1. See L.M., "The problem of Korea", The Indian Year Book of International Affairs 1954, vol. III, p. 190.
  2. The Hindu, 30 December 1945.

This was a cold war element.

The reason for the Indo-U.S. differences on Korea was the fact that the two countries viewed the crisis from entirely different angles. An Indian writer observed that the North Korean invasion of South Korea, ironically enough, provided a sore spot in Indo-American relations.<sup>1</sup> The same view was expressed by an American also. India was not interested in NATO and European issues, however, they were remote from India, but while "Korea is an Asian country," wrote Chester Bowles, "India in common with most Asian and Middle Eastern peoples, has watched anxiously the course of this conflict, and it is here that some of the sharpest disagreements have arisen between ourselves and most of non-Communist Asia."<sup>2</sup>

India was willing to see a negotiated settlement of the Korean problem and believed that the division of Korea would be disastrous for the future of Korea and would also jeopardize peace and stability in the Far East, as K.P.S. Menon, the Indian Chairman of the first U.N. Commission had stated on 19 February 1948, even prior to the time, the crisis reached its climax:

"If the Koreans are tenacious of independence,  
they are equally tenacious of their unity.  
Nothing is more remarkable than the homogeneity

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1. Kundra, J.C., Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54, p. 125

2. Bowles, Chester, Ambassador's Report (New York, 1954), p. 238.

of the Korean nation. They belong to the same race, speak the same language and are found of the same traditions. The North cannot live without the South, nor can the South without the North. The South is agricultural and the North is industrial; the South is the bread-basket of Asia, the North is a reservoir of power ... Korea is thus indivisible, whether you look at problems from an economic, political or historical point of view. Deep down in the heart of every Korean, whether in the North or in the South, is this longing for unity. ... Distracted and disillusioned, Koreans of all shades of opinion have been approaching us and telling us that 'the United Nations is our last hope'. If this last hope, too, is shattered Korea may blow up; and it may be the beginning of a vaster cataclysm in Asia and the world."<sup>1</sup>

When in September 1947, the U.S.A. referred the problem of the independence of Korea to the Second Session of the U.N. General Assembly, India supported the inclusion of the issue in the agenda.<sup>2</sup> The same was opposed by the Soviet Union. At the same time India advocated the holding of elections with a view to the calling of a Constituent Assembly at a very early date in Korea and for the establishment of a national Government. Moreover, she did not agree that elections should be conducted by the occupying powers. After the elections on May 10, 1948 in the U.S. zone, the Republic of Korea was formally proclaimed on

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<sup>1</sup> The Statesman, 20 February 1948.

1. His fear proved to be true when on 25th June 1950, the war started between North Korea and South Korea.
2. With the U.S.A., the U.K., China, and Syria.

15 July,<sup>1</sup> but India refused to recognize the Republic of Korea because she felt that such recognition would perpetuate the partition and prejudice all chances of Unification of the country.<sup>2</sup> However, if after the crisis took place, India decided to assist the Republic of South Korea in its fight against invasion, it did not mean and involve any modification of her foreign policy. Rather the policy was based on the promotion of world peace and the development of friendly relations with the countries concerned. Certainly it remained an independent policy determined solely by India's ideals and objectives. It was India's earnest hope throughout the crisis to put an end to the fighting and to settle the dispute by mediation.<sup>3</sup>

India's approach<sup>4</sup> to the problem of Korea was based on the following considerations:

1. North Korea was the aggressor;
2. The war must be localized;

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1. The People's Democratic Republic of Korea was proclaimed in North Korea on September 9, without any reference to the U.N. Commission.
  2. B. Shiva Rao and C. Kondpi, "India and the Korean Crisis", India Quarterly, vol. VII(4), October-December 1951, pp. 298-99.
  3. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 421-22.
  4. Nehru's statement on Korea on 3rd August, Parliamentary Debates, vol. V, pt. II, 3rd August, 1950, Col. 236.

3. Ways and means must be found to end the war at the earliest moment; because the Korean war had the explosive possibility of becoming a large scale world war.
4. The whole-country must get independence.
5. The future of Korea must be decided by the people of Korea without any outside interference.

At a Press Conference on July 7, 1950, Nehru clarified India's stand regarding the Korean War.<sup>1</sup> He denounced the action of the North Koreans and declared that the invasion had been made on a large scale and that it had been well planned. In addition to it he said that India had made no offer of mediation and had no intention of doing so unless so requested. In his view "the best assistance that India can render in this grave crisis is to help in limiting the area of conflict and ending it."<sup>2</sup>

#### THE AMERICAN STAND.

The U.S. viewed the situation otherwise. Unlike India the Americans thought that international Communism was trying to achieve by force what it could not otherwise achieve, and so there was to be no appeasement. "It is that appeasement of dictators. ... the sure road to world war", said President Truman in his Radio Address<sup>2</sup> on

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1. The Hindu, 8th July 1950, p.6, also see Nehru's Press Conferences 1950, pp. 104-111 and Press Conferences 1953, p. 26.

2. On the "Aims and Objectives" of resisting aggression in Korea", D.N.B., vol. XIII (584), September 11, 1950, pp. 407-410.

September 1, 1950 and "If aggression were allowed to succeed in Korea, it would be an open invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere". Therefore, "The United Nations made its historic decision to meet military aggression with armed force. ... The firm action taken by the United Nations is our best hope of achieving world peace", he added. In the same address the President made the following points:

"It is your liberty and mine which is involved. We cannot hope to maintain our own freedom if freedom elsewhere is wiped out. That is why American people are united in support of our part in this task."

"Communist imperialism preaches peace but practices aggression."

"Right now, the battle in Korea is the front line in the struggle between freedom and tyranny. But the fighting there is part of a larger struggle to build a world in which a just and lasting peace can be maintained."

"That is why we in the United States must increase our own defensive strength over and above the forces we need in Korea. That is why we must continue to work with other free nations to increase our combined strength."

Accordingly the U.S. aims and objectives in regard to the Korean crisis might be mentioned as follows:<sup>1</sup>

- 1) Preservation of peace and security through the United Nations in Korea.

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1. See Ibid, pp. 409-410.

- ii) The Koreans had a right to be free, independent, and United - as they wanted to be - under the direction and guidance of the U.N. to help them enjoy that right.
- iii) To prevent the fighting started by Communist imperialists in Korea as it might expand into a general war.
- iv) Belief in freedom for all the nations of the Far East including Korea. Because the freedom of Korea was at stake, the U.S. was fighting under the United Nations for it in defence against aggression.
- v) To teach the nations who acted as tools for the Communist dictatorship that there would be no profit for any people who follow the Communist dictatorship down its dark and bloody path and to ask them to follow the American way of freedom, the way of mutual cooperation and internal peace.

The Americans believed that the reason of the open military assault on the Republic of Korea was the fact that the Republic was too good a society to be tolerated on the otherwise Communist dominated mainland of North Asia, and because it was so good that it could not be overthrown from within by indirect aggression. Direct aggression was the only way to blot out this moral salient on the Communist mainland.<sup>1</sup> Dulles, the consultant to the Secretary, said on July 7, 1950 that<sup>2</sup> "The struggle in Korea represents the

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1. Ibid., vol. XXIII (576), July 17, 1950 p. 90

2. Ibid., p. 92

timeless issue of whether lovers of liberty will be vigilant enough, brave enough and united enough to survive despotism. We have never flinched when a great principle was involved. ... Our own liberty cannot long be safe in a world where despots can strike down liberty, piecemeal, with fire and sword."

Thus the U.S. saw the crisis from a perfect Cold War World strategic view point and the fact of Communist aggression (which was inspired by Russia and China - from the U.S. view) justified the U.S. in taking unilateral action in Formosa in the interests of security and postponing the recognition of Communist China till after the settlement of the Korean issue.

IN-IA-U.S. REACTIONS:

In the beginning the U.S. Government and public welcomed the acceptance by India of the two Security Council resolutions<sup>1</sup> which respectively called on the North Koreans to withdraw back to the 38th parallel and cease hostilities, and asked members of the U.N. "to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security

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1. (S/1501, 25 June 1950) Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, No. 15, pp. 7-8, (S/1511, 27th June, 1950) Ibid., No. 16, p. 4.



in the area". Since the aggression<sup>1</sup> had come from Communist North Korea, India was careful not to give room for any suggestion that as a result of her position on the North Korean aggression, she was ready to condemn the whole Communist World as "aggressors" and that she was finally aligned with the Western bloc, observed an Indian writer.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, India did not send any troops to the aid of South Korean Republic although she had agreed in her communication of 29th June, 1950 that "the halting of aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful conditions are essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement. This policy is based on the promotion of world peace and the development of friendly relations with all countries."<sup>3</sup> On February 17, 1953, speaking in Parliament, Nehru himself said: "We did not take part in the fighting because, though we are prepared to give medical succour, we have nothing to do with the war as such."<sup>4</sup>

The New Delhi correspondent of the New York Times voiced his appreciation:<sup>5</sup> "Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's

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1. India was one of the members of the U.N. Commission on Korea which reported that aggression had taken place. U.N. Doc. S/1496, June 25, 1950.
  2. Kundra, J.C. Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54, pp.126-27.
  3. The Hindustan Times, 30 June 1950. U.N. Doc. S/1520, 29 June 1950.
  4. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 424.
  5. The New York Times, 7 July 1950.

action, in accepting the U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the aggression of North Korea and in imposing counter measures was a highly courageous decision in the context of the delicate state of Indian public opinion, in the view of diplomats and other observers here in this instance Pandit Nehru ... had risked offending a large section of the Indian public that is ultrasensitive on the East-West question." The same issue also pointed out that "President Truman's announcement and the immediate employment of United States arms were condemned as another instance of Western intervention in purely Asian Affairs." Warren Austin, the U.S. representative said: "The cause of Justice and peace is strengthened by this positive help from a great nation such as India."<sup>1</sup>

Nehru also voiced his sympathy for the U.S. when on December 6, 1950 he said: "In the fighting in Korea, the main burden of the United Nations has fallen on the forces of the United States. They have suffered greatly, and I think our sympathy should go out to them."<sup>2</sup>

But India did not go all the way with the United States and other powers who sent their armed forces to

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1. Security Council, Official Record, 30th June 1950, p.10.

2. Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches, 1949-53, p. 192.

Korea which antagonized a large section of the American people. Prime Minister Nehru made his view quite clear that India's support related specifically to Korea and did not extend to the other steps mentioned in President Truman's statement<sup>1</sup> of 27 June regarding Formosa and Indo-China.<sup>2</sup> India abstained from voting when the Security Council passed its third resolution<sup>3</sup> on July 7, 1950, setting up a United Nations command because India was not sending any troops. On the same day Nehru, in his press conference, explained why India declined to send armed forces to Korea. He said: "Any military assistance is beyond India's capacity and would make little difference. India's defence forces have been organized essentially for defence and not for service in distant theatres of war."<sup>4</sup> At the same time Nehru earnestly tried to find a basis for terminating the conflict, and it was on 13 July 1950 that in his identical messages<sup>5</sup> to Marshal Stalin and Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary

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1. D.D.B. / vol. XXIII (574), July 3, 1950, p. 5.

2. See the Communication of (Government of India) dated 29th June, 1950.

3. S/1588, July 7, 1950; D.D.B., 17 July 1950, p. 83.

4. The Hindu, 8 July 1950. But India announced on 29th July 1950 to despatch a field Ambulance Unit and a small surgical Unit to Korea. In addition to it, she supplied 400,000 jute bags and a considerable quantity of medicines.  
Year Book of the United Nations 1950, p. 227

5. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1949-50, pp. 705-6. Also see P.M. Nehru's message of July 19, 1950, Ibid., p. 706-708.

of State, he explained that India's purpose was to localize the conflict and to facilitate peaceful settlement by breaking the deadlock in the Security Council" so that representative of the People's Government of China can take a seat in the Council, the U.S.S.R. can return to it, and, whether within or through informal contacts outside the Council, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and China, with the help and cooperation of other peace loving nations, can find a basis for terminating the conflict and for a permanent solution of the Korean problem." But Nehru received no encouraging response from any of the parties.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, India's policy and actions were determined by her desire that the Korean war should remain localized<sup>2</sup> and that in case of extension she should not be obliged to be involved in it. This position India maintained all along. While condemning the North Korean aggression, she was thinking that the Korean war might assume larger proportions

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1. Thereupon, in a special Session of Parliament on 31 July 1950 President of India Dr. Rajendra Prasad made it clear that the suggestion made by P.M. Nehru in these messages "was not intended to condone aggression or to weaken the authority of the United Nations; it was meant to add to the strength and moral force of the organization and to facilitate the early termination of a dangerous situation." Parliamentary Debates vol. V, pt.II, 31 August 1950, col.10.
  2. Against this see Broadcast by President Truman explaining the need to proclaim a state of Emergency, Dec. 15, 1950. DeB.B., Dec. 25, 1950, pp. 999-1003.

hence she did not want to get involved in it and was very careful.

All these statements, suggestions and activities on the part of India could not have been agreeable for the United States. They thought that Nehru was trying to conciliate the Communist bloc, which was associated with aggression. On 18th July, 1950 in his reply<sup>1</sup> to Nehru's appeal Dean Acheson politely rejected India's suggestion for seating Communist China at the U.N. and said:

"There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation by the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the decision of the Soviet Union itself. ...

"In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant Governments for China's seat in the United Nations is one which must be reached by the United Nations on its merits. It is a question on which there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the United Nations. I know you will agree that the decision should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which should subject the United Nations to coercion or duress."

This reply made it clear that the U.S. regarded

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1. Ibid., vol. XXIII (578). July 31, 1950, pp. 170-71. Against this Marshall Stalin welcomed the appeal and in his reply of July 15, 1950, stated "I fully share your point of view as regards the expediency of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council with the obligatory participations of the People's Government of China." Documents on International Affairs 1949-50, p. 707. The U.S.S.R. representatives, (having resumed seat) in the Security Council on 1 August 1950, said that Nehru's approach of seating the Communist Chinese in the U.N.O. and localization of the Korean war was the right one. Year Book of the United Nations 1950, p. 233

Indian suggestions as implying concessions to the Communist powers as a price to be paid for the North Korean aggression and leaving the Korean question open without asking any commitments on the part of the Communists. In Washington "Nehru's message caused understandable annoyance. The United States was now being asked to buy off a Communist aggression already under way."<sup>1</sup> India thought otherwise. To her these concessions seemed to be necessary parts of the process of easing tensions for a general settlement in the Far East. So there were wide differences between the two countries. In the U.S. eyes the fact of Communist aggression was of uppermost importance while India saw the Korean question together with other Far Eastern issues, thus, she blurred the fact of Communist aggression. Washington was convinced that it was better to fight the aggression than to secure peace by making concessions, which it had refused in the earlier part of the year and was the more unwilling to grant when the only new factor in the situation was an act of aggression against the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

Nehru voiced his annoyance while speaking in the Indian Parliament on August 3, 1950. Without actually

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1. United States in World Affairs 1950, p. 227

2. Survey of International Affairs 1950, p. 512

mentioning the U.S.A. he said:<sup>1</sup>

"If we are energetic in condemning the aggression by North Korea, it is necessary to add that we are by no means satisfied by existing conditions in either North or South Korea. The policy of the Western powers is dominated more by European problems than by those of Asia, and they continue to take decisions which affect vast areas of Asia without understanding the effective needs and the spirit of these people. In the West there is little understanding of the Eastern outlook. ... We can understand the outlook of the Asiatic Countries very much better than the West. Yet the future of Asia is still determined by the statesmen of the Western World."

Nehru emphasized that any attempt to tackle Asian problem without taking Asia into account was bound to prove fruitless. And certainly this was a clear indication of India's differences with the West, led by the U.S.A., on the best way to solve the Far Eastern problems.<sup>2</sup>

Further, the Indo-U.S. differences on Korea came on the issue of crossing of the 38th parallel by the U.N. Forces in October 1950 and Chinese intervention in Korea. On 30 September 1950 at a Press Conference in New Delhi, Nehru publicly stated his firm and vigorous opposition to the crossing

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1. Extract in Documents on International Affairs 1949-50 pp. 708-709. For full text of the statement see Parliamentary Debates, vol. 5, part II, 31 July - 14 August, 1950, cols. 217-236.

2. U.S. in World Affairs, 1950, p. 228.

of the 38th parallel by the U.N. forces and said:<sup>1</sup>

"It would be wrong to carry on military operations, when peaceful methods can bring the necessary results. Therefore, we think that the U.N. forces should not go beyond the 38th parallel till all other means of settlement have been explored. ... It is wrong ... to think that you can gain an objective by pursuing military methods to the utmost and to the last."

Nehru went ahead to refer to the South Korean President Syngman Rhee and said:

"If President Rhee means that he will take all kinds of military steps in furtherance of his aims, then I differ from him. I am no great admirer of President Rhee, anyhow."<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps, the U.S.A. and others regarded the test in Korea in the light of a penal action, whose principal object was the punishment of an aggressor; to Indian opinion however the Korean issue was more like a civil action, whose principal object was the righting of a wrong. To India, therefore, the retreat of the North Koreans behind the 38th parallel meant that the United Nations had accomplished their task of defending Korea.<sup>3</sup> The wrong had been righted and there was no need of crossing the 38th parallel. This crossing certainly alienated Delhi from Washington<sup>4</sup> because India regretted that the U.N. forces did cross the 38th parallel against her strong opposition.

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1. Nehru's Press Conferences 1950, pp. 178-179.

2. Ibid, p. 178.

3. Survey of International Affairs 1950, p. 513.

4. Ibid., 514.



From this time onwards Indo-U.S. views on the Far-Eastern situation almost never coincided and were marked by sharp differences and a great deal of mutual recrimination by the press and public men of the two countries.<sup>1</sup>

India expressed her opposition to the branding of China as aggressor by the U.N. on U.S. initiative on January 20, 1951, as she thought that such a step would hamper peaceful negotiations and increase the chances of war. In spite of the fact that earlier on September 30, 1950 Chou En-lai had warned that his Government would not idly stand by "while the territory of a neighbour was being wantonly invaded",<sup>2</sup> and Western powers could not accept the Chinese contention and crossed the 38th parallel. Henceforth, when Chinese intervened<sup>3</sup> in the early November in 1950 India, rather than blaming the Chinese for it, looked askance at the United States for having precipitated a crisis; having ignored India's warning and thus creating the risk of a general war. India's attitude seemed one of rationalization of the Chinese conduct rather than one of blame, which ran against the U.S. which was outraged by the

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1. Kundra, J.C., Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54, p. 134

2. New China News Agency, October 1, 1950.

3. The U.N. Command in Korea in its report of November 5, 1950 reported contact with Chinese Units, U.N. Doc. S/1884, Nov. 5, 1950; and the U.S. representative in the Security Council alleged on November 28, 1950 that Chinese Communist forces totalling more than 200,000 were engaged in aggression in North Korea. Year Book of the United Nations 1950 p. 242.

Chinese intervention. The U.S. press' and Congress' demand for the use of atomic weapons to stop the increasing Communist Chinese drive and to rescue the U.N. forces increased.<sup>1</sup> This certainly alarmed India. Fortunately the atom bomb could not be used. On February 1, 1951, the United States succeeded in getting passed the resolution,<sup>2</sup> condemning China as aggressor in reaction to the U.S.S.R.'s and China's opposition to the resolution of ceasefire.<sup>3</sup> B.N. Rau earlier had opposed the draft resolution on the ground that no useful purpose would be served by branding the Peking Government as an aggressor, besides the necessary psychological atmosphere for successful negotiations would disappear, accentuating the existing tension. Therefore, he observed that India was opposed to so disastrous a course.<sup>4</sup>

On 28th March 1952 referring to the situation in the Far East Nehru said:<sup>5</sup>

"The United Nations was meant to be an institution for the preservation of peace and was organized as such. Paradoxically enough, it is now engaged in meeting aggression with armed force. Another

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1. U.S. in World Affairs 1951, p.25, President Truman's statement at a press conference on November 30, 1950, The New York Times, December 1, 1950.
  2. Y.B.U.N. 1950, p. 248.
  3. General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No.20 A, Resolutions, 496 (v), p.1
  4. C.A.O.A., 5th session, First Committee, 426th Mtg., 20 January, 1951, p. 524. For details see B.N. Rau's statement the General Assembly on 1 Feb. 1951, C.A.O.A., 5th session 327th Mtg., 1 Feb., 1951, pp. 694-695.
  5. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-53, pp. 195-6.

curious feature of the situation in Korea is becoming increasingly evident. A new development is taking place, a rather remarkable and disconcerting one."

Furthermore, there were minor irritations between the two countries on two issues during the course of armistice negotiations in 1952-53: (i) the scope and make up of the proposed political conference on the Korean settlement,<sup>1</sup> and (ii) the conditions of the repatriation of prisoners of war. The United States wanted conference to be attended only by the nations that had borne the fighting. But India argued, as Korea was only one among many issues in the Far East, that chances of settlement in that area would be enhanced if other interested though non-belligerent Asian countries also took part. The United States was opposed to India's participation in a Korean peace Conference because India was not a belligerent. On the other hand India regarded herself to be more than merely a non-belligerent nation so far as the Korean war was concerned. Perhaps, the cause of the U.S. opposition was the hostile attitude of Ahee's Government toward India as the U.S. delegate Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. explained: "In view of the known attitude of the Republic of Korea the participation of India would jeopardize the success of the Conference."<sup>2</sup>

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1. The question was discussed in the Assembly in August 1953. United States opposed India's inclusion in the Conference.

2. U.N. Year Book 1953, p. 126

He also believed that the Conference was most likely to succeed if it was limited to the belligerents on both sides. On this matter the Indian delegate said that India had no desire to seek a place in the Conference unless it was clear that it could perform some useful function in the interest of peace and that the major parties concerned desired its assistance in the matter.<sup>1</sup> An Indian view on this question was as follows:

"The presence of neutrals would have loosened tension and introduced some cordiality into the bleak atmosphere of a conference of erst-while enemies or belligerents, none of whom could be considered as victor or as vanquished. In this respect the Korean Political Conference is unlike the Versailles type of peace conference. The presence of neutrals, the round table idea and the provision for unanimity between the two belligerent sides for any decision to be adopted, as proposed by the Chinese and North Koreans, seem to be reasonable enough and useful for the successful termination of peace parleys."<sup>2</sup>

Though the Conference was never held "Washington's opposition to the inclusion of India in the Korean Conference", at least, "brought Indo-American relations to a low point, if not the lowest in recent years."<sup>3</sup>

On the question of repatriation of the prisoners of

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1. Ibid.

2. "Political Settlement in the Far East": An Indian view, - Foreign Affairs Report, New Delhi, March 1954, vol. III No. 3, p. 38.

3. Robert Trumbull remarked in a despatch, New York Times, September 27, 1953.

war, in November 1952, the American delegate made the best exposition of the view of the Western Powers and said that the U.N. Command would have agreed to have all prisoners returned, provided no humanitarian considerations prevented such returns. According to him a large number of the prisoners of war under their command feared that, if they were returned, they would be executed, imprisoned or treated brutally; if an attempt was made to return them they would resist it by force. Therefore it would not only be highly immoral to force their return but it would also require a military operation of no inconsiderable proportions. He added, although the Geneva Convention gave the prisoner the right and the opportunity to go home, there was nothing in it to imply that he must be forced at the end of the bayonet to go back when he did not want to do so.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. did not much appreciate the Indian resolution<sup>2</sup> of 17 November 1952 and was not happy about it. They thought that the Indian resolution did not unambiguously guarantee fair treatment to those prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated. Moreover, they thought the resolution was

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1. U.N. Year Book 1952, pp. 186-187.

2. Which was adopted by the General Assembly on 3rd December, 1952. Text in Ibid., pp. 201-202. India presented the resolution, when the deadlock over repatriation delayed the ceasefire. Krishna Menon contended in the Assembly that the Indian resolution was in fact a ceasefire resolution, as the only outstanding obstacle to an armistice agreement in Korea was the prisoners of war issue, and if this issue were settled there would be a ceasefire within twelve hours.

C.A.S.P., 7th Session, First Committee, 535th Mtg., 1 December, 1952, p. 175.

vague about what would happen to those prisoners who opted against repatriation. The U.S. Government was also afraid that the proposed Political Conference would not work smoothly. Hence, they insisted that to make the Indian resolution acceptable to them the reference of the issue of the prisoners of war to the Political Conference must be ruled out.<sup>1</sup>

India's role as the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission<sup>2</sup> was made difficult because of the fact that neither of the two blocs fully cooperated with India in the discharge of her dual duties as Chairman Executive Agent of the NNRC and custodian of the prisoners of war. statements by leading U.S. Administration and Republican Party

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1. G.A.O.R., 7th Session, First Committee, 529th Mtg., 24 November 1952, p. 141. Later with a few amendments which partly met American objections the U.S. accepted the resolution. The U.S.S.R. and Communist China did not accept this. Vyshinsky, the Soviet representative described the resolution in the following words: "The draft resolution of the Indian delegation which is designed not to put an end but to prolong and extend the war, cannot serve the cause of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. G.A.O.R., 7th Session, 399th Plenary Mtg., 3 December 1952 p. 279. Later on, on June 8, 1953 the belligerents concluded an agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war which was very similar to the one India had proposed in her resolution and the U.N. accepted. Text in U.S.R., 22 June 1953 pp. 866-8.
  2. The Commission was established on 9 September 1953, and took charge of custody of the prisoners of war from both sides on the belligerents by 24th September. For a detailed study of the working of NNRC, see Shiva Dayal, India's role in the Korean Question, Delhi, L. Chand and Co., 1959, Chapter V. Under the Armistice Agreement, India was made a member-Chairman and Executive Agency of the 5 member NNRC. Text of the Agreement in UN Year Book 1953, p. 136.

spokesmen raising doubts about the impartiality of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission,<sup>1</sup> of which India was the Chairman, deeply rankled the Government and the press of that country. In October 1953, Dulles' reference to the N.N.R.C. as the "so called neutral body", was not appreciated in India.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Pyun, on August 24, used the strongest language against India, saying that South Korea did not want "a scheming and betraying India on our side" and accused India of "trafficking with the Communists".<sup>3</sup> The New York Times charged that in an effort to stay 'neutral', India had clearly dodged<sup>4</sup> one of the obligations it has assumed. The same paper, in a subsequent editorial, asserted that by refusing to carry out provisions in the armistice agreement in respect of release of the prisoners 'India violates the obligations it assumed when it agreed to act as deciding umpire and as custodian power. It is scarcely in a position to object, much less to charge a violation of the armistice agreement, if the U.N. command makes good the Indian

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1. For the reports of the NNRC see The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, Korean Report and Selected Documents 1954, Printed by the Manager, Government of India Press, New Delhi; Also see for NNRC reports, U.N. Document A/2641.
  2. New York Times, November 1, 1953.
  3. Ibid, August 30, 1953.
  4. Ibid, 15 January, 1954.

default by releasing prisoners in conformity with the armistice agreement."<sup>1</sup> The Washington Post (as quoted in The Hindu, 23 January 1954) blamed India for an impossible legal tangle in the release of prisoners of war. "The Indians chose an obtuse way out of the dilemma of the NNRC after the failure of the two sides to agree to a political Conference ... In seeking to appease China, India has sought to find a muddy middle path when in fact no middle path exists." All this criticism<sup>2</sup> was based on a grave misreading and misinterpretation of the terms of the armistice which did not vest in the Indian Chairman of the NNRC and Executive Agent the powers or the obligations which the criticism invested India with, observed an Indian writer.<sup>3</sup> Another observer said that "a neutral Commission governed rigidly by armistice terms was not the right body to pull chestnuts out of the political fire for the two blocs of the cold war."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid., 19 January 1954. But it was noteworthy that on 21st January, 1954, the New York Times balanced the above criticism with favourable (to India) comment on India's role: "But the final show down under the influence of its greater soldier, General Thimayya, India not only resisted Communist pressure to use force on the prisoners but also turned these men over to the U.N. It may be doubted whether any other power could have done this without precipitating violence, and for fulfilling the substance if not the letter of the armistice agreement India deserves the thanks of free men."
  2. In both the Communist and non-Communist press of the world.
  3. Rajan, K.S. India in World Affairs 1954-56, op. cit., p. 116. It must be mentioned here that even the U.N. Secretary General supported the U.N. Command on this issue stating that the release of the prisoners under the U.N. Command with the civilian status did not contravene the Armistice agreement. The Hindu, 29th January 1954.
  4. See 'Explanations to Korean POWs - Lessons of the Experiment', by a (Presumably Indian) correspondent from the demilitarized zone. The Hindu, 22nd January, 1954.



Nehru reacted quite dispassionately and said, "Whatever may happen today or in the near future in regard to Korea, we may feel in all humility that we used our endeavours in helping to bring hostilities to an end. That was some service to the cause of peace. We have no easy or smooth task, and we have been attacked from all sides and have had to function in the context of hostility, suspicion and bitterness that exist between the two sides. Our impartiality and objectivity have been assailed and the President of the South Korean Government had hurled threats and insults at us. In spite of all this, we have continued to shoulder these responsibilities without giving way to pressure or departing from the purpose that have always guided us --- the promotion of peaceful and just solutions."<sup>1</sup>

But the reaction of the Indian press was much more outspoken and bitter than that of the Government. Calling Senator Knowland's assertion that India was "sabotaging the peace as she did the war" an extraordinary comment, The Hindu<sup>2</sup>

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1. He was speaking before the Kalyani session of the Congress Party. The Hindu, 24 January, 1954. Because of the fact that the South Korean Government had always opposed a peaceful settlement of the Korean war and stood for the unification of Korea by any means even by force, Nehru once publicly referred to the 'irresponsible' manner of the South Korean Government and its threats of violence which he said was against all canons of international law and conduct. Ibid., 7 January 1954. Attacking the Indian proposal for reconvening the U.N. General Assembly, the South Korean Government accused India of having 'definitely aligned herself with the Communist Camp and no longer is her own master. She jumps when Moscow whistles and runs errands for a chubby man with bloody hands who sits in a high seat in the Kremlin.' Ibid., 16 January 1954.

2. Ibid., October 12, 1953.

warned that "these leaders by their statements are encouraging the Rhee Government in its policy of incitement." Moreover, Indian editors began to sprinkle terms such as "sabotage" and "treachery" over their editorial pages. The Free Press Journal asserted, if the United States stands for peace, "then it is high time that the antics of its spokesmen assumed a more reasonable, responsible and persuasive hue", or else drop all pretences.<sup>1</sup> Another editor noted: "The impression is strong that the U.N. command is very much influenced by, even if it does not share, the South Korean opposition to the armistice ... The U.N. Command, taking its cue from Washington, has not been as cooperative with the NNHC as it should be."<sup>2</sup>

It is in this context that the Geneva Conference on the Far East (which met from 26 April to 15 June 1954) failed to arrive at a solution. Unlike the Western Camp which took a tragic view of the situation, it was felt in India that it had at least, demonstrated the desire of both sides to meet and negotiate. Nehru expressed his view in the Parliament that the proposals made at the Conference by both sides could be "a kind of bridgehead from which a hopeful landing to the shores of a Korean settlement may, and indeed, should be

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1. Free Press Journal, October 6, 1953.

2. The Hindu, October 12, 1953.

planned or envisaged."<sup>1</sup>

India did not accept the U.N. sponsored resolution<sup>2</sup> on the question of the unification of Korea. Indian representative, in the course of discussions had urged that to achieve the U.N. objectives of peaceful unification, the best course was direct negotiations between the two parts of Korea, without outside interference.<sup>3</sup>

The above analysis makes it clear that both Americans and Indians wanted peace but they differed over the best way to secure it. While India continued to secure peace and to reduce the threat of a bigger war in East Asia, the United States desiring to avert a new world war, strove for a settlement that would discourage Communist aggression anywhere. In Indian opinion the only way out was withdrawal of all foreign troops from the two Koreas, the opening of talks between the representatives of the two Governments, with a view ultimately to holding internationally-supervised elections in both the halves.<sup>4</sup>

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1. E.P. Debates (25 August 1954, pt. II, vol. VI, No.3, col. 227.

2. The resolution was accepted by the General Assembly on U.N. Year Book 1957, p. 90.

3. Ibid., p. 89

4. See Krishna Menon's speeches - G.A.O.R., 9th session (1954) Plen. Mtgs. pp. 225 ff and G.A.O.R., 10th Session (1955), Plen. Mtgs., p. 242.

As a result of the Indo-U.S. differences, the latter's attitude towards Communist China hardened and perhaps the creation of the SEATO was a reaction to the Korean episode.

Unfortunately all the efforts failed and the parties did not reach any agreement and Korea remained divided. Certainly, the whole question of ending the Korean conflict bristled with a variety of difficulties and problems, because it involved, directly or indirectly all the Great Powers engaged in the Cold War, observed a noted Indian writer.<sup>1</sup> Any way, Western actions and postures in the whole episode were largely motivated by the less edifying considerations of the 'Cold War' strategy by which they sought to encourage deserters from Communist forces in future wars, and use these deserters for their own ends of fighting Communism.<sup>2</sup>

(B) ~~SEATO~~<sup>3</sup>

This was the most important pact which the U.S. concluded with the Asian countries as it aroused vehement criticism and

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1. Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs 1954-56, op. cit., p. 114.

2. Ibid., p. 117

3. Previously the U.S. Military Pact with Pakistan was signed in May 1954 to which India's opposition was overwhelming. This issue is discussed in a separate chapter (No. 5) in the same thesis.

protests in India — both from the Indian Government and the public in general. India had always been advocating a negotiated settlement for all outstanding Far Eastern questions. It was on February 22, 1954 that Nehru made an appeal for a ceasefire in Indo-China. He said: "It seems a tremendous pity that this war should continue without any serious attempt being made to find a way out."<sup>1</sup> In his view the Geneva settlement on Indo-China created a suitable atmosphere for peaceful negotiation.<sup>2</sup> And paradoxically the proposal for a collective defence system in South East Asia to assure 'peace security and freedom' to the nations of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific and which was aimed at countering potential Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia, was sponsored on the eve of Geneva Conference on Far East at which a settlement of the Indo-China conflict was due to be discussed, with China as a participant.

Nehru in his statement to Parliament on 24 April 1954, voiced the Government of India's regret and concern that<sup>3</sup> "a conference of such momentous character, obviously called together because negotiation was considered both feasible and

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1. India News, February 27, 1954.

2. In a statement on July 21, 1954, on the Geneva settlement Nehru spoke as such: "This is one of the outstanding achievements of the post-war era, and for the first time there will be no war in the world. This is a great step forward, but it is only a step, and it has to be followed by persistent efforts at further settlement to assure peace for the future." Ibid., July 24, 1954.

3. E. P. Deb. (24 April 1954), pt. II, vol. IV, No.52, cols. 5580-1. Also see, C. A. Deb. (27 August 1954), vol. VII, No.6, col. 597.

necessary, should be preceded by a proclamation of what amounts to lack of faith in it, and of alternatives involving threats of sanctions. Negotiations are handicapped, they start ill and they make chequered progress, if any at all, with duress, threats, slights and proclamations of lack of faith preceding them.' Furthermore, these developments were of grave concern and of grievous significance to India because "their implications impinge on the newly won and cherished independence of Asian countries. The maintenance of independence and sovereignty of Asian countries as well as the end of colonial and foreign rule is essential to the prosperity of Asian peoples as well as for the peace of the world. We do not seek any special role in Asia, nor we do champion any narrow and sectional Asian regionalism. We only seek to keep for ourselves and the adherence of others, particularly our neighbours, to a peace area and to a policy of non-alignment and non-commitment to world tensions and wars. This, we believe, is essential to us for our own sake and can alone enable us to make our contribution to lowering world tensions, to furthering disarmament and to world peace." He added that "the present developments, however, cast a deep shadow on our hopes, they impinge on our basic policies and they seek to contain us in alignments." In the same statement Nehru emphasized the ominous fact that the announcement of the proposal to set up the SEATO had been preceded by statements

"which came near to assuming protection, or declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine, unilaterally, over the countries of Southeast Asia."

The United States thought otherwise it became interested in having such a pact because of the outbreak of the Korean War which provoked the problem of meeting the Communist challenge in Southeast Asia. John Foster Dulles, speaking at an Overseas Press Club of America at New York on March 29, 1954, clarified the U.S. position that:<sup>1</sup>

"Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now, if we dare not be resolute today."

It was all because of the fact that the area had great strategic value. Southeast Asia was astride the most direct and best developed sea and air routes between the Pacific and South Asia. It had major naval and air bases. Therefore, "Communist control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, with

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1. Dex.D., AAX (772), 12 April 1954, p. 540

whom we have treaties of mutual assistance. The entire Western Pacific area, including the so-called "offshore island chain", would be strategically endangered", said the Secretary in the same address.<sup>1</sup>

Obviously, containment of Communism was the main objective before the United States while formulating the SEATO. Dulles, in his speech before the opening session on 6 September in Manila, said:

"The United States has itself no direct territorial interests in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, we feel a sense of common destiny with those who have in this area their life and being.

"We are united by a common danger, the danger that stems from international Communism and its insatiable ambition. We know that wherever it makes gains, as in Indo-China, these gains are looked on, not as final solutions, but as bridgeheads for future gains."<sup>2</sup>

Consequently, any significant expansion of the Communist world would, indeed, be a danger to the United States, because "international communism thinks in terms of ultimately using its power position against the United States. Therefore, we could honestly say, using the words that President Monroe used in proclaiming his Doctrine, that Communist armed

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., XXXI (785), 20 September 1954, p. 391.



aggression in Southeast Asia would, in fact, endanger our peace and security and call for counteraction on our part",<sup>1</sup> declared Dulles in his address to the Nation over radio and television on September 15, 1954. It meant that the United States was interested in the defence of Siam, Burma, Malaya and the remaining parts of the former French Empire in Indo-China i.e. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from both internal subversion and external aggression. Moreover the Americans were alarmed at the Communist success in Indo-China and wanted to create an immediate deterrent against Communist expansion to prevent the falling of the Asian "rice bowl" into the hands of the Communists.<sup>2</sup>

Contrary to this American thinking India's reaction to the formation of such a pact like SEATO, almost immediately after the Geneva settlement, was extremely unfavourable. India was not ready to see any talk about an anti-Communist collective defence system at a time when the contemplated "Peace Area" appeared as having become an accomplished fact. Just before the Geneva settlement, the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet had been signed on April 28, 1954 which paved the way for very cordial relations between the two countries. A general statement containing the 'five principles' of peaceful coexistence was also attached to this agreement. These

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1. Ibid., LXXI (796), September 27, 1954, pp. 431-432.

2. For a background to SEATO, see Dulles: "A survey of Foreign Policy Problems", Ibid., LXVIII (711), February 9, 1953, p. 213. Also see Ibid., LXVIII (714), March 2, 1953, pp. 331-333.

principles were reiterated on June 28, in a joint statement<sup>1</sup> by Premiers Nehru and Chou-En-Lai during the latter's visit<sup>2</sup> to New Delhi and Rangoon, which had tremendous impact on the forces governing the present international relationships of the countries of Asia. Since the Communist China had accepted and pledged to maintain "Five Principles", the leaders of non-aligned Governments of South and Southeast Asia were relieved for it meant that Communist China would not assist the Communist movements in their countries.

Nehru refused even to participate in the Manila Conference and said:<sup>3</sup>

"Our participation in the Manila Conference would have meant our giving up our basic policy of non-alignment ... Secondly our going there would obviously have affected our position in Indo-China, as Chairman of the three commissions there. We had gone there and we had been chosen by all parties for those responsible posts because we were thought to follow a certain policy. Now, if we change that policy and go behind that, our whole position in Indo-China would have changed. That would have been a very improper thing to do ... It seems to me, this particular Treaty is looking dangerously in this direction of spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful countries because,

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1. Full Text in India News, July 3, 1954.
  2. In June 1954.
  3. India, Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 7, pt. II, No. 30 (29 September 1954), cols. 3677-81. For full details see Ibid., cols. 3675-97

ultimately, it is the big and powerful countries that will decide and not the two or three weak and small Asian countries that may be allied to them. ... There is reference to a fact or situation created within this area which might entitle them to intervene ... Does this not affect the whole conception of integrity, sovereignty and independence of the countries of this areas ... The whole approach of this treaty is not only a wrong approach but a dangerous one from the point of view of any Asian country ... We have ventured to talk about an area of peace and we have thought that perhaps, one of the major areas of peace might be Southeast Asia. Now, the Manila Treaty rather comes in the way of that area of peace. It takes up that very area which might be an area of peace and almost converts it into an area of potential war."

The objection, which Nehru made seriously was to the provision (article IV, 2) of the Treaty<sup>1</sup> for regarding situations "other than by armed attack" as constituting danger to the signatory powers. India regarded the inclusion of the territories of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the Treaty area,<sup>2</sup> as going against the spirit of the Geneva settlement.<sup>3</sup> Because of the fact that the Indo-China settlement was based on the fundamental assumption that the new born states would remain

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1. For Text see D.S.E., XXXI (795), September 20, 1954 pp. 393-396.

2. Ibid., p. 395.

3. India News, September 18, 1954.

neutral, the inclusion of these states in the Treaty area affected that basic assumption and the whole conception of the Geneva Conference decisions is shaken ..., not only psychologically but practically.<sup>1</sup> Krishna Menon made a detailed statement on India's point of view on the pact in the United Nations General Assembly and said:<sup>2</sup>

"We think that is contrary to the sovereignty and self-respect of the people who are there. It is contrary to the spirit, if not the terms, of the (United Nations) Charter and, what is more, it is something calculated to prevent the Asian countries from ironing out their differences, and it is also something calculated to perpetuate the very things it is seeking to prevent."

It was not an alliance between equals and was based upon diplomacy by threats.

Apart from all these objections, India was directly affected by the SEATO because India came under the 'treaty area' of the pact, as well as the fact that a none-too-friendly Pakistan was a member of it observed an Indian writer.<sup>3</sup> Pakistan was the only 'Colombo Power' which participated in the Manila Conference and which also joined the Conference. India believed that the only reason for her joining the pact was her hostility

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1. C.C. Deb. (26 August 1954), vol. VII, No.4, cols. 447-8.

2. G.A.O.R., 9th Sess. (1954), Plen. Mtgs., pp. 229-30.

3. Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs 1954-56, p. 88

towards India. This might be proved from the obvious facts: (i) While signing the Manila Treaty on the SEATO, the Pakistani Foreign Minister emphasized the point that it was aimed at 'aggression' from whichever quarter, i.e., not merely from the Communist quarter --- it may proceed in a region where 'aggression has unhappily been a common experience during the past many years.'<sup>1</sup> On his insistence the Article 4 of the treaty was redrafted to omit, the qualification 'Communist' against 'aggression'. Except the United States which made a reservation on the issue, the other members of SEATO consented to Pakistan's stand.<sup>2</sup> (ii) At the instance of Pakistan, a reference was made to the need for early settlement of the Kashmir dispute, in the Karachi meeting of the Council of the SEATO in March 1956 in its communique.<sup>3</sup> In Indian view, this reference was wholly outside the purview of the organisation. The Indian Government reacted rather strongly against this reference. To Nehru it came as a great 'surprise' and the reference to Kashmir had confirmed his 'worst apprehensions about the organisation'

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1. The Hindu, 9 September 1954.

2. In fact, the Pakistani Foreign Minister was reported to have said that the treaty covered aggression by India against Pakistan. Coral Bell, Survey of International Affairs 1954, op.cit., p.80

3. The Hindu, 9 March 1956.

which it represented. Nehru's objection was that since the subject of Kashmir had nothing to do with the declared object of the SEATO (to increase defensive strength of member nations against external aggression and internal subversion), the reference could only mean that "a military alliance is backing one country, namely, Pakistan, in its dispute with India. For any organisation to function in this way to the detriment of a country, which is friendly to the individual countries comprised in the organization, would at any time be considered as impropriety." Therefore, India had protested to all the countries concerned at the unusual procedure adopted by the council.<sup>1</sup>

India regarded the establishment of the SEATO as the very negation of the recognition of the Geneva settlement on Indo-China that there was the need and practicability of co-existence of states of differing ideologies, especially China vis-a-vis the Indo-China States. How could the U.K. and France, who took the initiative to negotiate the Indo-China settlement, have also participated in the Manila Conference and agreed to set up the SEATO was all the more odd, if not worse. Nehru suggested that if their real objective was to ensure security for the Southeast Asian region, then the Republic of China must be recognized and allowed to come

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1. H.P. Deb. (20 March 1956), pt. II, vol. II, No.27,  
col. 3042

into the United Nations.<sup>1</sup> It had been India's foreign policy to develop friendly relations with China and she was not going to join any anti-China combination.

Once Nehru voiced his concern also about the after effects of the treaty. He said that "countries get interlocked with each other, each pulling in different directions and in a crisis you are pulled away in a direction you never thought of going."<sup>2</sup> He feared that this would end in turmoil and create hatred, fear and apprehension among countries.

Another consideration was the apprehension of India that the SEATO would mean a return of the West, to Asia<sup>3</sup> and a domination of the Asian countries in a new form because the Western powers would provide the military assistance under the pact and naturally the Asian countries would be dominated by those powers and would only be junior powers to the pact.

Against the outspoken opposition from India, the Pact was signed on 8 September 1954 under the leadership of the United States. This was once again an evident proof that the United States was not prepared to halt its own defence

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1. India, Lok Sabha Debates, (29 September 1954) vol. 7 pt.II No. 30, cols. 3687-90. For a detailed Indian critique of the SEATO, see R.K. Karanjia, SEATO, Security or Menace? (Bombay, 1956).

2. India, Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 3, pt. II, March-April, 1956 cols. 3735-6.

3. See Poplai and Talbot, India and America, pp. 134-135.

plans in deference to Indian opposition.<sup>1</sup> The Eastern Economist, a right wing and pro-West paper commented that "a decision of this magnitude should have been made against the studied opposition of India, Indonesia and Burma and the half-hearted opposition of Ceylon is itself an indication that Western powers are not prepared to accept Asian feeling as a bar to rapid military action."<sup>2</sup> The Western bloc was thus frustrating India's policy of 'peaceful co-existence' and lessening of tensions.

In the United States itself, there were few persons who were against the SEATO. Mr. Chester Bowles was one of them. At least he expressed his doubts as to the usefulness of a South-East Asia Defence Organisation without the participation of India and other 'neutralist' countries and said:<sup>3</sup>

"To rely on an alliance of these nations (South-Korea, Formosa, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, Newzealand with less than a population of 15% of free Asia) would be like trying to hold Europe with a NATO consisting of Spain, Portugal and Greece with the rest of Europe sitting on side lines. It would be welcome assistance, but it could hardly be decisive."

According to Walter Lippman<sup>3)</sup>, the Manila Treaty "is the first formal instrument in modern times which is designed

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1. As the U.S. aid in the case of military aid to Pakistan prior to the SEATO.
  2. "India after SEATO", The Eastern Economist, Sept. 17, 1954, p. 457. In opposing the SEATO, India was able to take Burma and Indonesia with her and exercised enough influence to keep a wavering Ceylon away from the pact.
  3. Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report, op. cit., p. 386.



to license international intervention in internal affairs.' In particular, the United States had acquired in the treaty 'an undefined right and an implied obligation to intervene under certain conditions.'<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, though India did not join the Communist bloc, the signing of the SEATO did help in India's coming to a better understanding with that bloc, especially with Communist China and added to the suspicion of the West in the minds of the Indians.<sup>2</sup>

N.B continued on Page 180.

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1. The Hindu, 19 September 1954, For example, U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.
  2. Kundra, J.C., Indian Foreign Policy (1947-54), op.cit. p.98. Also see V.F. Dutt, "Indian Policy and Attitude towards a South-East Asia Treaty Organisation", Foreign Affairs Report, (New Delhi), September 9, 1954.

( P.T.O )

(C) SUEZ CRISIS:

One of the most important cold war issues was the Suez canal conflict on which the views of India and the United States did not coincide to a certain extent. It was the announcement<sup>1</sup> of the nationalization of the Suez canal company, on 26 July 1956, by President Nasser of Egypt which marked the beginning of the tragedy.<sup>2</sup> By this announcement the Government of Egypt proposed to use the income from the company to build the Aswan Dam and the Company's shareholders were to be paid compensation in accordance with the last closing prices. According to the Egyptian Government the company had always been an Egyptian company, therefore, subject to Egyptian law and nationalisation in no way did affect

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1. The Times, 12 September 1956.

2. Perhaps, President Nasser did it in reaction to the Anglo-American decision to suddenly withdraw a week earlier the offer of aid to build the Aswan High Dam.

Previously the Canal was owned and operated by the Universal Suez Canal Company which was an Egyptian joint-stock company registered in Egypt, although the majority of its shareholders were foreigners. It enjoyed a 99-year concession from the Egyptian Government, which was due to expire in 1968 after which the control was to revert to Egypt (Egypt had already and repeatedly announced its intention not to renew the concession). The Constantinople Convention of 1888, an international treaty, regulated the canal and assured freedom of navigation in the canal and non-discrimination to all its users. For a short but lucid account see, A.P.S. Bindra, Suez Thrombosis (Delhi, 1969).

Egypt's international commitments in regard to the use of the canal under the 1888 Convention and the recent Anglo-Egyptian agreement of October 1954. Moreover, assurances were held out that freedom of navigation in the canal would not be affected in any manner or to any degree. The stand taken by President Nasser in regard to the nationalisation of the Suez canal was thus perfectly justified.

This move aroused quick and bitter criticism and opposition in the Western countries - in Britain, France and the United States particularly. These countries took certain financial and economic measures against Egypt and held urgent consultations in London where - in order to consider the establishment of an international agency for the canal to ensure freedom and security of transit with due regard to the interests of Egypt - they announced on 2nd August a plan to hold a 24-Power Conference; including India, at London. In their view the Egyptian act of nationalization was an 'arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an international agency'. It was also said that the act threatened freedom and security of the canal guaranteed by the convention of 1888.<sup>1</sup>

The London Conference was held during 16-23 August.<sup>2</sup> Again, 18 nations met in London in the third week of

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1. The Suez Canal Problem July 26 - September 22, 1956: A Documentary Publication, Washington, The Department of State, 1956, pp. 34 f.

2. In which 22 States participated instead of the 24 invited. India attended it.

September 1956 and discussed the proposal to constitute a Canal User's Association. This Association was formally inaugurated at London on 1 October.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps it was India's opposition to this association and indication of the inherent risk of war that made Anglo-French decision to take the issue to the United Nations. The crisis reached its peak when Israel launched sudden aggression against Egypt on 29 October by Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal area two days later.

#### INDIAN AND AMERICAN REACTIONS:

Though, both India and the United States opposed and their views coincided on the aggression by Israel, Britain and France against Egypt, it was on the issues - of nationalisation, of the Suez canal by Egypt, the two London Conferences, the proposed Canal Users' Association - that they had quite divergent views.

The national interests of the two countries were not alike. The American leaders viewed the Middle East not, like the British and French governments, in terms of national interest, but as one sector in a global policy in which the adversary was not Arab nationalism but Soviet 'imperialism'.<sup>2</sup> On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower made

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1. India opposed it.

2. Survey of International Affairs 1956-1958, p. 8.

a detailed statement in the congress. He said<sup>1</sup>:

"The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of communising the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East ... If the nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation."

The United States was not ready to commit itself to the Anglo-French cause rather it played a conciliatory role so as to keep away the area- Middle East- from the clutches of power politics and to keep itself on good terms with the countries of the Middle East. Therefore, on September 26, 1956, the Secretary of State Dulles declared:<sup>2</sup> "The purpose of the United States in relation to the Suez situation is precisely that which is set forth in the First Article of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, to seek a settlement by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of 'justice and international law.'" In no way, Washington was likely to undermine American influence by lining up with the colonialist powers against Egypt.

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1. United States Policy in the Middle East - September 1956 - June 1957, Documents, Department of State Publication 6505, August 1957, pp. 16-17.

2. Ibid., p. 87.

In the United States view, the Suez canal's importance lay in the fact that it enabled the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on the commerce that was essential if these countries were to maintain well-rounded and prosperous economies. The Middle East provides a gateway between Eurasia and Africa. Furthermore, it contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and Africa. The nations of Europe were peculiarly dependent upon this supply, and this dependency related to transportation as well as to production. This was vividly demonstrated by "the closing of the Suez canal and some of the pipe lines. Alternate ways of transportation and, indeed, alternate sources of power can, if necessary, be developed. But these cannot be considered as early prospects .. These things stress the immense importance of the Middle East," remarked President Eisenhower.<sup>1</sup>

Though, the United States was not dependent on West-Asian oil and her resources were sufficient to meet her own requirements even in the event of war, the American experts were of the opinion that the United States and her allies could not carry on a prolonged war without Middle East

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1. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

oil.<sup>1</sup> In addition the United States has a significant economic interest both in the extraction of the West Asian oil and in its supply and distribution to Europe.

Certainly, the overriding foreign policy objective of the United States in West Asia was to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the region the American policy makers while realising that the Arab nationalism would serve as the best deterrent against Soviet expansion, were greatly disturbed by what they regarded as the dangerous and misguided policies of President Nasser of Egypt<sup>2</sup> particularly his policy of non-alignment.

Secretary of State Dulles in July 1956 took a new course of action towards Egypt when he dramatically announced that the United States had decided to withdraw its offer of financial aid for the construction of the High Dam at Aswan.. The withdrawal of the aid offer, and more so its manner

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1. Information supplied by the U.S. Department of State in reply to the questions put by Senator William J. Fulbright (Democrat) Arkansas), U.S. Senate, The President's proposal on the Middle East, n. 7, I, 31.
  2. Venkataramani, M.S., 'Cold and U.S. Foreign Policy During the Suez Crisis - 1956-7', International Studies, vol. 2, No. 2, October 1960, I.S.I.S., Asia Publishing House, New Delhi 1960, p. 114.

angered the Egyptian people and their President, and led to speculations about the possibility that Egypt might retaliate by denying the Suez canal to Western ships and thereby jeopardizing the flow of oil to Europe.

India and Egypt were two very good friends following the policy of non-alignment. The two countries had the deepest sympathy for, and support to each other's aspirations, internal and external, and indeed, they had almost identical attitudes on most of the world issues - of adhering to the Panchsheel and the Bandung principles. India was interested in the continued availability of the canal for the transit of shipping or goods of all user-nations without discrimination on the same terms and conditions as before, and that the Egyptian Government had readily and fully guaranteed to all users of the canal. Therefore, the reactions of the Government of India and people to the Egyptian act of nationalization were contrary to those of the Western governments and Press. The bitter reactions, the militant postures and the hostile actions of the West against Egypt were not comprehensible and justifiable to the Government and people of India.<sup>1</sup>

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1. For a closely and cogently argued defence of Egyptian nationalization, see 'Suez and Sovereignty', Economic Weekly, 4 August 1956.



In the view of Prime Minister Nehru, the nationalisation of the Suez canal was 'symptomatic' of the weakening of the domination of European Powers over West Asia which had lasted for over a hundred years. 'Asia is on the march, and is emerging to take its rightful place in world affairs.'<sup>1</sup> Further more, in a statement in the Lok Sabha, on August 8, 1956, Nehru said:<sup>2</sup>

"The Suez canal company, which is nationalised by Egypt controls the operation and the equipment, and holds the concession of the Suez canal. The canal itself is in Egypt and an integral part of Egypt. The sovereignty of Egypt is thus beyond question ... The Suez canal company is an Egyptian company and, in Egypt's view, subject to the laws of the country ... No question of expropriation has arisen since the shareholders are to be compensated at market value. Even if there remain any outstanding differences in matter, they do not call for developments which lead to an international crisis."

India was not a disinterested party. She was a principal user of this waterway, and her economic life and development were also affected by the dispute. Even more, India was passionately interested in averting a conflict. She was in friendly relations with Egypt and had also good

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1. The Hindu, 2 August 1956.

2. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 528-29.

and close relations with the principal Western countries involved; and these relations were held in great esteem by us. The considerations and the criteria on which the Government had to base their decision were therefore not easy to determine. They were to be such as could serve the cause of averting the conflict and obtaining a peaceful settlement before it was too late. Certainly, in the words of Nehru<sup>1</sup>, "The settlement of this problem, on the basis of the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt, and by agreement amongst all concerned, and the abandonment of postures of threats and violence and of unilateral action by either party", were of the utmost concern to India.

Nationalization of the Suez Canal took the United States, British and French governments by surprise. They held consultations at London<sup>2</sup> and it was decided that Nasser could not be allowed 'to seize control of the canal' in defiance of international agreements and that Britain's 'essential interests in this area must be safeguarded, if necessary by military action'.<sup>3</sup> But the United States was not willing to use force. The statement issued by

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1. Ibid., p. 531.

2. The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, London, 1960, p.424.

3. Ibid., p. 426-7.

the United States noted that 'the seizure of the installations of the Suez Canal Company' had 'far-reaching implications', but took the view that the matter was principally of concern to those nations whose economies depend upon the products' passing through the canal.<sup>1</sup> Thus the United States attitude, during the tripartite consultations was to widen the basis of discussion, to keep the parties talking, and to avoid precipitate action.

The Western case was, indeed, built on the assumption that the three powers were defending not national interests it was, on the contrary, the bone of their accusation against Nasser that he was 'taking selfish action for purely national ends'<sup>2</sup> - but a 'great international waterway' in which many 'other countries, particularly, Australia, India, Ceylon, and a large part of Southeast Asia, had 'a close interest'.<sup>3</sup> As for the United States, Dulles had from the beginning laid down the principle that it was essential to 'mobilize world opinion in favour of international operation of the canal' and to 'get our tripartite

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1. Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 117.

2. Ibid., p. 159.

3. Ibid., pp. 126, 161.

views accepted by at least a two-thirds majority of the conference that was to be called<sup>1</sup> - indeed, this was the implicit presupposition upon which American willingness to act with Britain and France was based.

There arose further differences between India and the United States on the character of the London conference.<sup>2</sup> India would attend the conference, announced<sup>3</sup> Nehru on August 8, 1956, because, his government had satisfied itself that its participation would not 'injure the interests or sovereign rights and dignity of Egypt'; it had also 'obtained the necessary assurances from the United Kingdom. And the decision was taken with the full cognizance of Egypt. India was not bound by the principles of international control set out in the three-power statement, and its decision to attend was determined less by its interests as a major user of the canal than by the hope that Indian participation would contribute to a peaceful settlement. He further said that "the Government are well aware that this conference can reach no final decisions; for that requires the agreement of Egypt" and Egypt could not and

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1. Eden, Memoirs, p. 437.

2. Which met on 16 August. Egypt did not attend it.

3. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 530-532.

would not take part in a conference to which, although a principal, it had merely been invited without prior consultation.

The United<sup>States</sup>/thought otherwise. Herman Finer while giving account of Dulles' policy on Suez crisis wrote that in the mind of Dulles the U.S.S.R. was resolved to be the champion of Egypt; so was India of Pandit Nehru and V.K. Krishna Menon. Secretary of State Dulles was not fond of Pandit Nehru or Krishna Menon. He knew how deep and contemptuous was the hatred Menon bore towards the United States, a sour, corrosive hatred. Any way the Indian Ambassadors in Cairo (N.A.Y.J. Bahdur) and Washington (G.L. Mehta) were busy with Nasser and Dulles respectively. The Indian Ambassador to Washington called on Dulles and told him that the Indian Government did not like Dulles' plan for international management of the canal.<sup>1</sup> During discussions with Krishna Menon, before the beginning of the First London Conference, Dulles judged the Indian plan of merely instituting supervision over a canal authority, which would be altogether and exclusively Egyptian, as inadequate as his present approach.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Finer, Herman, ~~Dulles over Suez~~, <sup>The Theory and</sup> Practice of His Diplomacy, London, 1964, pp. 114, 133-135.

2. Ibid., p. 144.

On the following two issues the two countries had quite divergent plans: (i) the question of Egypt's sovereign rights, (ii) the nature of the proposed 'international system' and the character and functions of the proposed operating body. The plan introduced by Dulles was more in accord with the views of the British and French Governments than those of the Egyptian Government. The United States and the Indian plans<sup>1</sup> were based on 'diametrically opposite approaches to the question', as Prof. Hajan observed.<sup>2</sup> The Indian plan was to start negotiations with a basis of Egyptian sovereignty and then decide the quality and quantity of international association necessary to ensure the proper working of the canal and the legitimate interests of the user-nations. The American-British-French approach postulated as a basis international control of the Canal, and then decide the quality and quantity of sovereignty which could safely be left over to Egypt consistently with the dominant interests of the user-nations. Walter Lippman observed<sup>3</sup> that the end-result of the two approaches might have had little real difference, but the

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1. For a verbatim record of the proceedings of the conference see The Suez Canal Problem July 26-September 22, 1956: A Documentary Publication, Washington, the Department of State, 1956.
  2. Hajan, M.S. , India in World Affairs 1954-56, p. 159.
  3. The Piquet, 21 September 1956.

two plans represented both in origin and content too widely divergent outlooks and attitudes. The fact remained that the Western Powers deliberately sought to side-track the only two real issues in the Suez question, i.e., the legality of nationalization and the terms and procedure of compensation to the shareholders of the nationalized company and tried to bamboozle Egypt and the rest of the world to believe the one and only issue for settlement was international control of the canal - an issue which hardly arose out of Egyptian nationalization of the canal.<sup>1</sup>

In an editorial, The New York Times<sup>2</sup> sought to confuse and discredit the Indian position by, on the one hand, stating that the real issue in the dispute was whether the canal should be an Egyptian waterway or an international waterway, and by pretending, on the other hand, that the questions of Egyptian sovereignty, Arab nationalism or colonialism were not at issue.

Criticising the United States sponsored plan, which sought to internationalize the operating agency, Krishna

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1. Rajan, M.S., op.cit.

2. New York Times, 21 August 1956.

Menon, the chief delegate of India to the conference, remarked:<sup>1</sup> "It is inconceivable that the Egyptian Government will surrender by treaty what it has already set up". And also that the Indian and U.S. proposals 'represented two fundamentally different approaches. One sees internationalisation as the only remedy - the repeal of nationalisation. My plan does not involve the abdication of the position the Western Powers have taken upon internationalization. They can keep that position. But we must find a position between the Western position and de facto position of Egypt. The purpose of negotiations is to alter the position of both sides'. India was not on either side of the dispute. 'We are trying to get a workable arrangement', further he said.

India disagreed with the alternative b-Power proposal,<sup>2</sup>

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1. The Hindu, 23 August, 1956. For Text of Krishna Menon's speeches see, The Suez Canal Crisis and India, New Delhi, Information Service of India (1956).
  2. Originally sponsored by the United States and slightly amended by four other powers which received the support of 18 participants of the conference and had for its object the international control and operation of the Suez canal. It proposed negotiating with Egypt a convention which would provide for the creation of a Suez Canal Board for operating, maintaining, and developing the canal to which Egypt (which would be member of the Board) would grant 'all rights and facilities appropriate to its functioning'. The Board would make periodic reports to the United Nations. The plan also provided for an arbitral commission to settle disputes arising from the operation of the canal.



though urged the Egyptian Government to relieve the Menzies Committee (to present the plan to President Nasser of Egypt), because India did not want to do 'anything which would throw a hurdle in the way of negotiations',<sup>1</sup> said Menon. India rejected the British and French Government's proposal (proposed to Egypt with the concurrence of the United States, ignoring the Egyptian proposal<sup>2</sup>) for setting up a canal users' association, which would seek to operate the canal, collect transit dues and pay Egypt appropriately.<sup>3</sup> Criticising the proposal Prime Minister Nehru said that "the action proposed is not the result of agreement, co-operation or consent, but is to be taken unilaterally and thus in the nature of an imposed decision", and regretted that "this

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1. The Hindu, 28 August 1956. Earlier he had called the Suez controversy a 'crisis of confidence' partly from the way in which nationalization was affected and partly by troop movements. His view was that agreement to negotiate would be a step in restoring confidence. Ibid., 23 August 1956.
  2. Egyptian Government declined to accept the plan presented by the Menzies Committee on the ground that it was not in conformity with the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt. The Egyptian Government itself proposed that all user-nations meet and discuss the creation of a negotiated body to consider questions of freedom of navigation, canal development, toll charges etc., and to review the 1888 convention.
  3. Egypt denounced the proposal as an act of provocation and a violation of the 1888 convention. India sided with Egypt.

development which is very unusual, and will render peaceful settlements more difficult of realization. It is not calculated to secure to the users peaceful and secure use of canal, which should be, and is, what is required by the users and the international community." Nehru, at the same time, welcomed President Nasser's proposal of creating a 'negotiating body'.<sup>1</sup> The Times of India, in its issue of September 14, 1956, called the decision to set up the Users' Association 'political bankruptcy for which it would be difficult to discover an adequate parallel'.

Despite the fact that both India and the United States had divergent views to a certain extent, for Washington, the basic consideration was probably that 'war over Suez would mean the bankruptcy of American policy in the Middle East', and, indeed throughout Asia.<sup>2</sup> The Manchester Guardian in its issue of September 15, 1956 reported that the course of events in August had made clear the key role of India, and that the State Department in Washington, in formulating its policy, was 'thinking of New Delhi even more than of Cairo', or possibly even then of London.

1. H.P. Deb (13 September 1956). pt.II, vol.viii,  
No. 45, col. 6965.

[illegible]

2. Manchester Guardian, 6 August 1956.

It was the triple aggression against Egypt by Britain, France and Israel, on 31 October 1956 that brought the coincidence of views of both the countries. The two countries condemned the aggression. Nehru publicly branded Israeli action as a case of 'clear, naked aggression'. Anglo-French action was condemned by him as follows: "After fairly considerable experience in foreign affairs, I cannot think of a grosser case of naked aggression than what England and France are attempting to do..." He expressed his regret at the Veto of the U.S. draft resolution<sup>1</sup> by England and France in the Security Council and said "In the middle of the 20th century, we are going back to the predatory method of the 18th and 19th centuries. But there is a difference now. There are self-respecting, independent nations in Asia and Africa, which are not going to tolerate this kind of incursion by the colonial powers."<sup>2</sup> In Nehru's view the Anglo-French aggression was the end-result of the Baghdad Pact which divided Arab nations and invited Soviet apprehensions of a threat to their Southern frontier by its opponents in the 'cold war'.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Condemning Israeli aggression, calling for immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces behind armistice lines.

2. The Hindu, 2 November 1956.

3. Nehru at the A.I.C.C. Meeting. The Hindu, 12 November 1956.

In the General Assembly, while supporting the U.N. draft resolution<sup>1</sup>, the Indian delegate said:

"There has been released over Egypt and its people a manifestation of the law of the jungle, instead of the law of peace and the law of nations as enshrined in the Charter. Thus on the territory of Egypt is a mockery being made of the charter of the United Nations, and there the organs of the United Nations are being affronted by aggression and invasion."<sup>2</sup>

In the United States anger was intense; veteran reporters said they could not remember ever seeing American opinion, both official and public so incensed.<sup>3</sup> Dulles expressed his 'extreme displeasure' to the British Charge d'affairs,<sup>4</sup> and no doubt was left that Britain, France and Israel were believed to have executed a preconcerted operation about which the United States had been deliberately left in the dark. The United States played an important role in the

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1. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 2 November 1956 which urged immediate cease-fire by all the parties and halting of movement of military forces and withdrawal of forces behind armistice line. U.N. Doc: A/3256. India welcomed the creation of the U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt and was one of the 24 members of the U.N. which offered their forces.
  2. G.A.O.R., 1st Emergency Spl. Session (1956), 562nd Mtg., p. 31.
  3. Manchester Guardian, 1 November 1956.
  4. The Times, 1 November 1956.

General Assembly by putting forth its proposal for immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops. But it rejected the Soviet proposal<sup>1</sup> of joint Soviet-American military intervention within the frame-work of the United Nations. This Soviet initiative was described as 'unthinkable', 'an obvious attempt to divert world attention from the Hungarian tragedy.'<sup>2</sup> The fact was that the United States wanted to employ Asian influence in the United Nations for reaching a settlement of this problem. The Hindustan Times<sup>3</sup> reported that "Washington plans to use this influence in India to marshal Afro-Asian pressures on President Nasser both with the short-term objective of clearing the canal and for the working out of suitable guarantees that freedom of navigation will not be obstructed."

As a result of the Indian, American and Soviet efforts the Anglo-French forces completed their withdrawal of its forces on 22 December.

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1. Put forward by Premier Bulganin in his letter to President Eisenhower. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1956, pp. 292-4.
  2. Ibid., pp. 294-95.
  3. The Hindustan Times, 3,12, 56.

The influential Indian newspaper Statesman<sup>1</sup>, praised the American Government for a sense of responsibility and the spirit of moderation that it had displayed. Actually Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that the U.S. Government took one of its most difficult and momentous decisions in recent times when it resolved to be loyal to its commitments to the United Nations rather than to her historic ties with Britain and France.<sup>2</sup> This decision was not made exclusively on the basis of devotion to the ideals of the world organisation but also of hard-headed calculations concerning the short and long term interests of the United States. Oil was one of the most important factors. The Suez crisis brought out clearly the vulnerability of waterways and pipelines located in unfriendly territory and there by gave added impetus to the huge programme of tanker construction which many companies had already underway. Another lesson for the U.S. and its allies was that the development of nuclear power must be given even greater priority than previously

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1. The Statesman, 3 November 1956.

2. "Secretary Dulles, News Conference of February 5", D.I.B., 36 (25 February 1957), p. 305.

in order to lesson the extent of dependence on West Asian oil.<sup>1</sup>

American policy makers were convinced that British influence in the region had suffered an irrevokable set back and that if the U.S. did not move into the position that Britain had occupied in the inter-war years, a "power vacuum" would be created providing excellent opportunities for Soviet penetration.<sup>2</sup> The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) symbolized the determination of the U.S. to go to war, if necessary, to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of West Asia's riches.

Nehru commented<sup>3</sup> that "when a foreign power tries to step into another country, it disturbs the peace of that country and creates conflicts. It gives rise to tension and a race among foreign powers." Evidently he did not approve of the Doctrine. D.F. Fleming's remark<sup>4</sup> seems to be noteworthy here that "the only thing that was clear was that the doctrine constituted a major intensification of the cold war." In a leading article to the Hindu, Walter

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1. Venkateramani, M.A., "Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy During the Suez Crisis - 1956-7", International Studies, vol.2, No.2, October 1960, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, pp. 148-149.
  2. See Editorial, New York Times, 2,12, 56.
  3. The New York Times, January 7, 1957.
  4. Fleming, D.F., The Cold War And Its Origins 1917-1960, vol.2, 1950-1960, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1961, p. 844.

Lippmann warned that Dulles had no chance to succeed in the Middle East if he refused to accept the fact that "the Soviet Union is a principal power - a power which cannot be expelled and excluded, which must be balanced and negotiated with. We should, it seems to me, have it clearly in mind that we are on the threshold of a new situation in regard to the oil in the Middle East. This is often taken to mean that the Soviet Union may attempt to ruin Western Europe by depriving it of access to the oil."<sup>1</sup>

Whatever might have been the differences and coincidences during the Suez crisis the fact remained that both the countries - India and the U.S.A. played a conciliatory and constructive role in furtherance of a mutually satisfactory settlement by negotiation, because of their own vital interest in keeping the Suez canal free and open. Walter Lippmann had rightly observed<sup>2</sup> that both the United States and India were playing a similarly conciliatory role - the United States on the side of the West and India on the side of Egypt.

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1. The Hindu, 12,10,57. For Chester Bowles' criticism see The Statesman, 7,7,57.

2. The Hindu, 15 September 1956. So added Reston, Washington's unfailing procedure was "to play the role of mediator", going along with "no long range plans anywhere" and "being constantly surprised by events". The New York Times, November 20, 1956.



#### CHAPTER 4

#### INDIA-U.S. AND PAKISTAN

Nothing more has, perhaps, added to the strained Indo-American relations than their differences over policies towards Pakistan, which have raised misunderstandings and irritations between the two. Their differences on major issues e.g., the problem of Kashmir, the U.S. military alliance with Pakistan are the obvious examples as far as their relations with Pakistan are concerned. India has been till recently looking on Pakistan as the main threat to its security, so the U.S. on the Soviet leadership as the main threat to its security." It is true also that American responses to Indian-American friction have, at times, been reminiscent of Indian responses to Soviet - American friction."<sup>1</sup> The U.S. wants friendly relations with both the countries, India and Pakistan. All this is because of the strategic importance of Pakistan for the U.S.A.

#### (A) PARTITION:

The memories of the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two independent, Sovereign States i.e., India and Pakistan,

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1. Poplai and Talbot, India and America. A study of their relations, Indian Council of World Affairs, p. 68.

are fresh in the minds of Indians. The House of Commons of Britain passed the Indian Independence Act on July 18, 1947.<sup>1</sup> It was implemented on 15 August 1947. Though since 1940<sup>2</sup> the idea of a separate state for the Muslims of the North-West and North-East was coming into the picture and the Cripps Offer of 1942 and the Cabinet Mission of 1946 had failed to bring this idea as a reality, it was the Mountbatten Plan which brought the partition of India into being, in spite of India's great opposition to the same. Even Nehru was not ready to accept it, he said once after the terrible tragedy of Calcutta:

"The freedom we had envisaged and for which  
through generations of trial  
and suffering, was for all the people of  
India, and not for one group or class or the  
followers of one religion. We aimed at a  
cooperative commonwealth in which all would be  
equal sharers in opportunity and in all things  
that give meaning and value to life. Why  
then this strife, this fear and suspicion of  
each other?"<sup>3</sup>

Nehru in his Discovery of India (1946)<sup>4</sup> had made it

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1. Full-text in Gazette, 18 July 1947.
  2. Since the meeting of Muslim League in Lahore on March 23, 1940, the goal of a national Muslim state was shaping its one or the other form. W. Norman Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan, Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963, p. 146.
  3. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 1
  4. For details on the subject see, Nehru, The Discovery of India, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1961, pp.257, 279-84.

clear that the Native Hinduisim and the intrusive Islam had only one origin i.e. a Common Civilization. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875-1950) also held the same view. On the other hand Mohd. Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), Muslim leader, was of the view that Hinduism and Islam were more than two different civilisations. The Indian National Congress had always been against the demand of the Muslim League for a separate Islamic State of Pakistan. Instead it had stressed a United Secular India. This was the most fundamental of the Hindu-Muslim divergences, which led to the partition and is also evident in the present day Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> Thus Pakistan was not a political term originally; it was to describe a spiritual ideal. Later, the intense religio-political struggle gave birth to Pakistan.

The supporters of the 'Two Nations Theory' believed that the creation of Pakistan would solve the Hindu-Muslim problem. After partition this proved to be wrong rather the idea spread Communal fighting and mass migrations heightened the social and political tensions, misunderstandings, ill will

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1. See Brown, W. Norman, The United States and India and Pakistan, pp. 130-131. Also see Chakravarti, B.N., India Speaks to America, Orient Longmans, Calcutta, 1966, p. 92.

suspensions which had been generated during the independence movement. Even after partition the Government of India was willing to keep economic, cultural and social contacts and to be on friendly terms with Pakistan because it was natural as both the countries have more in common than any other countries in the world and the entire continent of India and Pakistan. But the friendly relations anticipated by India on mutual understanding between the two countries and the end of the Hindu-Muslim problem did not come about because there were certain unavoidable problems which hindered the paving of the way to solve the disputes. These problems

Future of Kashmir, evacuee property, division of assets, treatment of minorities, Canal Water dispute and other disputes.

<sup>1</sup>  
EVACUEE PROPERTY:

The dispute arose about properties abandoned by evacuees. The rural or urban immovable property of evacuees was liable to forfeiture, while there were several restrictions concerning

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1. For background, see Karunakaran, India in World Affairs 1950-53, pp. 166 ff. For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the subject, also see India, Rehabilitation Retrospect (New Delhi, Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1957).

the export of jewellery, other valuables, bank deposits, and securities. For the solution of this problem there were discussions, Conferences, disagreements, agreements, between the two Governments. And after the failure in implementing these agreements, there were the charges of non-implementation, bad faith and complaints against each other that more repressive laws concerning evacuees property were made. It was in 1955 that the problem of movable property and bank accounts seemed to have been solved.<sup>1</sup> But the problem of immovable property was stated by Pakistan not to be solved until the problem of Canal Water dispute was settled. It was after an agreement<sup>2</sup> signed between the two Governments on September 19, 1960, that this obstacle was removed.<sup>3</sup>

#### DIVISION OF ASSETS:

The second problem was concerned with the Pakistan assets. At the time of partition, the successor Government of India had been left in physical possession of the cash balances of undivided India. By agreement she was to pay 55 crores of rupees to Pakistan. But after the problem of

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1. See The Hindu, 1 November 1955 for the text of the decisions.
  2. India External Affairs (Ministry of -) The Indus Water Treaty 1960, pp. 1-22.
  3. Brown, V. Norman, op.cit., pp. 165-66.

Kashmir arose and developed, the Indians in a great number, including some high officials opposed paying this sum to Pakistan arguing that Pakistan might use the money in war preparations against India. Following partition, Gandhi's fast at Calcutta brought about some sort of rest to these problems. Indians were influenced.

Since then this question was in discussions and in 1960 it was solved.<sup>1</sup>

DISPUTE CONCERNING DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDUS VALLEY CANAL WATER:

It was a matter of long-term national economic importance to both India and Pakistan. The partition of India resulted in dividing the Indus river system. The agriculture in West Pakistan largely depends upon irrigation from the Indus river and its tributaries, the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej because there the rainfall is scanty. The two rivers: Jhelum, and Chenab flow in such a direction that their waters are mainly utilized in Pakistan. Only minor use of them is made in Kashmir. The two rivers Ravi and Sutlej pass through both the countries and the Beas is so situated that its full use is made in India.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid, p. 166.

2. See Karuna Karan, India in World Affairs, 1947-50, Oxford University Press, Calcutta 1952, p. 185. The Indus Water Dispute - Facts and Figures (Delhi, Publications Division, 1954). Also see F.J. Fowler, 'The Indo-Pakistan Water Dispute, Year Book of World Affairs 1955, vol. 9 pp. 101-25; J.B. Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations 1947-1955, Amsterdam, D. Jambatan, 1958; pp. 173-74.

The dispute arose from the fact that while India controls the upper courses of rivers supplying much of that water, Pakistan is in the position of making greater use of the water. The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers flow through Indian territory before reaching Pakistan and most of the land in West Pakistan is to be irrigated by these rivers. In case India could divert their water from Pakistan's Canals, India could very seriously injure its basic economy. The same might have happened with regard to Indus, Jhelum and Chenab if India could retain Kashmir and then India would be in a position to have a mortal grip on West Pakistan agriculture. After great efforts and failures and success an agreement was signed on September 19, 1960.<sup>1</sup>

#### TREATMENT OF MINORITIES:

After partition the problem arose about the treatment of Hindu minorities in Pakistan and of Muslim minorities in India.<sup>2</sup> India did never favour the partition on the basis of religious separation. This was made clear by Nehru in Parliament on March 17, 1950: "We did not accept

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1. Full text in India, External Affairs (Ministry of)-  
The Indus Water Treaty 1960, pp. 1-22.
  2. about 14½ million Hindus in Pakistan and 40 million Muslim in India.

it at any time on the basis of two nation theory but on the basis of some kind of territorial self-determination. Clearly it was impossible to divide India on the basis of separate religious groups on one side or the other, because they were bound to overlap." And further he added, "we discouraged in every possible way the migration of large numbers from one Bengal to the other ... Unfortunately in spite of our discouragement, people came over in hundreds of thousands", and "an exchange of population is something which we have opposed all along."<sup>1</sup>

There was constant movement of population from Pakistan to India and vice-versa and inter-Communal violence, even after partition, was flaring up.<sup>2</sup> There was chaos, violence, discord all around caused by this movement of population. The two Bengals (East-Pakistan, West-Bengal), Kashmir, (the then) Hyderabad, the Punjab, the Uttar Pradesh (formerly United Provinces) were the critical areas where the crisis was at the top. In January 1950, anti-Muslim riots broke out in Calcutta and in February 1950 anti-Hindu riots followed

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit. pp. 456-59.

2. For details see J.B. Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations, op. cit., Chapter VII.



in Dacca (Capital of East Bengal) and in other parts also. This problem has been the main source of communal riots and misunderstanding between the two countries upto the present day in the two Bengals specially. In spite of the fact that minority commissions were set up in the two Bengal s and other measures also have been used time and again on the official level. Many verifiable cases on the mistreatment have occurred e.g. in India (at Jabalpur) in February 1961. The attacks were made upon the Muslim community during more than one week. In Pakistan also there was retaliatory violence which was against the Hindus. Recently in June 1969, Indore suffered from these riots and at present Ahmedabad ( in Gujrat state) is suffering from it.

#### OTHER DISPUTES:

One of the other problems was the problem concerning the rehabilitation of refugees or the problem of caring for incoming refugees. The refugees who flowed to Pakistan from India suffered many difficulties as there were no sufficient facilities provided by Pakistan because it was newly born country without any experience of organised administration to preserve law and order and protect the refugees from hunger and maltreatment. There were fewer available resources to overcome the emergency and help the arriving refugees. Neither

she could provide the proper help to protect evacuees leaving its territory.

In India in comparison with Pakistan there were several camp for similar refugees, more facilities of sanitation and feeding. Though these arrangements were not adequate but they at least could provide temporary shelter for refugees. Refugees consisted of peasants, less prosperous villagers and urban workers: artisans, coolies and others of low economic levels. These refugees had to face poverty, hunger until this problem had been partly relieved by 1962 in India and Pakistan after the construction of residences and Colonies, e.g., in Karachi and Delhi. Though the rehabilitation had been done, this problem remained as many refugees were <sup>still</sup> living in sub-standard quarters in Karachi and Calcutta while sinking in permanent poverty.<sup>1</sup>

The other dispute was a political one concerning the accession of certain princely states either to India or to Pakistan. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 directly applied to the British India and not to the Indian States which were independent in theory. They were left free to accede to one or the other country or to remain independent. The dispute arose mainly in the case of Kashmir,<sup>2</sup> Hyderabad, and Junagadh.

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1. Lee Brown, N. Norman, op.cit., pp. 163-165.

2. This problem remains unsolved to the present day and is discussed separately in the following pages of the same chapter.

These three controversial questions between India and Pakistan were carried to the United Nations.

#### JUNAGADH:

India did not accept the decision of the Nawab of Junagadh that it should accede to Pakistan, against the wishes of his subjects and the advice of the fellow princes of Kathiawar. Junagadh was not geographically contiguous to Pakistan and Lord Mountbatten, as a Crown representative had made it clear at a special meeting of the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947 that although the states were theoretically free to accede to either of the Dominions or to remain independent, the principle of geographical contiguity could not be left out in making a decision in regard to the future of any state. In February 1948, a plebiscite was held, which favoured its accession to India<sup>1</sup> and now Junagadh is a part of Gujrat State.

#### HYDERABAD:

The people who were in power in Hyderabad tried to make it an international issue, even a delegate of the Nizam's Government participated in the United Nations Security Council meeting and raised the question of the relationship between

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1. See Karuna Karan, India in World Affairs 1947-1950, pp. 123-24.

Hyderabad and India. Pakistan also supported the authorities in Hyderabad when they tried to assert the independence of the Nizam. India did not agree. After some negotiations, the Nizam concluded a stand still agreement with the Indian Government on 29th November 1947.<sup>1</sup> But this agreement did not help in creating good will between the two as the authorities in Hyderabad took a different view that they had only 'suspended' some of the sovereign powers of the Nizam. The Government of India could not reach a friendly settlement with the Hyderabad Government. Hyderabad Nizam was defeated by India in a "100-hour war" by "Police-action" to restore law and order. On September 18, 1948, Nizam left as a ruler and Hyderabad was kept as a State.<sup>2</sup> Later, at the time of States' reorganisation in India, Hyderabad was kept no longer as a political entity and is now divided among the states of Andhra, Mysore and Maharashtra territorially.

Because of all these problems the relations between India and Pakistan did not remain friendly and instead became deteriorated. Consequently distrust, ill-will, suspicion

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1. Government of India, White Paper on Hyderabad, Delhi, Government of India Press, 1948.

2. For details see Karuna Karan, op. cit., pp. 124-130. The British and the American Press criticised Indian conduct toward Hyderabad, but India resented it on the ground that the case was misunderstood.

took place hindering the way for peaceful relations. Nehru tried to sign a "no war" declaration with Pakistan but it refused to sign it. Nehru said: "What I wanted was to create an atmosphere which would help in the solution of those problems."<sup>1</sup> He had emphasised that India and Pakistan were ultimately connected with each other sharing common history and culture apart from the fact that it was our next door neighbour.<sup>2</sup> He always ruled out war as a weapon for the easing of Indo-Pakistan relations. But in case Pakistan did not agree, he was perfectly ready for it. He always stood for intercommunal unity and wanted a peaceful solution of all problems. He reiterated:<sup>3</sup>

"We hoped we could live together in that freedom. The supporters of Pakistan had a different gospel. They were not for unity but disunity, not for construction but for destruction, not for peace but for discord, if not war."

Nehru understood well that India and Pakistan should live on friendly terms rather than being hostile to each other because it was dangerous from economic, strategic, and social point of view. In Asia the relations between these two countries would affect the whole politics of the Asian countries. It would affect even the security of India. Therefore, he emphasized the need of cordial and very close relations with Pakistan.

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1. Nehru, Indias Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 458

2. Ibid., p. 465

3. Ibid., p. 469.

B THE PROBLEM OF KASHMIR: MAIN FEATURES:

Although, the partition of India gave rise to many problems, it was the dispute over the future of Kashmir that had been the most critical point between India and Pakistan deteriorating their friendly relations. Not only between India and Pakistan the relations have been strained, but the United States is also involved in it, because of its strategic interests in Pakistan and Kashmir. Many times, since the rise of Kashmir problem, India and United States have misunderstood each other and thus irritated the flow of friendly relations between the two countries.

Because of its geographical location Kashmir, with its frontiers with the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, closely involves India's international security and contacts with other countries. Kashmir is related to India owing to its economic importance as the Caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India also pass through this state.<sup>1</sup> Kashmir is a Muslim majority state. India did never want partition on the basis of the two nation theory i.e. Hindu state and Muslim state. Kashmir is also important for Pakistan because of its economic, political and strategic significance.

At present the fact remains that Kashmir problem was

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit. p. 443

the product of the British policy which left the Indian States (568) free either to accede to any of the two countries India or Pakistan, or to remain independent and sovereign in accordance with Indian Independence Act of 1947 . Provision for accession was made in the Government of India Act of 1935 as amended under the Indian Independence Act of 1947:

"An Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor General has signified his acceptance of an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof."

It made it evident that there was no suggestion that any other action was necessary to make the accession final. There was no requirement for ascertaining popular will on either side. None of the provisions required a conditional or temporary accession. In fact, an accession once made was complete and final.

What happened in case of Jammu and Kashmir? The Maharaja of Kashmir's indecision was responsible for the beginning of this continued unhappy dialogue on Kashmir. He was interested to accede neither to India nor to Pakistan. In spite of the persuasion of Earl Mountbatten, the then Viceroy, while visiting Srinagar in July 1947 for four days, that Maharaja Hari Singh should join either India or Pakistan by August 14, the Maharaja did not decide any thing. The fact was that he wanted to remain independent. The reason might have been that he disliked the states' accession to India because India

was being democratized or to Pakistan because it was a Muslim State.<sup>1</sup> Having all this situation in mind evidently avoiding any final decision, he requested both Dominions to sign a temporary stand still agreement<sup>2</sup> providing for the continuance of economic and administrative relations between the State and the Dominions on the same basis as before the creation of Dominions. Pakistan accepted it (request of 12 August 1947) on August 15, 1947, while India rejected the same and informed Kashmir's Maharaja that further discussion of the matter would be required.

If the principles of religious predominance and geographical contiguity, which was applied to the provinces of British India, also had been applied to the Indian States, the state of Jammu and Kashmir would, probably, have gone to Pakistan and the Eastern parts of Jammu province, predominantly Hindu, or possibly the whole state, given to India. But since the choice lay with the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, being

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1. It was implicit in his letter accompanying the instrument of accession (October 26, 1947), but the circumstances made this independence impossible. For details see V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, Orient Longman's Ltd., Calcutta, 1961, pp. 394-395.

2. For the text of the telegrams exchanged between the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and the Government of Pakistan regarding a stand still Agreement see Security Council Official Records, 4th yr., Special Supple. No.7, Dec. 5/1430/Add. 1, Annex 43, pp. 162-3. Text of the telegrams exchanged between the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and the Government of India regarding also a stand still Agreement Iakhampal, P.I., Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute, (sic), New Delhi: International Publications, 1958, p. 45



an autocratic ruler, had the right and duty of making a final decision. In the Valley there were 90% Muslims, but in Ladakh and Jammu the non-Muslims were in majority. As even the Muslims were divided between two organisations - (i) the National Conference, leading the main popular anti-government agitations and opposing the two nation theory; (ii) the Muslim Conference - advocating its independence - it was not an easy affair to ascertain the wishes of the people. All attempts of the Maharaja during this period of indecision were calculated 'to isolate his state from what was happening all around.'

As V.P. Menon has observed:

"there was an obvious line of action which the Maharaja might have taken. He could have called a Conference of representatives of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and discussed the question with them. But the Maharaja was in a Micawberish frame of mind, hoping for the best while toying with the notion of an independent Jammu and Kashmir."

There was no pressure on Kashmir to join India. On 15 August 1947 Kashmir became an independent state but her relations with the rest of India - divided into two Dominions - India and Pakistan - were yet to be decided.

After this had occurred, the suspicion, distrust and misunderstanding played an important role. In Pakistan

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1. Gupta, Asir, Kashmir Agency in India-Pakistan Relations, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966, p. 23.

2. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 395.

within a few weeks after partition, the suspicion began to be voiced that the Maharaja of Kashmir wanted an eventual accession to India instead of remaining neutral with regard to India and Pakistan. Even before partition this suspicion had taken place when India did not accept Kashmir's proposal for a standstill agreement with India. Pakistan already apprehensive of maneuvers and rumoured actions involving India, suspected that the Maharaja was secretly planning to accede to India eventually rather than to accede to Pakistan. This suspicion was being aired when, at the end of September, the Maharaja of Kashmir unexpectedly released Sheikh Abdullah, though he continued to hold in detention the leader of the Kashmir Muslim Conference, who had been openly favouring Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Furthermore, India started to build the road from Pothohar to Jammu. Following all these circumstances, in September, 1947, a Muslim revolt against the State Government of Kashmir broke out in the already disaffected area of Poonch.<sup>1</sup> Thus from this time, onwards, the relations between the two countries could not remain cordial.

The dramatic catastrophe took place on October 22, 1947 when an invasion of Kashmir by armed Muslim tribesmen took place. On October 20, 1947, tribesmen began to cross the

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1. Press Note issued by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir regarding disturbances in the state, 12 September 1947 quoted by Sir Zafrullah Khan, S.C.O.R., 5th yr., 464th Mtg., 8 Feb., 1950, p. 11.

State's - boarder; On the fourth day a provisional Azad (Free) Kashmir was proclaimed with its own Government. Under such pressures, the Maharaja fled across the mountains to Jammu on October 25, in self defence. The tribal invaders were not far from Srinagar and were looting and murdering Muslims as well as Hindus and a few Europeans also, and the Kashmir's State forces were not enough to face the aggression. It was on October 26, 1947, under the growing threat to Srinagar from tribal invaders, that the Maharaja of Kashmir executed an instrument of accession with the Indian Dominion.<sup>1</sup> He was advised in doing so by V.P. Menon, Secretary, States Ministry of India, and supported by Sheikh Abdullah. On October 27, next day, Lord Mountbatten accepted the accession provisionally<sup>2</sup> and decided to defend Kashmir. Immediately, India despatched troops by air to arrive at Srinagar. Actually these troops pushed the tribesmen back and gradually cleared the Valley. Now after accession Kashmir was an integral part of India. One thing is noteworthy, that while accepting accession, Indian Government made it perfectly clear to the

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1. White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, Government of India, n.d., pp. 46-7.
  2. Ibid., pp. 47-8. For the Text of the Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir, 26 October 1947, also see Ibid., pp. 17-19.

Maharaja that in Kashmir the Government should be run in future b. the popular will and that as soon as law and order had been restored in the state and invaders had been driven out of the state's soil a reference to the people would settle the question of accession of Kashmir to India.<sup>1</sup> In the same speech Nehru said:

"We made it clear to them that while we welcomed the accession of Kashmir we did not want any hurried and forced accession and we would rather wait for the people to decide."<sup>2</sup>

Pakistan refused to recognise this accession<sup>3</sup> and held it was a violation of the stand still agreement and a fraud, perpetrated on the people of Kashmir by its cowardly ruler with the aggressive help of the Indian Government.<sup>4</sup> This was a wrong allegation.

P.M. Nehru tried his best that the Government of Pakistan might restrain the raiders. In his letter<sup>5</sup> to the P.M. of

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 445

2. Ibid, p. 444.

3. Telegram of the Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed to the Prime Minister of India, 30 October 1947, White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, p. 49.

4. Broadcast by the P.M. of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, November, 1947, Ibid., pp. 55-60.

5. ~~White~~ Ibid., pp. 74-75.

Pakistan, on December 22, 1947, he requested the Government of Pakistan to deny to raiders:

- "(a) all access and use of Pakistani territories for operation against Kashmir;
- (b) all military and other supplies; and
- (c) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the struggle."

The reply<sup>1</sup> of December 30, 1947 of the P.M. of Pakistan is noteworthy here:

"As regards the charges of aid and assistance to the invaders, by the Pakistan Government, we emphatically repudiate them. On the contrary, the Pakistan Government have continued to do all in their power to discourage the tribal movements by all means, short of war."

After the failure of discussions between the two countries in solving the problem, the increasing load of military operations were proving indecisive and costly. On December 31, 1947, Nehru referred the matter to the Security Council by despatching a charge-sheet<sup>2</sup> against Pakistan charging Pakistan under Article 35 of the United Nations Charter with "an act of aggression against India" and listing unfriendly acts, both of omission and commission by the Government of Pakistan. He

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1. White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, pp. 80-6

2. L.C.O.R., 3rd Year, suppl. for November 1948, Annex 28, pp. 139-44.

urged the council to persuade the Government of Pakistan to mend its ways promptly. This charge-sheet was put before the Security Council on 1st January 1948.<sup>1</sup> Pakistan faced the allegations with vigour and sent Sir Zafrullah Khan to Lake Success to conduct the case.<sup>2</sup>

In his reply<sup>3</sup> dated 15th January 1948, Zafrullah Khan said:

"The Pakistan Government emphatically deny that they are giving aid and assistance to the so-called invaders or have committed any act of aggression against India." Actually this confirmed what the P.M. of Pakistan had already stated on December 30, 1947 and was a total and straight denial of our allegations by Pakistan. It is noteworthy that to this time Pakistan never tried to justify its presence in Kashmir or to claim any right to be there. Instead it denied its presence in Kashmir and made a number of counter complaints unconnected with the complaint of India relating to Kashmir. The only relevant counter complaint to the Indian case on Kashmir was that: "India obtained the accession of the State

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1. S/628.

2. The Chief of the Indian Delegation was Sir N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

3. S.C.O.A., 3rd yr., suppl. for November 1948, Annex G, pp. 67-68.

of Jammu and Kashmir by fraud and violence."

But Pakistan could not produce any evidence in support of this allegation. India did never put any pressure on the ruler of Kashmir to accede to India. Even, Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General of India, had told the ruler on behalf of the Government that he might accede to Pakistan if he so desired and that we would not take it as an unfriendly act. In fact, there was no talk of India intervening in Kashmir, militarily. Only two days before its accession, the possibility that the ruler of Kashmir might ask for Indian help was considered for the first time. India did never try for Kashmir's accession to India against the will of Kashmir. On May 31, 1947, Gandhi said that "it was not the Maharaja with his soldiery that would count but the Muslims who were the vast majority there."<sup>1</sup> Not only this much, Nehru was confident, while writing a letter to Begum Abdullah on June 10, 1947 that "I have firm conviction that the will of the people will prevail in Kashmir."<sup>2</sup> From the above account it is clear that there

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1. Hindustan Times, June 1, 1947.

2. Hindustan Times, 11th June 1947. If Kashmir acceded to India, it was no wonder. Some of the leaders of the National Conference had the belief that the state would join the Indian Union, if free will was allowed to be expressed. Gandhi wrote to Nehru in August 1947 that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was most sanguine that the free vote of the people go in favour of Kashmir joining the Indian Union, provided the Government of Jammu and Kashmir would release Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders. Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, vol. II, Ahmedabad, 1958, p. 357. The people of Kashmir were shocked by the news of the partition of the Indian subcontinent which is clear from Mrs. Abdullah's letter which may be called an expression of the wishes of the National Conference, that no one has been pained more at the recent proposal (of partition) than the people of Kashmir, Hindustan Times, 15th June 1947. Before this Abdullah was reported by Hindustan Times on 7th June 1947 as writing to one of his friends favouring Kashmir accession to India. (At present he is the most important figure and supports the plebiscite in Kashmir.)

was no question of any fraud or of violence or even of a threat of violence on the part of India as far as Kashmir's accession to her was concerned. On the contrary, it was Pakistan which created violence and in turn under the pressure of circumstances Kashmir ruler acceded to India.

India came to Kashmir through legal process and Pakistan has no legal status in Kashmir. It got into Kashmir only through an act of aggression which can never be justified as legal. Pakistan came itself, it was neither invited by the ruler or by the people of Kashmir. Mr. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan did not think, before partition, that the State should join Pakistan if the Muslims were in majority instead he had said: "The policy of the all India Muslim League has been clear from the very beginning. We do not wish to interfere with the internal affairs of any state. That is a matter primarily to be resolved between the rulers and peoples of the State."<sup>1</sup> According to him, until its accession to India, Kashmir was an independent and sovereign state. Thus invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan was contrary to international law. There could be no justification whatsoever for Pakistan ~~and~~ to intervene in Kashmir.

Furthermore, when the United Nations commission for India and Pakistan visited Karachi in July, 1948, the same foreign Minister Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan informed the commission that

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1. Times of India, June 18, 1947.



their regular Pakistani brigades had been fighting in Kashmir territory since May, 1948.<sup>1</sup> The Commission in its First Report<sup>2</sup> said and objected that according to the Security Council Resolution<sup>3</sup> of the 17th January, the Government of Pakistan was requested to inform immediately the Security Council of any material change in the situation. In a letter addressed to the Security Council, the Pakistan Government agreed to comply with this request." The Government of Pakistan have, however, not informed the Security Council about the presence of Pakistan troops in the state of Jammu and Kashmir."

Then the Foreign Minister told the UNCIP that if Pakistani troops had not gone there, India would have taken over the whole area under the occupation of the raiders and that since the commission had been charged to deal with the problems related to the Indo-Pakistan question, his Government thought

that the information should instead be given to it. But he had been unable to do this previously because of the delay in the commission's arrival in the subcontinent. Any way Pakistan

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1. Pakistan first denied and later admitted that she has sent her troops to Kashmir - Sir Owen Dixon, the U.N. Mediator, said in effect. that Pakistan's action was a breach of international law.
  2. S/1100, Paragraph 127
  3. Kashmir Documents (17th January 1948 - 30th March 1951)  
Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, n.d., p.1, Another resolution was adopted on 20 January 1948 (S/654), by which a three member Commission was to be appointed to investigate and mediate but that was never implemented. For text see S.C.O.D., 3rd yr., suppl. for November 1948, Annex 1, pp. 64-5.

had no justification to go into a territory where it had no legal and constitutional rights. The Commission made its views clear in Appendix I to the enclosure of the UNCIP Report:<sup>1</sup> "The presence of Pakistan troops in Jammu and Kashmir, however, constitutes a material change in the situation ~~inasmuch~~ as the Security Council did not contemplate the presence of such troops in that State."

Against these violations by Pakistan, India was exercising her right and duties to protect the State after it had acceded to her. The presence of the troops of India in Kashmir was legal. India was legally authorised to do so. And it is this unlawful presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir, where they had no locus standi, that the Commission had to take into consideration in formulating its resolution<sup>2</sup> dated August 13, 1948. The first preliminary step that the resolution stipulated was that Pakistan should agree to withdraw its troops from that State because the presence of Pakistani troops in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constituted<sup>3</sup> material change in the situation -

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1. S/1100, Paragraph 4.

2. S.C.L.R., 3rd yr. Supple. for November 1948, pp. 32-4, India accepted this Resolution but Pakistan did not work in accordance with the resolution.

a change which had been effected by Pakistan without any knowledge of the Security Council. Therefore the first and foremost condition of the truce was the withdrawal of Pakistani troops. A thorough reading of this resolution makes it obvious that the UNCIP had kept in view the lawful presence of Indian troops in Kashmir in contrast to the unlawful presence of Pakistani military forces in the State and also that it proceeded on a clear recognition of the fact that the sovereignty of the State was vested in India.

Actually, once Pakistan was forced to admit to the Commission that regular Pakistani troops were fighting in Kashmir, Indian complaint needed no further proofs. This proved that Pakistan's action was contrary to international law and it was obviously guilty of an act of aggression. Therefore, India would have been perfectly justified in pressing the Security Council to ask Pakistan to withdraw from Kashmir, Indians were persuaded to accept the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948, and of January 5, 1949<sup>1</sup> so as to secure peaceful and harmonious relations with a close neighbour, Pakistan. India accepted the resolutions containing

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1. Text in S.C.O.R., 4th Year, Supple. for January 1949, pp. 23-5.

plebiscite proposals<sup>1</sup> provided Part I and II of the Commissions resolution of 13th August which refer to ceasefire and the truce agreement had been fully implemented. Certainly Pakistan was aware that if it did not act up to these resolutions by first withdrawing its troops and tribesmen from Kashmir, India would not be bound in any way by its acceptance of those resolutions. As the parts I and II of the resolution of August 13, 1948, have not been implemented because of Pakistan's refusal to withdraw its troops from Kashmir and thus the conditions have not been satisfied India can no longer be held to be bound by these resolutions.

The time went on, Pakistan dragged on the negotiations hoping that with the efflux of time the people would forget Pakistani aggression in Kashmir. And indeed, outsiders forgot the Indian complaint against Pakistanis. Moreover, they even tried to equate their presence in Kashmir with that of India. On the other hand India was not prepared to be treated in the same way as the aggressor because she was the aggrieved party. Pakistan did not

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1. Resolution of 21 April 1948, adopted by the security council also called for the withdrawal of all the Indian troops and the tribesmen from Kashmir so that a free and impartial plebiscite may be held and an interim Government representing both "the major political groups", (the National Conference and the Azad Kashmir elements) should be established. At the time of plebiscite, conduct of the voting was to be entrusted to a Plebiscite Administration headed by a United Nations appointee. Furthermore, a five-men United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was to proceed to Kashmir to exercise its good offices at the disposal of the two disputant countries in restoring peace and arranging a fair plebiscite. See Year Book of the United Nations 1947-48, pp. 396-400; S.C.D.R., 3rd Year, Supple. for April 1948, pp.8-12. The main issue during the discussions in the security council from this time onwards has been how to frame the conditions for a plebiscite acceptable to all the interested parties who for one or the other reason were involved in the fate of Kashmir.

accept any of the offers made by India time and again. The same was the case when during the course of discussions India made many concessions provisionally in regard to demilitarization proposals. Now she is not going to make more concessions or to basically modify these resolutions as the modifications proposed so far have been only in favour of Pakistan. That is why India does not care for the criticism that India did not accept any of the proposals made since the resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949.

The assurance that the question of State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people after the law and order had been restored in Kashmir, was given voluntarily and unilaterally, but it did not make accession conditional to a reference to the people; it was not given to Pakistan which had no locus standi on the issue. India believed that whatever political interest Pakistan had in the future accession of the State, it forfeited by its aggression on Kashmir. A reference to the people was to be implemented only after the invaders had been expelled. India pleaded that as this last condition had not been fulfilled as the result of Pakistan's continuing occupation of a part of the territory of the state, Pakistan had no right to demand a plebiscite on the strength of the August 1948 resolution. When it had not carried out its own part of the UNK resolution which should

precedes the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces, preliminary to making arrangements for a plebiscite. India's answer to the critics of her stand was that even if accession was conditional on a plebiscite, the plebiscite itself was conditional on the liquidation of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir and establishment of law and order - neither of which condition has been fulfilled so far. The reason has been the intransigence of Pakistan.

Ever since January 1948, there have been long discussions on the Kashmir Problem in the Security Council and outside, including discussions between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. Even U.N. Commissions came, mediators came to examine the problem. On December 31, 1948, a cease fire was brought about and has been kept though it has been broken occasionally.

(C). THE PROBLEM OF KASHMIR AND THE INDIA-PAK RELATIONS

(i) INDIAN VIEW POINT.

To India with its strategic, political and economic significance Kashmir has become a symbol of national prestige and international justice. Though Kashmir is a Muslim-majority state, Indian secularism defends this characteristic. In Indian view Kashmir is the part of India historically, geographically and legally as Nehru once remarked "Kashmir

has at no time been recognised as a sovereign state under international law. It has always been considered an integral part of India."<sup>1</sup> India's defence is invdved as Kashmir is a state bordering with her two neighbours Pakistan and China. As far as the accession of Kashmir to India is concerned in his speech, during debate on Foreign Affairs in Parliament on March 28, 1961, Nehru declared:<sup>2</sup> "The accession of Kashmir to India is entirely in conformity with the Indian Independence Act and the negotiations that preceded it; it is also fully in accord with all that has happened in case of the other princely states which acceded to India." Thus the original accession of the Kashmir Government to India was legally complete and final by the execution by the Maharaja of Kashmir of the Instrument of Accession on 26th October 1947 which was formally accepted by the Governor General<sup>3</sup> of India. Consequently, India has had some responsibility for the defence and maintenance of law and order and some rights and responsibility in regard to both the plebiscite and demilitarization. On the other/<sup>hand</sup>

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp. 467-468.

2. Ibid., p. 467.

3. Lord Mountbatten was the Governor General.

Pakistan, who had committed aggression in Kashmir, had no similar right and responsibility in Kashmir. By the accession of the State, Jammu and Kashmir became part of the territory India, juridically and politically. At no time have the United Nations Commission and Security Council challenged this fact."<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, Nehru said, "neither the U.N. Commission nor the Security Council has suggested that the accession was open to question."<sup>2</sup>

As a result of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India, the Government of India became responsible for the defence of the State against unlawful aggression by Pakistan helping the tribesmen (invaders) and Indian forces entered the State in October 1947. During the following months of November and December 1947, the Government of India tried to persuade Pakistan to withdraw the raiders from Kashmir but could not succeed as Pakistan was persistently denying its involvement in the invasion of Kashmir. Then India referred this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations on 1st January 1948, "as an act of faith, because we believe in the progressive realization of a world order and a world government."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., 467.

2. Ibid, p. 468.

3. Ibid, p. 461.



The reference by India to the Security Council was made on legal basis. The Indian claims and allegations against Pakistan were purely legal. According to the Indian case the invaders were allowed transit across Pakistan, they were allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations; they included Pakistan nationals; they drew much of their military equipment, transportation, and supplies from Pakistan, and Pakistani officers were training, guiding and otherwise actively helping them. India charged that such assistance was an "Act of aggression against India."<sup>1</sup> Further more, in the end of the letter it claimed that the reservation of peace in the area was not only in the interest of both states but also in the "interest of the world."

Touching the legal interest, the Indian letter made a reference also to the accession of Kashmir to India. It stated that as the threat to the Valley of Kashmir became grave the ruler of the State had appealed to the Government of India for military help. A similar appeal was made by the state's popular leader Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. The state had acceded to Indian Union which thereupon promptly

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1. S/628, Paragraph I, 1 January 1948, L.C.O.R., 3rd year, suppl. for November 1948, p. 139. For the full text of the letter see Ibid. pp. 139-44.

sent military help. Moreover, it added:<sup>1</sup> "But in order to avoid any possible suggestion that India had utilized the State's immediate peril for her own political advantage, the Government of India made it clear that once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invader and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their future by the recognized democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum which in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices."<sup>2</sup>

India did not feel any necessity of and could not make the Security Council understand, why the Indian Government had not made a straight charge of aggression against Pakistan under Chapter 7 of the Charter India did not make its position clear that the main Indian interest was to secure the withdrawal of invaders from Kashmir as soon as possible rather than to ask the United Nations to condemn Pakistan as an aggressor.<sup>3</sup> What India demanded was:

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1. S/628, Paragraph 6, p. 141, For details see Nehru India's Foreign Policy, pp. 443-449.
  2. Later on plebiscite became the central issue as far as the settlement of Kashmir problem is concerned.
  3. Poplai and Talbot, India and America, p. 72. Frank Moraes' view is that it was a mistake on the part of the Government of India to take the Kashmir issue to the Security Council under Articles 34 and 35 of Chapter 6 of the U.N. Charter which is entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" instead of under Chapter 7 which is specially concerned with "Acts of Aggression". Frank Moraes, "Visit to Kashmir: VII- Adding up the Balance sheet", Times of India, Bombay, 16th April 1957, pp. 6, 11. But A. Appadorai does not agree with him. In his view the clear proof of the Pakistani aggression was available only some four months after India referred the matter to the Security Council and after Pakistan committed the act of aggression. A. Appadorai, Essays in Politics and International Relations, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1969 p. 224

- "(1) To prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and Civil, from participating or assisting in the invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State;
- "(2) To call upon other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking part in fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir state.
- "(3) To deny to the invaders: (a) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir, (b) military and other supplies, (c) all other kind of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle."<sup>1</sup>

India desired "only to see peace restored in Kashmir and to ensure that the people of Kashmir are left free to decide in an orderly and peaceful manner the future of their state" said the representative of India, G. Ayyangar, in his statement in the Security Council on 15th January 1948.<sup>2</sup> Everything that India had done had been in discharge of its legal, constitutional, and moral responsibilities and obligations.

India refuted the Pakistani allegation that it obtained the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by "fraud and violence." Nevertheless India did not put the slightest pressure on the State to accede to the Indian Dominion, "because", in the words of Nehru, "We realized that Kashmir

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1. S/628, paragraph 13, p. 143.

2. S.C.C.R., 3rd Yr., Nos. 1-15, 227th Mtg., 15 January 1948, p. 29, for full text see Ibid., pp. 13-29.

was in a very difficult position." He himself was in favour of ascertaining the will of the people of Kashmir as was clear from what he said:

"We did not want a mere accession from the top but an association in accordance with the will of the people. Indeed, we did not encourage any rapid decision. Even in regard to a Stand Still agreement no speedy steps were taken by us, although Kashmir had entered into a Stand-Still agreement with Pakistan soon after August 15."<sup>1</sup>

So far as the plebiscite issue was concerned, it was not the fundamental factor before India rather, according to Nehru, "The fundamental factor is the aggression of Pakistan on Indian territory, secondly the denial of the fact of that aggression; thirdly the present admission of the fact." As Pakistan informed the UNCIP in July 1948 when it visited Pakistan that three regular Pakistani brigades had been fighting in Kashmir territory since May 1948, which constituted a material change in the situation. In fact, in India's view "That has been the fundamental difficulty in this Kashmir business: the fundamental issue has been slurred over and passed over. Now the basic factor is revealed by the very admission of the Pakistan Government."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 443.

2. Ibid., p. 455

3. Ibid.

Actually at a time when the fighting was going on and the situation was deteriorating, Copala Swami Ayyangar pointed out that the method by which the Security Council wished to tackle the problem was somewhat like "putting the cart before the horse" because there were leisurely discussions on plebiscite rather than on stopping the fight in Kashmir.<sup>1</sup>

India accepted the resolutions of UNO on certain conditions, e.g., India emphasized that if she was to accept the commission's plebiscite proposals (in accordance with the resolution<sup>2</sup> of 5 January 1949), no action could be taken in regard to them until Part I and II of the Commission's resolution<sup>3</sup> of 13th August, 1948 had been fully implemented. These parts refer to ceasefire and the truce agreement and also that "in the event of Pakistan not implementing these proposals, or having accepted them, not implementing parts I and II of the resolution of 13th August, the Government of India's acceptance of them should not be regarded as in any way binding upon them."<sup>4</sup>

The resolution required that Pakistan should withdraw its armed forces from the area of the State occupied by it. India was asked to withdraw the bulk of its forces later, on Pakistan withdrawing from that area. India might retain her

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1. S.C.O.R., 28 January 1948, pp. 51-5.  
S.C.O.R., 4th Yr., Supple. for January 1949, pp. 23-5.
  2. S.C.O.R., 3rd Yr., Supple. November 1948, pp. 32-4.
  3. S.C.O.R., 4th Yr., Supple. for January 1949, Annex.4, Aide-Memoire 1.
  4. S.C.O.R., 4th Year, Supple. for January 1949, Annex.4, Aide-Memoire 1.

army in the State in order to give it protection. Thus the right of Indian Army to be there was recognized but it was stated that since Pakistan was withdrawing completely from the Jammu and Kashmir State, India also could reduce her forces as that would tend to bring about a better atmosphere. Therefore, Nehru declared<sup>1</sup> in Lok Sabha on March 29, 1956 during his reply to the debate on Foreign Affairs, that "all this talk of plebiscite and other things is completely beside the point. Those questions would arise only when Pakistan had taken a certain step, that is, withdrawal of its armed forces. And Pakistan is out of court till it performs its primary duty by getting out of the part of the State on which it has committed aggression. This is a major fact to be remembered."

In the Government of India's view, the attitude of the Government of Pakistan towards the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces was a total obstacle to the bringing about of the peaceful conditions required for a plebiscite.<sup>2</sup> "Until Pakistan goes out nothing else is going to be done, about a plebiscite", said Nehru, "instead

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit. p. 483.

2. This was made clear in the letter of Secretary General Ministry of External Affairs, India, addressed to the Chairman of the UNCIP, 8th September 1949 (E/AC.12/262). For the Text see, S.C.O.A., 4th Yr., Special Supple. No.7, Doc. S/1430/Add.1, Annex 36, pp. 143-7.

of going out, Pakistan has now entrenched itself."<sup>1</sup>

According to Indians the military aid pact, of Pakistan with the U. .A. in 1954 created not only a new military situation but a new political situation which became progressively worse because of the flow of this military aid to Pakistan and the conclusion of CENTO and the Baghdad Pact. And since then "apart from the legal and constitutional issues, we have this practical aspect to remember in discussing the question of Kashmir with Pakistani representatives and others."<sup>2</sup> India was not ready to take any step which would be disruptive or upset things that have settled down because it wanted to promote the happiness and freedom of the people of Kashmir.

It was the communal psychological war that continued to make it impossible under the circumstances to obtain a fair plebiscite. Krishna Menon, the representative of India, in his statement<sup>3</sup> in the Security Council on June 22, 1962 declared "We are a secular State, all of our organization is political and has nothing to do with the religious aspects of a people. We are not prepared to face a position where

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 487.

2. Ibid., p. 484, for details see Ibid., pp. 484-486.

3. S.C.O.R., 17th Yr., 1016th Mtg., 22 June 1962, pp.42-5.

religious fanaticism is to be or is protected." Heavily, India did not accept partition on the Hindu state and Muslim state theory, rather it was a political settlement. The situation was made much more clear when in February 1964 India's representative, M.C. Chagla, in the Security Council stated<sup>1</sup> that "Our position on Jammu and Kashmir is clear and unambiguous. The two resolutions of the Security Council dealing with the plebiscite were conditional and contingent on Pakistan vacating its aggression and that condition has not been complied with ... by the passage of time and various factors intervening ... they have become obsolete. We cannot possibly contemplate with unanimity the threat to the integration of our country and the danger to our cherished principle of secularism by the holding of plebiscite in Kashmir. I wish to make it clear on behalf of my Government that under no circumstances can we agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir."

Apart from the issue of accession and plebiscite there have been other considerations which arose from Kashmir problem from Indian view point which should be brought out here.

India ruled out war as a measure for the easing of

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1. M.C.O.R., 19th Yr., 1088th Mtg., 5th February 1964 pp.13-4.



Indo-Pakistan relations and therefore time and again tried to have a no-war Declaration with Pakistan which was rejected by the latter country. But since the other party "brings it in and talks and shouts so much about it"<sup>1</sup>, Nehru had to be perfectly ready for it, because it cannot be ruled out independently or unilaterally.<sup>2</sup>

When India was asked to go to the World Court for an advisory opinion, she opposed the idea because in her view this was not a matter for the World Court or for an advisory opinion. Rather "this is a political issue", and, what was more, "We are both members of Sir Patrick's much loved Commonwealth and under the terms of our adherence to the World Court we have made some exceptions in regard to the matters which can be referred to it"<sup>3</sup>, said Krishna Menon in the Security Council. So the question of reference to the World Court does not arise.

The Government of India declined to consider any proposals for the internationalisation or division of the Valley, or joint control of Kashmir and the like. Prime

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., 469

2. And it was in 1965 when Pakistan attacked India and India faced it successfully.

3. A.C.Q.R., 17th Yr. 1016th Mtg., pp. 42-5.

Minister Nehru, in his statement<sup>1</sup> in the Lok Sabha on the Indo-Pakistan Ministerial Talks on Kashmir, reiterated on 13 August 1963 that "If and when a settlement is arrived at, it must obviously be a peaceful one, not affecting the stability and progress already achieved, and must strengthen the friendship between the peoples of India and Pakistan, without this no settlement has any meaning."

India was not prepared to be treated on the same level as the aggressor because she was the aggrieved party.<sup>2</sup> In her view with the efflux of time the outsiders and even Pakistan forgot Pakistani aggression in Kashmir and the Indian complaint against it and even they tried to equate their presence in Kashmir with that of India.<sup>3</sup>

India has not been ready to abandon her sovereignty over the state of Jammu and Kashmir and has never agreed to any resolution which even by implication questioned this sovereignty. That was made clear by the Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, in his letter<sup>4</sup> to the Secretary General of the United Nations on September 14, 1965 during the Indo-Pakistan war, when he said that "no pressures or attacks will

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, vol. XIX, No. 1, August 13, 1963, cols. 158-165.

2. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 490

3. In compliance with this view India rejected the Graham proposals, S.C.O.A., 13th Yr., Supple. for January-March, 1968, pp. 41-5.

4. U.N.I.C. Press release, 65/21501, pp. 3-7.

deflect us from our firm resolve to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country, of which the state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part."

U.S. ATTITUDE.

The United States has got involved in the Kashmir dispute ever since India referred it to the United Nations in 1948. During these, about 21 years, the representatives of the U.S. have had to express their views and cast votes on matters related to it. Thus the Government of the United States has played an important role.

For the U.S. attitude toward the problem of Kashmir unlike India and Pakistan, Kashmir may be seen from the point of view of Cold War world strategy. After world war II (1945), two super powers - the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. - emerged in place of Great Britain, Germany etc. These two powers began the march of world domination by trying to subside each other and thus affecting the world balance of power. The national interests of one power struck against the other's. Thus Cold War started between the capitalist block headed by the United States and the Communist Bloc, headed by the U.S.S.R. The policy of containment of Communism affected the Indo-U.S. and Pakistan relations as Pakistan

is a part of the "ring of deterrence" and thus involves American security, although the United States is neither afraid of Pakistan nor regards Pakistan as likely to commit aggression.<sup>1</sup> However, the U.S. Government "earnestly hopes to see" the dispute between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir to be "settled in accordance with the United Nations principles and in accordance with agreements already reached between the parties", remarked Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, U.S. representative to the U.N., in 1952.<sup>2</sup> This was the fact that in 1947 and 1948, America's main immediate concern was centered on its fear or assumption that the dispute might lead to a general war<sup>3</sup> between India and Pakistan. In case there were no general war, the tension would continue and the exhausting military budgets would weaken the two countries. Thus in turn this down fall might affect the American strategy in Asia by pushing down either India or Pakistan or both in into Communist hands. This can be made clear from a statement made by Raymond A. Bane, Assistant Secretary, for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 22, 1966:

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1. Poplai and Talbot, India and America, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
  2. D.S.B., vol. XXVII (196), October 27, 1952. p. 666.
  3. This American fear came to be true in August 1965 when a full-fledged war broke out between India and Pakistan.

"South Asia is the heartland of non-Communist mainland Asia. The will and determination of the peoples of this region to withstand the pressures from Communist China, will, in the long run, bear decisively on the question whether Communist China can be contained and brought to respect the dictates of international law and society. We should not let this view of the importance of the region be obscured."<sup>1</sup>

When the Kashmir problem arose, the Communist expansion was very rapid and the American fear was, in fact, based on the delicacy of the situation was observed by one writer<sup>2</sup> who said that putting the international aspect in the most extreme terms, Kashmir could be "the grave yard of the remaining Anglo-American position on the subcontinent of Asia" or at the very least, it could impede Washington in what was apparently its current tendency to look toward India "as a partial policy substitute for China."

However, the United States with all the members of the United Nations wanted to see a few disputes settled peacefully. It had the most "earnest desire to see the two

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1. D.N.E., vol. LIV (1400), April 25, 1966, p. 669.
  2. Rosinger, Lawrence K., India and the United States. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950, p. 105. When in 1965, Pakistan attacked India the United States was alarmed "because India and Pakistan are two very important nations whose friendship and progress we highly value and because just over the Himalayas Red China was sitting eagerly waiting for a chance to pick up the pieces", said Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the U.N., in his address before the National Press Club at Washington on April 19, 1966. D.N.E., vol. LIV (1402) May 9, 1966.

great states of the subcontinent join together to assure their mutual peace and security as well as their mutual prosperity."<sup>1</sup> The U.S. National interest lies in having friendly relations with both India and Pakistan which put the U.S. in a complex position so far as the Kashmir problem was concerned.

From the time Britain transferred power to the Governments of India and Pakistan in 1947, the U.S. acknowledged the importance of these two large nations strategically situated on the rim of Asia where the Americans could foresee real prospects of orderly processes of modernisation in Asia. Without progress and stability of these two, on the contrary if either of them or both should for any cause stumble badly, then the prospect for large parts of the largest continent in the U.S. eyes, would not be bright. The Kashmir issue which has been a central symbol of the area disputes between India and Pakistan "has been a concern", from the beginning "to the U.S. because of its impact on the policies of and progress of India and Pakistan including their policies toward the United States." In fact, "Kashmir is only one

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1. Remarked Ernest A. Cross, U.S. representative to the General Assembly in the Security Council on Dec. 5, 1952, Dal.B., vol. XXVII (705), Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1032.

aspect, of course, of our larger interests in the sub-continent of south Asia", admitted Phillips Talbot.<sup>1</sup>

In the U.S. view the origin of the dispute was complicated and deeply buried in the history of the great sub-continent. The dispute had long historical and sentimental and political roots among the peoples of both countries.<sup>2</sup> From the U.S. view point the basic issue before the U.N. was the "disposition of Kashmir". The main question, however, "is interwoven with a complex of religious feelings, national prestige, legal subtleties, and economic pressures."<sup>3</sup>

The United States endorsed the acceptance by India and Pakistan of the UNCIP resolutions of August 1948 and January 5, 1949 as a political compromise of the difficulties which followed from the partition of the subcontinent into two countries and the ensuing dispute over the status of Kashmir. This compromise provided that the plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir as supplementary to the ceasefire and truce arrangements contained in the UNCIP resolution of 13th August 1948 without coercion or intimidation from the military forces of either country. The U.S. support of the U.N. resolutions was based on this principle of self-determination.

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1. U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in his address to the U.N. Association of Wichita at Wichita on October 23, 1964, D.B., vol. LI, (1325), November 16, 1964, p. 702.

2. It was the view, expressed by Secretary of State Rusk before News Conference of December 10, 1962, D.S.R., vol. XLVII (1327) December 31, 1962, p. 998.

3. Ibid., vol. XXI (539), October 31, 1949, p. 654. Address made by Deputy Under Secretary, Rusk before the Commonwealth Club of California on Oct. 21, 1949.

As far as the legal aspect of the dispute insisted by India and the claims of Pakistan, in addition to opposing the legal claim of India,<sup>1</sup> on the ground of certain geographic factors, economic ties and communal affiliations were concerned, the Government of the United States emphasized that the agreement between the two nations for an enduring settlement of the dispute must be reached on broad political grounds. The demilitarization, the ceasefire, and the plebiscite were the issues, to which it lent its support. Gross, the U.S. representative to the U.N. said "In our view it is eminently fair and sound, and in fulfilment of our duty as member of this Council dedicated to peaceful settlements, to recommend to the parties that they accept a principle which strengthens the concept and value of the ceasefire line and avoids the risk of an extension of military activity."<sup>2</sup>

According to the Americans it has been the U.S.' desire, throughout the history of the issue of Kashmir, to do what it could to bridge the gap (differences) between the two friends - India and America. The principles on which Americans tried to proceed to assist the parties to carryout their Charter obligations were once summarised by Ernest A. Gross, U.S.

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1. That the state of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India.
  2. U.N., E.C.O.R., (5th year), No. 9, p. 12



representative to the General Assembly:<sup>1</sup>

"In the first place, a lasting political settlement must be an agreed settlement.

"Secondly, the Security Council will always welcome agreement of the parties which they themselves can reach on any theory that will settle the dispute which is consistent with the principles of the Charter.

"Thirdly, it is the role of the Security Council to assist the parties in seeking to reach agreement. In this case the Security Council has made available the services of Dr. Frank Graham as U.N. representative.

"Fourthly, agreement most frequently is reached step by step through negotiation, and negotiation involves an element of compromise.

"Finally, the Security Council should consider with care the views and the recommendations of its representative and indicate to him and the parties its views on the positions he has taken."

In doing so, to compose the differences between the two friends, the United States started from the point of agreement between them because in its view it was an equitable compromise based upon the sound principle that the people whose political affiliation and national status was subject to dispute have the right to express their will.

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1. D.A.B. vol. XXVII (705), Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1028.

This principle, the U.S. regarded as providing a sound basis upon which a political compromise of the dispute between India and Pakistan could be achieved through peaceful means.<sup>1</sup>

The United States firmly believed that there could be no real and lasting settlement of the Kashmir dispute which was not acceptable to both parties. And that any attempt to decide the issue without the consent of both parties, would only leave a constant and explosive irritant in the relations between these two Governments, "an irritant which will effectively prevent the bringing about of peace and security in South Asia."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, though, a ceasefire and a demilitarisation programme was a process in which the Council could, if necessary, assume the initiative, the enduring political solution was essentially the responsibility, in the U.S. view, of the parties to the dispute and their agreement and their cooperation were the indispensable ingredients. Secretary Acheson spoke before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950 that:<sup>3</sup>

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1. Statement made by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. representative in the Security Council on Feb. 14, 1964 (USUN Press Release 4362) in which he reviewed the stand taken by the U.S. on the problem of Kashmir.  
Dat.B., vol. I, No.1290, March 16, 1964, pp. 425-426.

2. Ibid., vol. XXIV (609) March 5, 1951, p. 395.

3. Ibid., vol. XXII (561), January 23, 1950, p. 118.

"In India and Pakistan we are willing to be of such help as we can be. Again, the responsibility is not ours. Again we can only be helpful friends. Again the responsibility lies with people who have won their freedom and who are very proud of it."

The U.S. insisted that an agreement cannot be imposed from outside and recognised that the legitimate security interests of both India and Pakistan involved intricate internal problems of law and order and political consent. In accordance with this view it suggested negotiations to resolve their differences peacefully by taking a diligent and unrelenting effort. Secretary Marshall lent his support for the continuation of the mediation and negotiation between the great nations of India and Pakistan with respect to Kashmir, in order that the process of peaceful settlement might bring to a conclusion an issue which had been charged with great dangers.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. belief was that the problem of Kashmir cannot be settled unilaterally by either party. So the two parties should make an agreement acceptable to both of them.

The most important issue advocated by the U.S. has been that of plebiscite in Kashmir as a final step in solving

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1. *Ibid.*, vol. XIX (483), October 3, 1948, p. 434.

the Kashmir problem. This implied that Kashmir is a Muslim majority state so certainly it would vote for Pakistan. Unlike India the U.S. thought that the partition of Indian subcontinent was based on the two Nations Theory - Hindu State and Muslim State.<sup>1</sup> It has been emphasizing "free and impartial" as well as "U.N. auspices" because these words support each other in a guarantee to the world and to each party that the plebiscite would be so fair that objective and dispassionate observers could not criticize the plebiscite in any way. Equally important in this concept to the idea of a free and impartial plebiscite, in U.S. view, has been the guarantee to the Governments of India and Pakistan that each would have its interest protected by a plebiscite under United Nations' auspices, so that the outcome would not be held unfair and the result of coercion or intimidation.<sup>2</sup> In spite of the fact that there are no chances of a plebiscite to be held in Kashmir,<sup>3</sup> the Government of the United States still hopes that India and Pakistan can find a solution through the process

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1. Here arise main differences between the approach of India and that of the U.S.
  2. See E.I.R., vol. XXIV (609), March 5, 1951 p. 396, for Ernest Gross' (Deputy U.S. representative to U.N.) statement before the Security Council on February 21, 1951.
  3. India is not ready for this although, Pakistan wants and considers it as fundamental factor.

of ascertaining the wishes of the people of Kashmir in doing so and that has been the U.S. position for 21 years and it sees no reason to change it.

While extending military assistance to Pakistan, the U.S. was aware of and feared the fact that Indians would dislike it because it was given to their neighbouring country with whom they were not on the best terms.<sup>1</sup> But the Americans defended themselves and expressed their view point that they had always attempted to approach the Kashmir problem on its merits, and did not believe that their collaboration with Pakistan in area defence affected the merits of this case. Rather the U.S. "seek to assist both India and Pakistan - and I say this with great sincerity - in finding a first and equitable solution of the Kashmir problem ... We again urge them to cooperate to that end"<sup>2</sup>, said Barco, U.S. Deputy representative to the U.N.

At the time when India was under threat of Chinese Communist attack in 1963, the attitude of the United States toward the Kashmir issue was somewhat compromising. It put

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1. Undoubtedly, Indian spokesmen, expressed anxiety that military assistance would make Pakistani Government feel that it could wield a big stick with respect to Kashmir.
  2. He was speaking in the Security Council after Soviet veto on 20 February 1967. D.L.B., vol. XXXVI (925), March 18, 1967, p. 461.

pressure on India in turn of its military aid to her that she should reach a final settlement of the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir and urged that if the dispute was to be peacefully resolved, there should be bilateral talks between the parties. But these talks did not succeed in achieving an agreement.

In 1964, the U.S. Government suggested that the two countries should consider the possibility of recourse to the good offices of a third country or a person of their choice to assist them in bringing about the resumption of negotiations and in mediating their differences.<sup>1</sup>

There came a slight change in the U.S. attitude toward Kashmir dispute when the undeclared war broke out in 1965 between India and Pakistan. This was the fact that the U.S. valued deeply the friendship of both India and Pakistan. Nothing, "We know, is more painful or more costly to all concerned than a falling out between one's friend," remarked President Johnson<sup>2</sup> while welcoming Mrs. Indira Gandhi, P.M. of India, at Washington. The war between India and Pakistan was a tragic experience for Americans. They

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1. And the time came in 1966 when Russia mediated at Tashkent after Indo-Pak war.

2. D.L.B., vol. LIV (1399), April 18, 1966, p. 598.

favoured ceasefire stance. The U.S. did not oppose the good offices even of a Communist country, the Soviet Union, rather it appreciated its effort at Tashkent.

Prior to 1963, the Sino-Pak Axis, the U.S.A. for almost all the time had been with Pakistan in the Security Council. But since the time Pakistan became interested in China, it has shifted a little from its policy on Kashmir. Now the U.S. has refused to support Pakistan anymore in the Security Council and has insisted on bilateral talks between the two disputant parties so as to find out a settlement of the dispute.

The United States has a special interest in this sense: that if these two great countries in the subcontinent could find themselves working together in the closest cooperation, then the subcontinent would be invulnerable from external attack and they could both proceed with their economic and social development programmes as their highest priority. In the absence of that cooperation and with higher tension between them, the two countries create not only great problems for themselves but increase the burden upon the United States to be of assistance to them in getting on with their economic and social development programmes and in furthering their own national interest

and their own national development.<sup>1</sup>

Though, neither the United Nations nor the U.S. has found a path to settlement during these 21 years, nevertheless the Americans take heart that all these related approaches have limited violence and at certain moments helped to avoid war between India and Pakistan.

They regret greatly that India and Pakistan have been unable to reach a settlement either through the Security Council or in bilateral talks, and that this dispute continues to occupy so much time of the international community. It is hard for them to understand why these two countries have not found it possible during all these years of bloodshed and of violence to take joint action to calm this situation and to allay the suffering. Therefore, the U.S. believes and hopes that India and Pakistan have a responsibility to their own people, to the people of Kashmir and to the world community to set these issues on the road to final solution for the sake of humanity and peace.

(iii) REACTIONS TO AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF:

All the U.S. efforts in the U.N. and outside it

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1. Remark by Secretary Auk at News Conference of March 6, 1964. D.S.B., vol. I (1291) March 23, 1964, pp. 441-442.



failed in solving the problem of Kashmir throughout the history of the case for about 22 years and the dispute still remains between the parties concerned.

There had been certain factors which brought the failure of the U.N. in solving the Kashmir problem, before and after 1962. The troubles, and frustrations that the U.N. encountered in subsequent years were the result of its bypassing a charge of aggression against Pakistan. In Indian view this was the fundamental factor. As Krishna Menon dramatically reminded the members of the Council, at the end of his marathon speech in 1957, the Charter enjoins upon the Council "an action consistent with the crime of invasion"<sup>1</sup>. This was the fact that it could not succeed in its conciliatory role "by brushing the ugly fact of aggression under the carpet. There cannot be a compromise with aggression. That was, if we are permitted to call it, the original sin that vitiated its conciliatory efforts"<sup>2</sup>, observed an Indian writer. This all was done by the U.N. on the U.K. - U.S. initiative, so as to evolve a formula to persuade the tribal raiders supposed to be fired by the ideals of freedom and self-determination,

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1. E.C.A.R., 12th Yr., 764th Mtg., 24 January 1957, p. 46

2. Mahmetullah Khan, Kashmir and the United Nations, Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1969, p. 135.

rather than coerce them into retreat. However, the Council shifted to the issue of plebiscite leaving aside the issues of indirect and direct aggression and the withdrawal of Pakistan forces from Kashmir. This had been the fundamental issue of difference between India and the United States and really the cause of the failure of subsequent conciliatory efforts by the United Nations through the UNCIP resolutions and mediatory efforts made by A.G.L. McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon and Dr. Frank Graham.<sup>1</sup> Despite the fact that the United States applied its pressure on India for accepting and acting in accordance with these efforts, India refused even to accept them on the ground that these strengthened the U.N. intervention in Kashmir and did not coincide with the stand taken by India.

The United States tried to solve the problem also by means of bilateral negotiations between the two parties - India and Pakistan. But these negotiations failed as the views of the two could not be reconciled. Before India the accession of and plebiscite in Kashmir were not the primary issues, rather the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces from Kashmir, an Indian territory, was the first and foremost issue which the U.S. and the U.N. did not take

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1. These are dealt in details in the following pages.

seriously. From the very beginning the United States sided with Pakistan which had been the source of conflict between India and the U.S., so far as the Kashmir dispute was concerned. Almost every resolution<sup>1</sup> on the dispute in the Security Council came from the U.S. and was rejected by India on the ground that it did not take into account the Indian position of the case.

After having gone through the Indian view point of and the U.S. attitude toward the Kashmir problem, it should be mentioned here that the latter's attitude in practice was in favour of Pakistani position on the issue. Apart from the fact that the U.S. officials in their speeches and statements had expressed their stand of having friendly relations with both the countries and using conciliatory and peaceful measures to settle the dispute, in the UN. and outside it, they, perhaps, supported Pakistani claims on Kashmir. Whatever might have been the reason - either the U.S. thought that India was wrong, or the U.S. did not appreciate the position of India with regard to this dispute, or the U.S. partisanship towards Pakistan or the lack of knowledge on part of the U.S. of the facts about the problem of Kashmir - it is very difficult to produce

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1. Exceptions were the two UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which were accepted by India.

an evidence in support of the allegation that the U.S. was deliberately and intensely taking pro-Pakistan stand, which appeared to be anti-Indian<sup>1</sup> and was resented by the Indian Government, the Indian press and the Indian public. Possible reasons were also analysed by the correspondent of the Hindu (a newspaper of Madras) as follows:

"A great deal of suspicion still seems to exist among some countries, notably in the United States, as to the direction in which India's foreign policy is moving and the suspicion arises because India has constantly avoided aligning herself with this or that bloc ... Pursuit of an independent foreign policy would often result in a situation when there would be few friends left, but that is the path India has chosen to tread, confident in the belief that truth must ultimately triumph over power politics or diplomacy."<sup>2</sup>

BEFORE 1952:

Indians were surprised to see that the U.S. along with the majority of the members of the Council were more impressed by the so called "broad and human" and masterly presentation of Pakistan's case, by the then Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan, in the Security Council than the so called more limited and "legalistic"

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1. Kundra, J.C., Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-1954, op. cit., p. 102.

2. The Hindu, February 27, 1948.

complaint presented by India on the Kashmir situation.<sup>1</sup> Against the legal argument of the Indian delegation Pakistan's contention<sup>2</sup> was that the problem of Kashmir was more than a legal case. It was a manifestation of the problems which the two Dominions had to face because of the communal massacres taking place in the subcontinent following partition. Furthermore, he could convince the delegates that the problem could be viewed correctly only in the context of the disturbances in the Indian subcontinent following the partition. The real question as presented by Pakistan was not of invasion but why the invasion took place, the main problem was of ensuring to the Muslims of Kashmir the right to choose their political future.

Perhaps all this suggested to Americans as well as others that India, the complainant, had not come before the Council with "clean hands", rather both countries had become enshared in tragic developments. Therefore, the prevailing American

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1. Poplai and Talbot, India and America, p.72. For India's legal claims see Indian view point in the same chapter. One writer observed: "In contrast to the able presentation of Pakistani Foreign Minister, the Indian delegation failed to portray its case effectively. Indeed, it has been suggested that this was a significant factor, causing India's initial severe defeat at the United Nations." Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, (New York, 1953), p.63.
  2. For details see the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, addressed to the Secretary General of the U.N., 15 January 1948, (S/646) and corr. 1) S.C.O.R., 3rd Yr., Supple. for November 1948, Annex 6, pp.69-87, and the statement made by him in the Security Council on 16 and 17 January 1948, S.C.O.R., 3rd Yr., Nos. 1-16, 228th-229th Mtg., 16 and 17 January, pp. 64-118.

reaction was that there was no justification in solving the Kashmir dispute only on the basis of legal points made by India i.e., the validity of the Maharaja's accession to India and the allegation of Pakistan's aggression. This is a fact that the members of the Security Council including the U.S. were influenced by the principle of self-determination which Pakistan also seemed to uphold. Moreover, they were so overwhelmed that they did not pay adequate attention to India's legal case regarding defacto aggression and instead threw their support for a solution by means of a plebiscite under international auspices without taking trouble as to have full knowledge of tribal and Pakistani invasion of Kashmir as alleged by India. Even they did not brand any party as the aggressor in the case. Indian resentment on this attitude was expressed by the Indian representative in the Security Council who said that "It would be putting the cart before the horse if the Security Council omitted to consider that point (cessation of hostilities) at the very beginning but proceeded instead to deal with the question of a plebiscite which, if it is in fact a matter for discussion and decision by this body, should come at the very end."<sup>1</sup>

The American delegate reacted at once. His comment<sup>2</sup>

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1. G. Ayyangar, I.C.O.E., 236th mtg., 1948.

2. Ibid.

is noteworthy: "One cannot have cessation of hostilities and violence unless one has also an understanding." This was in support of Pakistani view. Furthermore on January 29, 1948, the American delegate declared "No one wants to see a superior force sent into Kashmir area to drive out the invaders of that area."<sup>1</sup> A few lines from the speech of the U.S. delegate made before the Security Council on February 4, 1948 seem worth quoting here:<sup>2</sup>

"How is it possible to induce the tribesmen to retire from Jammu and Kashmir without warfare and without driving them out? That is the only way it can be done. Unless the tribesmen are satisfied that there is to be a fair plebiscite assured through an interim Government that is in fact, and that has the appearance of being, non-partisan." It was evident that against the Indian claim that the tribal invasion was illegal, the U.S. delegate said that the tribal invasion of Kashmir was not completely unjustified and that nothing should be done to evict the tribesmen by force. Mr. Resinger had rightly remarked that:<sup>3</sup> "The United States' view seemed to be that while India's legal position was strong because of the use of Pakistan's territory for the invasion of Kashmir, the dispute had a communal or

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1. Ibid, 237th mtg., January 29, 1948.

2. Ibid, 240th mtg., February 4, 1948, p. 369.

3. Kosinger, Lawrence K., India and the United States, op. cit., p. 106.

religious aspect denied by India."<sup>1</sup>

It came against the Indian expectations, as the United States was expected to take "a more active part ... Washington is known to feel that the United States could work somewhat more closely with Britain in contributing to the preservation of peace in India".<sup>2</sup> When India introduced the problem of Kashmir in the Security Council, she had expected the United Nations to support its position on Kashmir. More or less, the attitude of the United

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1. Perhaps, Americans believed that British India was partitioned between Hindus and Muslims on the theory that they constituted two different nations. India never agreed to their two-nation theory, and this has been an important point of difference in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. India agreed to partition because there was no other way of attaining her independence. India did not accept the U.S. thinking that being a Muslim majority State Kashmir should go to Pakistan. While returning to India from the United States, Nehru made it clear in a Press Conference at London on November 12, 1949 that India was divided on territorial and not on a religious basis and that conflict in Kashmir "was not between Hindus and Muslims, but between people who wanted freedom based on Kashmiri nationalism, with all the population pulling together, and believers in the two nation theory that nationality went by religion". Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru in America, National book stall, New Delhi, 1949 p. 217. Sir Benegal Rau in a statement in the Security Council on March 1, 1951 tried to remove some of the misconceptions and prejudices that appeared to have gathered round the Kashmir dispute and said that "The Kashmir question is not a Hindu-Muslim question as so often represented or misrepresented". S.C.C.R., 6th Yr., 533rd Mtg., 1 March 1951, p. 3.

2. New York Times, March 6, 1948.



Kingdom and the United States, being taken during the early debates on the question, was more acceptable to Pakistan than to India. In India, the public opinion became bitter about the Kashmir issue and the Security Council was regarded by the Indian newspapers for a time as almost wholly pro-Pakistan, excluding the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine, which had abstained from voting.<sup>1</sup> The U.S.' reluctance to consider the legal aspect of the dispute made Indians critical of its attitude. They were shocked and excited by the obvious stand taken by the United States on the dispute of Kashmir in the Security Council. Mr. M. Gopala Swami Ayyangar, the Chief mouthpiece of India on Kashmir in the Security Council, tried to make the Indians understand the position on 26 February 1948 by declaring in New Delhi:<sup>2</sup>

"Do not feel surprised if I tell you that the representative of the U.S.A. went so far as to demand that the condition under which the plebiscite is held should be such as would satisfy not merely insurgents, not merely Pakistan, but also the tribesmen from the North West Frontier. In other words his argument was that the people who were raiding Kashmir should be given assurance by India that the conditions, under which the plebiscite was being to be held after normal conditions had been restored, would be such as the tribesmen would recognize as satisfactory."

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1. Ibid. February 11, 1948.

2. Government of India Information Services,  
No.3632, March 10, 1948, pp. 1-2.

Nehru also spoke as such at Jammu that "Instead of discussing and deciding our references in a straight forward manner, the nations of the world sitting in that body got lost in power politics".<sup>1</sup> Nehru made another comment addressing the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) that:<sup>2</sup> "I must confess that I have been surprised and distressed at the fact that the reference we made has not even been properly considered thus far and other matters have been given precedence..."

"I regret greatly that the representatives of Pakistan should have made many statements and charges in the Security Council against India which have no foundation in fact ...

"Our making a reference on this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations was an act of faith ... To betray these people would be to betray the basic ideas for which the United Nations stands or should stand. Even at the moment of accession we went out of our way to make a unilateral declaration that we would abide by the will of the people of Kashmir as declared in a plebiscite or referendum."

Indians felt that their position on the issue was not understood correctly. Even their efforts at a positive

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1. Hindu, 16 February, 1948.

2. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp.450-51.

contribution to the solution of the Kashmir dispute has been misunderstood. India's position was that although, the accession of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to India on 26 October 1947 was perfectly a legal act, it was on January 1948 that the Indian Government proposed an internationally supervised plebiscite to be held in Kashmir, provided certain prior conditions were met, e.g., the withdrawal of invaders from Kashmir. Thus the first step as suggested in Indian draft proposal was that the fighting be ended.

The resolution<sup>1</sup> of 21 April 1948 was not regarded by India as an impartial action on the part of the Security Council. Since, the resolution was sponsored by the United States also, and she had played an important role in its adoption, many Indians were of the view that the United States had accepted the Pakistan version of the Kashmir dispute, and had supported Pakistan's claims to have a hand in the affairs of Kashmir.<sup>2</sup>

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1. S/726, Full Text in A.C.Q.R., 3rd Yr., Supple. for April 1948, pp. 8-12.

2. Poplai and Talbot, India and America, p. 74. After the rejection of this resolution by India and Pakistan, the U.S. reacted at once. Warren Austin declared on 26 May: "We have noticed that there is apparently no sense of obligation on the part of the parties to the case ... The parties come here and engage the very expensive machinery of the United Nations and the time of the distinguished men from all over the world: then when it comes to the performance or execution of the terms of a resolution, they say they will not consider it. 'There is something exceedingly wrong about that'. United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Yr., No. 74 304th mtg., May 26, 1948.

India did not like the placing of Pakistan on an equal footing with India as this resolution authorised the United Nations Commission set up in January to offer... its good offices with regard to both "the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite by the two governments ... " This was actually the cold shouldering of their complaint against the war like acts of Pakistan by the Security Council.

Indian resentment was strengthened when Pakistan accepted the presence of its forces since May 1948 in Kashmir in July 1948 before the UNCIP and nothing was done by the Security Council about this military presence. Indians were of the opinion that the United States, at no time, had brought any public pressure on Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Kashmir soil unconditionally and even did not criticise the continuing presence of Pakistani troops on Indian territory.<sup>1</sup>

The United States had never tried to ask Pakistan to abide by the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, instead they urged India to proceed with plebiscite

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1. On Indian territory because Kashmir had acceded to India on 26 October 1947. This admission was an obvious proof of India's charge that Pakistan's regular troops were fighting in Kashmir. In fact, if there ever was any need to investigate and establish Pakistan involvement in the invasion it had ended after that admission. See Rahmetullah Khan, Kashmir and the United Nations, pp.135-136 But the Commission chose to proceed with its conciliatory function despite the admitted aggressive act.

arrangements without establishing peace in the region. Instead it had since been held in the United States that after accepting these resolutions India lost her claims against the question of Pakistan's aggression or for the validity of the Maharaja's accession and that these issues became outdated in as much as the plebiscite itself was to determine the future disposition of the State. This avoidance had been resented by Indians that the Security Council and the U.S. were always ignoring the cruelty and terror, arson and murder used by the tribal and other invaders in Kashmir with Pakistan's assent and participation. Only the prior fulfilment of the condition that Pakistan should withdraw from Kashmir could bring the possibilities of a plebiscite in Kashmir.

Indians seemed to believe that despite the remarks of the U.N. mediator, Australian jurist Sir Owen Dixon that actions - the crossing by hostile elements of the Jammu and Kashmir frontier on October 20, 1947, and the movement of regular Pakistan forces into that state in May of 1948 were actions "contrary" to and "inconsistent" with international law,<sup>1</sup> perhaps the United States had

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1. U.N. Security Council, 5th Yr., Official Records, Supplement for September through December 1950 (New York, 1951), p. 29, para 21. For Full Text see Ibid. pp. 24-52.

been lending its support to the Pakistani charge that there had been Indian aggression in Kashmir for the purpose of securing Kashmir's accession by "fraud and violence". United States, India wanted, should have supported the Indian charge of Pakistani aggression.

Nehru rejected the proposal of arbitration and an early settlement of Kashmir dispute, made by the U.N. Commission, though President Truman of the United States in a letter<sup>1</sup> to him on August 30, 1949 urged to accept it.<sup>2</sup> The letter warned also that the dispute constituted a "grave threat to peace in all of Southeast Asia". Nehru refused to accept the proposal and his attitude was quite different from that of Pakistan<sup>3</sup> and indicated "unmistakable signs of irritation" over this "intervention" because no effort, he said, "had been made to understand or solve the fundamental issues involved" in Kashmir question.<sup>4</sup> Dr. J.C. Kundra's remark seems appropriate:

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1. New York Times, August 31, 1949. Full text in D.A.B. September 12, 1947, p. 399. P.M. Clement Attlee also made similar appeal to both the countries.
  2. The same letter was sent to Pakistan P.M. Liaqat Ali Khan also. Pakistan accepted it on September 7, 1949.
  3. For details see: Sisir Gupta, Kashmir a Study in India Pakistan Relations, pp. 194-202.
  4. The Hindu, September 5, 1949.

"So far as India regarded the U.S.A. as not wholly impartial in the Kashmir dispute, or at any rate not fully appreciative of India's standpoint, it was too naive to hope that India would accept the arbitration over a political dispute to which all states are generally averse by a U.S. national even when acting under U.N. auspices. Nor would the Indian public opinion have taken lightly an adverse decision by any arbitrator."<sup>1</sup>

standing firm on her stand on the dispute, India rejected the McNaughton proposals.<sup>2</sup> America was putting pressures to get these proposals accepted by India. Its support was lent to the Commission's work in the mediatory efforts of General J.G. L. McNaughton.<sup>3</sup> India was against all such pressures. On 7th February 1950 the correspondent of the Hindu reported from New York:

"It is astonishing to see how pressure is being brought to bear, subtly and otherwise, to make India accept the plan. But this pressure appears to have produced only the natural reaction of making India tougher. The press is contributing its share in this pressure game."<sup>4</sup>

Why were the United States and other Western powers

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1. Kundra, J.C., Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54, op. cit. p. 104.
  2. Text in S.C.O.H., 5th Yr. Supple. for January-May 1950 pp. 14-6. Under these proposals, the aggressor got a fair and equitable treatment. The legally constituted Armed Forces and Militia of the State of Kashmir were to be dissolved along with the invading tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who by then had metamorphosed into the "Azad Forces".
  3. The then President of the Security Council.
  4. The Hindu, 9 February 1950.

taking a pro-Pakistan stand? The most sound explanation, which seemed from the Indian point of view, was that the Western powers were interested in obtaining military bases in Kashmir, as the territory was of great strategic significance, which they had no hope of getting if Kashmir remained a part of India<sup>1</sup> because India was a non-aligned country. One writer's remark that American policy in Kashmir dispute had been widely interpreted in India to be a reaction to India's refusal to align itself with the United States in the cold war<sup>2</sup> is noteworthy here. This might be made clear from some concrete facts. In 1949, the U.S. suggested first the name of General Walter Bedell Smith<sup>3</sup> and then Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz<sup>4</sup> as the U.N. plebiscite Administrators in Kashmir. Mr. Rosinger's view may be right that this showed that "American interest in Kashmir has a strategic aspect."<sup>5</sup>

The United States realized the strategic importance of Pakistan and Kashmir more after the Berlin blockade,

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1. Joseph Korbé denied that either the U.S.A. or the U.K. had any such motives. Danger in Kashmir, (Princeton, 1954) p.269. see also, Kundra, India's Foreign Policy 1947-54, p. 103; Rosinger, India and the United States, p.105, "The interest of the U.S. presumably, arose in part from Kashmir's strategic location close to the U.S.S.R., bordering on Afghanistan, Sinkiang, Tibet, India and Pakistan". Ibid.
  2. Poplai and Talbot, India and America, op.cit., p.78. In fact this trend in Indian thinking has become stronger since the 1954 American arms aid agreement with Pakistan.
  3. Previously U.S. Ambassador in Moscow.
  4. He was the wartime Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean areas.
  5. Rosinger, India and the United States, op.cit., p. 111.



the formation of NATO, the victory of Communists in China in 1949, the Korean crisis 1950 and the end of U.S. monopoly of the atomic bomb. These major developments had intensified the Cold War and strengthened the strategic importance of Kashmir in the U.S. eyes.<sup>1</sup> And the U.S. had started to use its pressure on India impatiently. But

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1. Sir William Barton supported the Pakistani position in an article to the January 1950 issue of the American quarterly, Foreign Affairs, emphasizing the urgent need of Pakistan in the strategy against Communism after the Chinese revolution. He made the points in the support: (i) from the view point of population and geography Kashmir was a part of Pakistan; (ii) Abdullah was Nehru's protege; (iii) India would need an army of occupation to hold Kashmir; (iv) India was becoming economically weak and politically unstable a morass out of which a lasting peace with Pakistan was the only escape; (v) Pakistan had on the whole a sound financial position and politically she was "in smoother waters than her great neighbour"; (vi) Pakistan, along with the Islamic Middle East, was becoming anti-West at a time when oil counted for much strategically, and Islam could well be thought of as a potential barrier against Communism. The task was to "induce Pandit Nehru and his Government to be less uncompromising" and a new approach could be to give most of Kashmir to Pakistan, leaving a part of Jammu, South of Chensab, for India. This would restore the old boundaries before the British committed the "tragic blunder", "the record of Hindu rule" could not entitle them to any thing more. William Barton, "Pakistan's claims to Kashmir", Foreign Affairs, January 1950, p.299. Indian Press was surprised. In a leading article the Hindustan Times wrote "What Indian opinion cannot so easily understand is why a journal of the standing of Foreign Affairs should have allowed such propaganda stuff to disfigure its pages." The Hindustan Times, February 6, 1950.

India was successful in resisting this pressure.

Nehru's earlier observation was quoted by the Times of India<sup>1</sup> that "this method of bringing pressure to bear for other reasons is something which the Government of India have not learned to understand yet" and added: "Nor should they ever learn it". The most strong reaction was felt in Kashmir itself. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad said that "so long as a single Kashmiri is alive the McNaughton formula will not be accepted."<sup>2</sup> Mirza Aszal Beg's warning may also be quoted: "India will lose the friendship of Kashmir if she were to bow down before the pressure of Anglo-American bloc and accept, in any shape or form, the McNaughton formula which equated the aggressor and the aggrieved."<sup>3</sup>

Indian Press, perhaps was confident of the Security Council failure with regard to this mediation. The Amrita Bazar Patrika had earlier written in an article that <sup>4</sup> "India need not fear the Anglo-American machinations as long as she is firm as a secular state. And so long as the

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1. Times of India, 8 February 1950.
  2. Hindustan Times, 29th February, 1950.
  3. Tribune, 2 March 1950.
  4. Amrita Bazar Patrika, January 15, 1950. Abdul Ghaffar Malik, "Role of Anglo-American and U.N. in Kashmir Drama".

Security Council is guided in its consideration of the Kashmir issue by the Anglo-American imperialistic view, it, like the Kashmir Commission, is sure to meet failure." B.N. Rau spoke against the propaganda and publicity in the Western Countries in favour of Pakistan. His speech demonstrated India's anguish: "It is incomprehensible to us why pressure should always be brought to bear on India to acquiesce in the wrong, and why, for a change, some pressure should not be brought to bear on the other side to acquiesce in the right on the same grounds."<sup>1</sup>

Sir Owen Dixon<sup>2</sup> did the same. He fell into the same error of compromising with aggression, though he recognized that both the crossing of the frontier of the State of Kashmir on 20 October 1947 and the movement of the regular Pakistan forces into the territory, were contrary to and inconsistent with international law.<sup>3</sup> What was wrong was with the solution he offered namely, of a partial plebiscite and/or partition of the State. That was, perhaps, the climax of the U.N. mistakes in the Indian view. The failure of Dixon's mediation came at a time when for the first time Indian attitude was distinct from that of the West on the major world problem i.e. the Korean War, which brought the struggle

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1. S.C.O.F., 463rd Mtg., 1950.

2. He was a distinguished Australian jurist.

3. S/1791, 15 September 1950.

between Communism and anti-Communism at its peak in Asia. Probably, this led to view the Kashmir problem in the light of the new situation created by this Cold War strategy. Even, Moscow Radio commented on the Dixon proposals that "Having established their own administration in Kashmir, the Anglo-American imperialists would have postponed the plebiscite indefinitely under the pretext of lack of agreement between India and Pakistan."<sup>1</sup> In the United Nations also this cold war struggle was going on. So the suggestion of having a U.N. administration in Kashmir was regarded by the Soviet Union and other Communists as a grand and sinister move to take over the state which was important strategically for West's fight against the U.S.S.R. and China.

This was an important change which brought the Kashmir dispute to a new position in international policies as was observed by Asir Gupta:<sup>2</sup> "Keeping the U.N. out of Kashmir would now become one of the tests that one bloc of nations would apply to India's policy of non-alignment - a policy which was of great significance and

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1. Reported in the Times of India, 28 August 1950.

2. Asir Gupta, Kashmir a study in India-Pakistan relations, op.cit., p. 222.

imperative necessity for India in the context of the deepening cleavages between the power blocs."

But so far as India was concerned it saw this new situation from a different angle. She was interested in limiting the scope of U.N. intervention in Kashmir because it involved India's vigorous national pride and consciousness and not in deference to the wishes of any power bloc. Moreover, India criticised these proposals because these were inconsistent with the Indian stand on the Kashmir dispute.

With the failure of London talks<sup>1</sup> in evolving an agreement between the disputant parties, the American and British press started attacking India. The New York Times criticised Nehru in these words:

"Mr. Nehru has been giving us all advice about a settlement of the Korean conflict. Evidently he finds it easier to solve the problems of the world than the one in his backyard."<sup>2</sup>

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1. This Commonwealth meeting was an attempt in early 1951 to have the Kashmir issue discussed at another international forum, after the apparent deadlock following the Dixon report in the United Nations. Though the U.S. was not a member of the Commonwealth, it was noteworthy that on 5 January 1951, the press officer of the U.S. State Department liked the Commonwealth meeting and said that obviously, it had offered an opportunity for discussing the Kashmir problem in the solution of which the United States also had been deeply interested. The Hindu, 7th January 1951.

2. New York Times, 17 January 1951.

India-United States differences arose over both the U.N.-U.S. draft resolution<sup>1</sup> of 21 February 1951, and the revised resolution<sup>2</sup> adopted by the Security Council on 30 March 1951. Although B.N. Rau, the Head of the Indian delegation had assured the Security Council, on March 1, 1951<sup>3</sup> that the Constituent Assembly, which would frame the Constitution, would not prejudice the issues before the Security Council or come in its way. The representative of the United States, Ernest A. Gross objected before the Security Council on March 21,<sup>4</sup>

"We believe that it is important that the Security Council hold firm ... toward the obligations of the Government of India in respect to this Constituent Assembly. The matter of the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is an international question, a matter which this Council has

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1. S/2017, which disapproved the plan for convening a Constituent Assembly (in Jammu and Kashmir) as contrary to the Council's resolutions (of 13 Aug. 1948, 5 Jan. 1949 and 14 March 1950) previously accepted by both India and Pakistan and endorsed Sir Owen Dixon's proposals for demilitarization.
  2. (S/2017/rev.1), S.C.O.R., 6th Yr., Supple. for January-March 1951, pp.25-7. It was with two significant changes (1) dropping all references to the U.N. force to concede a point to India, and (2) also those to the possible division of the State to satisfy Pakistan. But the provision for arbitration and the paragraph relating to the Constituent Assembly were retained. The crux of the debate was the issue of arbitration. While India rejected it, Pakistan accepted it. India's stand had been supported by the U.S.S.R. against the U.S.A.
  3. S.C.O.R., 6th Yr., 533rd Mtg., 1 March 1951, p.3-10.
  4. News, vol. XXIV (615), April 16, 1951, p. 631.

had within its purview for over 3 years. It clearly falls within the field of external affairs, and Sir Benegal Rau has told the Council that the External Affairs of the Government of Kashmir are within the control of the Indian Government. The Security Council, therefore, should be entitled to assume that the Government of India will prevent the Government of Kashmir from taking action which would interfere with the responsibilities of this Council."

India refused to accept first the draft resolution and later the revised resolution because the arguments advanced in support of it by the U.K. and U.S. delegations "posit an entirely new and fantastic theory that Kashmir is a kind of no-man's land where sovereignty is yet undetermined",<sup>1</sup> despite the fact that it had acceded to India in October 1947. Nehru also said:

"We did not ask the United Nations to adjudge the validity of Kashmir's accession or to determine where sovereignty lay ... The United Nations took advantage of our initiative in our referring the matter to them and thus enlarged the scope of their enquiry."<sup>2</sup>

He refused to consider arbitrament as the right means of solution of a complex problem like demilitarization and also because it ignored the basic facts of aggression by Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> B.N. Rau objected that under the guise of arbitration, agreements already arrived at were sought to

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.465.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 467-468.

be disturbed. He gave the reasons: "First, it seeks to give Pakistan a voice in matters in which Pakistan, an invader of the State, has been rightly denied any voice under the older resolutions, and, secondly, it seeks to transfer to arbitrators the right to make vital decisions, which under the older resolutions required India's agreement." Therefore, though India would not accept this resolution, she would have no objection to the U.N. representative visiting the subcontinent "to assist by suggestion, advice and mediation" in determining how demilitarization could be carried on.<sup>1</sup>

Along with the official condemnation of this resolution, almost all sections of the Indian press criticised bitterly the Security Council's adoption of the Anglo-U.S. resolution. One of the leading newspapers commented:<sup>2</sup>

"The Anglo-U.S. resolution on Kashmir has deeply hurt India's feelings. Justice has been sacrificed to diplomacy and mediation has been trostied for the convenience of power politics. For sometime the Security Council's prestige has been lowered by its unrepresentative character, but by rousing contempt in a people, the most passionately attached to collective security and the firmest adherents to the U.N. machinery, the Council has done irreparable damage to itself."

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1. S.C.O.A., 6th year, 538 mtg., 29 March 1951.

2. National Herald, April 1, 1951.



AIRING 1952-1953:

By the year 1952, there had emerged two different opinions in the Security Council. One, of extending further the role of the Council and of affecting demilitarisation of Kashmir through arbitration, which was favoured by Pakistan and the U.S. with other Western Powers. The other, of throwing the onus on the parties themselves to proceed with direct contacts to solve outstanding problems, that was favoured by India and the Soviet Union. "Apparently the slow emergence of India as a powerful force in Asia, independent of any great overt or covert influence of the West, was making a difference in attitudes to the Kashmir problem", Sisir Gupta has rightly pointed out.<sup>1</sup> Now the U.S. or the other Western powers were in no position to get success in putting pressure on India to act in according to their wishes in the United Nations. Another fact which became evident was that one of two power blocs would resist any attempt on the part of the U.N. to put pressure on the parties to accept a solution which might transform Kashmir into some kind of a U.N. mandated territory.

The U.S.S.R.'s anti-U.S. behaviour might be seen in its criticism of the U.S. and U.K. stand on these U.N. mediatory

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1. Sisir Gupta -, Kashmir A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, op.cit., p.233.

efforts. On January 10, 1952, Jacob Malik, the U.S.S.R. representative to the U.N., gave a new angle to the problem in the Council and alleged that:

"The United States of America and the United Kingdom are continuing as before to interfere in the settlement of the Kashmir question, putting forward one plan after another ... These plans in connection with Kashmir are of an imperialist nature, because they are not based on the effort to achieve a real settlement. The purpose of these plans is interference ... in the internal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir, and the conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States of America and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering assistance through the United Nations. Finally, the purpose of these plans in connection with Kashmir is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into an Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic base against the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China."<sup>1</sup>

These comments brought further complications into the Kashmir dispute.

At that time the Korean war had led to an intensification of the Cold War in Asia and the policies of America in Asia were mainly based on the need of providing a military answer to the Communist challenge. In the prevailing atmosphere, the Soviet opposition of external interference in Kashmir was natural, because Indo-Pakistan sub-continent

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1. Year Book of the United Nations 1952. op.cit., p.232.

had importance in Asia and Kashmir, 'with its status undetermined', might appear 'to the U.S.S.R. as one of the possible areas where the U.S. would extend itself. It is not possible to say how far the Soviet view was justified; but in the atmosphere of suspicion and tension, it was a natural corollary to the thinking on either side. Not unoften did the Western writers express their worry of growing soviet (or communist) influence in Kashmir.'<sup>1</sup> This was U.S.S.R.'s indirect support to the Indian position on Kashmir and since now the U.S.S.R. became the major concern in India's foreign policy. The anti-Communist forces became interested in trying to end the non-alignment of some of the nations of Asia while the U.S.S.R. began to help countries to remain non-aligned.

It was in this context of India's refusal to abide by all the U.N. mediatory efforts that Graham left the problem to direct negotiations between the two disputant parties - India and Pakistan. This was a new development which took place as a result of the failure of U.N.C.I.F. efforts. Throughout the negotiations India stressed that the great powers should not entangle themselves in the dispute over Kashmir so that a neutral and impartial approach might be brought about.

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1. Sisir Gupta, op.cit., p. 245.

In India's view, as a result of the joint Communiqué<sup>1</sup> of 20 August 1953, issued on the talks between the two Prime Ministers in Delhi,<sup>2</sup> the important gain, was that the new Plebiscite Administrator, according to a reported agreement, would not be from a big power but from a small one; and Admiral Nimitz whose being a citizen of the U.S. might create complications, was to go, (though his competence was doubted by none). The Hindu reported:<sup>3</sup> "Admiral Chester Nimitz may not have to wait any longer to take over the post of Plebiscite Administrator as the choice of such an administrator will in all probability fall on an Asian nation".<sup>4</sup> This was agreed not because Nehru was prejudiced against the U.S. but because, as the Indian Prime Minister later put it:<sup>5</sup> "The great powers are too entangled in their difficulties and often pull against each other. Hence it has become the normal practice to avoid having representatives of these powers in any matter requiring some kind of a neutralist and impartial approach. That is no reflection on any power, much less on an eminent person like Admiral Nimitz. It is merely an appreciation of the

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1. Text in Negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India regarding the Kashmir Dispute. (June 1953-September 1954), Rawalpindi; Govt. of Pakistan Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, n.d. pp. 103-4.
  2. Talks began on 17th August 1953.
  3. The Hindu, 22 August 1953.
  4. The Pakistani press also welcomed this change. See The Pakistan Times, August 20, 1953.
  5. Nehru's letter of 28 August 1953 to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, White Paper on Kashmir, op.cit., p. 15

facts of the present-day situation."<sup>1</sup>

Because of her policy of non-alignment India had requested Pakistan not to vote with the U.S. in the U.N. on the issue of Korea. But it did not do so, perhaps to win the U.S. support for the Kashmir dispute. Nehru in his letter of 3 September 1953 stressed the need that for India's larger policy of non-alignment, it was essential that the Kashmir question did not get entangled in big power politics because, if, Kashmir became also an arena of conflict between the great powers, then not only India and Pakistan but also the people of Kashmir would play a secondary part.

Negotiations brought some fruits to India but as Pakistan continued to rely on the Western bloc, the resignation of Admiral Nimitz was resented even by the Pakistani press. The Times of Karachi wrote editorially: "In retrospect, we can see the devastating results of direct talks with India. Their net result is that Nimitz is gone, thereby destroying the entire fabric of agreements reached under the auspices of the United Nations."<sup>2</sup>

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1. India was surprised to see that The Dawn in a lengthy despatch discovered in Nehru's suggestions: (1) an attempt "to drive a wedge between the U.S.A. and Pakistan" and (2) "to create a situation in which the Kashmir dispute may for all practical purposes cease to be a live issue before the U.N." The Dawn, 27th August 1953.
  2. The Times of Karachi, 6th September 1953. Editorial - "Stab in the Back".

This was a fact that Pakistan did not succeed in direct negotiations with India because the U.S. was not on its back for supporting its claims.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN<sup>1</sup> AND THE PROBLEM OF KASHMIR:

This move on the part of the United States was the most grievous blow, which harmed the prospects of a negotiated settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir on the one hand and deteriorated relations between India and the United States on the other hand. It was altogether a 'new and serious element introduced into the situation by Pakistan'<sup>2</sup> which changed the whole context of the problem of Kashmir. One of the main reasons might have been Pakistan's hope that her entering into alliance with the United States would make the latter to give Pakistan, "besides economic and military aid, full moral and political support in finding an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute".<sup>3</sup> Pakistan, perhaps, thought that as a part of the arrangement the U.S. would support Pakistan in its disputes with India especially over Kashmir, in return

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1. The issue is dealt separately in the next chapter. The formal announcement of U.S. Assistance was made by Mohammad Ali on 22 February 1954 and the PACT was signed on 19 May 1954.

2. Sisir Gurta, op.cit., p.277

3. H. Ansen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and the U.S.", Pakistan xaxax Horizon vol. IX (December 1956), p. 20.

for Pakistan's support of the United States on the cold war issues in the world politics.

As has been pointed out earlier Pakistan and Kashmir were of strategic importance in the American foreign policy as the military basis against Communist expansion in Asia. Prime Minister, Nehru's visit to the U.S.A. during October 1949 had confirmed that the U.S.A. would not succeed in bringing India to align itself with the U.S.A. in its fight against Communism. Previously also, India's policy of non-alignment, ever since her independence, had been misunderstood by the Americans. Indians were feeling from 1950 onwards that the American attitude on Kashmir was changing more and more in favour of Pakistan. In 1949, the Communist overthrow of the Nationalist Government of China, supported by the U.S. Government, had caused the U.S. to find dependable allies in the region to contain Communism. When the U.S. saw that India would not agree, Pakistan was the obvious alternative to fill the power vacuum in South Asia, which was caused by the withdrawal of Britishers from the Indian sub-continent. So the U.S. did not hesitate in having a military pact with Pakistan, which in turn did irreparable damage to any settlement of the Kashmir problem. Before the U.S.A. the main danger was the Communist power while the problem of Kashmir was before Pakistan and she wanted to be militarily strengthened against her neighbour

India, so that she might win Kashmir.

Whatever might have been the reasons which brought about the signing of the pact the fact remained that in consequence it had such repercussions which bear their effect also on the present day Kashmir dispute. This military assistance had direct bearings on the problem of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Certainly, India protested against it because in her eyes, Pakistan's alignment with the U.S.A. brought the cold war nearer her borders<sup>1</sup> and strengthened Pakistan against India.<sup>2</sup> Nehru did not hesitate and delay in warning Pakistan that this aid would change the context of, and approach to, the discussions on the settlement of the Indo-Pakistani disputes, especially with respect to the Kashmir question, making their long talk of 1953 somewhat irrelevant. He added, "... we must retain full liberty to keep such forces and military equipment in the Kashmir state as we may consider necessary in view of this new threat to us."<sup>3</sup> In his speech in the Lok Sabha Nehru declared that the military aid being given to Pakistan by the United States was a form of intervention in the problems between India and Pakistan, which was likely to have more far-reaching results than

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1. India was a non-aligned country and it did not want any alliance to touch the Indian subcontinent.
  2. Despite the fact that President, Eisenhower had assured Nehru that this military aid to Pakistan was not given for use against India.
  3. Letter of 5 March 1954 of P.M. Nehru to P.M. of Pakistan Negotiations between the Prime Minister of Pakistan and India, op.cit., pp. 73-74.



the previous types of intervention.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, Nehru demanded the withdrawal of American personnel from the U.N. Observer's group in Kashmir, as the U.S.A. was now a partisan in Indo-Pakistan problems. So these American observers can no longer be treated by us as neutrals in this dispute, and hence their presence there appears to us to be improper", remarked Nehru.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, the new situation prepared the ground to consider afresh and from different premises the problem of Kashmir. In his letter to Pakistan F.M., Nehru wrote that U.S. military aid to Pakistan produced a 'qualitative change' in the existing situation and therefore, it affected Indo-Pakistan relations, more especially on the Kashmir problem. Because of this development there was danger of losing all the ground so far gained on the question. The previous discussions on demilitarisation in Kashmir became meaningless in the face of the projected reinforcement of the military strength of Pakistan with the help of U.S. military aid. Thereafter, it would be a relatively small matter what forces Pakistan maintained within the area of Kashmir occupied by it. These forces could come back at a few hours' notice. If, however, they were backed

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, 1954, vol. I, Part II, col. 971, for details see cols. 963-74.

2. Ibid.

by an increasing armed power in Pakistan itself 'that is of far greater moment than the so-called demilitarisation of Kashmir State. In fact, it becomes rather absurd to talk of demilitarisation, if Pakistan proceeds in the reverse direction with the help of the United States.'<sup>1</sup>

Nehru made reference to one more important point that contrary to the Pakistan Government's stand that U.S. military aid to Pakistan was an 'extraneous issue' to Kashmir the P.M. of Pakistan had himself stated (particularly in his interview to the U.S. News and World Report on 15 January 1954) that the aid would help in solving the Kashmir issue. 'This can only mean that you wish to settle this issue by force of arms or by threat to use arms, unless the preliminary issues still outstanding, such as the question of forces, are settled to the satisfaction of Pakistan ... It takes it out from the region of a peaceful approach for a friendly settlement by bringing in the pressure of arms. However, Nehru added, "It is a matter of deep regret to me that after our attempts to find a peaceful settlement of this difficult problem of Kashmir a new series of events should have upset our calculations and prevented any future progress. It is not merely the

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1. India Government White Paper, Kashmir ... (New Delhi) Ministry of External Affairs, October 1954), p.48.

Kashmir question that has become much more difficult, but a serious threat has arisen to India's Security. We must take a grave view of these developments."<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, India suspended an agreement<sup>2</sup> with Pakistan to appoint a plebiscite administrator latest by the end of April, 1954. Nehru said in the Indian parliament on March 16, 1954: "A situation has arisen where by any officer of the U.S. Army can not be considered neutral in the dispute in Kashmir."<sup>3</sup>

Voicing the grievances of India over U.S.- Pakistan Military Pact, the Indian Press and public opinion was far ahead of the official Indian opinion. In the words of The Statesman, Pakistani Premier Ali's reference to this aid as likely to make a settlement over Kashmir easier was "a plain enough hint."<sup>4</sup> The Hindu noted it was feared that any military assistance to Pakistan was "bound to result in the exercise of undue pressure" on India.<sup>5</sup> The same paper also accused the United States of throwing the

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1. Ibid., p. 72.
  2. Joint Communique of August 20, 1953 by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan embodying the Agreement. Text in India News, August 22, 1953, p. 273.
  3. Ibid., March 20, 1954.
  4. The Statesman, March 4, 1954. This comment was provoked by P.M. Ali's interview with U.S. News and World Report 15 January 1954.
  5. The Hindu, February 15, 1954 (Weekly Review).

peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem by tilting the balance between the parties to the dispute.<sup>1</sup> The Hindu was unconvinced by the President Eisenhower's assurance, it wrote: "The U.S. has found it difficult enough to restrain even a puppet regime like Syngman Rhee's; it will be impossible for it to control a country like Pakistan, particularly on Kashmir."<sup>2</sup>

The Indian newspapers urged the Indian Government to take vigorous measures if the parties concerned did not heed the admonition. As a matter of fact, the American military observers were subsequently withdrawn from the area by the U.N. Though, the stalemate continued and the Indian Government insisted that negotiations on Kashmir could not be conducted on an acceptable basis since Pakistan had received U.S. military aid. In this way a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir problem became more difficult to achieve.

Since now, as a result of the U.S. military aid to Pakistan, the Soviet Union, began to support India openly in the U.N. and outside the U.N., the Western thinking at this time was that any nation not with them was against them and that the neutralist nations were helpful to Communism.

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1. Ibid., March 8, 1954.

2. Ibid., "and really the U.S. could not prevent Pakistan when it used its weapons in its war against India in 1965."

Pakistani press upheld this view particularly and it began to identify Nehru with Communism.<sup>1</sup> It was made evident in the Dawn<sup>2</sup> that India had entered into a secret pact with Russia and China and that Pakistan's decision to accept U.S. assistance was a result of this development.

It was on December 9, 1955 that during his visit to India, with Nikita Khrushchev (Communist Party First Secretary), the Soviet Premier Bulganin referred to Kashmir as the "northern part of India, and Khrushchev said on December 10:

"The question of Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir ... While in the Republic of India we find an ally in the struggle for peace and for the peaceful solution of unsettled problems, unfortunately we cannot say the same about Pakistan ... We do not like the Baghdad Pact at all, the most active participant of which is Pakistan even though her participation is without any benefit to her and her people."<sup>3</sup>

All these statements made it clear that the Russians, who had thus far remained neutral on the Kashmir problem and whose representatives had abstained from voting whenever the issue of Kashmir came up in the Security Council, had changed their stand and decided to support India completely

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1. Sisir Gupta, op.cit., p. 282

2. The Dawn, December 31, 1953.

3. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 10, 1955-56. p. 1460<sup>4</sup>.

as a result of Pakistan's alliance with the United States.<sup>1</sup> As far as the statements of Russian leaders were concerned the Indian view was expressed by Nehru on 3 January 1956 at Agra when he said that Soviet leaders had said "correct things", although they were not "asked to do so", and that their opinions were expressed after due consideration and great deliberation".<sup>2</sup> And if there seemed any cold war element (as alleged by the Pakistani press)<sup>3</sup> in them, it was first introduced by Pakistan by allying herself with the U.S. military pact; which had disturbed the military balance of the region. The Hindu wrote that "Pakistani leaders and newspapers have more than once openly touted for the support of the Anglo-American bloc in the United Nations."<sup>4</sup>

The changed Russian attitude was much disturbing to the Pakistanis who had "looked to the United States for equally unequivocal support, but got nothing more than the suggestion that the question be again referred to the United Nations. They seemed to assume that because the Russian leaders had openly supported India, the U.S. should as openly side with its ally, Pakistan, and they were bitterly disappointed when the United States failed to act

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1. Pakistan's resentment came over these statements because of the fact that the U.S. Secretary of State had not come out in support of the Pakistani stand to offset the effects created by the Russian statements.
  2. The Statesman, 4 January 1956.
  3. See Pakistan News Digest, IV (December 15, 1955) p.3
  4. The Hindu, Dec. 12, 1955.

as expected."<sup>1</sup> Perhaps, the U.S. was to change her policies with regard to the Soviet Union and there was a growing awareness of the use and importance of the non-aligned posture of India, in the United States.<sup>2</sup>

The New York Times reported<sup>3</sup> India welcomed the Soviet support for the Indian case on the Kashmir dispute without hesitation because in the words of Nehru, the whole basis of the Kashmir dispute had "completely changed" following a series of developments e.g. the American military aid to Pakistan. "There is much more increased military potential sitting on the other side. It makes a huge difference. Large bases surrounding India ... not only surrounding India but their existence on Pakistan occupied territory of Kashmir ... have made a tremendous difference", said Nehru, so it made little difference to what extent Pakistan agreed to demilitarize on its side of the ceasefire line in Kashmir.

The Indians viewed that between the Russian support to the Indian position and the American support to Pakistan on the problem of Kashmir, there was one fundamental difference. In the Russian view of Kashmir an element of

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1. Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and Pakistan", Current History, XXXIV (March, 1958) p. 145.

2. Sisir Gupta, op.cit., p. 422.

3. New York Times, April 3, 1956.

cold war politics was doubted by few as far as India's case was concerned. In getting Russian support India did not assure the Soviet Union of any kind of military or political support, but, in fact, it was in reaction to the effect of Pakistan getting into the pacts with her Western allies as the Russian leaders had made no secret of their dislike of Pakistan's participation in the Baghdad Pact. Because Pakistan intended to strengthen her defence against India and was motivated by her desire to deal with India from a position of strength while aligning herself with these pacts, Russian support was not unwelcome in India. As Sisir Gupta has observed:

"Apart from the fact the Indian position was for the first time accepted by a powerful nation, this certainly was expected to illustrate to Pakistan the futility of trying to solve problems like Kashmir with strength borrowed from one of the cold war blocs."<sup>1</sup>

Though the United States believed that these pacts - the U.S. Military alliance with Pakistan, SEATO (1954), Baghdad pact (1955)<sup>2</sup> in Asia were to strengthen defence against Communist expansion, India opposed them and certainly they added to the defence burdens of India. Speaking in Lok Sabha on March 20, 1956, Nehru made the

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1. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir A Study in India Pakistan Relations, op.cit., p. 302.

2. Later to be known as CENTO from 1958 onwards.



points of increased anxieties with regard to these Pacts. First that they "affect intimately", and "tend to encircle us". Second, that Pakistan had joined this Baghdad Pact "because of India."<sup>1</sup> Because the major problem between India and Pakistan was the problem of Kashmir, the effect of involving Pakistan in the cold war by joining these Western military pacts would only be to bring to Kashmir as well. That was the main reason of India's concern. These developments added to India's burden so as to become more strong than Pakistan.

But the U.S.' argument was that it did not believe that Pakistan would commit aggression against "such a large and powerful country as India", to quote Dulles. His thinking was that the SEATO military treaty did not increase tension, "but brought peace nearer".<sup>2</sup>

The Indian fears came true when in the SEATO Council meeting of Ministers in Karachi in March 1956 the Pakistani feelings were voiced and the Council, in its communique<sup>3</sup> of March 8, 1956 "affirmed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir question through the U.N. or by direct negotiations". India was surprised how the Kashmir question

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.94.

2. The Dawn, 13 March 1956.

3. Text in D.S.B., vol. XXIV (873), March 19, 1956, pp.447.-449.

which was out of the SEATO formation could be raised and also that the U.S. along with six other members of the treaty organization supported the demand of Pakistan that a U.N. supervised plebiscite be held to determine whether Kashmir should go to India or Pakistan. The Government of India could not bear this and protested against it on the ground that to discuss the Kashmir problem was beyond the scope and functions of the SEATO.<sup>1</sup>

It was criticised by Indian press also:

"The reference to Kashmir in the Communique of the SEATO has caused India surprise and pain for it means that the SEATO alliance is backing Pakistan in its dispute with India ... India does not wish to enter into an arms race with Pakistan but our Government cannot ignore the consequences of the arms aid to Pakistan."<sup>2</sup>

In addition to it, the Baghdad Pact Council in its communique<sup>3</sup> of 19 April 1956 stated inter alia: "Specific problems which were causing tension in this area were also discussed thoroughly and frankly in a spirit of mutual comprehension. In particular the Council emphasized the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir

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1. Nehru's speech on March 20, 1956, see Lok Sabha Debates, 1956, vol.2, part II, col. 3042.

2. Editorial: "Voice of India", The Hindustan Times 21 March 1956.

3. Text in the Dawn, 21 April 1956.

disputes." India's regret might be seen from what All India Congress Committee said in its meeting in June 1956:<sup>1</sup>

"The Committee regrets the reference to Kashmir in the recent meetings in Karachi and Tehran of the SEAO and the Baghdad Pact Organisation. This concerns the integrity and the sovereign rights of India."

THE CHANGED CONTEXT AND THE SOVIET VETO:

The participation of Pakistan in all these Western alliances and other developments instigated the Soviet Union to use its Veto in the Security Council in February 1957 on the resolution relating to the Kashmir problem. The Veto of the Soviet Union started a new chapter in the history of the dispute. Undoubtedly, certain major developments had added to the Indo-U.S. differences and the foreign policies of both India and Pakistan, continued to drift apart. India had opposed the U.S. military assistance accepted by Pakistan. India had resented the formation of SEATO (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955) of which Pakistan became a member. On the issue of Hungary 1956, the Western view was supported by Pakistan, while India did not vote with the West even on a single Council resolution. Over the Suez Canal dispute 1956 the differences were more sharp. India supported

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1. Congress Bulletin, Nos. 5-6, June 1956, All India Congress Committee, p. 184.

the sovereign rights of Egypt and Pakistan emphasized the international character of the Suez canal in turn supporting the stand taken by the United States with other Western powers. In short, it might be said, Pakistan was one of the kingpins in the Western defence strategy in West and Southeast Asia while India was the major non-aligned country of the region. From the Western view point, Pakistan was at the least an ally and India at the most a friend.<sup>1</sup>

Though, the American press was not much critical and showed only greater awareness of the "complexity" of the problem and had made few comments, there was a new sympathy for Pakistan over Kashmir in some of the major newspapers of the Western countries. The Sunday Express of London wrote: "Mr. Nehru had no hesitation in attacking Britain's Suez policy in the United Nations. He proved himself our open and dangerous enemy. Let Britain now be open about Mr. Nehru for ingrabbing Kashmir this hypocritical man, who censures colonialism and the use of force so loftily elsewhere, is guilty of blatant aggression."<sup>2</sup> No criticism could be more bitter than that one. So did the other newspapers e.g., the Daily Telegraph of Sydney, (29 January 1957), Daily Mirror, Manchester Guardian, and the News Chronicle.

The Soviet Union, having been aware of all these developments vetoed the draft resolution<sup>3</sup>, sponsored by the U.S.A., Britain, Cuba and Australia on February 14, 1957,

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1. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir A Study in India Pakistan Relations, op.cit., p.310.

2. The Sunday Express, January 6, 1957, under the heading "Speak Out".

3. S/3787, E.C.O.R., 12th Yr., Supple. for January-March 1957, pp. 7-8.

which made reference to demilitarization, plebiscite and a U.N. Force. Since the U.S.S.R. lent its full support to the Indian position on the provision in the draft resolution to the introduction of the U.N. force in Kashmir. Consequently, for the first time, the veto compelled the sponsors of the next resolution<sup>1</sup> to only proposing to send Gunnar Jarring to India and Pakistan, but making no reference to demilitarization, plebiscite or a U.N. force, to which the Indian and the Soviet delegates had expressed their strong opposition.

The Indian view was that since the U.S. military assistance had flown to Pakistan, the issue of demilitarization was of no avail. The proposal for U.N. force in Nehru's view was "against international law and the Charter of the United Nations unless India accepts it." Nehru said "Under no circumstances will we accept any foreign forces on our territory" and he described the resolution as "entirely misconceived" and "wholly wrong" and "as the attempt to advance step by step in a direction which we consider wrong and unfair."<sup>2</sup>

Indian press also protested against the resolution of 14 February 1957. The Times of India commented that:<sup>3</sup>

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1. S/3793, 21 February 1957, Ibid., p. 9
  2. Times of India, 17 February 1957.
  3. Ibid., 18 February 1957.

"It is no pacific act of settlement, but a provocation to violence to appease the aggressor by imposing a U.N. force on the territory of the aggressed. Here is neither logic nor commonsense nor "justice". Nehru attacked the U.N. indirectly while on 21 February, he called the resolution a "collective approval of aggression", and accused some countries of deliberate hostility to India.<sup>1</sup> Indian representative at the U.N., Krishna Menon, made it clear, speaking in the Security Council, that "My Government has deliberately chosen the path of an independent foreign policy. No pressures will elbow us into an alignment in one direction or another."<sup>2</sup> India was not afraid of any pressures whatsoever which might come from the United States and the other Western countries so as to make India accept their stand on the Kashmir problem. Both the Government of India and the public opinion expressed through Indian press were critical of the United States because of her siding with Pakistan and pleading for plebiscite, demilitarization and U.N. force in Kashmir without having any consideration for the changed situation. The United States had no margin for Indian case and had given way to disappointment in India.<sup>3</sup>

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1. The Hindu, February 22, 1957.

2. S.C.O.A., 12th Yr., 769th Mtg., 15 February 1957, p.47

3. Pakistanis welcomed it and were satisfied.

The American representative on the other hand made it clear that all that the resolution said was that the introduction of such force could "deserve consideration", this was one of the elements which needed to be borne in mind in making a new attempt to achieve a settlement.<sup>1</sup> The United States did not accept the Soviet amendments to the draft resolution because, according to Sir Pierson Dixon, "The effect of these amendments is to emasculate the draft resolution to such an extent that the resulting proposal would not be likely to make a contribution to the settlement of the Kashmir problem."<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet Veto came as the amendments were not accepted. The Soviet delegate, previously, while explaining Soviet view in the Council, had declared that the Soviet delegation would "vote against the inclusion in the draft resolution of any provisions which do not correspond to the true situation in the Kashmir area, which fail to take into account the vital interests of the people of Kashmir, or which are at variance with the principles of the U.N. Charter."<sup>3</sup>

The exercise of veto by the U.S.S.R. started a new chapter in the U.S.-India and Pakistan relations, since

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1. S.C.O.R., 768 mtg., 1957.
  2. Ibid., 771 mtg., 1957.
  3. Ibid., 770 mtg., 1957.

the Soviet Union, who had always been abstaining from voting on any resolution on the Kashmir problem in the Security Council for the first time used its veto power to prevent a resolution from being passed, a resolution which was opposed by India and was favourable to Pakistan. A new hope arose in India and she felt that at least one country would support her case and she was somewhat satisfied. The U.S.S.R. veto was welcomed by various sections of opinion in India.

The U.S. and the U.K. felt that the Soviet veto could have only one purpose to "perpetuate international conflict and dissension between two of Asia's great countries",<sup>1</sup> said Barco in his speech in the Security Council. In the same meeting Firoz Khan Noon's reaction was noteworthy: "It is surprising to us that the representative of the Soviet Union should argue that the voice of India alone should decide this case, and not that of Pakistan".<sup>2</sup> This was the Pakistani resentment.

Whatever might have been the reactions in the countries of the world with regard to Soviet veto on the resolution, the fact remained that as a result the U.S.A. became aware of its position in dealing with the Kashmir dispute

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1. Ibid., 12th Session, 773rd Mtg., 20 February 1957, p.29.

2. Ibid.



and the veto gave an entirely new turn and shape to the problem. Since then, demilitarization became the main issue of conflict between the parties concerned. India was opposed to demilitarization and the introduction of the U.S. force in Kashmir for the purpose of undertaking a plebiscite; while Pakistan wanted almost total demilitarization now and an early plebiscite. This was the dilemma in the aftermath of the Soviet Veto that brought the failure of <sup>Gunnar</sup> V. Jarring and Dr. Graham's efforts to break the deadlock between the two countries.

The same view point brought the rejection by India of the Security Council resolution<sup>1</sup> of November 16, 1957 and the acceptance of the Indian and the Soviet amendments<sup>2</sup> by the sponsors of the resolution which avoided the use of the word 'demilitarization' in the resolution<sup>3</sup> which was adopted by the Security Council on 8 December 1957.

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1. U.N. Sec. Council Official Documents, S/3911, Nov. 16, 1957  
By this resolution Dr. Graham was authorized to visit the subcontinent once more in order to make recommendations to the two parties, and to formulate within three months "an early agreement on demilitarisation procedures". In addition to its emphasis on a reduction of forces on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions, the resolution also pointed out that both India and Pakistan "recognise and accept" their commitments under the 1948 and 1949 resolutions which envisaged the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir.
  2. Ibid., S/3920, November 27, 1957. The Soviet Union had threatened to use veto power in case amendments were not accepted.
  3. A.C.O.R., 12th Yr., Suppl. for October and December 1957, pp. 21-2. India did not accept even this amended resolution.

India did not accept the resolution of November 16, 1957 because this resolution referred to demilitarization. India objected that instead of noting India's complaint of further aggression, the resolution gave moral support to the aggressor. Its effect was an incitement to subversion, to which India could not agree.<sup>1</sup> The objection by the Soviet delegate, Gubolev, was made on 21st November 1957 that:

"The statements made by the representatives of the Western powers in the Security Council show that they continue as before to disregard the present situation in Kashmir. This becomes even more evident in the five power draft resolution."<sup>2</sup>

The important thing was that the Indian opinion was also disappointed with the amended resolution of December, 1957 of the Security Council. The India Express

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1. Ibid., Mtg. 805, 1957.

2. Ibid., The U.S. lent its full support again for the Mission of Graham.

wrote that Dr. Graham's demilitarization efforts were "doomed to fail".<sup>1</sup>

In accepting the proposals of Graham Mission Pakistan had changed its previous stand on Kashmir i.e. no withdrawal of the Pakistan forces from Kashmir. That was an important change which had been affecting almost every decision since then. This change came as a result of its joining the Western alliances.

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1. The Indian Express, December 4, 1957. In spite of the fact that India had expressed her consent to talk to Dr. Graham, One thing is noteworthy here that neither India nor Pakistan was satisfied with the U.S. attitude in the Security Council though the United States' stand was somewhat pro-Pakistan on the Kashmir problem. Pakistani press was also disappointed on account of the resolution. The amended resolution was called a "let down". The Dawn / "The original five power resolution did not go far enough and the Swedish amendments have reduced it to almost worthless document. The people of this country who have been fed on hopes that all, but the Communist world, supports Pakistan's stand on Kashmir and that in the United Nations the Western powers will stand firmly by Pakistan have a right to know why the latter seems to have let us down." The Dawn, December 6, 1957. By all this criticism of Western Powers, Pakistan wanted to influence them to get the accounts settled with India at an early date. This was for the first time that P.M. Pervez Khan of Pakistan, speaking in the Pakistan National Assembly on 8 March 1958, threatened to desert the Western camp unless the U.K. and the U.S.A. offered positive support to her over the Kashmir dispute; and Pakistan might also "shake hands with those people who are enemies today because of these pacts". He warned also that unless the U.N. mediator Dr. Graham did something by the end of April to further a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan would consider revising its foreign policy. Ibid., 9 March 1958.
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But the Graham Mission<sup>1</sup> proved to be a failure because India turned down its proposal of the introduction of a U.N. Force on the "Azad" Kashmir territory (Pakistan side of Kashmir territory which India claimed was really a part of India). The official position of India was expressed by Nehru on 4 April<sup>2</sup>, at a press conference that "Any consideration of this problem which ignores certain basic issues and which endeavours to put up on the same level as Pakistan is not agreeable to us and will not be accepted by us". He insisted there were two realities which needed to be accepted: (1) Pakistan's aggression and (2) Kashmir's accession to India and "if these things are admitted other matters can be discussed." Pakistan agreed to both the withdrawal of Pakistani forces and the introduction of U.N. troops into Azad Kashmir by insisting on a synchronization with the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces from Kashmir, as laid down in part II of the UNCIP resolution of August, 1948.

India was strongly criticised by newspapers of the U.K. and the U.S.A., for the failure of the Graham mission. One of them wrote:<sup>3</sup> "India's inflexibility and intransigence

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1. Text of the Graham Report, submitted on 28 March 1958, in S.C.O.R., 13th Yr., Supple. for January-March, 1958, pp. 41-5.

2. The Hindu, April 5, 1958.

3. The New York Times, 5 April, 1958.

is no longer directed against Pakistan. It is directed against the United Nations itself."

Press reactions to the report of Dr. Graham were not so enthusiastic in India. Its proposals were called by an Indian newspaper as "basically pro-Pakistani and mischievous."<sup>1</sup> The Indian Express, in its issue of 5th April 1958, commented that "to place the aggressor and the aggrieved on the same plane suggests an unusual approach to a highly controversial problem, simply enough if faced squarely but serious and complicated in the context of the cold war." The Times of India's hope was that the report might be "the last of a series of U.N. essays in frustration."<sup>2</sup>

An important point should be mentioned here that since the U.S.S.R. used its veto the U.S.A. had realised that any move in the Security Council which did not favour India's position on the Kashmir dispute, could be failed by the U.S.S.R.'s veto power. There came a change in the attitude of the United States and it started to avoid touching the Kashmir dispute with in the United Nations and also in the out side world. With the coming of the Democratic President John F. Kennedy, in the White House

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1. The Hindustan Times, April 4, 1958.  
2. Times of India, April 4, 1958.

in 1961 a new trend of liberal attitude towards India started so far as the Kashmir dispute was concerned. There were some evident instances which could make clear how the United States avoided to discuss the Kashmir problem which brought a better understanding and relations between the two countries - India and the U.S.

(1) During his visit<sup>1</sup> to India and Pakistan in December 1959, the U.S. President Eisenhower said that he could discuss the Kashmir issue with P.M. of India if India wanted to do so and the initiative must come from India.<sup>2</sup> James Haggerty explained the fact that President Eisenhower had explained before leaving Washington that he was not on a negotiating tour, and therefore he was not going to take the initiative in any such discussion. Although Pakistan was optimistic that the U.S. President might use his influence and good offices on his visit to New Delhi with the Government of India in trying to persuade India so that the Kashmir problem should be settled once and for all and they had presented Pakistan's position on Kashmir before the President in a long memorandum.

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1. It was his eleven-nation tour.

2. The statement was made by the White House Press Secretary, James C. Haggerty, in Karachi on December 8, 1959 after the American President had attended a five-hour conference session with President Ayub. See the New York Times, 9 December 1959.

But, inspite of the thinking in some political circles in India that for bringing India and Pakistan closer together "TRK" may use his good-offices<sup>1</sup>, Nehru was not willing to initiate talks on Kashmir, though he was ready to discuss anything with Eisenhower.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, he did not raise the Kashmir issue during President's stay in India.<sup>3</sup> Because the President Eisenhower did not support and accept the Pakistani memorandum on Kashmir dispute the position was welcomed in India and it was realized in India that "the Americans have now come to appreciate Mr. Nehru's wisdom in keeping India and this region out of the cold war" and that "any way, both the United States and Soviet Union are at present agreed on letting India develop as a non-aligned State" consequently better appreciation of each other's problems between India and the U.S.A. became evident<sup>5</sup> and Mr. Eisenhower's visit has brought India and America closer ... Non alignment has, however, been given a new perspective of American friendship.<sup>6</sup>

(2) After the incoming of Kennedy<sup>as</sup> President of the U.S. in 1961, the U.S. Vice-President, Lyndon B. Johnson's

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1. The Times of India, 6th November, 1959.
  2. The Hindustan Times, 8 December 1959.
  3. Ibid., 15 December 1959.
  4. Durga Das, "Political Diary", Delhi Hindusthan Standard, 8 Dec., 1959.
  5. The Hindu, 16 December 1959.
  6. remarked B.G. Verghese in an article to The Times of India, 17 December 1959. Pakistan could not gain anything.

trip to Pakistan in May 1961, again disappointed the press and public opinion in Pakistan more than Government Circles, because the Vice-President had no words of support for Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. Even the word "Kashmir" was not mentioned in the joint Communiqué issued after talks between President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and U.S. Vice President, Johnson. Rather Johnson added that his instructions from President Kennedy were to "listen and learn" and that he could only relay President Ayub's views to President Kennedy.<sup>1</sup> The present new trend in the U.S. of liberal attitude to India in regard to her dispute over Kashmir with Pakistan was due to the fact that President Kennedy always had been doing justice to Indian policies and thinking. At present also he had sympathy for India and respect for her policies.<sup>2</sup>

This time Pakistan started attacking and accusing the U.S. and the Pakistan Times, June 11, 1961, was reported as saying that "The Kennedy Administration had sought to widen the economic gap between two neighbours to such a degree that ultimately we may not be left with any other alternative but to accept India's leadership."<sup>3</sup>

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1. New York Times, May 22, 1961.

2. Ibid., 27 March 1961. Though there were pro-Pakistan Senators who had been attacking India time and again. One of them, Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee described Pakistan as one of America's most consistent friend and termed Mr. Nehru as "a demagogue and hypocrite." Ibid.

3. Quoted in the Statesman: 12 June 1961.



(3) President Kennedy was not much responsive to Pakistan's request for American support in regard to the Kashmir dispute. Instead, in the join communique issued at the end of President Ayub's visit to Washington in July 1961, Kennedy merely affirmed the desire of the United States to see a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir issue and expressed the hope that progress toward a settlement would be possible at an early date.<sup>1</sup> The American sources indicated at the end of the talks that President Kennedy had declined to take an active role in settling the dispute over Kashmir, in spite of President Ayub's request that the U.S. help would solve the long-standing dispute between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the same sources said that the President of America had restated the United States' backing for a U.N. supervised plebiscite in Kashmir, but also had urged not to bring up the matter at the next meeting of the General Assembly.<sup>2</sup>

(4) In addition to all these changes Mr. Galbraith the then U.S. Ambassador to India said at the press conference in Calcutta on July 22, that nothing would be more against the U.S. Government's policy than the use against India of weapons given under the agreement. The U.S.

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1. The New York Times, July 14, 1961.

2. Ibid., July 15, 1961.

Government did not want any cold war in Asia and desired that tension between Pakistan and India be minimised.<sup>1</sup>

(5) Furthermore during Nehru's visit to the U.S. in November, 1961, Kashmir was not the issue between Nehru and Kennedy, though they could discuss if they desired. Instead Nehru's motives were two. First "to convince a nettled and suspicious American public that India is not heading towards the Soviet Union, indulgent to Russias' breaking of the test ban and unconcerned about its consequences on the world's health and peace." The second was an exchange of point of view with President Kennedy and the new U.S. Administration.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps, the slight change came in this attitude when India rejected the U.S. offer of the good-offices which was made in January 1962. In his letters<sup>3</sup> to President Ayub and P.M. Nehru on January 16, 1962, President Kennedy asked both the Governments to indicate whether they would be agreeable to accept the good offices of a person mutually acceptable to both countries. The letters were sent "with the object of explaining to the Governments of India and Pakistan the outlines and prospects, which might lead

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1. The Statesman, 23 July, 1961.

2. Editorial - "Two Missions", Ibid., 11 November 1961.

3. The New York Times, January 24, 1962. This person as was disclosed later, was Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, who had successfully mediated the Canal Water dispute between India and Pakistan.

to a satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir question.<sup>1</sup>

Nehru rejected the offer on January 29, 1962 and explained on 2 February 1962 that India disliked as a matter of principle any third party becoming arbitrator or mediator on the issue. He made it clear that although Eugene Black had done excellent work in settling the Canal Waters dispute, "a third party cannot come in where this issue of sovereignty is involved. In these matters only the two parties concerned can talk about it."<sup>2</sup>

Possibly, "it was after this curt response" observed an Indian critic, "that Mr. Kennedy became notably cautious in his references to India and the impression that Mr. Krishna Menon<sup>3</sup> was dominating India's foreign policy gained ground in the U.S.A." And that "Had India handled it diplomatically, she could have put the onus of rejection on Pakistan by accepting the proposal on condition that no attempt was made to revise plebiscite and other outdated engagements. Instead, the suggestion was abruptly rejected by India and quickly accepted by Pakistan."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid. These letters were sent when the Pakistan's request (S/5058, 11 January 1962) for a meeting of the Security Council on Kashmir was pending. Kennedy was quick enough in sending these letters as he was not willing that Pakistan should raise the issue in the Council.
  2. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, XIII (1961-62), p. 189+3.
  3. He was regarded in the Western Countries as a pro-Communist favouring the Soviet Union.
  4. Ajit Bhatta Charjea, the then Hindustan Times Correspondent in Washington, wrote in an article to The Hindustan Times, 19 July 1962 under the Caption: "Indo-U.S. Relations Reach critical point."

The U.S. refusal to take any active part in putting pressure on India to come to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan made Pakistan put the question once more in the Security Council and the refusal of India to accept the mediation offer of the U.S. made Pakistan succeed in approaching the U.N. During the debate in the Security Council, once again the U.S. delegate Adlai Stevenson suggested direct negotiation between the two parties. He said that the U.S.A. was "convinced that a high level Conference between India and Pakistan would enable the parties to ascertain the precise areas of disagreement ... and induce a spirit of compromise."<sup>1</sup> The U.S. delegate did not put forth his support to any concrete action on the part of the Security Council to bring about demilitarization and a plebiscite in Kashmir. Rather, he merely supported the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949 that these resolutions provide the best starting point for solving the Kashmir problem.

Once again, the Soviet veto over the Irish draft resolution<sup>2</sup>, of 22nd June 1962 (S/5134) in the Security Council, gave chance to the overwhelming U.S. and Pakistani

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1. U.N., S.C.O.R., 1012 Mtg., June 15, 1962.

2. Text in S.C.O.R., 17th Yr., Supple. for April-June 1962 p. 10<sup>h</sup>.

criticism of India and the Soviet Union. The veto was used by the Soviet Union because of India's opposition to this resolution. The Indian representative, Krishna Menon had objected to it strongly because "In passing the resolution it will not be ... discharging a duty that will in any way promote the purposes which motivated it. Besides, it is not the function of the Security Council to pass resolutions without a purpose ... The uncommitted countries in particular should not now become parties either passively or actively to a resolution of this character."<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Nehru complained<sup>2</sup> that the Western powers were almost invariably against India on matters that created passionate feelings in the country.<sup>3</sup>

Pakistan's vehement reaction to the use of veto by the USSR was voiced in the Government and the press criticisms. P.M. Mohammad Ali expressed that the Soviet Veto appeared to him as a matter of fact "profound regret and great shock". He was critical of the Soviet veto and said that "the Indo-Soviet axis has succeeded through power politics and pressure

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1. Ibid., 10<sup>th</sup> Mtg., 1962.

2. Rajya Sabha, 23 June. See Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 8, 1962, p. 116.

3. The matters were like Goa and Kashmir.

tactics in persuading neutral countries to withhold support on such an important question."<sup>1</sup> The Pakistan Times' criticism was noteworthy:

"We should spare our energy on getting angry with the Soviet Union for its veto. If there is any one to be angry with, it is our friends and allies. Not only have they done previously little to stand by us diplomatically, they were competing with the Soviet Union in wooing India."<sup>2</sup>

In the United States also the criticism of India became the main task of the American press. The New York Times commented editorially:

"The U.S. support of the Irish resolution has caused P.M. Nehru to complain vehemently and question American good will towards India. The fundamental good will in this country towards India is probably no less wide spread now than before. But clearly there has been disapproval and disappointment at some actions India has taken recently, notably her resort to aggression in Goa and refusal to reach settlement on the Kashmir issue. In both cases India had damaged her image in this country and at the same time weakened the peace-keeping and dispute settling capacity of the U.N."<sup>3</sup>

Another newspaper the New York Herald Tribune was reported to have said that<sup>4</sup>, "Mr. Krishna Menon may deceive himself and Mr. Nehru into believing they scored a victory

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1. Pakistan National Assembly Debates, vol. I, 1962, pp. 390-91.
  2. Editorial, "The Soviet Veto", Pakistan Times, June 25, 1962. This time also Pakistan was suspect of U.S. intentions.
  3. Quoted in the Indian Express, 27th June 1962.
  4. Ibid.

at the U.N. But the Kashmir issue, though killed for the time being in U.N. is hardly over. Pakistan is trying with the idea of flirting with Communist China to off-set India's flirtation with Russia. And Communist China, as India had learned to its sorrow, does not feel bound by the U.N. or by respect for anyone else's frontiers".

The Washington Star, in its issue of 26 June 1962 criticized Nehru as "One of the most unpopular of the world's neutralists", and that the Americans and others had become "quite fed up" with him.

The Indian press, having noted all these criticisms, concluded the facts and this was the thinking of the The Hindustan Times' correspondent in Washington that "with Mr. Kennedy no longer strongly campaigning for India, the traditional forces in U.S. politics consisting of military tacticians, old-school diplomats and disappointed idealists - took the offensive. Speeches in Congress and newspaper comments became sharply critical of India. The campaign was helped by reports of Indo-Soviet negotiations for MIG fighters and mounting U.S. distrust of India's Defence Minister."

But the Chinese aggression in India changed the whole atmosphere and these criticisms could not bear for reaching effects.

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1. Ajit Bhatta Charjea, "Indo-U.S. Relations Reach Critical Point." The Hindustan Times, 10th July 1962.

THE NEW CHAPTER:

With the Chinese attack on Indian territory in October 1962, a new chapter started in Indo-American relations and also in Indo-U.S. and Pakistan relations over Kashmir. Since then the United States ceased to support Pakistan whole heartedly, as before, on the Kashmir question. As a result of the pressure from Pakistan the U.S.A. got success in initiating direct negotiations between India and Pakistan on the dispute of Kashmir. The U.S. military aid to India aroused bitter criticism in Pakistan and Pakistan again referred the question of Kashmir to the Security Council because of the failure of direct negotiations. This was also a fact that Pakistan tried to convince China and had a boundary agreement with it only because of the fact that the U.S. military aid was extended to India which in Pakistan's view added to its defence burdens.

The U.S. and British assistance came to India so as to make India capable of facing the Chinese attack. But Pakistan could not bear it as she became afraid of Indian military strength after receiving the military aid from the U.S. and the Britain. An American writer pointed out that "Pakistan insisted throughout this period that aid to India should not be of such a magnitude as to upset the balance between them, and more importantly, that the Kashmir



dispute should be settled as the quid pro quo for sharing up the defence of India."<sup>1</sup>

While India accepted and appreciated the extended U.S. military aid in her self-defence, Pakistan's emphasis and logic seemed to be that the outbreak of Sino-Indian war in October 1962, presented Pakistan's Western allies with the most opportune moment to apply their pressure on India to come to a settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir.<sup>2</sup> And the settlement should be more favourable to Pakistan.

President Kennedy's letter to President Ayub at the end of October 1962, was the first U.S. effort to extract an assurance from Pakistan that it would not make any move in Kashmir as long as Sino-Indian hostilities lasted because India's power position vis-a-vis China might be affected as a result of Pakistani new moves in Kashmir at that time. In his letter, Kennedy urged that the two countries - India and Pakistan - drew together in what, he called, was a moment of common peril.<sup>3</sup> But President Ayub, in his reply to this communication, was reported to have taken a "firm line" vis-a-vis the American military aid to India and declined to give any assurance on Kashmir.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Frank N. Trager, "The U.S. and Pakistan: A Failure of Diplomacy", Orbis, IX (Fall, 1965), p.65.
  2. The New York Times, January 19, 1963.
  3. Ibid., 31 October 1962.
  4. The Dawn, November 8, 1962.

The New York Times, in its issue of November 19, 1962, published the report from its correspondent in Karachi. The correspondent pointed out that there was "acute disappointment in the Government and among the people (of Pakistan) that the U.S. and Britain failed to put pressure on India at the opportune moment to reach a settlement with Pakistan of the emotional dispute over the control of Kashmir." It was, probably, in response to this disappointment that in November 1962, when the high power delegation from Britain and the United States came to India to discuss the arms requirements of India, they also became successful in persuading the Government of India to reopen negotiations on the Kashmir question and other important problems with Pakistan. At that time the cause which paved the ground for fresh negotiations by increasing the West's capacity to influence thinking in New Delhi, was the new situation created by the Chinese invasion of India. On November 29, a draft announcement<sup>1</sup> was issued simultaneously from both New Delhi and Rawalpindi, announcing that the Pakistani President and

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1. Text in Pakistan Horizon, vol. XV, No. 4, p. 350. Also see The Statesman, December 1, 1962. The Commonwealth Secretary of Britain, Duncan Sandys, and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Averell Harriman were the two diplomats who had made efforts to get the agreement of both the Governments with regard to the starting of these negotiations.

the Indian Prime Minister had agreed to hold talks on Kashmir and related matters after initial discussions at a ministerial level.

The ministerial talks, between the Pakistan delegation led by Z.A. Bhutto and the Indian delegation headed by Sardar Swaran Singh proved to be a failure after the six rounds of discussions held alternately in Pakistan and India during December 27, 1962 and in a joint communique<sup>1</sup> issued on May 16, 1963, the two parties recorded with regret that no agreement could be reached on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.<sup>2</sup>

To India this did not come as a surprise. The Indian Express wrote:

"The expected had happened ... its provocative action in signing the Sino-Pak border agreement when the Kashmir talks had just begun seemed to underline Rawal Pindi's true intentions."<sup>3</sup>

There was a change in the <sup>U.S.</sup> attitude towards India. It was a favourable one which made Pakistan to see no prospects for an early settlement of the problem of Kashmir. Another

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1. Text in Pakistan Horizon, vol. XVI, No.2, pp. 134-5. Also see Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on 13 August, 1963 on these ministerial talks, Foreign Affairs Records, August 1963, pp. 169-71.
  2. Hindustan Times, 17 May 1963.
  3. The Indian Express, 18 May 1963.

factor may be cited here. The changed attitude of the United States, on the Kashmir problem, was, as India viewed it, because of the "Pak flirtation with China".<sup>1</sup> And that since India entered the present series of discussions with Pakistan over Kashmir, in terms of U.S. understanding, India has made gains and Pakistan has lost ground. In the opinion of observers in the U.S., it is largely because she is conscious that this had happened and Pakistan has again stepped up her diplomatic and press offensive against India and the U.S."<sup>2</sup> Henceforth, Communist China became an additional obstacle in the way of the settlement of the Kashmir dispute because the defence of India against Chinese attack was the main objective before the U.S. and it wanted to bring together India and Pakistan because the U.S. thinking was, as was made clear by Bowles in Washington, that the defence would be a lot easier if those two countries would "pull together", and that both countries were draining their resources in maintaining military forces on the border.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Easwar Sagar, the co-correspondent of the Hindu in Washington wrote in an article. The Hindu 12 August 1963.
  2. Easwar Sagar, "India and Pakistan: Change in U.S. thinking." Ibid., 7 April 1963.
  3. The Hindu, 25 May, 1963. Mr. Bowles' nomination as U.S. Ambassador to India was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 30, 1963.

Indians were relaxed, as T.V. Parasuram wrote in a letter from America, to the Indian Express that "Thanks to Pakistan's intransigence, Kashmir is no longer a major issue in context of Indo-American relations. For the first time in the 14 year history of the "dispute" it is India, not Pakistan, that is regarded as a reasonable party, at least by important Administration leaders."<sup>1</sup> In the same despatch hopes were raised that "a prime basis exists for the understanding between the U.S. and India. India now has an opportunity to play her cards directly and well."

To the present day the problem of Kashmir remains between India and Pakistan. Neither the United States, nor the United Nations, nor the negotiations and bilateral talks between the two parties - India and Pakistan, nor the mediation and good offices have been able to settle the dispute. Even the devastating undeclared war in 1965 between the two countries failed to bring about a final solution. Since then, the negotiations have failed. Now the Soviet Union has decided to give military aid to Pakistan in July 1968.

After having failed to bring the two parties, India and Pakistan, together the United States has now started to

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1. Indian Express, 28 May 1963.

insist on bilateral negotiations so as to resolve the Kashmir problem.

The above account and discussions on the Kashmir problem make it clear that India is not going to accept the solution of the Kashmir problem beyond her national interest and prestige. The United States or any other country cannot force a settlement of the dispute which is not acceptable to India. Now plebiscite and demilitarization are not the issues before India rather the liberation of Azad Kashmir (part of Kashmir-Indian territory) from the clutches of Pakistan is the only issue which deserves consideration.

CHAPTER V

INDIA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS  
AND THE U.S. MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

Ever since the inception of the Pakistan military alliance with the United States in 1954, the solution of the problems between India and Pakistan has become very difficult, if not impossible. Because of the fact that the alliance has, since then, been embittering the friendly relations between India and the U.S.A. on the one hand and between India and Pakistan on the other. The U.S. Military Pact with Pakistan changed the whole context of the issues existing between the two countries i.e., India and Pakistan, as this alignment of Pakistan with the United States, one of the two super powers of the post war world, set up a focal point of Cold War tension right on India's borders.

U.S. INTEREST IN HAVING SUCH AN ALLIANCE WITH PAKISTAN:

In the early post-war period after 1945, the main aim before the United States was to encircle and contain the Communist land-mass in Eurasia. India and Pakistan were the two Asian countries which might play an important role, by allying themselves with the U.S.A., in its fight against Communism. After the withdrawal of the British from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, there existed a power

vacuum in the area and the U.S. wanted to fill it up by allying India with itself against the Communist countries. At the time of her independence in 1947, India had declared herself non-aligned with any of the two power blocs and was not willing to side with the U.S. bloc. The last hope of the U.S. was torn away when P.M. Nehru, during his visit to the U.S. in October 1949, made it clear, both in his public speeches and in his private talks, that India would, definitely, not align herself with one bloc against the other and remain non-aligned, following an independent foreign policy.<sup>1</sup> Certainly, the U.S. became fully disappointed with the Indian attitude to its policy of forming a ring around the Communist countries by means of bilateral alliances and regional pacts. This policy was a part of the American global strategy. The Communist overthrow of the Nationalist Government in China, in 1949,<sup>2</sup> added to the fears of the United States and stressed the need of the U.S. to find out more dependable allies in this region of Asia.<sup>3</sup>

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1. See, Nehru, Visit to America, New York, 1950, p.29
  2. The same year brought the end of the American Atomic monopoly as it was broken by the Soviet Union in September 1949
  3. Previously, in the period immediately after the end of the war American policy in East and South Asia was built round the concept of collaboration with China, under the leadership of their ally, Chiang Kai-Shek. During this period the U.S. did not experience any special fears concerning a possible extension of Soviet influence in India. Rather it was the security of Western Europe and to a lesser extent, of West Asia that virtually monopolized American attention. M.S. Venkataramani with the collaboration of Harish Chandra Arya, "America's Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership", International Studies, vol. 8 Nos.1-2, July-October 1966, I.S.I.S., Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966, p. 75.



Since Nehru appeared to the U.S.A. as somewhat anti-American and the U.S. thought that India would not agree to be militarily aligned with it, the alternative before her was Pakistan, which was important for the U.S. in having strategic bases against the possible expansion of the Communist power.<sup>1</sup>

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1949 was formed in the Western sector as a part of anti-Communist regional defence system of the United States world strategy.<sup>2</sup> In the Eastern Sector the U.S. signed defence treaties with Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea. But the Southern Sector, comprising the Middle East and the South Asian countries which were strategically important from the American view point, was still undefended. Between Eastern Turkey and Western Thailand there was a wide gap which had to be filled so that the policy of the containment of Communism might become successful. Americans saw that the leading Arab States were busy with their preoccupation with Israel, and therefore, were not inclined to listen to the Western reasoning of bringing these countries into her alliance system in defence of the 'free world'. They also knew that India was 'positively' neutral. In such circumstances the U.S. realized that this gap could only be filled up with

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1. Chakravarti, B.N., India Speaks to America, p. 130.
  2. Along with NATO, the Marshall Plan 1947, and the Truman Doctrine 1947 were the other measures implemented by the U.S. in this process.

its alignment with the three non-Arab Muslim countries of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. And Iraq was the only Arab country which was willing to side with the Western bloc. Iraq with Afghanistan formed the 'northern tier' of the Middle East immediately bordering a few miles away from Soviet territory. In order to bolster the defence of the Southern Sector, the U.S. encouraged, positively, an alliance among these four Middle Eastern countries.

Apart from Pakistan's strategic importance for the U.S. in relation to the defence of the Middle East, the eastern wing of Pakistan forms the Western boundary of Southeast Asia. So Pakistan could be used as a link between the Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern defence systems.<sup>1</sup> North-West Pakistan's and 'Azad' Kashmir's (under Pakistani control) proximity to Soviet Central Asia, and East Pakistan's to Tibet and Sino-Burmese border had been other strategic reasons for American interest in having a military alliance with Pakistan.

#### PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS AND TACTICS:

Pakistan's thinking was quite different from that

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1. For details of Pakistan's strategic importance and value see, Lord Birdwood, "Reflections on Pakistan in International Relations", Pakistan Quarterly, (Spring, 1955), p.6. Also see - New York Times, February 5, 1955 - C.L. Lulzberger's article. He called Pakistan a "geographical absurdity" but of immense strategic and geopolitical value.

of the U.S. She did not feel any threat either ideological or territorial from any of the Communist powers. Keith Callard's remark seems to be right to a certain extent that as far as the ideological rift between the Western Capitalism and the Soviet Communism was concerned,

"Pakistan had no strong convictions about the balance of righteousness."<sup>1</sup>

But Pakistani fears were rather indirect than direct as India and Afghanistan were being supported by the Soviet Union in their disputes with Pakistan. Though, the Soviet Union did not throw its full weight behind India and Afghanistan openly until the MDAP was signed by Pakistan with the United States, she was atleast, always sympathetic towards them.

Even Communist China, in Pakistan's eyes was not dangerous, though Pakistan had noticed the slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" in 1950s. Communist China had been refusing to take sides with India as far as the Indo-Pakistani disputes were concerned. It was clear that whatsoever the apprehensions, Pakistani leadership had from Chinese and Soviet quarters, were not so much because of their being Communist countries as they seemed to be the result of their close relations with India and Afghanistan, Pakistan's neighbours with .

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1. Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, An Introduction. (New York, 1967), p.17.

whom Pakistan had long standing disputes. In Pakistan's foreign policy, the main danger was from India.

From the very beginning of her independence, Pakistan was inclined to be very friendly with the United States. Pakistan saw that it was Indian Prime Minister Nehru who was given preference to visit the U.S. in October 1949 because the U.S. Government first extended an invitation to him to pay an official visit. Pakistan tried to draw the U.S. attention towards her, even before Nehru was invited by the U.S. Pakistani Minister for Commerce, Fazlur Rehman had declared in October 1947, that the U.S. and Pakistan shared a similar ideological outlook and that Pakistan would never tolerate Communism.<sup>1</sup> Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammed, spoke of Pakistan's need of American technicians to help in the task of its industrial development.<sup>2</sup> Pakistani leaders' devotion to the sanctity of private enterprise has been so strong that the American journal Business Week was obliged to say that the climate for foreign investment was more favourable in Pakistan than in India.<sup>3</sup>

In 1950, Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the U.S. served an important purpose in influencing

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1. Venkataramani, M.S. International Studies, vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, July-October, 1966, p. 78.

2. The New York Times, October 13, 1947.

3. Business Week (New York), October 25, 1947, p. 109.

the Americans. He propounded Pakistan's determination to oppose aggression and showed his devotion to the encouragement of private enterprise. Furthermore, he made it clear that communism was incompatible with Pakistan's Islamic way of life.<sup>1</sup> The result was a more favourable response from the American Congress and the press than Nehru's policy of non-alignment. His views were appreciated by the New York Times as "heart warming".<sup>2</sup>

It was Pakistan's effort to draw American attention towards herself during the Korean war by extending her outspoken support to the U.N. and condemning North Korean aggression. In the beginning, Americans did not pay much attention to the attitude of Pakistan rather they were busy in applauding India because of her acceptance that the aggression had been committed by North Korea.<sup>3</sup> Washington Post, in its issue of July 1, 1950, appreciated the land of Gandhi "and the manner in which its Government had enforced the voice of man-kind." At the same time, India's abstention from the vote on the "uniting for peace" resolution

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1. See for details, P.M.'s speeches in the U.S. - Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan The Heart of Asia, (Cambridge, Mass., 1950). Also see, Congressional Record, vol. 96, 1950, p. 6403.
  2. New York Times, May 5, 1950.
  3. Ibid., June 30, 1950.

in the U.N.<sup>1</sup> and Nehru's identical letters<sup>2</sup> to Marshall Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, P.M. Clement Attlee of Britain and President Harry Truman of the U.S. urging a ceasefire and negotiations in Korea as well as the seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China slowed down American enthusiasm for India. And the proposal was rejected by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to the Indian attitude, the American policies in Korea were vigorously supported by the Pakistani delegate to the U.N.<sup>4</sup>, Mohammad Zafrullah Khan and P.M. Liaquat Ali Khan.

The U.S.'s efforts to conclude a peace treaty with Japan which India had not supported, were supported by Pakistan. The U.S. was not happy over the manner in which India practised her policy of non-alignment under the leadership of Nehru<sup>5</sup>, though it clearly realized the importance of ensuring that India did not "go the China way."

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1. Year Book of the United Nations 1950, New York, 1951, p. 192.
  2. The New York Times, July 14, 1950.
  3. Ibid., July 20, 1950. Also see the issue of July 19, 1950.
  4. G.A.O.R., Session 5, First Committee, p.96.
  5. Venkataramani, K.C. International Studies, vol.8, Nos.1-2, July-Oct. 1966, pp.81-82.

At the time, when the U.S. was busy in formulating its alliance system after the coming of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, Pakistan expressed her interest in collective security moves while India and other non-aligned Asian countries led their vigorous opposition to the creation of military alliances. The success of the Soviet Union in breaking the American thermonuclear monopoly in September 1953, compelled the United States to consider the demand of Pakistani Government as soon as possible.

Pakistan in reality wanted to be strengthened against India as William L. Katz has pointed out:

"Pakistan is an example of a nation having among her neighbours one other nation larger and more powerful than herself with which her relations have been constantly unfriendly. That neighbouring nation, which in Pakistan's case is India, is therefore, the most important, constant, and the controlling factor in Pakistan's foreign policy... Therefore the main problem of Pakistan's foreign policy has been where to turn for support in her dispute with her neighbour, and for some redress of the power disparity between that neighbour and herself."<sup>1</sup>

And the U.S. was the country, to which Pakistan turned for support, using American fears of Communist

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1. William L. Katz, Pakistan: Government and Politics, (New Haven, 1966), p. 171.

expansion and the policy of alliances for the containment of the Communist land mass for its own purposes. Its purposes were: strengthening itself against India, neutralizing Indian superiority on the subcontinent, and enlisting American support for its case on Kashmir. On the Kashmir problem Pakistan feels extremely insecure with India in what it considers the forcible occupation of the greater part of Kashmir, which includes the head waters of the important rivers that flow through and irrigate West Pakistan. In Pakistan's view, Indian presence in the strategically important and predominately Muslim valley of Kashmir symbolized Indian superiority in the subcontinent.

Pakistan moved for the U.S. help in its search for security, after being disappointed by Britain and the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Pakistan wanted to gain support from these countries but they refused to do so. The Commonwealth refused to take sides with Pakistan because the questions between India and Pakistan had involved two Commonwealth members. The Middle-East countries, who had just achieved their independence, after having struggled for it under the banner of territorial and ethnic nationalism, i.e., Arab Nationalism, did not like the concept of Pan-Islamism of Pakistan. As they had their own so many internal problems to cope with, they were in no position



to bear responsibilities abroad and give material help to Pakistan in case of an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan or between Pakistan and any other country. Furthermore, they did not want to displease India, the largest non-aligned nation in the World, by siding with Pakistan in her dispute with India.

Thus Pakistan decided to enter into a military alliance with the U.S. because of her desire to strengthen herself vis-a-vis India on the question of Kashmir for bargaining from a position of strength. One of the Pakistani writers had remarked that in Pakistan the danger of conquest by a Communist power was very remote "compared with the immediate and continuing danger of forcible merger with India".<sup>1</sup> Most of the Pakistanis thought that Pakistan's alliance with the U.S. was worthless if it did not strengthen Pakistan against India. In fact, instead of the Communist countries, India was the real enemy in Pakistani eyes.

The Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S., Mohammed Ali, for the first time declared, while speaking at a meeting of the English Speaking Union in San Francisco on June 12, 1952, that Pakistan was against neutralism and definitely

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1. M. Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and the United States", Pakistan Horizon, IX (Dec. 1956), p.200.

on the side of the West. "Do not count Pakistan as a neutralist nation of Asia. Our basic sympathies are strongly with the West".<sup>1</sup> With the coming of the Republican Administration in 1963, Eisenhower as President, and John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State, the door was opened for Pakistani demands. Dulles visited Pakistan in May 1953 as a part of his tour of the Middle East and South Asia. He made an announcement on June 1, 1953, in a radio report regarding his trip that "Pakistan is the largest of the Moslem nations and occupies a high position in the Moslem World. The strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people make them a dependable bulwark against Communism."<sup>2</sup> By now Pakistan had started to have strong position in the formulation of the U.S. foreign policy. After that the visit of the Pakistani Army Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, and the visit of Governor General Ghulam Mohammed to the U.S. took place. It was in early December 1953 that the American Vice President, Nixon visited Pakistan on his Asian good will tour.

INDIAN REACTIONS EVEN BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THIS PACT:

India was definitely against any kind of military

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1. Dawn, June 13, 1952.

2. U.S. Deptt. of State, Bulletin, vol. XXVIII (729), June 15, 1953, p. 833.

pact to the area. It was in late 1953, that strong rumours<sup>1</sup> originated from Pakistan which indicated that the U.S.A. would soon be concluding a military aid agreement with Pakistan. These rumours roused suspicion in India.<sup>2</sup> India's opposition was on two grounds: (1) it would be detrimental to the goals of India's foreign policy of keeping as great an area as possible free from the cold war; (2) it would also create insuperable complications in Indo-Pakistani relations and add to India's security problems.<sup>3</sup> On November 15, 1953, addressing a press conference, Jawaharlal Nehru indicated his grave concern with regard to this development. He said:

"This is a matter on which constitutionally or otherwise it is none of our concern what Pakistan and the U.S.A. are doing. But practically it is a matter of the most intense concern to us and some thing which will have very far-reaching consequences on the whole structure of things in South Asia and especially on India and Pakistan."<sup>4</sup>

Next day on November 16, 1953, the Indian Ambassador called on the Secretary of State to seek information about the proposed pact.<sup>5</sup> The reports regarding the projected

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1. Which, later, became true when in May 1954, Pakistan signed a military pact with the U.S.
  2. Chakravarti, B.N., India Speaks to America, p. 130.
  3. Gupta, Sisir, Kashmir- A Study in India Pakistan Relations, pp. 277-78.
  4. The Hindustan Times, November 16, 1953.
  5. Poplel and Telbot, India and America, p.87.

American military aid to Pakistan were severely criticized by P.M. Nehru. And actually, "It is no exaggeration to say that the reports of projected American military aid, whether with or without the quid pro quo of Pakistan military bases for the United States, came as a bomb shell to Indians, and its shock was perhaps next only to that of Pakistan's abetment of the tribal invasion of Kashmir in 1947,"<sup>1</sup> remarked M.S. Rajan rightly. Nehru denounced the proposed pact for bringing the cold war to the door step of India and warned Pakistan that negotiations begun in August 1953, and then under way, to solve the Kashmir dispute would be broken off if Karachi decided to go through with the aid pact. Addressing the Indian Parliament Nehru said that "the whole contexts of the August agreement on Kashmir will change if military aid comes to Pakistan".<sup>2</sup> Thus P.M. Nehru made his objections to such an alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan in and out side the Parliament of India. Approaches made by India through diplomatic channels, to the U.S.A. evoked no satisfactory reply. It was unfortunate that further diplomatic approaches were given up and instead of keeping the matter for secret diplomatic negotiations, public statements were made in India pointing out our objections to the U.S. military

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1. Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs 1954-1956, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964, p.263.

2. The Statesman, December 24, 1953.

assistance to Pakistan,<sup>1</sup> observed an Indian writer.

These public statements had no effect in the U.S.A. Instead they caused some annoyance at what was considered as an Indian effort to influence American foreign policy. Without any sympathy for Indian objections, the U.S. seemed to assume that India did not want military aid from it to defend herself as it was undoubtedly her own business, but at least it had no right to object to Pakistan's desire of securing such aid for its own defence. By that time, the U.S. had decided to extend military aid to Pakistan and there was no possibility of its withdrawal in any case particularly because the news had leaked out.<sup>2</sup> Even the vehemence of Indian opposition led the Washington correspondent of the New York Times to comment:

"As a matter of fact the opposition of P.M. Jawaharlal Nehru of India was so pronounced that the State Department felt the U.S. had to go through with the agreement or face up to the consequences of turning the leadership of South Asia over to neutralist India."<sup>3</sup>

This comment made it clear that the U.S. Administration was put in an uncomfortable position by the reactions of India.

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1. Gupta, Sisir, op.cit., p.130.

2. Chakravarti, B.N., India Speaks to America, p.131.

3. New York Times, February 8, 1954.

On February 22, 1954, replying to the debate in Lok Sabha on the President's Address, P.M. Nehru made it clear that in opposing such a military pact "our concern is not so much due to any ill feeling against Pakistan, and certainly not due to any ill feeling against America. But I have felt strongly that this step is a wrong step and a step which adds to the feeling of insecurity in Asia. It is, therefore, a wrong step from the point of view of peace and removal of tensions."<sup>1</sup> The Hindustan Times wrote:

"To drag Pakistan into the Middle East Defence Organization will be to drag the whole of the Indian subcontinent into a war and no one can say that this is a matter which does not concern India. Any part of the territory of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent cannot be dragged into military commitments elsewhere without India also being drawn into it."<sup>2</sup>

The press opinion in India was strongly critical of the proposed pact, but it reflected the "disappointment of a friend" rather than any overt hostility. Most of the editors of the newspapers were unable to understand why the United States preferred the friendship of Pakistan to that of India. This might be seen in an editorial of The Hindustan Times:

"We can not believe that the object of Washington is to alienate India from the

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.471.
  2. The Hindustan Times, October 22, 1953. (Over Seas Edition).

U.S. and weaken the forces of democracy in Asia ... We cannot conceive of a more unfriendly act toward India than the conclusion of the proposed agreement by the U.S."1

Times of India wrote:

"America's friends are dismayed and distressed by the appearance of what can only be described as the cloven foot of imperialism. In the context of Kashmir the open arming of one of the parties by a foreign power can only be construed as an unfriendly act to the other. Should that situation erupt into warfare the blame must rest squarely on Washington ... India can legitimately and does regard such action as a projection of the policy of incitement and encirclement."2

In India, not only pro-Communists were critical of the proposed alliance, even anti-Communists or pro-Americans did not find much to say in favour of the American policy of arms aid to Pakistan. It was a pro-American periodical Thought<sup>3</sup>, which called the U.S. decision foolish, and characterized the Indian Government's reaction as "psychologically narrow and inhibited" and added that "there is no doubt that this country's innate goodness and humanity will survive the present stupidity of the American Government and the

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1. Ibid., December 12, 1953.

2. Times of India, December 17, 1953. Editorial under the caption "The New Imperialism". Also see further comments, The Hindu, November 24, 1953 and 12 December 1953.

3. Thought, December 26, 1953.

hysteria of our politicians". Only one newspaper the Statesman could acknowledge at least one merit of the proposed alliance: "As a focus for the expression of the feeling of national unity it has served a useful purpose - the only one, as India sees it."<sup>1</sup> It did not mean that the same newspaper was not critical of the proposed military aid to Pakistan by the United States.

THE ALLIANCE - 1954:

The formal announcement for the U.S. assistance was made by Mohammed Ali, P.M. of Pakistan, on February 22, 1954.<sup>2</sup>

The Government of the United States tried to convince the Indian Government that the pact would have no effect on India because Americans were aware of the Indian resentment which might follow the signing of the Pact. Being well informed of this presumed adverse reaction in India, the U.S. President, Eisenhower announced on February 25, 1954<sup>3</sup>

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1. The Statesman, January 26, 1954.
  2. The Dawn, February 23, 1954. Previously, in a joint Communique, on February 19, 1954, Turkey and Pakistan had announced their intention to study methods of achieving closer collaboration on various matters including means designed towards strengthening peace and security. D.I.B., vol.30 (766), March 1, 1954, p.327.
  3. D.I.B., vol. 30 (768), March 15, 1954, p.401.



that the United States, "gravely concerned over the weakness of defence capabilities in the Middle East", was complying with a request by Pakistan for military aid. He said:

"Let me make it clear that we shall be guided by the stated purposes and requirements of the mutual security legislation. Those include specifically the provision that equipment, materials or services provided will be used solely to maintain the recipient country's internal security and for its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part. Any recipient country also must undertake that it will not engage in any act of aggression against any other nation. These undertakings afford adequate assurance to all nations, regardless of their political orientation and whatever their international policies may be, that the arms the United States provides for the defence of the free world will in no way threaten their own security. I can say if our aid to any country including Pakistan is misused and directed against another in aggression I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action before within and without the U.N. to thwart such aggression. I would also consult with the congress on further steps."

In addition to this announcement, President Eisenhower had also sent a personal letter<sup>1</sup> to P.M. Nehru of India on February 24, 1954, in which he assured Nehru that the action "is not directed in any way against India", that he was

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1. Full Text, Ibid., pp.400-401. Also see, New York Times, 26 February 1954 and Hindu, February 26, 1954.

recommending to Congress the continuation of American economic and technical aid to India, and that "if your Government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration". Further he emphasized that this step "does not in any way affect the friendship we feel for India" and that he "will continually strive to strengthen the warm and enduring friendship between our two countries." Nehru was also assured in this letter that in case the aid is "misused", he would "undertake" appropriate action "to thwart such aggression".

In spite of all these assurances from the U.S. President, there was an immediate outcry and violent reactions following the proposed pact in India. The U.S. Government's action was denounced both by the Indian Press and public as well as the Government. Nehru rejected the American offer of military aid and said, "If we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves."<sup>1</sup> In his historical

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1. Parliamentary Debates, 1954, vol.I, No.12, part II, col. 970. It was also public opinion in America that India would not accept military assistance from any foreign power because of her policy of non-alignment with any of the power-blocs.

statement<sup>1</sup> of March 1, 1954 in Parliament, Nehru objected to the pact because "It adds to our tensions. It makes it much more difficult to solve the problems which have confronted India and Pakistan." He went on to say,

"The military aid being given by the United States to Pakistan is a form of intervention in these problems which is likely to have more far-reaching results than the previous types of intervention."

In the same statement, Nehru made the reference to the problem of Kashmir and asked for the withdrawal of American personnel from the U.N. observers' group in Kashmir, as the U.S.A. was now a partisan in India-Pakistan problems.<sup>2</sup>

Undoubtedly, in giving military aid to Pakistan and in setting up the SEATO a few months later, the American objective was to secure the defence of South-East Asia against Communist expansion. As Mr. John Jerngen, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, said in Philadelphia on April 3, 1954, that the U.S. aid to Pakistan was for common defence and there was no basis for Indian fears.<sup>3</sup> This U.S. objective was accepted even by Nehru when he said in the

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1. Full Text, Ibid., cols. 963-74.

2. Whatever direct or indirect implications, this pact had on the problems of Kashmir, are discussed in details in the previous Chapter.

3. Text in, D.D.B., vol. XXX (773), April 19, 1954, pp. 593-597.

same statement in Indian Parliament that he had no doubt as to the sincerity and good will of President Eisenhower toward India.<sup>1</sup> But how could Americans not realise the fact that Pakistan wanted military aid for building up its military strength for use against India and not for defence against possible Communist aggression, though Pakistani leaders never made this fact a secret.<sup>2</sup> Later on an American

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1. Parliamentary Debates, Op.cit., col. 968.

2. Even after the signing of its pact with the U.S., for instance, at the Manila Conference which was convened on September 7, 1954, the representatives of the United States and Pakistan clashed on the question of the definition of the word "aggression" in Article IV, paragraph I of the draft treaty. (In its final form, the Article provides that in case of an aggression or armed attack against any signatory to the treaty, each member would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes). The United States desired the treaty organisation to be exclusively a bulwark against Communist aggression, and argued that the treaty could only be invoked in the case of Communist aggression. While Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan's argument was that the Conference should not discriminate between various kinds of aggression. His conviction was that "Aggression is evil", and "there are no varieties of evil, no varieties of aggression", it was necessary to resist it wherever it came from. (See, Pakistan Times, September 7, 1954). Finally, the U.S. was compelled to agree to the omission of the word "communist" from the prepared draft of the treaty organisation. But at the same time, the U.S. Secretary of State Dulles explained to the Conference that his government was not ready to assume any obligation in case of a quarrel between two non-Communist States. (Which, perhaps, did imply the quarrel between India and Pakistan). Therefore, the U.S. appended an "understanding" to the treaty stating: "The United States of America in executing the present treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph I, apply only to Communist aggression or armed attack, it will consult under the provision of Article IV, paragraph 2". See United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. VI, part I, 1955, p. 85. Also see, D.S.B., vol. XXXI (1955) September 20, 1954, p. 395.

correspondent, after a visit to Pakistan, wrote:

"The average Pakistani thinks very little about the Communist threat, if he thinks of it at all. His hostility is towards India rather than the Soviet Union. And he assumes that in the event of a showdown with India, the American military supplies will be drawn upon."<sup>1</sup>

Nehru, further, questioned the assurance given in President Eisenhower's letter that the aid was merely meant to strengthen Pakistan, so that it could defend itself against aggression, and also to ensure security and peace. He said:

"It is not clear to me what kind of aggression and from what quarter it is feared. I am unable to see any danger of aggression on Pakistan from any quarter."<sup>2</sup>

As far as peace and security were concerned Nehru reiterated that if there had been a No-War declaration or non-Aggression Pact,

"Obviously that would have ceased tension between the two countries and in surrounding areas and produced a greater feeling of security in both countries ... Now it is in the context of this rejection of our proposal for a No-War declaration that we have to view this military aid from the United States to Pakistan".<sup>3</sup>

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1. The New York Herald Tribune, June 7, 1956. Article by A.T. Steele.
  2. Parliamentary Debates, op.cit., col. 968.
  3. Ibid., col. 969.

To say that the Americans were not aware of Pakistan's motives behind the pact, is wrong. The fact remains that the discussions in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made it clear that some members of the Senate, at least, were aware of Pakistan's real objective. The alliance was opposed by Senator William J. Fulbright of Arkansas. He declared:

"I think the decision to supply arms to Pakistan is an unfortunate mistake ... I have the greatest respect for the people of Pakistan, as I do for the people of India ... Their mutual difficulties have threatened war, so we are not unaware of the tension between them and therefore should have been extremely careful in our relations with them". Furthermore he said: "I disapprove of this move and I wish the Record to show clearly my disapproval, because in the future when the results of this policy are evident to all I want it to be clear where the responsibility rests."<sup>1</sup>

The then U.S. Ambassador to India George Allen opposed the pact on the ground<sup>2</sup> that:

"There is one issue upon which perhaps 95% or more of the Indians are united in opposition to the United States. That is the only issue on which there is strong feeling. It is the question of American aid to Pakistan on that question they are all against us."

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1. Congressional Record, vol. 100, 1954, p.481. Also see The Hindu, March 5, 1954.
  2. U.S. House of Representatives, Congress 83, Session 2, Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing, The Mutual Security Act of 1954 (Washington, D.C., 1954), p.530.

Celler, Democratic Congressman for New York had opposed the pact even before the formal announcement was made by Pakistan on 22 February 1954. Speaking before a public meeting under the auspices of the Indian League of America, after his return from his visit to India and Pakistan, he had said on December 30, 1953 in New York that high Officers in the U.S. Department of Defence believed that "a militarized Pakistan is essential in view of India's neutrality in the event of any Soviet invasion of South-East Asia", and "frankly from what I have seen the Pakistan Army, with or without American aid, would not be of decided advantage." His view was that military aid to Pakistan would not be worth the cost of "a disaffected and hostile India". Furthermore, he had rightly presumed:

"The Russian and/or Chinese communists would cut through Pakistan like a hot knife through butter. Mr. Nehru and his Cabinet felt that in the event of that aid, they would have to match Pakistan's new military strength by an expansion of the Indian Army. This would greatly impede the social and economic programmes that Mr. Nehru has in mind to advance the living standards of 400 million Indians. American aid of this character would be grist to the Communist propaganda mill."

... Celler had suggested that "the best aid that we can give to Pakistan in the struggle against Communists is to build up Pakistan's economy, which is basically weak."

I believe our emphasis should be on economic rather than military aid", and warned that Defence Department Officers might see distinct advantages in their present programme. "It might boost our prestige throughout the Muslim Middle East, but disadvantages are greater. A U.S.-Pakistan military agreement in the minds of the Indians would bring the cold, if not a hooting war into India's midst". He went on to say that "we should maintain the friendship of both countries - Pakistan and India. We should help each country in every possible way. They are indeed worthy of our assistance - but we should not help the one at the expense of the other".<sup>1</sup>

Former Ambassador to India (and to be recredited as Ambassador a second time in 1963) Chester Bowles wrote in opposition to the Pact in the New Leader:

"It is bad arithmetic to alienate 360 million Indians in order to aid 80 million Pakistanis who are split in two sections, divided by 1000 miles of Indian territory. Instead of adding to the stability of the subcontinent, this will create new tensions and suspicions and thus further contribute to its insecurity."<sup>2</sup>

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1. The Statesman, January 1, 1954.
  2. Chester Bowles, "A U.S. Policy for Asia", New Leader, XXXVII (February 22, 1954).



Previously also Mr. Bowles had been reported to have said that many Indians "honestly believe" that the only reason for Pakistan's readiness for American military aid "is to attempt to get ahead of Indian in their own tragic little arms race" and warned that the possibility should not be overlooked that if the U.S.A. gave military aid to Pakistan, Russia might offer India and other Asian countries its own version of Point Four.<sup>1</sup>

Though the New York Times had played an important role in supporting the proposed pact, a number of letters published in it by well known personalities and experts on Asian affairs opposed the projected alliance. Letters from Prof. W. Norman and some of his Colleagues of the University of Pennsylvania and Dr. E. Stanley Jones<sup>2</sup> were noteworthy. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt also spoke against military aid to Pakistan at a luncheon meeting of the Citizens Conference on International Economic Union at which Prof. Bokhari, Pakistan's permanent Representative to the U.N. was present.<sup>3</sup> Norman Thomas, the Socialist leader also opposed the Alliance.

The above facts made it clear that though Pakistan welcomed the announcement and Pak Government Officials took

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1. The Statesman, January 8, 1954.

2. The Hindu, 10.2.54. He had also been an American missionary in India for forty years and had written a biography of Gandhi.

3. New York Times, February 27, 1954.

a leading part in defending and praising the proposed pact in the U.S.A., there was an atmosphere of "public clamour and official silence".<sup>1</sup> Public clamour was in opposition of rather than in support of the decision of the U.S. to extend military aid to Pakistan.

The then U.S. Vice President Nixon,<sup>2</sup> Senator Russel<sup>3</sup> and William Knowland (Senate Republican Leader) were among the vigorous supporters of the pact. Senator William Knowland had urged President Eisenhower to ignore objections made by India and extend military aid to Pakistan. His argument<sup>4</sup> was that "to withhold American aid because of the protest of neutralist India would be discouraging to those nations willing to stand up and be counted on the side of the free world". And that "these nations might then think it was better to play the game of Indian neutralism than to throw in their lot with the free nations".

In a series of three articles published on August 10, August 24, and September 7, 1959, in the New Republic, Selig S. Harrison rightly narrated how and why the United States came to take the decision of granting military aid to

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1. James W. Spain, "Military Assistance for Pakistan", American Political Science Review, XLVIII (Sept. 1954), p. 738.
  2. Dawn, January 2, 1954.
  3. Ibid., January 7, 1954.
  4. New York Times, 3 January 1954.

Pakistan and later to set up South East Asia Treaty Organisation which Pakistan joined as a member. According to him, the United States was influenced in taking up this policy by the opinion of certain prominent British officials that Pakistan should be groomed to fill the vacuum created by Britain's withdrawal from the sub-continent of India. Apart from the British influence, 'Knowland - wing's Republican desire to get tough with Nehru played an important role in shaping this policy. Selig S. Harrison concluded by saying that Vice President Nixon<sup>1</sup> 'urged this alliance (with Pakistan) not for its purported defence value against aggression but for the very reason Pakistan had sought the aid - as a counter force to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India'. No wonder, if many Indians suspected as such.

The Christian Science Monitor<sup>2</sup>, the American paper had also warned the U.S. against the proposed military pact.

The view of U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Hildreth might seem some what complex. Once replying to a question whether the aid secured from the U.S.A. could be used against Bharat in case that country attacked Pakistan the Ambassador said in Peshawar:

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1. Now, Nixon is the President of the U.S.
  2. Quoted in The Hindu, January 28, 1954.

"Why not? In defence of her independence against aggression from any quarter a country can use American equipment."<sup>1</sup>

Any way, Pakistan and U.S. signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Pact in Karachi on May 19, 1954<sup>2</sup>, despite the vehement Indian opposition.

#### CONSEQUENCES OF THE PACT:

The signing of the U.S. Military Pact with Pakistan changed the whole context of the problems existing between India and Pakistan. The impact of this pact was very serious on Indo-Pakistan relations particularly in respect of the Kashmir question.<sup>3</sup> The bilateral Indo-Pakistani relations now assumed a triangular relationship, with the United States as the third party. Indian friendship towards Pakistan was, at least, frozen for the time being by this pact and it greatly affected the hitherto prevailing goodness and willingness to compromise in the settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes which is clear from the fact that the pact

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1. Dawn, April 1, 1954. And it came to be true when Pakistan used American military weapons in its war against India in 1965.
  2. The pact was signed by Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan (Pakistan) and the U.S. Charg'd' affairs, John K. Emerson, deputizing for Ambassador Horace Hildreth. For important provisions of the pact see: New York Times, May 20, 1954. Full Text: Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954. Council on Foreign Relations, New York, pp.379-383.
  3. This has been dealt with details separately in the previous Chapter.

hindered the way and changed the context of negotiations already going on in respect of the Kashmir question.

In Indian eyes, Pakistan became a part of the foreign policy of a Great Power<sup>1</sup>, because by now Pakistan became a member of the Western military bloc and was playing its assumed role in the cold war against its unaligned neighbours rather than against the bordering Communist nations. Actually, Indians felt grieved and injured against both Pakistan and the United States.

Furthermore, U.S. aid to Pakistan became a lasting and irritating issue in Indo-American relations which no amount of goodwill and understanding could remove. "Even the shrewdest strategist in the Kremlin could not have planned the present state of estrangement in Indo-American relations", observed an Indian writer.<sup>2</sup>

Another consequence was that apart from the fact that the newly established military relationship between the United States and Pakistan fundamentally changed the foreign policy

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1. 'India and her Neighbours: Hospitality on Right and Left', Round Table, vol. 46 (1955-56), p. 339.
  2. G.S. Bhargava, 'The United States and India: The Parting of the Ways', New Republic, 30 August, 1954, p.9.

orientation towards each other as well as towards India. Changes came even in the attitudes of other countries also. The most important amongst them was the Soviet Union, the greatest rival of the United States in the Cold War world strategy. It was in reaction to this pact that the U.S.S.R. came out with its full fledged support to the Indian case on Kashmir in the United Nations. Previously, it had been neutral with regard to India-Pakistan disputes in and outside the U.N. Actually it was because of this pact that the Soviet Premier, Bulganin and the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, during their visit to India in December 1955, supported Indian and Afghanistani claims concerning Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan respectively, against Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> To quote Selig S. Harrison:<sup>3</sup>

"In contrast to the United States, which stumbled almost inadvertently into the Indo-Pakistan arena and makes periodic efforts to bring the two protagonists together, the Soviet Union has played a deliberately divisive role in South Asian relations. The use of the veto on the Kashmir question has been

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1. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, vol.10, 1955-56, p.14604. The United States did not take any notice of these statements which affected the issues of the Security of Pakistan, so it felt somewhat irritated and astonished.
  2. Selig S. Harrison, 'Troubled India and Her Neighbours', Foreign Affairs, January 1966, vol.43, No.2, New York, pp. 322-323.

the cutting edge for what has become a broad Soviet commitment to a "progressive" India as against a "reactionary" Pakistan. This has placed the United States in an extremely awkward position as each instance of Soviet support of India prompts demands for equally unequivocal backing from Pakistan. Much of the motive behind Pakistan's increasing assertion of independence from the United States comes from the fact that the United States holds to the anti-Communist basis of the alliance and seeks to remain above the battle in Indo-Pakistan disputes."<sup>1</sup>

Undoubtedly, the active involvement of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the Indian subcontinent have made the tensions between India and Pakistan more abrasive by the pressures of the Cold War.

During the Suez Crisis in 1956 also, India and the Soviet Union sided against the United States which was supported by Pakistan. Soviet Union was supporting Egyptian case and was the great champion of President Nasser. But the United States and Pakistan were not ready to see the sphere of Russian influence to grow in the area concerned.<sup>2</sup> This made the U.S. more inclined towards Pakistan.

Certainly India presented a posture of friendship with

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1. Now the situation is changing, the Soviet Union has also proposed its military aid to Pakistan.
  2. Mohammed Ayoub, Pakistan's Alliance with the United States, 1954-66: A Study in Leads Capabilities and Responsiveness, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1966) p.64.

Soviet Russia and Communist China after the pact was signed. She condemned this alliance also. This attitude of ours on the one hand created doubts about the policy of non-alignment in the minds of the American defenders of freedom, and on the other, our opposition to let Pakistan become stronger provided a natural and easy outlet to her built-in feelings. Thus the military alliance "sharpened Indo-Pak tensions. It became a constant factor in the reaction and counteraction which characterized subsequent relations between the suspicious neighbours".<sup>1</sup>

President Nasser of the U.A.R. also was affected by this military pact of the U.S. with Pakistan and started to lose faith in Pakistan. India lent her full support to President Nasser of Egypt when during the Suez Crisis, he was in a critical position. While accepting a large contingent of Indian troops in the U.N. Emergency Force, set up to patrol the Egyptian-Israeli border, President Nasser refused to accept any Pakistani troops as part of UNEF and also refused to see Suhrawardy. It was not unknown to President Nasser that Pakistan was a Western stooge and also that it would not like to see American influence vanish from the Middle East

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1. Russel Brines, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, p.104.



completely which Cairo seemed to prefer. This was a fact that for economic support, agricultural surpluses and military assistance Pakistan used to depend too much upon the U.S. aid.<sup>1</sup>

The consequences of this military pact brought the U.S. to a very complex position and added to its responsibilities so far as its relations with India and Pakistan were concerned. The important thing was that the U.S. neither wanted to annoy India nor Pakistan. The two hostile neighbours were to be appeased, which was not an easy job. If the U.S. wanted to appease one, the other immediately got annoyed. For instance, when the U.S. did not take notice of Soviet leaders' statements in India against the interests of Pakistan, Pakistanis became very critical of the U.S.A. And it was to satisfy these Pakistanis that the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Horace Hildreth in his statement in Karachi reiterated American support for U.N. resolutions on Kashmir. However, in addition to this, in a meeting of the SEATO council the U.S. endorsed the communique issued, which called for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of U.N. resolutions which implied a plebiscite in the State

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1. Mohammed Ayoub, *op.cit.*, pp. 52-53.

of Jammu and Kashmir. Dulles, the then U.S. Secretary of State, had initiated this move with other initiators in the Council meeting.<sup>1</sup>

Though Pakistanis felt delighted for the moment, the Indians resented this move bitterly. Again it was in response to the dissatisfied leadership in India that the U.S. Secretary of State, Dulles hurried to New Delhi immediately after the end of the Karachi Conference so as to cool the flames of India's opposition to the U.S. support for Pakistan at the SEATO Conference. The Indians were assured by Dulles that in case of an attack by Pakistan on India, they would be supported by the United States.<sup>2</sup> He reiterated that the weapons given to Pakistan by the United States were only for defensive purposes. Furthermore, the Secretary of State made it clear that though the U.S. did not believe that Pakistan had any aggressive designs against India, in case of such a hypothetical attack, Karachi's good relations with the West would end and the latter would support India in

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1. D.D.B., vol. XXXIV (873), March 19, 1956, p.446. Certainly reference to Kashmir in the SEATO Council's meeting was not relevant.
  2. But the U.S. did not support India when Pakistan attacked her in 1965.

the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

Pakistan criticised even the U.S. massive economic aid to India and the sale of arms to India on a large scale. It accused the U.S. and other Western nations for supplying arms to India both directly and indirectly through the medium of economic aid, which might be used to divert its own resources to armaments. It was on September 24, 1957, Mr. F.K. Noon, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, spoke before the Security Council in New York that it was pertinent to observe that India was also receiving aid from the U.S. and other countries, "allegedly economic in nature, but actually military in character". According to him the money India spent on defence alone was 140 per cent of Pakistan's total budget, yet Pakistan never claimed the right to question what India did inside her own territory though as a result of "this colossal armaments programme, it is Pakistan which should complain of a threat of India's

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1. New York Times, March 11, 1956. Also see The Hindu, March 11, 1956. India welcomed this statement while in Pakistan it led to intensifying more anti-American sentiment. But the fact remained that the unreserved Soviet support to India pushed Pakistan completely into Western Camp. Harish Kapoor, "The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistan Relations", International Studies, vol.8, Nos. 1-2, July-October, 1966, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, p. 154.

aggression."<sup>1</sup>

Once again, after the London Declaration (July 28, 1958) of the Baghdad Pact countries (U.S., U.K., Iran, Turkey and Pakistan), the U.S. Secretary of State, Dulles made it clear in Washington after his return from the London Conference that while his diplomatic talks in London has strengthened the confidence and morale of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and while the U.S. had become more closely associated with the Baghdad Pact countries, closer association, as he put it, involved only "technical agreements leading to supply of military equipment" rather than any new defence commitment by the U.S. to aid them in the event of an outside attack.<sup>2</sup> Clearly he refused to be involved in an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan, especially because the parties

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1. The Hindu, September 26, 1957. Previously also Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali was reported on 4th January 1954 in Decca as having said that the U.S. economic aid to India was indirectly for military purposes in turn. New York Times, January 8, 1954. In March 1958, Noon was reported to have said that despite U.S. Military aid to Pakistan, India had four or five times the military strength of Pakistan, and the ratio was expected to increase. P.M. Noon threatened the U.S. that should Pakistan feel her independence in jeopardy "We will break all pacts in the world and shake hands with those whom we have made our enemies for the sake of others." New York Times, March 9, 1958.
  2. The Dawn, July 30, 1958.

to the conflict could define the term "aggression" in different ways. This led to great resentment in Pakistan. Dulles was criticised by the Dawn,<sup>1</sup> the leading newspaper of Pakistan, for saying one thing in London and another in Washington and that

"If the proposed bilateral treaties<sup>2</sup> are to impose on the the United States no greater obligation than the supply of military equipment, then what would be new in them?... The London Declaration of Mr. Dulles would have meaning only if, under a new series of treaties the U.S. stands committed to send its armed forces to the aid of any of these countries which may be attacked from outside."<sup>3</sup>

When in November 1956, the U.A. and France used the American arms supplies to its NATO allies against Egypt, the ineffectiveness of American assurances was fully exposed. Actually Indians had no reason to expect that America would intervene on the side of India in case of Pakistani aggression,

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1. Ibid., July 31, 1958.

2. Bilateral Agreements of cooperation with the three Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact were signed on March 1959 in Ankara.

3. This was an evident proof that Pakistan's primary object in seeking military aid from the United States was to be strengthened against India, a non-Communist country, because Pakistan was afraid of an outbreak of hostilities between the two. It wanted a clearcut assurance from the U.S. that its military aid could be used against an aggression which might not "necessarily be Communist in its origin", The Dawn, July 30, 1958. While the U.S. was not ready to commit herself against India with whom it wanted to be on friendly terms and it was because of this fact that the United States could not fulfil the hopes of the Pakistan Government which had been raised by the London Declaration. For text of the Declaration and the communique see D.S.D., vol.XXXIX, No.999, August 18, 1958, pp.272-273.

because the reason for United States political intervention in the dispute against Anglo-French aggression had little to do with the fact of the misuse of American supplied arms to those two countries. How could Indians feel secure that the U.S. would take appropriate steps in favour of India, in case Pakistan used military weapons given by it, against India.

Nehru rejected the Pakistani proposal for joint defence in 1959. On 24 April 1959, Ayub Khan had suggested that "in the event of an external threat both India and Pakistan should defend the subcontinent in cooperation with each other".<sup>1</sup> Nehru, however, rejected the proposal for a joint defence saying, "I do not understand when people say 'let us have a common defence policy'. Against whom?"<sup>2</sup> The United States wanted that India and Pakistan should remove their differences. Therefore Nehru's rejection had disappointed the U.S. Policy makers. But they were unwilling to give up hope. Averell Harriman told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Nehru's rejection of Ayub Khan's offer might not be "the final word". He expressed his agreement<sup>3</sup> with the

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1. The Dawn, 25 April 1959.

2. The Hindu, 6 May 1959. Ayub Khan again spoke of the usefulness of an agreement for joint defence of the subcontinent. Ibid., 3 November 1959. But Indian P.M. rejected it in a decisive fashion. Ibid., 6 November 1959.

3. U.S. Senate, The Mutual Security Act of 1959, n.63, vol.I, pp. 123-24. Harriman was at that time a private citizen but his views apparently reflected the general sentiment of the Eisenhower Administration.

view that the U.S. "ought to pursue it, pursue it quietly, however, not with publicity ... We ought to use our influence towards getting both countries to direct their military efforts more toward common defence of the sub-continent and less against each other. I think it is of vital importance to both of them that they work together, and perhaps they can work together without a pact". Any way India was reluctant to accept the proposal of joint defence because of the fact that Pakistan had military pact with the U.S. as well, and she did not see any threat from any country to her security except that of Pakistan.

A very competent and informed American writer in a series of three brilliantly written articles<sup>1</sup>, referred earlier, analysed that the cost of this blundering American decision, which had only a marginal and doubtful military advantage, was very heavy in political and diplomatic terms to all the three parties involved - the U.S., Pakistan and India. In the case of India 'what began as an emotional outburst has hardened into an enduring sense of injury'. It was concluded by most Indians that it was 'essentially an anti-

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1. Selig S. Harrison, 'India, Pakistan and the United States', in the New Republic, 10, 24 August and 7 September 1959.

Nehru manoeuvre "designed to force his hand". The military necessity (for the aid) is so questionable and Pakistan's preoccupation with India so conspicuous that it makes sense to them only in these terms, they cannot seriously believe the great U.S. simply blundered into a mistake.<sup>1</sup>

Since the signing of the military aid pact between the U.S. and Pakistan India could no longer consider the U.S. - a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council - as neutral in respect of the Kashmir question lying on the agenda of the Council. Therefore, India successfully pressed for the withdrawal of American nationals in the U.N. Observer Service across the ceasefire line in Kashmir.<sup>2</sup>

This pact has also had important consequences to the internal political developments within all the three countries concerned - in the sense that the hands of the unfriendly circles of the United States and Pakistan in India and of India in the United States and Pakistan were strengthened.

In consequence, when Indian objections proved ineffective and Pakistan started receiving heavy arms from the United

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1. Ibid., 24 August 1959, p. 21.

2. For details see - Previous Chapter pp.



states, the Indian Government was compelled to spend more money on arms (thereby adding to India's burdens of foreign exchange). "The resources and energies of India and Pakistan, instead of being wholly devoted to the development of their backward economies and the improving of the standard of living of their two peoples came to be used for an arms race (despite the denials of Indian spokesmen with respect to India) which did good to no body, not even to the United States and the 'free world' in whose interests the aid to Pakistan was started to have been proffered", remarked M.S. Rajan quite rightly.<sup>1</sup>

India's attitude to the Indo-Pakistani disputes stiffened as a result of this military pact of Pakistan with the U.S. All the political parties in India supported a stiffer and stronger stand with reference to Pakistan and attacked the Government's policy if it did not meet the demands put forward by them. Nehru expressed his regret and disappointment "that at a time when we in Asia should be bending our energies to the task of development, a new factor making for tension

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1. Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs 1964-66, op.cit. pp. 274-275. The President of the governing Congress party of India, U.N. Dhebar, said that American military aid to Pakistan had imposed an indirect burden on India by compelling her to increase expenditure on defence. The Hindu, 30 January 1966.

and instability should have been introduced by this arms aid."<sup>1</sup> India opposed both SEATO and Baghdad Pact while Pakistan accepted the membership of these two alliances. India opposed Baghdad Pact because it created far greater tension in West Asia than ever before which resulted in Anglo-French military attack against Egypt in 1956.

Nehru was criticised in the American press. The New York Times in its issue of March 25, 1954, editorially criticised and accused Nehru of a double standard of evaluation of Communist and non-Communist arms supplies to some Asian nations, because he indicated American policies (in particular of American military aid to Pakistan) for having created 'insecurity, uncertainty and instability' in Asia.

But there were some distinguished Americans who supported Nehru's words and spoke against the military pact. Chester Bowles, former American Ambassador to India, criticised the aid to Pakistan and asked for 'new realism' in the United States foreign policy, abandoning its 'Maginot Line' concept. Furthermore, he questioned how the Security of South Asia had been increased by U.S. aid to Pakistan when it had antagonised India and Afghanistan (where it had opened the

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1. H.F. Deb., (20 March 1956), pt. II, vol. II, no.27, cols. 3042-3.

door for large-scale Soviet aid).<sup>1</sup> John Sherman Cooper, former U.S. Ambassador to India, also made comments that the U.S. Government did not take into consideration the repercussions of U.S. Aid on another friendly country like India.<sup>2</sup> It was early in 1956, that the former U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson disfavoured the military pacts in West and South Asia.<sup>3</sup> Walter Lippmann's opinion is worth mentioning here. He sharply analysed the damage done to the cause of the United States in Asia by 'entangling alliances' in South Asia. 'We have alienated India and Afghanistan by our meddling and we have not made secure the adherence of Pakistan ... The damage done to American position by the Pakistan entanglement alone is enormously greater than what can be done to repair the damage by economic aid.'<sup>4</sup>

A great controversy arose over the U-2 plane affair in May 1960 between Pakistan and the United States as it involved the Security of Pakistan. The U.S. plane had taken off from the airbase at Peshawar, so Pakistan

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1. The New York Times Magazine, 20 May 1956.

2. The Hindu, 25 August 1956.

3. See his article in the New York Times Magazine, 15 April 1956.

4. The Hindu, 6 January 1956.

became aware of the danger of an immediate Soviet threat to its security. The Pakistan Government protested against this and informed the U.S. that the use in the future of Pakistani airfields even by unarmed American aircraft would have to be more firmly controlled.<sup>1</sup> This further made it clear that the U.S. was interested much more in containing the Soviet Union than in strengthening Pakistan against India. But the result was just the reverse, Pakistan was strengthened against India. Neither India nor the U.S. could resist the use of American military aid against Indians in 1965.

Owing to this pact India could not regard the U.S. as her unequivocal friend. The U.S. itself could not make such gains as it had expected. It was Pakistan who could enjoy its advantages. Between India and the U.S. there arose doubts, misconceptions and mis-understandings.

#### U.S. MILITARY AID TO INDIA:

It was the U.S. military aid<sup>2</sup> in November 1962 to India during the Chinese attack on India (October 1962), which added fuel to the Pakistani criticism of India and

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1. The Dawn, May 15, 1960.

2. D.S.R., vol. XLVII (1223), December 3, 1962, pp.837-838.

the United States. Previously also, during his visit to the United States in 1961, President Ayub had spoken out strongly, against any U.S. military assistance to India. At the National Press Club on July 13, 1961, the Pakistani President had warned bluntly that any move to provide military aid to India "would put a strain on our relationship with America".<sup>1</sup>

India readily accepted U.S. Military aid during her emergency, in spite of the fact that Nehru had previously rejected all the U.S. proposals for the same. Once, when in August 1961, the U.S. Under Secretary of State (and former U.S. Ambassador to India) Chester Bowles stated on his return to Washington from a visit to the Indian subcontinent that in the event of Pakistani or Indian aggression on each other, the U.S. was committed both ways "to go to the rescue of the aggrieved".<sup>2</sup> Commenting on this P.M. Nehru

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1. The New York Times, 14 July 1961. Commenting on the U.S. consideration on the military aid to neutrals in 1961, President Ayub said that it would "open the floodgates of armaments for India". The Times, 5 July 1961. While the Defence Minister of India, Krishna Menon made it clear that the proposed amendment to U.S. Mutual Security Act permitting U.S. Military aid to "neutrals" would have no effect on India's foreign policy of opposition to military aid and military alliances and non-acceptance of foreign military aid. The Hindu, 16 July 1961.
  2. P.S.B., vol. XLV (1160), September 13, 1961, pp.487-488.

said in the Indian Parliament that India was not under any other country's protection, that India had not asked for such protection and that there was no commitment on the part of the United States to come to India's rescue in case of Pakistani aggression on India.<sup>1</sup>

And when the U.S. rushed massive arms aid to India during the Chinese aggression, Pakistan took it as a direct threat to its own security. Though the United States had no such intention and was giving military aid to India against a Communist country, i.e., China, Pakistan's argument was that this aid might be used against it by India in spite of the fact that India had assured the U.S. and other Western powers, supplying arms to that country, that these arms would be used exclusively against the Chinese. In his letter<sup>2</sup> to President Ayub, President Kennedy tried to convince him but he refused to accept the U.S. point of view and in his reply<sup>3</sup> he said that large scale supply of military equipment

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1. For details see Lok Sabha Debates, vol.56, 17 August 1961, cols. 2771-2773.

Commenting on the U.S. decision that Pakistan would be given more military aid, P.M. Nehru said if the U.S. wanted to give more military aid to Pakistan "knowing that the main target of Pakistan is India, let her do so we are not afraid of it. Although we can not match the U.S. in military strength, we are capable of defending our country". The Hindu, July 16, 1961.

2. New York Times, October 31, 1962. Similar letter was from P.M. Macmillan of Great Britain.

3. The Dawn, November 8, 1962.

to India would not further the cause of world peace and international understanding especially between the three neighbouring countries of India, Pakistan and China.

The United States' position was that military aid to India was given only because of the emergency created by China's invasion of that country. It did not take any notice of Pakistan's vehement protests and continued its arms shipment to India. Pakistan was not ready to bear any more the expansion of the emergency commitment by the Western Powers to India because it would have meant a continuous build up of Indian military strength against Pakistan.

Any way, the U.S. favoured India ignoring Pakistani objections, and it was on June 30, 1963 that in a communique President Kennedy and P.M. Macmillan reaffirmed their "policy of continuing to help India by providing further military aid to strengthen her defences against the threat of renewed Chinese communist attack".<sup>1</sup> This announcement was called by Pakistan as an "unwritten alliance" between the Anglo-American bloc and "uncommitted India". In fact, Pakistanis resented that "without entering into a formal alliance with the Nehru Administration, President Kennedy and Premier

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1. D.S.B., vol. XLIX (1256), July 22, 1963, p. 133.

Macmillan have now decided to bestow upon India many of the 'benefits' and security normally accruing to members of a military alliance".<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. State Department, however, refused to accommodate Pakistan as far as military aid to India was concerned. The Defence Secretary Robert MacNamara stated before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 25, 1964:<sup>2</sup>

"Our military assistance to India has deeply troubled Pakistan, as you are well aware. Nevertheless, it is important to the entire free world, including Pakistan, that India be able to defend itself against Chinese communist aggression. The United States has taken great pains to assure the Government of Pakistan that our aid to India will not be at the expense of Pakistan's Security to which we are committed under our mutual defence agreements."

SINO-PAK AXIS:

It was against the U.S. Military aid to India that Pakistan became interested in having an alliance<sup>3</sup> with China in 1963. Its effect on Pak-U.S. relations was not good. Both Pakistan and China considered India to be their

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1. The Dawn, July 2, 1963.

2. D.S.R., vol. I (1297), May 4, 1964, p. 710.

3. Full Text in Peking Review, 15 March 1963, pp. 67-70.



common enemy. Communist China declared its open support for Pakistan in the event of Indo-Pakistan war, and labelled India as aggressor. China increased activity on the Sino-Indian borders which forced the Indians to keep a large part of their army on the Chinese border and thus helped the much smaller Pakistani arms to fight the Indians to a stand still.

#### INDO-PAK WAR:

A critical point was reached among the three countries - the U.S., Pakistan, and India - during the undeclared Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, when the United States supported neither India nor Pakistan and immediately after the outbreak of large-scale hostilities between them imposed an arms embargo<sup>1</sup> on both belligerents.

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1. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1965, Council on Foreign Relations, 1966, p.113. This statement was made by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States Representative to the United Nations, to the Security Council of the U.N. on September 17, 1965. He said: "The United States enjoys and hopes to continue to enjoy friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. I should like to emphasize that we have suspended arms shipments to both countries since we want, in support of the Security Council's resolutions calling for a ceasefire to help bring about an end to this conflict and not to escalate it. It is the sense of the Security Council's resolutions that there be a prompt end and not an intensification of hostilities" Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1965, p.602. U.N. Documents S/RES/209 (1965), September 4, 1965, and S/RES/210 (1965) September 6, 1965. This arms embargo made Sardar Swaran Singh say in Lok Sabha on September 20, 1965, that the U.S. Government had more or less "confessed its inability" to do anything about its assurances that arms supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, December 11-18, 1965, Keessing's Publication Ltd., London, p.21117.

In this war Pakistan used U.S. arms against India. Indians protested against this as they saw that Indian fears at the time of the signing of the U.S. military pact with Pakistan were proved to be true. They complained to the U.S. against the use of its military equipment by Pakistan against India and asked it to do something so that Pakistan might not use these weapons and apologize for this use. Pakistanis also accused<sup>1</sup> India and complained against the use of American arms by India. They were perfectly wrong, India did not use U.S. weapons. This was clear from the fact that while an Indian Government spokesman alleged on September 3, 1965 that the Pakistan Government had refused U.S. Observers permission to visit the Chhamb sector to check the presence of U.S. tanks, and commented that without U.S. tanks and aircraft "Pakistan would have not dared launch its latest adventure" and that the U.S. official in Delhi were reported on September 6, to have informed Washington, after visiting the Indian side of the Jammu front, that Pakistan was using American equipment against India.<sup>2</sup> It was the Indian Government who allowed the U.S. Observers to

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1. Bhutto's remark that American Military aid ultimately enabled India to 'Invade Pakistan' is noteworthy. The Dawn, November 22, 1965.

2. See, Ibid.

visit the Indian side of the border and the observers had seen no American equipment with the Indian troops.<sup>1</sup>

In reply the United States did not say even a single word either to India or to Pakistan.

In such a situation the position of Pakistan was more serious than that of India. India was receiving military hard-ware from a wide range of countries, e.g., Britain and the Soviet Union. While Pakistan relied almost exclusively on American equipment.<sup>2</sup>

#### AN ANALYSIS:

Whatever might have been the repercussions of the United States Military aid to Pakistan on India, the American and Indian thinking had been quite different on this issue.

#### THE AMERICAN ARGUMENT:

It was thought in America that the assistance to Pakistan to improve the equipment, mobility, training and organisation of its force would render less rather than more likely a

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1. Ibid., p. 20928

2. The Dawn, September 12, 1965.

Soviet attempt to overrun or subvert the country.<sup>1</sup> The military aid was only a part of the assistance that the United States offered Pakistan. The economic aid in a large volume being pledged to it on the ground that the healthy development of Pakistan was the best insurance of its peace and stability against any internal or external threats (from Communist countries).

Next reason was the view of the United States that the best way of serving the interests of the free world would be to strengthen both India and Pakistan and this could be brought about if both countries moved forward in peace towards stability and economic development.

Thirdly, there was no presumption in the United States that its military aid to Pakistan would pose any threat to Indian security. In American view there were vast dissimilarities between the two with regard to their size and strength. Their assessment was that with India having nearly four times the area of Pakistan, four times the population, probably ten times the industrial base, and superior strength in most other measurable dimension, how could it be thought that

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1. For a revealing history of discussions leading to the American decision to aid Pakistan, see Selig B. Harrison, 'India, Pakistan and the U.S.-1; the Case History of a Mistake', New Republic, 10 August 1959, pp. 10-17.

Pakistan would constitute any threat to the security of India? The Pakistan Government had also assured the U.S. Government that the military aid would be used for the designated common purposes of defence against Soviet attack.

And if in spite of its relative weakness and official pledges, Pakistan would dare to launch a hopeless aggression against India, perhaps the U.S. authorities assumed that American influence would be adequate to forestall the action. But this American assumption was proved to be wrong when in August 1965 Pakistan attacked India and the U.S. could do nothing.<sup>1</sup>

THE INDIAN VIEW POINT:

India did not and does not believe in the extension of the military pact system to Asia. In her view American military aid has tended to harden instead of softening local conflicts. It brought cold war to the door step of the Indian subcontinent, while India did not want to be involved in the cold war rivalries. India has been a non-

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1. For details of American Point of view see Talbot and Poplai, India and America, pp. 89-90.

aligned country and is not aligned with either of the two blocs.

India did not believe that the policy of entangling alliances was the best one to secure peace and stability in Asia because if a country became a member of one bloc, it would naturally become the enemy of the other bloc. In such a situation rivalries would not be lessened, instead they would be increased.

So India thought that by allying itself with the U.S., Pakistan had aligned herself with one of the two power blocs which was counter to basic Indian concepts of a foreign policy based upon non-alignment with either of the two power blocs. In her view Pakistan's alignment with the West endangered India's security by bringing the clashing interests of the major powers to the borders of India. By joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO Pakistan had also presumably sought to strengthen its own general influence in international affairs, an influence which India suspected. Not only Pakistan's alliance affected South Asian position but by this Pakistan had also taken a position different from that of India in Western Asia, where India felt that its security and other interests could be best served by encouraging 'neutralism' and by keeping extremely friendly relations

with Egypt, befriending the Arab countries and cold shouldering Israeli claims. Pakistan on the other side, being aligned with the West, has been supporting the Israeli claims.

India did not and does not agree with the U.S. on the point that the great disparity between Indian and Pakistani strength was the guarantee against Pakistani aggression. Indians had been citing many examples: it was in 1948, when Pakistan was very weak, that it sent its troops into Kashmir to fight against the Indian army. Again in August 1965, a full fledged war brokeout between India and Pakistan, in which the latter used U.S. military equipment against our country despite the fact that it had given assurance to the U.S. not to use them against India - a non-Communist country.

Pakistan had referred many times to a "holy-war" to liberate Kashmir from India and that was why India suspected that Pakistan would not use this military aid only for defence purposes. So Indians believed that Pakistan was interested in American arms in order to improve its bargaining position against India. Because of these objections of India, American military aid to Pakistan had been certainly disturbing friendly Indian-American relations time and again.

In spite of the fact that the U.S. continued to give military aid to Pakistan against Communist expansion, it did not use it against any Communist country but against neutralist India. On the contrary, the U.S.A. still believes that when called upon to do so Pakistan would honour its commitments as an ally and as a member of SEATO, to assist the U.S.A. in its efforts to contain Communism. But there had been certain instances when Pakistan did not do so. It was because of the U.S.A. that SEATO extended its protective umbrella to Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, even though these countries were not members of SEATO. In the summer of 1962, when there was a feeling that the Pathet Lao might sweep down to the borders of Thailand, an American force of 5,000 to 6,000 troops was brought to Thailand with the concurrence of the Thai Government, in order to boost the morale of the people in South-East Asian region.<sup>1</sup> Some other members of SEATO also sent token forces to Thailand on this occasion, but not Pakistan. When questioned, the Pakistanis pleaded that Thailand had not asked for troops from Pakistan. What was the American explanation? Pakistan was in no position to supply troops since it was afraid of a likely attack from India. This was a wrong reason as India

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1. For details see, D.S.B., June 4, 1962, pp.904-906.



had then a whole brigade of troops in the Congo and was also contributing the largest contingent of troops to the U.N. Force in Gaza. The fact was that Pakistan did not want to do anything in deference to the wishes of China. How could the fear of attack from India not prevent Pakistan from sending, within a few months, some 1,500 troops to West New Guinea, to constitute the U.N. Force there?

Another instance was when in the SEATO meeting held in London in the beginning of May 1965, Pakistan refused to support the U.S. action in South Vietnam.<sup>1</sup>

The fact remains that while obtaining large scale military aid from the U.S.A. and joining the military alliances of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan had at the same time given an assurance to China that the building up of its military strength would in no way ever be directed against China.

The Observer, London, had rightly commented on July 21, 1963, that "it is significant, however, that Chou En-lai had told a visiting Pakistani delegation recently that

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1. Ibid., June 7, 1965, p. 924.

China would defend Pakistan throughout the world as Pakistan defended China in CENTO and SEATO."<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, Indians have been unable to understand why the U.S.A. should be so much worried about Pakistani protests against comparatively much smaller military aid to India which had to defend herself against Communist China. Pakistanis complain of the military assistance received by India from the U.S.A. in 1962-63 and 1963-64, totalling 165 million dollars, half in credits and half in grants<sup>2</sup>, while Pakistan itself had been given much more massive military aid by the U.S.A. with the avowed object of containing the Communist Chinese, whom they are now befriending. According to American newspaper reports the aid in military hardware alone till the beginning of 1963, is said to have been of the order of 1.3 billion dollars. Thomas Brady writing from Karachi reported that Mr. Dean Rusk declared in Karachi on May 1, 1963 in the CENTO Council that U.S. aid to Pakistan upto date had been over three billion dollars. "The figure on military aid in the nine years since the alliance was formed has been kept secret at Pakistan's request."<sup>3</sup>

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1. See The Dawn, April 11, 1963, for the Text of the Extracts from Premier Chou En-lai's interview with the correspondent of the 'Associated Press of Pakistan.'
  2. Figures given by Chakravarty, India Speaks to America, p. 139.
  3. The New York Times, May 2, 1963.

So it is not possible to find out the exact figures of the amount of military aid. Another figure quoted for the period ending the fiscal year 1969 amounts to 981.7 million dollars of which military equipment was worth 536.7 million dollars and the remaining 445 million dollars had been given for defence support and direct forces support.<sup>1</sup>

The continued flow of military aid to Pakistan, thus, has been a matter of grave concern to India as Pakistan and China have very cordial relations. Pakistan received the first submarine as a gift from the United States on August 29, 1964. The question arises - against whom is a submarine needed? It seems that the Americans are inclined to believe that Pakistan is really afraid of India and not of Communist China. Certainly it is supposed to use it against India and it is India which may be afraid of Pakistan rather than Pakistan which should be afraid of India, because of the fact that Pakistan's security is guaranteed through military pacts like SEATO and CENTO, and it has a separate military aid agreement with the U.S.A. And, paradoxically, it has now obtained also the protection of the People's Republic of China. Indians are unable to understand that if Pakistan is really afraid of India, why

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1. John C. Campbell, Defence of the Middle East, (Praeger Publications) 1960, pp. 200-201.

it had consistently been refusing India's offer of a no-war pact.

There is a very sound remark made by Selig Harrison:

"Pakistan has been able to acquire a disproportionately strong power position relative to that of India through alignment with the United States. As an ally permitting the use of its territory, for strategic intelligence purposes, Pakistan has commended from the United States an economic and military aid subsidy, much larger than her size would otherwise warrant. Nawalpindi has been emboldened by this to think big and press for Indian concessions from a position of artificially induced strength.

"The special nature of the Pakistani link (with U.S.A.) has been scarcely understood in the American refusal of Indian requests for supersonic aircraft, air-to-air missiles and heavy tanks, all of which has been given to Pakistan."<sup>1</sup>

Professor H.J. Morgenthau, an outstanding authority in the field of international relations, made a correct analysis of the situation arising from U.S. military assistance to Pakistan when he wrote in an article in Commentary in its issue of May (1964) as follows:

"The alliance with Pakistan has from the outside been a useless and counter-productive instrument of American foreign policy; it could

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1. Selig S. Harrison, 'Troubled India and her Neighbour', Foreign Affairs, vol. 43, November 2, January 1965, pp. 322-323.

truly be called a diplomatic act against nature. For the military forces of Pakistan, built up with our (U.S.) massive support, have as their primary target not the Soviet Union or China, but India. Yet we have an obvious vital interest in the political and economic success of India, an interest far transcending any other we have in Asia. Our military support of Pakistan has forced India to divert a proportionate fraction of its scarce resources to military purposes and we, anxious to prevent India's collapse, have been compelled to replace at least a part of those diverted resources with foreign aid.

"It was possible to dismiss this armament race with ourselves as a costly absurdity until China invaded India, and in the aftermath of that invasion, Pakistan reached a political and also, it is generally believed a military understanding with China. Everything points to the likelihood that China will invade India on a large scale as soon as she has solved her logistic problems. It is also obvious that when this happens and India is fighting for her life, Pakistan will bring the weapons supplied by us into the camp of her enemies while we will support India improvising a crash programme after the invasion had started."

But the U.S. did not help India during Indo-Pakistan war in 1965.

So long as India had suggested that because of its difficulties with Pakistan, the United States should not proceed with Pakistan to strengthen their joint plans against the danger of Soviet aggression, Americans had been apt to be resentful. Sometimes American support to Indian positions had been resented in Pakistan.

CHAPTER VI  
INDIA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS  
WITH CHINA

At the heart of major Indian-American differences over East Asia has been the so called "China Question". Ever since the communists took over the control of mainland China in the year 1949, China looms large and important both in the Asian scene and in Indo-American relations because of its strategic significance. The two countries - India and the United States - approach this 'question' from profoundly divergent perspectives and follow different policies toward the two Chinese Governments i.e., the Communist China and the Nationalist China. Not only the two countries differ on the matters of the recognition of Communist China and its representation in the United Nations or on the issue of disposition of Korea, but their relations toward Chinese Communist moves in other countries show quite varied points of views e.g. Communist penetration into Tibet or Chinese policies toward South-East Asia and Korea.

BACKGROUND:

There were no vital differences between India and the United States with regard to China before September 12, 1949.

the day when the Communists over threw the government of Chiang Kai-Shek. The leaders of Indian nationalism as well as the American people and Government had a number of ties with China and friendly, admiring relations with Chiang, who had long been viewed by both countries as an outstanding nationalist leader. After September 1949, there were two Chinas. The United States refused to recognise People's Republic of China, dominated by Communists while supporting exile government of Chiang on Formosa. On the contrary India recognised Communist China and since then has been advocating for the membership of Communist China in the United Nations.

India's contact with China dates back in the ancient times from the first to the eleventh centuries and had included considerable travel and trade and had seen the spread of Buddhism from India to China. So with political sympathies and historical memories Indian nationalist leaders tried to revive contacts between India and China in the modern times also. Rabindranath Tagore visited the Far East in 1924, and Jawaharlal Nehru contacted the Chinese leaders which excited great public interest in both the countries.

The Japanese aggression against China in 1931 and 1937 outraged Indian as well as American public opinion and India became more interested. India did a lot in favour of China.

Indian newspapers called on the League of Nations to apply military sanctions against Japan. Even the Congress Party passed resolutions and organised demonstrations on "China Day" when the commander of the Communist Red Chinese Eighth Route Army appealed for help, a privately supported Indian ambulance unit was sent to China. Nehru visited<sup>1</sup> China in August 1939 and in February 1942 he brought Chiang in touch with other Indian nationalists at the time of his visit<sup>2</sup> to India to appeal for more support against the Japanese at that critical stage. Chiang failed to persuade congress party leaders to support the Allied war effort, yet Nehru called his visit as "a great event in India" as a result of which "the bonds that tied India and China grew stronger".

Unlike India, American contacts with China were of more recent origin and of a more concentrated and intense nature. Prior to World War Second, 1939-1945, it was through a century's intercourse at missionary trading and political levels that the United States had come to know China. The

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1. The Indian Annual Register 1939, vol. II, July-December, p. 229.
  2. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, vol. No. IV (1940-1943), February 21-28, 1942, p. 5053.



First Chinese-American Treaty<sup>1</sup> was made in 1844 which in various ways sought to limit the encroachments of foreign powers on China and to resist the whittling down of Chinese sovereignty by Russia, West European States and Japan. By this support, the United States was serving its own economic and political aims of preserving a united and independent China, as well as the interests of the weak Chinese government. It was because of this outlook that the Japanese invasion of China in 1930's promoted great indignation in the United States<sup>2</sup> and the American government refused to recognise the Manchukuo regime set up by the Japanese. Their contacts increased in range when they became allies during World War II, and became very intimate and Substantial American help for several years supported Chiang's efforts to meet his military and domestic problems-serious in nature.

The genuine interest of the United States in China and its desire to elevate her to the status of a truly great power was made fully apparent by President Roosevelt when, late in 1943, he urged the Congress to legalise Chinese

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1. Melloy, William M., (Comp.), Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and other Powers, 1776-1909, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 187-205.

2. In India also.

immigration as "additional proof that we regard China not only as a partner in waging war but that we shall regard her as a partner in the days of peace."<sup>1</sup> It was because of the United States, initiatives that China became a permanent member of the Security Council, a powerful organ of the United Nations in 1945 after World War Second.<sup>2</sup>

On the one hand the United States was trying her best to strengthen Chiang while on the other hand the great social, economic and political ravages of the Japanese occupation<sup>3</sup> with the attendant stresses on civil war had undermined the foundations of the Kuomintang government. The continuing ineffectiveness of the military forces became a matter of mounting concern to the United States. The masses of the Chinese people had become weary not only of the Kuomintang Government and its corrupt administration but also of the long and seemingly futile struggle against Japan. American stood aside and pressed Chiang Kai-Shek to seek a compromise settlement with his Communist rivals. The United States was in fact, distressed to see the signs of disintegration in China.

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1. D.S.B., vol. IX (225), October 16, 1943, p.255. Full Text in Ibid., pp. 224-225.

2. Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, The Far East 1942-1946, p. 164.

3. Which had continued for fourteen years in Manchuria and eight years in China proper.

The United States was aware of the fact that Communist victory in China would heighten the threat posed by the Soviet Union. There was a bitter controversy in the United States as to whether the United States could have prevented this debacle.<sup>1</sup> But Washington, ignoring the corruption and weakness of the Kuomintang Government, clung to the hope that it could be reformed and that a strong and United China would finally emerge to take its place beside the United States as the dominant stabilizing influence in the Far East. It was on December 15, 1945, that President Truman had issued an important policy statement with regard to China. "It is the firm belief of this Government", he said, "that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of the United Nations Organisation and for world peace". He stressed that a divided and disorganized China was "an undermining influence in world stability and peace now and in the future". Furthermore, he stressed that while it was the policy of the United States not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other nations, at the same time it was "in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly

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1. Popple and Telbot, op.cit., p. 89.

by means of peaceful negotiations". He also pledged financial assistance for the reconstruction of the country.<sup>1</sup>

But Indian government and public opinion took these developments calmly. Since Chiang had failed to achieve administrative and social reform and was fully dependent on the support of the United States Indians were not enthusiastic for their government.

It was the greatest failure of the policy of the United States in China or in the Far East where on September 21, 1949 the Communists established the so called People's Republic of China and proclaimed frankly that it was a genuine Communist government based on Marxian principles. The flight of the beaten Kuomintang armies to the island of Formosa had the effect of profoundly shocking America and arousing all its latent anti-Communist instincts.<sup>2</sup>

Communist China was recognised by the Soviet Union, two days after its proclamation. Five Eastern European countries recognised it within a week and the remaining Satellites - North Korea, the People's Republic of Mongolia, and the German Communist Republic accorded it recognition

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1. "United States Policy toward China", D.A.B., vol. XIII (338), December 16, 1945, pp. 945-946.

2. Lawrence H. Battistini, The United States and Asia, p.234.

within a month. It was only after four days of the inauguration of the Chinese Communist Republic that a Sino-Soviet Friendship Association was organized as a mass organization "to found and consolidate paternal friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and Soviet people and to develop the interflow of knowledge and experience of the two great nations".<sup>1</sup>

(A) ISSUE OF RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA:

India and the United States differ on the question of the recognition of Communist China. On December 30, 1949, the Indian government recognised the newly proclaimed Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, whereas the United States rejected the Communists' claims to sovereignty over China.

INDIA'S STAND:

Shortly after the Chinese Communists came into power over the whole mainland Prime Minister Nehru told a group of reporters in New York that "the happenings in China are such that they cannot be ignored."<sup>2</sup> Since the time of the coming

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1. Alfred Le S. Jenkins, "Present United States Policy toward China", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 294, July 1954, p. 84.
  2. New York Times, November 8, 1949.

of Communists in power in China, India has been inclined to accord a certain amount of defence <sup>to</sup> to the Government of Red China. For New Delhi, it was mainly a question of Peking's being able to maintain effective control over nearly six hundred million Chinese and to rule the country with undisputed authority. The United States policy of refusing to recognize the Communist Government has been a quite puzzling factor in India-United States relations.

During his visit to the U.S.A.<sup>1</sup>, Nehru had pointed out the need for recognizing "realities",<sup>2</sup> and India recognised the "reality" after Nehru's return home. He took this decision in consultation with other members of the Commonwealth.<sup>3</sup> India did not wish to wait for U.S. action as far as the recognition of the Communist Chinese Government was concerned. Peter Calvocoressi explained India's attitude as follows:

"The Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, was eager to establish relations with Peking, because he believed that the Chinese Communists could be weaned from Moscow and that India and China could together constitute a third force, which might perhaps build a bridge between Washington and Moscow."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Nehru visited the U.S.A. in October-November 1949.
  2. U.S. in World Affairs 1949, pp. 431-432.
  3. For details see Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association) XXI, 2(1950), p.154.
  4. Survey of International Affairs 1949-50, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), p. 335.

India's attitude was explained by Nehru on March 17, 1950, in the Indian Parliament, that India was recognising the fact of the Chinese Communists having come into power and effectively controlling the mainland of China. He made it clear that it was not a question "of approving or disapproving" the changes, but "of recognising a major event in history and dealing with it". Furthermore, he said that India was satisfied that the new Government of China was a stable Government and that there was "no force likely to supplant it."<sup>1</sup> This shows that India's approach was based on the defecto theory of recognition of governments in International Law, according to which the new governments should be recognised as soon as they are, in fact in control of the State without going into the nature of that government.<sup>2</sup>

India has been trying not only to make the world more acceptable to China, but also to make China more acceptable to the world.<sup>3</sup> Nehru and other Indian spokesmen in ranking positions had often reiterated their contention that there

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1. Parliamentary Debates, vol. 3, pt. II, No. 2 (17 March 1950) col. 1699.

2. Schuman, F.L., International Politics, The Destiny of the Western State system, McGraw Hill Book Company, INC., New York, 1948. p. 143. The United States also usually followed this policy during the period from 1793 down to the first Wilson Administration.

3. The Statesman, November 6, 1954.

can be no settlement of the problems of the Far East of South-East Asia unless the central fact of the existence of the People's Government of China was recognized and acted upon by all the nations of the world which are concerned with the stability of that sector of the globe.<sup>1</sup>

The Government of India holds that peace in Asia depends partly on the recognition of the government of Communist China. This contention was made clear by Nehru, when on September 29, 1954, after the Korean Crisis, he blamed, that a great part of our present day difficulties - certainly in the Far East, "is due to this extraordinary shutting of our eyes to the fact of China".<sup>2</sup> India thought that the international acceptance of Communist China would have symbolic importance as a recognition of the new states of Asian peoples in world affairs.<sup>3</sup> At that time Asian countries were fighting for their freedom from colonial powers. And the recognition of any newly emerged country might be very inspiring for others.

India recognized Communist China not because she liked

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1. The Hindu, August 10, 1953 (Weekly Review)

2. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 7, pt. II, 15-30 September 1954, col. 3689.

3. Talbot and Poplai, India and America, op.cit., p. 106.



Communist bloc and also not because she wanted to win support from the Communist countries. She did not intend to pose any hostile attitude towards the United States, but it recognised a simple fact i.e., the existence of the People's Republic of China. In Indian eyes, the Chinese were fellow Asians first, and Communists afterwards<sup>1</sup>, as they were unaware of what they would do in future. Even Sardar F.M. Panikkar, former Indian Ambassador to Peking and V.K. Krishna Menon, had expressed doubts that the Chinese were properly to be classified as Communists at all. Sardar Panikkar, after a four year stay in China as the Indian Ambassador, was convinced in 1952 that a "community of approach, a commonness of understanding", linked the leaders of India and China. "Political issues apart, there were no differences at all ... On matters like the freedom of Asian peoples and the need for social and economic justice".<sup>2</sup>

India was not ready to recognise two Chinas separately. And as late as February 25, 1955 Nehru made it clear in Parliament: "It is patent that we cannot recognise two Chinas, we can recognise only one. And we have deliberately recognised

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1. Robert Strausz Hupe, Alvin J. Cottrell James and James E. Dougherty, American-Asian Tensions, op.cit., p. 19.

2. The Times of India, August 26, 1952.

one China because that was the real China. Obviously, Formosa is not China".<sup>1</sup> So there was no question of recognizing Formosa against Peking.

Behind the Indian decision to seek contacts with, cultivate, and befriend Communist China obviously, were certain hopes, national interest and objectives. What were they?<sup>2</sup> The Government of India thought firstly, that it would thus insure the friendship of a powerful neighbour and make easier the task of securing our frontiers. It was hoped that China would respond to India's friendship and that a basis for avoiding conflict and misunderstandings would be established. This normalization of relations with a big neighbour was considered a better guarantee of peace on the northern borders than a military buildup and a military posture for it was thought that the money thus saved might be better spent on economic development to provide inner strength and security to the country.

More than this other interests could be served through friendship with China. India's view was that the Chinese revolution could be kept in the main stream of post war Asian resurgence and thus be humanized and normalized. Speaking

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. I, pt. II, No. 5 (February 25, 1955), col. 511.

2. See Policies towards China: Views from Six Continents edited by A.M. Halpern, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1965, pp. 203-204.

in the Indian Parliament Nehru said, "one of the dominant features of our age is the rise of Asia and it is totally immaterial whether people like it or dislike it: it is a fact. Here is a fact as big and solid fact as any - the fact of the existence of the People's Government of China. But some countries do not recognise it!"<sup>1</sup> India's belief was that through increasing contacts with the outside world and association with the world community, Chinese policies could perhaps be invested with a sense of responsibility, and the rigours of the cold war could be softened and thus would contribute to the cause of world peace.

Thirdly, India was influenced by another consideration, namely, that she was already involved in a bitter dispute with a neighbouring country, i.e., Pakistan. Therefore, inviting the enmity of another neighbour, both big and powerful was neither good politics nor good economics. Later, Pakistan's military alliance with the West was regarded in India as primarily aimed against her.

Naturally India offered her friendly hands to Communist China, "for the peace of Asia depends upon these relations".<sup>2</sup>

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. I, pt. II, No. 5 (25 February 1955), col. 509.

2. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 135.

THE AMERICAN STAND:

The United States and India have not seen eye to eye on the issue of recognition of Communist China. The former did not and does not recognize the People's Republic of China because of her strategic interests in the Far East. The U.S. interest is to use Formosa as a deterrent military base against Communist expansion in the Far East and it regarded the Communist Chinese regime, almost before its birth was completed, as a potential instrument of aggression in the Far East.

Although, Great Britain and many other Western nations friendly to the United States in time recognized the new regime, the American Government almost overnight developed a policy of fervid support for Kuomintang Government. The U.S. Government has continued to recognize the Kuomintang regime as the legitimate government of China while violently opposing every move of Red China to worm its way into the United Nations. American hostility to the new Red China could be seen from what the then Secretary of State, Acheson pronounced in the Summer of 1949:

"Should the Communist regime lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression against China's neighbours, we and the other members of the United Nations would be confronted by

a situation violative of the principles of the United Nations Charter and threatening peace and security."<sup>1</sup>

Along with the political considerations there were formal and theoretical arguments as far as the American recognition of China was concerned. Since the time of Jefferson, the U.S. has in most but not all periods of its history, applied three criteria of recognition:<sup>2</sup> (1) control over the machinery of State; (ii) government with the assent of the people or at least without their open opposition, and (3) the willingness and ability of a regime to fulfill its international obligations. American recognition was delayed or prevented in case of several Latin American regimes, of Soviet Union, Manchukuo and the Franco Government in Spain, as these countries failed to meet the second and third standards.

In case of Communist Chinese Government, America has not recognized it because it has not met Jefferson's second criterion and has repeatedly violated the third one e.g. the

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1. Department of State, United States Relations with China (White Paper), (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. xvii. Also see The Hindu, 6,8, 1949.

2. Poplai and Talbot, India and America, op.cit., p. 104.

aggression of Korea charged to China by the U.N. has not been purged by Peking's subsequent actions. So America has continued to recognise the Nationalist Government as it retains its legal status despite the Communist's de facto control of the mainland.<sup>1</sup>

It was not before the end of 1949, that the United States' attitude against Communist China's recognition hardened. Though it had suggested to its friendly nations<sup>2</sup> that none of them should recognize a Communist regime in China without previous consultation with the others.<sup>3</sup> The publication of the Department of State White Paper on American Policy in China on August 4, 1949<sup>4</sup> had been an evidence that the "American Government had washed its hands off the Nationalist regime and was waiting on events".<sup>5</sup> It was not prepared to underwrite the Chiang government, though, did not quite know what to do about the 'Peking Government'.<sup>6</sup> The fact was that the United States wanted to

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1. Ibid., pp. 104-105.

2. Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Australia, India, Pakistan, New Zealand, Ceylon, and South Africa.

3. The Hindu, May 26, 1949.

4. United States Relations with China, Department of State Publication 3673, August 1949.

5. Survey of International Affairs 1949-'50, p.325.

6. Bundy McGeorge (Ed.): "The Pattern of Responsibility, Record of Secretary of State Dean Acheson", (Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1952), pp.179-180.

know whether Communist China passed into the Russian orbit or not, so it was delaying recognition until this became clear and was looking forward towards 'Chinese developments'.

Obviously, the United States withheld recognition on two grounds: The Peking Government (a) was subservient to a 'foreign imperialism' and (b) had maltreated the U.S. citizens and seized military barracks in Peking (January 6, 1950) which housed the U.S. consular offices.<sup>1</sup> Mao Tsetung's prolonged visit to Moscow in December 1949 was interpreted by the United States as an evidence of Chinese subservience to Soviet Russia. On January 12, 1950, Mr. Acheson made a statement, at the National Press Club, expressing his fear and alleged that the Soviet Union was trying to detach four Chinese provinces, namely, Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Mongolia and Sinkiang.<sup>2</sup> Previously, Mr. Acheson had bluntly warned the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists against undertaking any expansion outside China. He had promised the United States would encourage all the developments now and

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1. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1950, pp. 506-507. Mr. Loy Henderson's statement in New Delhi explaining why the U.S.A. did not recognise Communist China. For the incidents of maltreatment of the U.S. nationals in Communist China, see- D.S.B. XXVII, ( 2 February 1950), pp.14-17 and 40-44.

2. Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, pp.111-118.

in the future" which would contribute to an overthrow of the Communist regime.<sup>1</sup>

Public opinion in the United States was not ready to allow an early decision towards the recognition of the Peking regime. The United States Government, under considerable pressure from Congress, had replied that recognition at that time would divide the country and jeopardize Congressional sanction of American foreign policy, not only in Asia and Africa but in Europe as well. No compromise was in sight.<sup>2</sup>

In the early 1950, the American Administration was faced with one problem: how to deal with the expansion of Communism in Asia. There were three reasons: (a) The Administration itself was divided on the question whether to recognise Red China or not, (b) the President was trying to resolve that division; and (c) the British and some thirteen nations either had or were about to recognize the Chinese (Communist) regime.<sup>3</sup>

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1. The Hindu, August 6, 1949.

2. The New York Times, December 11, 1949.

3. Ibid., January 1, 1950.



Senator Knowland and Senator Smith of New-Jersey, both argued that the United States should have made a new effort to help Chiang Kai-Shek hold the islands of Formosa and Haiven, off the coast of China. Senator Knowland's thesis was that while the U.S. has opposed Communism successfully in Europe, it was indifferent to the expansion of Communism in China and South-East Asia.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Hoover (Republican) in his letter, said that it was his strong belief that "we should not recognize the Communist government of China; we must continue to recognize and support the Nationalist Government; we should, if necessary, give naval protection to Formosa, the Pescadores, and possibly Haiven Island."<sup>2</sup> Senator Taft said he thought that they "should take steps to see that the Communists do not cross over into Formosa, and I would use the Navy to keep them out if necessary."<sup>3</sup>

Senator Knowland's view was that the United States was in a worse position in the Far-East today than before Pearl Harbour, and his assertion was that unless the Administration succeeded in maintaining Chiang Kai-Shek in the Chinese islands, the U.S. positions in Okinawa, the

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1. Ibid.

2. The Times, January 4, 1950.

3. Ibid.

Philippines and perhaps even in Japan would be untenable and the U.S. might be forced to withdraw its defence to Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

This thesis was strongly opposed by the State Department and by some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who regarded it as a highly exaggerated and alarmist estimate of the situation. The officials of the State Department were of the opinion that if they followed the Knowland-MacArthur thesis, they might very well end up by holding Formosa and losing the confidence of Nehru, India, and the other potential allies of the U.S. in South-East Asia.

Instead, the State Department was much more impressed with the estimate of the situation made by Prime Minister Nehru during his visit to the United States, October-November, 1949. This was the estimate which was given to American officials and presumably formed the basis of Nehru's decision to recognize the Communist regime in China. According to the Nehru thesis:<sup>2</sup>

1. The problem was to block the expansion of Communism, and for this purpose to encourage those in the Chinese

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1. The New York Times, January 1, 1950.

2. Ibid.

Communist regime who favoured an independent Chinese policy, based not only on friendship with Moscow but on good relations with the West as well.

2. Communist China, was divided into three factions. Mao Tse-tung, head of the Peiping regime, was for a straight pro-Moscow policy; Chou En-lai, the Foreign Minister wanted to do business with the West as well. Lili-San, Peiping's Minister of Labour, had enormous power in and perhaps control of Kremlin's policy in Manchuria.

3. If the West followed a hostile policy toward Peiping, nobody in that Government would be able to do anything except follow the Moscow line. Moreover, if China was confronted by a hostile West, the Chinese Communists would have an excuse for their failure to deal with the economic plight of the country, and might even be encouraged to carry on their military adventures beyond the borders of China.

4. If, however, the Communists were recognized and forced to trade on an equal cash basis, they would get more help from the West than from the Russians, they would have to take responsibility for the economic conditions of the country and they would probably develop an independent policy totally different from the small Slavic State conquered

by the Communists in Eastern Europe.

Although, the American officials realised all these factors, they did not make up their minds for recognizing Communist China on account of other factors.

The signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 15, 1950<sup>1</sup>, further added to the doubts and misgivings entertained by the U.S. authorities regarding the aims and objectives of the new (Red) rulers of China and the accompanying Agreements<sup>2</sup> on the Chinese Changchun railway, Port Arthur and Dalny contained a number of substantial concessions by Moscow to Peking. This Pact was aimed against possible future Japanese aggression or any third power assisting the Japanese in aggression and bound the two nations closely together in a defensive alliance.

Up to the outbreak of the Korean war, the policy of the United States towards Red China was one of strong unfriendliness, suspicion and distrust and since then, we may say, it has been a policy of uncamouflaged hostility. The entry of the Chinese Communists into the

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1. Documents on International Affairs 1949-'50, pp.541-43.

2. Ibid., pp. 543-545.

Korean war in 1951 altered the whole picture and forced new policy decisions. Consequently, Truman-MacArthur differences arose over Formosa, the use of Chiang's troops, and a "limited" versus "expanded" war in the Orient to a climax with the removal (April 11, 1951) of the General. MacArthur was criticising the reluctance to defend Formosa as "appeasement and defeatism".<sup>1</sup> He had told President Truman, when they met on Wake Island on October 14, 1950, that he did not expect Chinese intervention in Korea.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, one result of this entry of Communist China was that the United States as well as the United Nations hardened their attitude toward Communist China, so long as the war was to go on.

Secretary of Defence, Marshall told the Senate Committee that the United States did not intend to reward Communist aggression by bartering Formosa and a seat in the U.N. to Peiping in return for a Korean settlement.

Britain shut off the sale of rubber to Peiping on 10 May 1951. The United Nations Political and Security

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1. Ceylone Daily News, 5 June 1951.

In his message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on 28 August 1950, General MacArthur had spoken the same. In June 1950, he was made U.N. Commander, under the U.N. aegis at the time of Korean crisis.

2. Ibid.

Committee voted an arms embargo against Communist China on May 18, 1951.

There were two important objectives in the then United States Far Eastern policy. First was the early conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan which would restore Japan's sovereignty and make it an anti-Communist bastion. Moscow and Peiping had insisted on taking part in a four-power pact with Japan. The second objection was to secure internal peace in Southern Asia and strengthen these new nations against Communist imperialism. To this end the administration intended to continue economic aid to the peoples of this area.<sup>1</sup>

With the full-scale entrance of Red China in the Korean war, many voices in America clamored for a blockade of the entire Chinese Coast. Others demanded the "unleashing" of Chiang's army in Formosa with the support of American air and naval power. Some extremists had even advocated, at one time or another, the unleashing of an air attack on the Chinese mainland. But the Truman and afterwards Eisenhower Administration carefully pursued a policy of sanity and contented themselves with imposing an economic embargo on

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1. Ibid.

all goods of military value to China. The free nations were called upon to support this embargo. The United States had also, in its determined opposition to Red China, stepped up its economic and military assistance to the Formosa Government of Chiang Kai-Shek.

Meanwhile, United States hardened its attitude towards China by signing a Peace Treaty<sup>1</sup> with Japan at San Francisco on September 8, 1951. This was a step forward to rearm Japan against the Communists and to protect it from falling into the hands of the Communist bloc either through military aggression<sup>2</sup> or internal revolution.<sup>3</sup> The implication of this treaty provided for the inclusion of Japan in the Western defence system. Japan's proximity to China and the Soviet Far East together with the territorial settlements connected with a Japanese Peace Treaty had made it an East-West issue. That was the reason why India decided not to be a party to the Japanese Peace Treaty, as proposed in the joint United States-United Kingdom draft.<sup>4</sup> So did the Soviet bloc as it was against the Communist countries.

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1. Text: Documents on International Affairs 1951, pp.611-629.

2. Survey of International Affairs 1949-'50, p. 462.

3. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1951, pp.462-66.

4. Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1951, pp.132-138.

### THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION:

When in 1953, the Republican President Eisenhower took over charge, a new 'get tough' policy of the Republicans started as far as their policy towards Communist China was concerned.

But things, however, improved after the death of Stalin on March 6, 1953. There were clear signs of Soviet bloc making concessions and relaxing tensions. Agreement on the prisoners of war was reached on June 8, 1953 and a cease-fire was effected in Korea on July 27, 1953.<sup>1</sup> India was also satisfied with these results and her selection as the Chairman of the N.N.R.C. in Korea. We may say that international tensions were eased to some extent and a better climate was felt.

Late in 1954, the United States concluded a defensive military pact<sup>2</sup> with Formosa which provided that in the event of an attack on Formosa by Red China, the United States would promptly come to the defense of that island with land, sea and air power. Communist China was dedicated to the

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1. See Chapter Third, p.

2. Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, signed at Washington, December 2, 1954. Text in Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954, pp. 360-362.



protection of what she considered her security, as well as the desire to aid and abet the spread of Communism which was intolerable to the United States. It was in November 1954 that the debate on the issue of recognition of Communist China was barred in the United States.<sup>1</sup> That was the climax because Communist China had jailed 13 Americans as spies.<sup>2</sup> Senator Knowland urged a China blockade unless the 13 Americans were freed.<sup>3</sup> But Dulles, the Secretary of State, ruled out blocking China for Red jailings and promised U.S. would 'react vigorously' without any step violating its "international obligations and impairing the alliance of the free nations".<sup>4</sup> Even, President Eisenhower's view was that blockade of China "will amount to war action".<sup>5</sup>

It was the general understanding in the United States that all actions of Communist China were aimed to force the United States make three main concessions: (1) Diplomatic recognition of the Peking Government; (2) Admission to the United Nations, and (3) return of Formosa to Communist China. As things stood at that time, there was no prospect

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1. The Times of India, 22 November 1954.

2. New York Times, 29 November 1954.

3. Ibid., 28 November 1954.

4. Ibid., 30 November 1954.

5. The Hindu, 2 December 1954.

of the United States making any of those concessions. In the opinion of most observers both Western and Asian, Chinese actions such as the imprisoning of 13 Americans only served to postpone the day of Communist China's recognition by the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

In February 1955, Secretary of State Dulles, while talking to Foreign Policy Association, made it clear that the basic purpose of the United States in regard to China was to assure that Formosa and the Pescadores would not be forcibly taken over by the Chinese Communists as Foreign Minister Chou, had said that they would use all their forces to take Formosa and treat the Coastal islands as the means to that end.<sup>2</sup>

The formal Mutual Defence treaty of December 1954 was buttressed by Congress' joint resolution<sup>3</sup> of January 1955 authorizing the President to use the American armed forces, at his direction, for the defence of Formosa and the Pescadores - against, of course, the Chinese Communists.

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1. Reported K. Belaramen, the Hindu correspondent in the United States. Ibid.
  2. The New York Times, 17 February 1955.
  3. Text in D.A.B., vol. XXXII, No. 816, February 7, 1955, p. 213.

The Treaty and the resolution became the law of the land, and they are a part of the statutes even today, embodying the official China policy.

The year 1958 brought about a fateful extension of the 1955 doctrine. It was an important year. First on August 11, the State Department made public a long official memorandum<sup>1</sup> entitled "United States Policy regarding Non-recognition of the Chinese Communist Regime". The statement said: "The United States holds the view that Communism's rule in China is not permanent and that it one day will pass. By withholding diplomatic recognition from Peking it seeks to hasten that passing."<sup>2</sup> It cited a host of factors as warrant for its policy decision, and finally took a categorical stand against any "two Chinas" solution.

Next came the Formosa Strait crisis which resulted in a further enlargement of the policy in support of the Nationalist position. On October 23, 1958, in the joint communique<sup>3</sup> issued at the end of discussions between

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1. Ibid., vol. XXXIX (1002), September 8, 1958, pp.385-390.
  2. Ibid., p. 389.
  3. Ibid., vol. XXXIX (1011), November 10, 1958, pp.721-722.

Secretary of State Dulles and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, it was stated: "It was recognized that under the present conditions the defence of the Miaoys, together with the Matsus, is closely related to the defence of Taiwan and Penghu (the Pescadores)."<sup>1</sup> This brought the Offshore islands within the scope of the application of the January 1955 joint resolution, and the lawyer's conditional "Under the present circumstances" could hardly be taken as offering much of an escape clause for the future. This issue of Formosa, the legal status of which was still to be determined, had been riveted firmly to that of the Offshore islands - undeniably an integral part of China.

On June 27, 1962, in his statement<sup>2</sup> President Kennedy reaffirmed the standing American policy with respect to the defence of Formosa and the offshore islands established under the Formosa resolution of January 1955,<sup>3</sup> that "the United States will take the action necessary to assure the defence of Formosa and the Pescadores". But he reiterated that "the purposes of the United States in this area are peaceful and defensive."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid., p. 721.

2. Text in Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962, pp. 297-299.

3. See p. , Also see, The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, and the Manchester Guardian Weekly, all of June 28, 1962.

4. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1962, p.298.

INDO-U.S. DIFFERENCES AND THE PRESS ON THE QUESTION OF  
THE RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA:

Ever since the time, Communist China came into existence in 1949, India has been pressing the United States for recognizing the Peking Government and giving Formosa to the Peoples Republic of China. In the Indian eyes the United States has been very unreasonable with regard to this issue of the recognition of Communist China. Indians felt it to be very odd that the United States did not recognize Communist China in 1949 while prior to this it had recognized Communist Russia. Though now, this issue involves many other issues and international considerations which have made the way of recognition difficult, but that was not so in 1949. Then the United States could very easily recognize Communist China. But Formosa became the greatest obstacle in the way and it still remains so.

COMMON AIMS BUT DIFFERENT APPROACH:

Both India and Communist China are Asian countries while the United States is non-Asian. Their national interests differ from one another as we have discussed, previously, in this chapter. For India China was first an Asian country then Communist. Peace and security in Asia were given priority. But the U.S. interest was in containing the spread of Communism

in Asia, and for this purpose Formosa was found to be an anti-Communist military base. India did not believe in military measures. Upon the U.S. policy towards China - the influential New Delhi daily Hindustan Times commented editorially:

"... when the United States cries a halt to the spread of Communism in Asia she must realize that this can be achieved not by military measures but only by a positive policy of economic aid."<sup>1</sup>

Unlike the United States, the Indian stand on the Chinese recognition was based on the merits of the case, and was not complicated by any 'policy failure', 'anti-Communism' or opposition of internal public opinion as was the case with the United States.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the attitude of India to the Communist victory in China was quite different from that of the United States of America. The downfall of the Kuomintang, in Indian eyes, was not only the defeat of a corrupt oligarchy that exploited the Chinese masses for the benefit of a small selfish clique, but the defeat of a regime that had made itself an instrument of Western imperialist interest.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Hindustan Times, 7 August 1949.

2. J.C. Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954, op.cit., p. 125.

3. Edgar McInnis "Lucknow Conference", International Journal, Winter 1950-1951, p.3.  
Also see Mark C. Fear: "Indians and the Soviet World" Eastern World, April 1954, pp. 10-18.

This was so despite the fact that in the early years of Indian independence the Chinese Communists had nothing but contempt for independent India, its government and leaders. For months the Chinese press had indulged in wild attacks on independent India as "an agent of western imperialism". Even after their victory in China the communists followed the same attitude which was clear from the reply of Mao Tse-tung stated on 19 October 1949 to a message of greetings from the Indian Communist Party:

"I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, free India will one day emerge in the Socialist and People's Democratic family; that day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the history of mankind".<sup>1</sup>

What did it mean? It meant that free India still needed to be "liberated" through the establishment of a totalitarian Communist regime either of an indigenous or foreign brand! It was clear that to the Communists the achievement of political power on the mainland of China was merely the beginning, not the culmination of their revolution, and Mao's statement darkly hinted at their other ambitious

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1. The Communist, Bombay, January, 1950.

international goals. But India remained strongly imperturbed either by the character of the Chinese revolution or its half-expressed ambitions and became anxious right from the beginning to befriend Mao's China.

In presenting his credentials to Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, the Indian Ambassador, Sardar K.M. Panikkar, went far beyond the usual diplomatic politeness and said:<sup>1</sup> "The peoples Republic of China and the Republic of India, representing the oldest communities in the world are now in a position to cooperate effectively for mutual advantage and for the welfare of their people. The two sister republics of Asia, which between them contain over a third of the world's population, can through their cooperation become a great and invincible force." It was because of this feeling that the first ambassador of Communist China, General Yuan Chung-shien was received at the Delhi railway station with an ovation the like of which was seldom accorded to foreign ambassadors arriving at the Capital.

To placate Communist China India refused to recognize the Nationalist Government at Formosa. Nehru went out of his way to criticise the United States for her non-recognition of

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1. Broad cast from Peking Radio in English on 21 May 1950.



Communist China and repeatedly urged the powers to accept "the facts of political life" in East Asia as he understood them.

The role which India played in the Korean War bears on it the same impress of a desperate anxiety to keep on the right side of China. When the war broke out in June, 1950, India acted with the Western bloc and supported the United Nations' resolution condemning North Korea as an aggressor and calling for ceasefire and withdrawal of the northern forces from South Korea.<sup>1</sup> But when Communist China began to show resentment against the steady advance of the United Nations' forces, the Indian attitude underwent a marked change. In fact, India almost identified herself with the Chinese view that the crossing of the 38th parallel amounted to a direct threat to the security of China, and if Peking had sent its forces into North Korea, it had done so in sheer self defence. It was, therefore, not surprising that when in February, 1951, a resolution was moved in the United Nations General Assembly condemning Chinese aggression in Korea, India voted with the Soviet Bloc against the resolution<sup>2</sup>,

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1. Security Council resolution, S/1501, 25 June 1950.

2. Year Book of the United Nations 1951, p. 224.

stating that the proposal would prolong hostilities in Korea indefinitely and might expand the conflict into a global war. The representative of India stressed that the Government of India was not convinced that the participation of Chinese forces in the fighting in Korea was due to any aggressive intention. It was more probably due to its fears for the territorial integrity of China.<sup>1</sup>

A few months later (18 May) India also refused to participate in the United Nations General Assembly vote which imposed an arms embargo against Communist China and North Korea.<sup>2</sup> On this issue Nehru himself condemned the military mentality "that is seizing some nations", and expressed concern over certain statements made in the United States by the "highest authorities" over the Far Eastern situation and said that "all this talk of the blockade of China is not talk that leads to peace or settlement".<sup>3</sup>

As far as the Korean war was concerned, the American view was that international Communism was trying to achieve by force what it could not otherwise achieve. So there was to be no appeasement. Instead force had to be met with force.

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1. Ibid., p.221.

2. Ibid., pp. 227-228.

3. Parliamentary Debates, vol. I, pt. II, No.6 (18 February 1953), cols. 453, 456.

If this led to war the communists must be blamed for it. It was a cold war issue for Americans. Furthermore, for the Americans, the fact of Communist aggression, doubtless inspired by Russia and China, justified taking unilateral action in Formosa and in the interests of security and postponing the recognition of Communist China till after a settlement of the Korean issue.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand the Korean War had two aspects for India (a) aggression had been committed by North Korea and it had to be resisted; (b) the Korean war had the explosive possibility of becoming a large scale world war and somehow that had to be prevented.<sup>2</sup> So the approaches of the two were quite distinct from each other. India was not ready to accept the United States view that Red China was an aggressor in the Korean War. Mr. B.N. Rau, the representative of India to the United Nations warned while speaking in the Political Committee at Lake Success on January 20, 1951, that the branding of Red China as aggressor would not add to the credit of the U.N. and instead of solving any problems

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1. Radio Address by President Truman, September 1, 1950 on the "Aims and Objectives" of resisting aggression in Korea. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1950, pp.9-12.
  2. Nehru's Press Conferences 1950, pp.104-114 and Press Conferences 1953, p.26.

would only make them insoluble.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, the differences between India and the United States arose over the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty. India refused to participate in the San Francisco Conference held in September 1951, for the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty<sup>2</sup>, though she was invited by the United States. One of the reasons was that the treaty was being signed without the participation of Communist China, which should take part in any settlement of Far Eastern affairs and the other was that there was no provision in the treaty to restore Formosa to China. These reasons were given by the Government of India in its communication of August 23, 1951.<sup>3</sup> India's view was that the Japanese Peace Treaty on the lines suggested by the United States was likely to increase tensions in the Far East<sup>4</sup>, as it was aimed against Communist countries.

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1. The Hindu, 22 January 1951.

2. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1951, pp. 611-625.

3. Ibid., 606-608. Also see, D.D.B., 3 September 1951, p.386.

4. Debate in the Indian Parliament, Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, vol. XXII, 3(1951), pp.619-620. For details see Parliamentary Debates, vol. 14, pt. II No. 17(27 August 1951), cols. 1357-1361.

The United States' reaction to the Indian note was sharp. Whether the Indian note was based on sympathy with the Communist bloc or not, its effect was the same, i.e., on the Japanese Peace Treaty India's views happened to coincide with those of Soviet Russia<sup>1</sup> and Communist China. In its reply<sup>2</sup> to the Indian note on August 25, 1951, the United States sharply hinted that the United States was not going to hand over Formosa to Communist China. Instead the U.S. desire was to build up Japan as an ally against the risks of Communist aggression in the Far East.<sup>3</sup> According to a comment the Indian note was "flatly rejected" by the United States "with signs of irritations that were unusual in its diplomatic exchanges with non Stalinist countries."<sup>4</sup> The United States was neither ready to recognize Communist China nor to recognize Communist Chinese sovereignty over Formosa too.

In fact, whatever might have been the merits and demerits of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the United States

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1. For the Soviet note on the Japanese Peace Treaty, see the Soviet note of May 7, 1951 delivered to the American Ambassador, A. Kirk, in Moscow, People's China, vol.III,2 (June 1, 1951, Supplement), and the Soviet note of June 10, 1951, (D:S:BN;23-July-1951; pp. 138-143.
  2. Ibid., September 3, 1951, pp.387-388.
  3. Foreign Policy Bullentin, vol. XXX, 36 (New York, June 22, 1951); and Ibid., May 4, 1951.
  4. United States in World Affairs 1951, p. 192.

was very much displeased by the stand taken by India. Even the United States press commented as such: "Nehru is fast becoming one of the great disappointments of the post war era ... What has gone wrong?"<sup>1</sup> Indian public opinion also "believed America to be actually seeking war."<sup>2</sup>

India could have more diplomatically dealt with this Treaty while refusing to sign it. She could have avoided launching such a big public attack on the Treaty and made safe the interest of her neutral position. The open controversy led to a lot of bad-feeling between the two countries.<sup>3</sup> Once again India failed to make up the mind of Americans to recognize Communist China.

Another point was that the United States thought of the Chinese revolution not as a relatively natural Asian development, which it was, but as a Moscow-directed plot, which must be frustrated in order to preserve the world balance of power. The United States' vested interest was,

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1. New York Times, August 28, 1951.
  2. Chester Bowles, Ambassadors Report, p.30. The new U.S. Ambassador, Chester Bowles arrived in India in October 1951 and found himself unable to realise "how badly the relations between the two countries had deteriorated". Ibid., p.3.
  3. J.C. Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954, op.cit., p. 146.

the identification of the Western position in these areas - Middle East and South East Asia - with resistance to Communist aggression. As the main protagonist of the policy of "containment of Communism", the United States had become interested in the maintenance of Western power in Asia just at the moment when other Western countries were evolving in the opposite direction. It might be said that the United States policy was to be based upon the assumption of inevitable hostility between a Communist China dominated by the Soviet Union on the one hand and a Pacific island chain, including Japan, dominated by the United States on the other. That was the reason for the Americans' thinking that the Communist government in China had given them little ground for revising this assumption and that its intervention in Korea and the treatment meted out by it to countries like Britain, which were quick to recognize the new regime, had not been such as to give promise of civilized relationships. So it did not recognize the People's Republic of China.<sup>1</sup>

India did not agree with this United States thesis. To Nehru an armed conflict between the major Asian powers at the very moment of Asia's liberation from Western dominance would be the ultimate tragedy. On October 24, 1949, Nehru

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1. Kenneth Yonger, "Western Policy in Asia", Pacific Affairs, vol. 26, No.2, June 1952, Richmond, Va, Institute of Pacific Relations, pp. 119-125.

had made his diagnosis clear. "Asia the mother of continents and the cradle of history's major civilizations is renaissance today. The dawn of its newly acquired freedom is turbulent because during these past two centuries its growth was arrested, frustration was wide spread and new forces essentially nationalist were seeking political freedom; but behind them was the vital urge for bettering the economic condition of the masses of the people. Where nationalism was thwarted there was conflict as there is conflict today where it is being thwarted, for example in South East Asia. The troubles and discontents of this part of the world and indeed of the greater part of Asia are the result of obstructed freedom and dire poverty. The remedy is to accelerate the advent of freedom and to remove them".<sup>1</sup> It was on 18 February 1953 that Nehru said in the Indian Parliament: "The whole of Asia is very wide awake, resurgent, active and somewhat rebellious."<sup>2</sup> And the set up of Communist China, the defeat of Nationalists signified the post war Asian resurgence and thus it was to be recognised. According to Indians, the United States' refusal to recognise the Communist government had always been contributing to the numerous difficulties confronting

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1. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 127.

2. Parliamentary Debates, vol. I, pt. II, No. 6 (18 February 1953), col. 455.



negotiators in the Far East ever since the Chinese intervened in the Korea war. On February 17, 1953 Nehru blamed<sup>1</sup> much of the trouble in the Far East on the "non-recognition of the reality that is China" and the acceptance of a "small island off the coast, as representing China". His contention was that "this fact is the crux of the situation that has developed in the Far East. The non-recognition of realities naturally leads to artificial policies and programmes and that is exactly what is happening."

The Indian press also went far in criticizing American policy of non-recognition as "one of the most tragic and costly major mistakes made by the democracies in recent years".<sup>2</sup> The National Herald characterized it<sup>3</sup> as "a first class blunder in history". A number of newspapers blamed the United States for being so intransigent as to leave China no alternative but to seek the close friendship of Moscow. The Tribune, in the fall of 1951, lamented that so few Americans grasped "the obvious fact" about Nehru's China policy, which was "not designed to strengthen Communist imperialism but to weaken it by demonstrating to the people of China that their friends are to be found not among the

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1. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-53, p. 238.

2. The Times of India, August 20, 1952.

3. The National Herald, August 23, 1952.

Communist States alone but everywhere."<sup>1</sup>

Even before the Chinese entry into the Korean war .  
an Indian columnist, J.K. Banerji, summed up the American  
point of view as follows:<sup>2</sup> "The essence of the Far Eastern  
problem is the challenge of New China to the claim of the  
United States that the entire Pacific ocean stretching  
right up to the shores of China is the security zone of the  
United States." But the Indians wondered as to why should  
the United States be afraid of China, China after all had no  
fleet of longrange bombers, unlike now in 1969 when it has -  
or a navy which could pose any serious threat to the United  
States. On the other hand, India did not lack columnists who  
called attention to the other side of the coin:

"In the event of a war with the West, the  
Chinese will neither be easily destroyed  
nor forced into submission. This fact  
may carry no weight with those in the  
U.S.A. who believe not only in bargaining  
from strength but also in a show of strength,  
but people with reason throughout the world  
shudder at the thought of its possible  
consequences."<sup>3</sup>

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1. The Tribune, October 30, 1951.

2. The Hindustan Standard, December 24, 1950.

3. The Statesman, February 5, 1955.

"Vedette" made this observation after a trip to China  
where he found "a grim strain in the Chinese character ...  
no exhibitionism but an essential part of the collective  
national mind... a determination to resist armed attack."

The United States policy toward Communist China was hardened after the coming of Republicans in the White House in 1953. The Indians were alarmed by it. Addressing a joint session of the Parliament, President Dr. Rajendra Prasad pointed out that we recognized only the Peking government and held that their claim to Formosa was completely justified. He went on to say that it was clear to his country (India) that American support to the Nationalists, who were not even sure of the loyalty of the people of Formosa, had kept the regime in being and encouraged it to play the role of a Government in exile.<sup>1</sup> When the Republicans came to power in America they actually urged Nationalists to fortify the shore islands like the Tachens, and use them as bases for raiding the mainland. This policy of "unleashing" Chiang's troops was now being changed, but it had been done in such a way as to alarm the People's Government of China and give them the impression that a large scale war against China was being contemplated.

How had the Americans done this? They had done it by signing a Mutual Security Treaty in December 1954 with Chiang which not only gave him liberal help but permitted America to maintain air and naval bases in Formosa. Further,

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1. The Hindu, February 22, 1955.

in order to assist in the evacuation of the Tachen Island, the Americans brought in large naval and air forces off the Chinese coast. Indian's assumption was that "the result of these moves has created the impression in China that a massive attack on the mainland is being planned. The consequence has been that China has now embarked on universal conscription and is in process of raising new armies of many millions".<sup>1</sup> The Indian suggestion was that if the Nationalists evacuated Quemoy and Matsu and the Americans withdrew their naval forces from that area, the situation might be restored. But it was not clear to what extent the Americans would or would not support the Nationalists if the Communists drive them out of Quemoy and Matsu. And in Indian view this American policy of "keeping them guessing" was highly dangerous because if in the fighting off these unimportant islands, an American warship were to be hit by Communist Bombs, the result might be a major war which nobody wanted. So this was an explosive situation which was to be avoided.

The United States was becoming day by day militant as far as its policy towards the Asian countries was concerned. India was strongly opposed to this. Instead of accepting

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1. Ibid., Criticized editorially.

the decisions of the Geneva Conference (1954), the United States Secretary of State Dulles organized the S.E.A.D.O. by which a group of countries led by America put forward a Monroe Doctrine for the protection of South East Asia against Communism. Nehru's comment was:

"I say one of the biggest factors towards ensuring Security in South East Asia and in the Far East is the recognition of China by these countries and China coming into the United Nations. There would be far greater assurance of security that way than through this South East Asia Treaty Organization and the rest."<sup>1</sup>

PANCH SHEELA AND AFTER:

Following the Bandung Conference, (18-24 April 1955) China proved it self to be Asian first and Communist next as it accepted the principle of Coexistence. In turn Nehru became much impressed and supported the irredentist claims of Communist China to offshore islands and Formosa. On 31 March 1955 Nehru said, "So far as we are concerned, obviously we can have only one broad approach to this problem which flows from the recognition of the People's Government of China. Nobody, of course, says that there is separate State like Formosa because Formosa claims to be China just as China claims Formosa to be part. But there

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 91.

has been a general, wide agreement of one obvious fact, and that is that the Islands of Matsu and Quemoy, which are four or five miles off the mainland are definitely part of the mainland, and an enemy force there is a constant irritation and constant danger ... Yet the occupation of Quemoy and Matsu by other forces continues".<sup>1</sup> Nehru went on his way supporting Communist China, even after Indian territorial integrity had been violated by Communist China by constructing the Sinkiang-Gartok road through Ladakh. On 7 September 1958, Nehru said at his monthly press conference:

"No country could tolerate an island 12 miles from its shores being used as a base for attack on it. India, therefore, felt that the off-shore islands immediately, and later Formosa too, should belong to the People's Republic of China." "But, this", he added, "must happen peacefully".<sup>2</sup>

India always tried to bridge the Sino-American differences and pleaded for U.S.-Chinese accord. During his visit to the United States of America and Canada in December 1956, Nehru urged for the end of the Trade Ban, and brought the issue of the recognition of China into the light while speaking at Ottawa on 23 December 1956.

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 2, pt. II, No.30 (31 March 1955), col. 3894.

2. The Statesman, Calcutta, September 8, 1958.

He said<sup>1</sup> that while practically the rest of the world had accepted, the fact of the People's Government of China, it was largely "the U.S.A. and some other countries who have not approved of the idea, I imagine because of unfortunate occurrences, like the Korean War ... Whether you like it or not China has gone through a major revolution and you cannot measure a revolution by the normal yard stick". Nehru was still hopeful that though there existed a wide gulf between the United States of America and China and also a great deal of hostility. But with a certain twist in circumstances, it would probably become much less and fade/away".

But the United States remained adamant in its attitude towards Communist China. In a personal letter of 7 July 1956, to Chiang Kai-Shek, President Eisenhower affirmed his stand that "International Communism alters its tactics from time to time, but we have as yet no evidence of any change in its objectives. The American people and Government realize this. Likewise, let there be no misapprehension about our own steadfastness in continuing to support the Republic of China."<sup>2</sup> The United States was not going to recognize Communist China.

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1. The Hindustan Times, 24 December 1956.

2. The New York Times, 8 July 1956.

(B) THE ISSUE OF THE SEATING OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS:

The approaches of the two entirely differ on this issue from each other. Ever since, the overthrow of the Nationalist Government by the Communists in China, India has been advocating for the seating of Communist China in the United Nations while the United States has been opposing the same as she has not recognised Communist China though it has been in existence for the last twenty years. Both the countries have often clashed on this issue in the United Nations.

It was at the time of the formation of the United Nations in 1945 that China (then under the control of nationalists) was made a permanent member of the Security Council because of American pressure or tactics.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps, then the United States thought that one day China would become a powerful Centre in Asia and thus the United States of America would have a strong and faithful ally in the Far East supporting its policies in the United Nations. But this did not happen and the Chinese Communists have become instead the major Asian Power.

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1. See p.



THE GROUNDS GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF ITS  
POLICY:

First and foremost reasoning in the United States has been that Communist China should not be a member of the United Nations because the Nationalist Government retained its legal status despite the de facto control of the mainland by the Communists. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs made it clear on July 30, 1954: "The United Nations is not an organisation of de facto governments",<sup>1</sup> so it was not liable for the membership of the United Nations.

Secondly, they argued that by the charter the membership was supposed to be limited to the "peace loving" nations who were "able and willing to discharge their duties under the Charter". That was strengthened further more by the provision that any nation against which enforcement action was taken should be liable to suspension from membership in the United Nations. Thus the United Nations was not set up "to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you get in and not that being in would make you good."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the United States, basing itself on the principles of the Charter, took the position that the

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1. D.L.B., vol. XXXI (791), August 23, 1954, p. 262.

2. Ibid., vol. XXXI (786), July 19, 1954, p. 87.

Communist regime was disqualified by its consistent record of opposition to the principles of the United Nations. "It is relevant to recall that the Chinese Communist regime became an aggressor in the latter part of 1950. Its armies invaded Korea and waged war against the United Nations Command. They contributed largely to the killing, wounding, or losing in action of about 500,000 soldiers of the United Nations Command, including over 100,000 Americans", remarked Secretary of State Dulles at New York on March 29, 1954.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, later, he gave record of the Chinese Communist regime at the Geneva Conference that it continuously denounced the United Nations. It had been the subject of enforcement action recommended by the United Nations. In South East Asia it promoted aggression. "All of these facts combine to make a case such that we do not believe that the requisite vote can be found to admit the Communist regime to represent China in the United Nations."<sup>2</sup> Thus clearly in his opinion the Chinese Communist regime was not qualified to be seated in the United Nations. In the United States opinion, "The position which Communist China represents, if it were accepted", would mean the death of the principles of collective security

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1. P.S.B., vol. XXX (772), April 12, 1954, pp. 540-541.

2. Ibid., vol. XXXI (786), July 19, 1954, p. 87.

and of the United Nations itself.<sup>1</sup> How could an aggressor be admitted to the United Nations? Americans took the Chinese aggression on Indian territory in October 1962 as an additional proof in support of their policy.

The third ground on which the United States opposes the Chinese Communist admission to the United Nations is their conviction that there is no need of Communist China's entry in the United Nations as the Nationalist China is the member of the United Nations. They refuse to recognise Communist China for the same because "recognition of Peiping by the United States would inevitably lead to the seating of Peiping in that body"<sup>2</sup> and this entry would symbolize the existence of two Chinas, which the United States is not ready to bear.<sup>3</sup>

They support the Republic of China in the United Nations because in their view it is a Charter member in good standing of the United Nations and its representatives there have contributed importantly to the constructive work of that

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1. Ibid., p.88

2. Ibid., vol. XXXIX (1002), September 8, 1958, p.387.

3. Ibid., vol. XLV (1174), December 26, 1961, pp. 1057-1058.

organisation. If the representatives of the Chinese regime were to be seated in their place and given China's Veto in the Security Council, "The ability of that body in the future to discharge the responsibility it has under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security would be seriously impaired."<sup>1</sup>

There have been other considerations also. Most important of them seems to be the Communist hostility towards the United States of America. Speaking on December 4, 1958 at California, Secretary Dulles remarked as such:

"The Chinese Communist regime is bitterly hostile to the United States. It is dedicated to expelling all our influence from the Western Pacific. It is determined to take over the free peoples and resources of the area. It violates all established principles of international law and of civilized conduct."

In his view its recognition and seating in the United Nations would so increase their prestige and influence in the Far East, and so hearten our allies there, that the Communist subversive efforts would almost surely succeed.<sup>2</sup>

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1. D.S.R., vol. XXXIX (1002), September 8, 1958, pp.387-88. Also see statement by Adlai Stevenson in the General Assembly on October 22, 1962, ibid., November 19, 1962 pp. 786-791.

2. Ibid., vol. XXXIX (1017), December 22, 1958, p.992.

Against this the Americans support the Government of the Republic of China because it controls the strategic island of Taiwan and through its possession of a sizable military force -one of the largest on the side of the free world in Asia-presents a significant deterrent to renewed Chinese Communist aggression. So the recognition by the United Nations and the United States of Communist China would seriously cripple, if not destroy altogether, that Government.

To the proposal that if Red China was admitted, the United States should pull out, Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary Congressional Relations, commented<sup>1</sup> that to do so would be a complete and unjustified surrender to the Soviet Union - a surrender as abject and as unwarranted as any the men in the Kremlin could dream up. If we should quit in a pet and sulk on the side lines because we lost a decision, the Communists would be handed, without cost or sacrifice to themselves, a golden chance to achieve a dominant position in the United Nations and to make it a creature of Soviet Union. He went on to say, "I am convinced that it is to the interest of the United States and to the interest of the anti-Communist nations to resist - as we have - the entry of Red China into the United Nations.

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1. DSSB., vol. XXXI (788), August 2, 1954, p.158.

And ... that we should stay in and fight the Communist purpose inside the United Nations as hard and with the same firm purpose that we are fighting it on the outside."

To the question why the United States did not apply the same policy to the Soviet Union, Dulles replied, "The fact is that the Soviet Union has not been found by the United Nations to be an aggressor. There is nothing comparable in that respect as far as the record of the Soviet Union is concerned."<sup>1</sup>

It is sometimes argued that the Chinese Communist regime does not have to meet the Charter tests because the Republic of China is already a member and the so called People's Republic of China inherits the rights in this respect of the Republic of China. "The fact is that", said Dulles<sup>2</sup> at New York on September 25, 1958, "the membership of the United Nations had a choice of whether or not to bring into its midst and to give veto power on the Security Council to a regime which has flagrantly defied the United Nations; ... which is the test for expulsion." In the United States eyes it was a substantive and not a procedural matter to determine whether or not "the Communist regime shall be seated."<sup>3</sup>

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1. D.S.B., vol. XXXI (786), July 19, 1954, p. 89.

2. Ibid., XXXIX (1007), October 13, 1958, p. 564.

3. Ibid., XXXI (786), July 19, 1954, p.88.

Lastly, in the United States view the main author of the exclusion of Communist China from the United Nations has been Communist China itself, with its continued addiction to violence at home and abroad. The leaders in Peiping had damaged their own case even more by explicitly demanding that the United Nations acknowledge their so called "right" to conquer the 11 million people on Formosa.<sup>1</sup>

INDIA'S STAND:

Unlike the United States India recognized Communist China while rejecting United States plea that Formosa was the legitimate government of China. In her view Communist China's was a legal entity which controlled the whole of China and played an important role in the world politics. Therefore, India holds to the present day that it should be recognized by those nations who have not recognized it untill now. In accordance with its desire to bring China into the world community and promote the cause of world peace, India advocated admitting the representatives of

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1. D.S.B., vol. XLVI (1183), February 26, 1962, p.320. For detailed account - why the General Assembly has repeatedly rejected the Peiping regime's claim to take over the United Nations seat of the Republic China and why the United States has been opposing the same, see the statements made by Stevenson, United States Representative to the General Assembly on December 1, 1962 and on December 14, 1962, Ibid., January 15, 1962 pp. 108-117.

Communist China to the United Nations. The People's Republic was, first of all, the only government which could deliver the goods so far as mainland China was concerned, India's delegate to the United Nations, Benegal N. Rau, made the Indian view clear in September 1950 while speaking before the General Assembly.

"Why did we recognize this new Government of China? For a variety of reasons, the main reason being that, according to the best of our knowledge and information, it is sound and stable government ... As I have mentioned in my draft resolution, and as is well known, the Republic of China is a Member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council and as such that Republic has a number of obligations laid upon it by the Charter of the United Nations. Who is to fulfil them? A State can not fulfil obligation except through some government, and obviously only a government exercising effective control over the territory and the people of the Republic of China can fulfil the obligations laid upon the Republic of China ... But how can we require the fulfilment of these obligations and yet deny that government its rights under the Charter, one of which is the right to be represented in the United Nations? To deny rights and, in same breath, to insist on obligations is clearly illogical and inconsistent."<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, India thought that a solution to the problems of Asian countries would be facilitated by peaceful

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Meeting

1. U.N. General Assembly (5th Session), Official Records, Plenary, vol. 1 (New York: Author, 1951), p. 9.



negotiations with the new Communist regime of China provided China's entry into the Councils of the World was accepted. It was clear from the speech of Prime Minister Nehru to the Parliament in September 1954, when he said: it "amazed him how this straightforward question" of recognizing China's credentials had been twisted around and made the cause of infinite trouble. There would be "no settlement in the Far East or South-East Asia", he continued, "till this major fact of People's Government of China is recognized" and it was allowed to come into the United Nations. There was a far greater assurance of security that way than through SEATO, "because if China came into the picture, she would assume certain responsibilities in the United Nations."<sup>1</sup> Actually Nehru was amazed to see that the United Nations which was sponsored for the purpose of world peace and security could not do anything for the membership of Communist China. Previously on February 18, 1953, he had said in an address to the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) that "the principle of universality with which the United Nations started has been departed from. A great country like China is not given recognition at the United Nations...

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 7, pt. II, 29th September 1954, col. 3690.

The failure of the United Nations to give recognition to a country which is obviously stable and strong has given rise to fresh problems of a universal character."<sup>1</sup>

During the Korean war (1950-1953) this issue was not given much attention but as soon as the war ended, the dominant tone of the Indian press was that there was no longer any excuse for delay in resolving the question of Peking's representation in the United Nations. The Hindu commented:<sup>2</sup>

"The future of Indochina and the stability of Southeast Asia depend on securing the good will of the Chinese. It is more than ever necessary that the international position of the Chinese Government should be recognized and that it should be associated with the efforts to bring about a lessening of world tension."

In an editorial, the Statesman insisted that "Chinese admission to the United Nations, to some a right and to others an impertinent, is to the judicious one of the points bargained for."<sup>3</sup> Thus, even Indian press supported the stand taken by India.

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 169.
  2. The Hindu, August 10, 1953 (Weekly Review).
  3. The Statesman, August 8, 1953. Under the caption "Tumult and shouting".

The third ground on which India advocated Peking's representation in the United Nations was that it would strengthen the ties of friendship between India and Communist China, which would have a salutary effect upon the international situation in Asia. This view was made explicit by B.N. Rau while speaking at the United Nations:

"India has historical and almost immemorial ties of culture and friendship with China. For us, situated as we are and where we are the friendship of China is desirable and natural. We wish to do every thing possible to promote the friendly relations that now prevail between us, because we feel that a free and independent China marching with India will be the most effective stabilizing factor in Asia."<sup>1</sup>

INDIA-U.S. REACTIONS:

It was because of these divergent views that the two countries had clashed time and again. As far as the Korean war was concerned Nehru said:<sup>2</sup> "I am convinced in my mind that there would have been no Korean war if the People's Government of China had been in the United Nations, it is only guesswork - because people could have dealt with China across the table." In his letter to Dean Acheson on

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1. U.N. General Assembly (5th Session), Official Records: Plenary Meetings, vol. 1, op.cit., p. 10.
  2. Lok Sabha Debates: vol. 7, pt. II (29th September 1954), col. 3689.

July 19, 1950, he made it clear that our proposal for breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council, so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take their seat in the Council and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can return to it, was designed to fulfil the policy of peace in the United Nations and not to weaken it. He went on to say, "It was made on its merits and also in the hope that it would create a suitable atmosphere for the peaceful solution of the Korean problem. I do not think that the admission of China now would be an encouragement of aggression."<sup>1</sup> But United States was not willing to discuss this issue, "it is highly inappropriate for the Security Council to concern itself with this question at this time", said Austin, United States Representative to the Security Council in his statement<sup>2</sup> on 1st August, 1950. He was strongly opposed to any action of the Council which might leave the impression that the question of the termination of the aggression from North Korea could be contingent in any way upon the determination of the question of Chinese representation. Moreover, he declared:

"The fact of aggression cannot be obscured by unrelated issue;;; Consideration of the

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1. M.I.B., vol. XXIII (578), July 31, 1950, p. 171.

2. Ibid., 14 August 1950, pp. 245-246.

Chinese representation issue in any relationship whatever to Korea would divert and distract from the great collective effort of the United Nations."<sup>1</sup>

Nehru objected in 1953, speaking<sup>2</sup> in the Parliament that though the United Nations was founded on the principle of Universality. But it did not accept People's Republic of China's membership. Was it not a break from the fundamentals of the U.N. Charter? India also believed that if Chinese Communists were seated in the United Nations they would have become more responsible and better facing the nations of the world. The United States thought otherwise. In their view the argument that the Communist Chinese regime would be "reformed" if it were in the United Nations was wrong. "The U.N. is not a reformatory", said Dulles on 25th September 1958.<sup>3</sup> With regard to the conception of universality of the U.N.O., Dulles commented that there

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1. On August 2, 1954, Henry Cabot Lodge, the U.S. Representative to the U.N. reiterated: "To admit Chinese Communists before there is a peace in Korea is an insult to the entire principle of collective security which we in the United Nations are sworn to uphold as well as being an affront to the memory of our dead. It would be a proof that we did not mean what we said when we solemnly declared our hatred of aggression." Ibid., vol. XXXI (791), August 23, 1954, p.280.

2. See Parliamentary Debates, vol. 1, pt. II, No. 6 ( 18 Feb., 1953), cols. 488-489.

3. J.S.L., vol. XXXIX (1007), October 13, 1958, p. 564.

was debate at San Francisco as to whether the United Nations should be a universal institution or whether its membership should be selective. The choice was in favour of selectivity.<sup>1</sup>

To the Indians, the Chinese were fellow Asians first and Communists afterwards while to the Americans they were primarily Communists. Since the Bandung Conference in April 1955, the Indians started to have an impression that Communist China was being rapidly drawn in to the orbit of Asian powers and to that extent identified less with a Communist bloc dominated by the Soviet Union. The Statesmen, for instance took note of China's pledge "to the ideals of the United Nations" which was embodied

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1. Ibid., In the same speech he quoted an extract in support of his stand, from the report of Secretary of State Acheson to President Truman on the results of the San Francisco Conference which created the U.N. "It was pointed out by a number of delegations and particularly by the delegation of the Soviet Union, that it would be unfortunate to have a member persistently violating the principles of the Charter while continuing to remain a member of the Organisation, such a member would be like a cancerous growth and ought not, it was thought, to be associated in any way with the organisation. In the end this view prevailed at the Conference ..." (Report to the President on the results of the San Francisco Conference, June 26, 1945, Department of State Publication 23497, p.49). Then he said: "Since then we have had some practical experience. Communist nations which became members - and which cannot be expelled because of the Veto - have not in fact been reformed. They have used force in Korea and Hungary and have consistently rebuffed the efforts of the U.N. to put peace and order upon a stable basis. If the Chinese Communist regime were brought into the U.N., it would have shot its way in." L.I.B., op.cit.

by inference in the final communique issued from Bandung. That Communique, said the newspaper, made Chou-En-lai "a party to suggestions that the U.N.'s organisation should be used in various beneficial ways and that the U.N. Charter should be upheld."<sup>1</sup> In Indian eyes, China had strengthened her claim to a seat in the international organisation by identifying herself with these sentiments. India did not like, Secretary of State, Dulles' suggestions for the acceptance of two Chinas in the United Nations. The Hindu, in November 1953, commented that "Mr. Dulles' suggestions that Peking may represent China in the General Assembly, while Formosa (with the veto) will speak for the Chinese in the Security Council seems most improper and unhelpful."<sup>2</sup> The American evaluation of Formosa was understood in India to be crucial to the whole situation. The Statesman's presupposition, which has not proved to be in existence, was that it seemed "pretty plain, if a violent solution of the Formosan problem can be avoided, recognition of the Peking regime as China's true representative in the U.N. will not be very far off."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Editorial, "Bandung Balance Sheet", The Statesman, April 30, 1955.
  2. The Hindu, November 10, 1953 (Weekly Review).
  3. The Statesman, April 30, 1955.

Prior to 1955, The Statesmen did not consider the entry of China into the circle of U.N. members so urgent as to justify overhasty action. Noting that Peking's "bellicose association has not subsided", the newspaper deemed it proper that "representation should wait upon China's disassociation from aggression against the Republic of South Korea and its sponsor and protector, the United Nations".<sup>1</sup> It was by early 1955, that even the Statesmen had come to be critical of continued exclusion of Red China from the world body.

At the time when the issue of the American airmen, imprisoned in China<sup>2</sup>, came before the United Nations, most Indians believed that the Chinese Government had a case which at least merited a hearing in New York before the U.N. arrived at a decision in the matter. It was an occasion for the articulation of suspicions in Asia that the United Nations was being too patently converted into an instrument of United States policy. The United Asia concluded that it was "abundantly clear ... (that) the charges are on the whole legitimate". It continued:

"Asian opinion has by and large accepted the Chinese version. The U.N. arbitration

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1. Ibid., October 4, 1953.

2. 13 American airmen were imprisoned by Communist China as spies in May 1954.



move indicated beyond question the growth of a dangerous bias in the U.N. organization, directed primarily against the Chinese Government. For how can the U.N., by its own recent conventions, have any concern in so domestic a matter as the imprisonment of spies? And if it must, why was no more taken against the racial policies of South Africa, which by any standards are a greater sin against international etiquette than the mere imprisonment of spies cloaked in uniform."<sup>1</sup>

What did the Indian Government do? It supported the visit of Secretary General Hamarskjold to China so that an amicable settlement of the dispute might be reached. The hope of the Indian press was that it might mark the beginning of normalization of relations with China. The Hindu commented that the incident might have been "a measure of retaliation to the recent pact between the United States and Marshal Chaiing Kai-shek".<sup>2</sup> And the same newspaper later on, declared<sup>3</sup> that Peking's action was "obviously related to other Far Eastern problems such as the armistice in Korea, admission to the United Nations and the presence of the United States land and naval forces in the Pacific."

As a result of the American airmen's imprisonment by Communist China, the Eisenhower Administration's attitude

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1. Editorial in United Asia, December 1954, p.263.

2. The Hindu, December 18, 1954.

3. Ibid., January 17, 1955.

became very hard. In July 1954, President Eisenhower declared that United States of America was "unalterably" opposed to China joining the United Nations.<sup>1</sup> Even the debate on the issue of recognition of Peking regime had been barred in the Congress of the United States<sup>2</sup> and Senator Knowland urged for a China blockade.<sup>3</sup>

Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the U.S. representative to the United Nations was reported to have said on March 18, 1954 at the United Nations, New York, that if necessary he would not "shrink" from using the veto to prevent the seating of Communist China in the United Nations Security Council.<sup>4</sup>

Nehru's view point was quite different from that of America. "It is not", he said, "a question of the admission of China to the United Nations. China is one of the founder members of the United Nations. It is merely a question of who represents China... It is really a question of credentials as to who represents China."<sup>5</sup> He

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1. The Statesman, July 7, 1954.
  2. The Times of India, 22 November 1954.
  3. The New York Times, 28 November 1954.
  4. Ibid., 9 March 1954.
  5. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.91.  
He was speaking in the Lok Sabha on 29th September 1954.

added that if China was given a seat in the United Nations it would assume certain responsibilities in the United Nations and would abide by the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations. "Sometimes the United Nations passes resolutions giving certain directions to the People's Government of China. The response from China is: "You do not recognise us; we are not in the United Nations; how can we recognize your directions?" This is an understandable response. Instead of adding to the responsibility and laying down ways of cooperation you thus shut the door of cooperation and add to the irresponsible behaviour of nations in this way, and call it security. The result inevitably is that the influence of the United Nations lessens. I do not want it to lessen, because it is one of our biggest hopes of peace in the world."<sup>1</sup>

Dulles' policy of entangling alliances against the Communist countries was not a solution as far as the problem of world peace was concerned. World peace cannot be brought about by threats or by having military alliances. Nehru believed that the two major protagonists were too powerful to be dismissed one by the other, then "you have to co-exist", understand and deal with each other in a

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 91-92.

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restrained way. In case co-existence is rejected, the alternative would be war and mutual destruction.<sup>1</sup> He held that in the interests of World peace it was imperative that Communist China should be recognized inside and outside the United Nations by all countries of the world.

Communist China's claim for its seat in the Security Council was supported by India and others even in an eleven-nation non-official Conference<sup>2</sup>, held at New Delhi between 6 and 10 April, 1955, in which China also participated. The Conference adopted, a number of resolutions demanding inter alia the immediate lifting of the embargo on trade with China, seating Communist China in the Security Council and its recognition by all countries.<sup>3</sup>

During and after the Bandung Conference (18-24 April 1955), in which twenty nine nations of Asia and Africa participated, Chou-en-lai played his cards with superb skill and declared<sup>4</sup> that he had come "to seek unity, not to quarrel", that China, although a Communist country, had no desire to publicise its ideology and that all that it sought for was normal

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1. Ibid., p. 93.

2. The Hindustan Times, 7 April 1955.

3. Ibid., 11 April 1955.

4. Documents on International Affairs 1955, pp.409-412, Also see pp. 420-425.

relations with all Asian and African countries, "particularly her own neighbours on strict adherence to the principles of co-existence agreed upon between India and China". Thus Chou En-lai expressed what Nehru wanted, the friendship and mutual relations between Asian countries. The United States' charges of imperialist and aggressive motives against Communist China seemed to Nehru merely suspicious and distrustful.

India continued with her efforts to seat Peking in the Security Council. "I do not think" Nehru said to the Lok Sabha on March 20, 1956, "that so long as the Chinese People's Republic is not admitted to the United Nations, the situation in East Asia will return to normal."<sup>1</sup> In fact, it looked as though the seating of Communist China in the Security Council had become one of the major objectives of Indian foreign policy. In spite of the fact that Communist China had violated Indian territorial integrity by constructing the Sinkiang-Gartok road through Ladakha in 1958, Nehru's sympathies for Peking remained unshaken.

The United States continued to strengthen its ties with Chiang while India put forward a resolution in the United Nations for the admission of China on 15 September 1957.

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. II, pt. II, No.27 (20 March 1956), col. 3046.

Jall said India proposed as a "matter of urgency and importance" that an item entitled "the representation of China in the United Nations" be included in the agenda of the new session.<sup>1</sup> Even the Pakistani Press went ahead criticizing the American stand:

"The U.S. stand on this issue is not only unethical and in violation of the rules of International Law governing the recognition of governments and states, but it is conducive to the increase of international tension and bitterness."<sup>2</sup>

India opposed the suggestion of some countries to bring the China-Tibet question to the United Nations on the ground that there was "no legal stand open", because "China is not a member of the United Nations nor is Tibet, the question should not be brought to the United Nations."<sup>3</sup>

The countries of the world expressed their hopes with the coming of the Kennedy Administration in 1961, that it would take a new look into the China problem. In February 1961 Lord Casey, Australia's Minister of External Affairs from 1951 to 1960, said: "It is becoming more and more difficult to justify keeping Red China in quarantine".<sup>4</sup> Britain's

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1. The Hindu, 19 September 1957.

2. Editorial, "China's U.N. Seat", Pakistan Times, 18 September 1957.

3. Said Mr. Desai while speaking at a press conference sponsored by the Council of World Affairs. The Hindustan Times, 16 October 1959.

4. The New York Times, February 21, 1961.

Lord Home early that year, as Foreign Secretary accepting the United States allegations that China had been unconciliatory and publicly asserted its belief in war, said that "All that is true, but the facts of international life require that communist China should be seated in the United Nations."<sup>1</sup>

It was amazing that even growing pressure of World public opinion could not make the United States accept the membership of Communist China to the United Nations. Only one change seemed that after fighting a delaying action for years, the United States was forced in 1961 to accept debate on the Chinese representation issue - where before the discussion had been on the procedural point of whether the issue itself should be debated. Since the issue began to be openly debated in the U.N. General Assembly in 1961, India, Britain and others have consistently voted for the accreditation of Peking's representatives.<sup>2</sup> In an address before the American Association for the United Nations, United Nations Secretary-General U. Thant expressed his opinion and observed that : "Today the influence of Peking on World affairs is unmistakable and if I may say so, I wonder if it would be wise, or even possible, indefinitely to ignore China, especially when dealing with problems affecting peace and security of the World."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1961.

2. America's Foreign Policy, edited by Harold Karan Jacobson, Random House, New York, 1965, p.523.

3. The New York Times, November 12, 1963.

(C) SINO-INDIA BORDER DISPUTE:

It was Chinese aggression on Indian territory in October 1962, that brought India and the United States very close to understand each other's problems. Though non-aligned, India accepted the military aid extended by the United States of America under Kennedy Administration. For India it was in self-interest and self-defence to take military aid from where ever quarter of the world it came, and on the other hand, the United States willingly provided military and material aid as a part of its global strategy to maintain balance of power in Asia against Communists.

BACKGROUND:

Although, India has always been doing its best to be friendly and cooperative with the Government of Communist China, Communist China did not prove to be a sincere friend. In January 23, 1959, Chou-En-Lai, in a letter<sup>1</sup> to Nehru, for the first time, questioned the established boundary between India and China. He contended that the "Sino-Indian boundary had never been delimited" and that the so-called "McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China" and therefore,

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1. Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged and agreements signed between the Governments of India and China - 1954-59, White Paper I, Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, pp. 52-54.



an "illegal line". Even then, no specific territorial claims were made. The claim to 50,000 square miles of Indian territory was put forward by Chou En-lai only on September 8, 1959.<sup>1</sup> It was significant and amazing that the Government of India had made earlier public declarations affirming the established boundaries of India, and China had not questioned the declarations. China could have raised the question, if it had any doubts about the boundary. But it did not do so. India was hurt and grieved because this boundary dispute was an entirely new and deliberate attempt on the part of China to give an unfriendly twist to the long history of peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries. Ever since the time, India became independent and Communist China came into existence, the relations between the two countries remained extremely cordial apart from a few differences e.g., on Tibet. Unrealistically, India never thought that China would behave in such a manner. What was the reaction in India to the rise of a warlike and militaristic China? In any event, China was a neighbour with a common border of 2500 miles and China, helped in the earlier years by Soviet Russia, was militarily strong. For India the choice was either to embark on a

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1. Ibid., White Paper No. II (September-November 1959), pp. 22-33.

huge defence budget in order to defend its Northern frontiers deliberately postponing hopes of raising the standards of living of its people, or, to concentrate on alleviating the grinding poverty of its people through a bold programme of industrial and agricultural advance through planned development, hoping at the same time to keep the Chinese neighbour satisfied by a policy of friendship. In the early years after independence, India chose the latter alternative.<sup>1</sup>

Previously, the Government of China, concealed their territorial claims, even when the two countries negotiated and signed the 1954 Agreement on Tibet.<sup>2</sup> Though it was concluded to settle all outstanding issues and to consolidate the friendly relations between the two countries, the preamble to this Agreement indicated the wider purposes of the treaty. The Five principles of peaceful co-existence were embodied in it for the first time.<sup>3</sup> One of the five principles was "mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty", which clearly implied that the borders of each party to the treaty were known to the other. Had China believed that there was a territorial dispute of

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1. E.K. Acharya, India and China - A Brief Survey, Information Service of India, 1965, pp.2-4.

2. White Paper I (1954-1959), op.cit., pp.98-101.

3. See India's Answer to Chinese Aggression, Publications Division, 1962, p.2.

any size about the entire Sino-Indian boundary, was it not the time to raise the question when the two countries were solemnly pledging the "territorial integrity" of each other?

Prime Minister Nehru expressed himself, what he felt, before the Lok Sabha on November 25, 1959: "It is a strange turn of circumstances that we in India who stood for peace and worked for it with all our might should suddenly be drawn into this dangerous situation and be faced with the possibility even of war. I do not think war will come."<sup>1</sup>

In October 1954, when Nehru visited China, he mentioned to the Chinese leaders that he had seen some maps published in China which showed a wrong boundary between the two countries and added that he was not worried about it, because the boundaries of India were quite clear and not a matter of argument. The Chinese Prime Minister replied that "these were really reproductions of pre-liberation maps, and the People's Government "had no time to revise them".<sup>2</sup> "The Government of India recognised the force of this argument" and did not pursue the matter further.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 359. Nehru's doubt became true when China attacked India on 20 October 1962.

2. White Paper I (1954-59), op.cit., p. 49.

3. Ibid., p. 46.

Again in 1956, when Chou En-lai visited India, Nehru referred to the wrong Chinese maps, especially in relation to the Eastern Sector. Chou En-lai said that he had accepted the MC Mahon Line as the border between China and Burma, and he would accept this border with India also.<sup>1</sup> On 21st August 1958, the Government of India drew the attention of the Chinese authorities to a map published in an official Chinese magazine<sup>2</sup>, which included in Chinese territory four of the five Divisions of India's North-East Frontier Agency, some areas in Uttar Pradesh in the Middle Sector and large areas in Ladakh. It was pointed out that as the People's Government had been in power for nearly nine years, corrections in Chinese maps should not be delayed any longer.<sup>3</sup>

Chou En-lai wrote<sup>4</sup> to Nehru admitting "It was true that the border question was not raised in 1954 when negotiations were being held between Chinese and Indian sides for the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet region of China and India. This was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement."<sup>5</sup> This can be cited

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1. Ministry of External Affairs, India-China Conflict, New Delhi, 1964, p.3.

2. The China Pictorial.

3. White Paper I (1954-59), op.cit., p.46

4. See the reply of Chou En-lai on January 22, 1959, op.cit., Ibid., pp.52-54.

5. Ibid., p. 53.

as one of the amazing admissions of dissimulation in modern history. Now did time become 'ripe' in 1959 for the dispute to be raised. The reason would have been that by that time China had obtained effective control of Tibet, having put down the popular rebellion there, and the Chinese army was well-entrenched across the borders of India. Therefore, China raised the question only when she was in a position to subject the issue to the arbitrament of arms. This was clearly contrary to the spirit of good neighbourliness and Afro-Asian solidarity.

In 1957, China built a road across the Aksai Chin area of India. Not only China waited to put forward her claim until she became strong in Tibet, but also until she had, through clandestine incursions into remote areas, occupied parts of Indian territory. The Chinese detained an Indian patrol in this area in the summer of 1958 and in reply to a protest they referred to their "frontier guards" having detained the Indian patrol because they were in Chinese territory. In addition to these incursions, in July 1959, Chinese armed forces came to Khurnak Fort in Ladakh, and arrested an Indian patrol party in Aksai Chin and made other incursions across Indian territory. They further penetrated into Ladakh in October 1959 and opened fire on an Indian patrol near the Kongka Pass, killing nine Indians.

Ten other members of the party were taken into custody and meted out inhuman treatment. China had thus by 1959 already begun to resort to force and to raise tension in the border areas.<sup>1</sup>

The Government of India was not in favour of drastic steps, but took the gravest view of the situation. Nehru gave an assurance that past mistakes would not be repeated and that India could no longer take chances with her borders in the north and north-west. Should the necessity arise, he added, India would not hesitate to talk in the language which the Chinese seemed to understand - that of force - in defence of her territorial integrity.<sup>2</sup> Nehru said in the Lok Sabha on 28 August 1959, "While I do not wish to take alarmist view of the situation, we shall naturally be prepared for any eventuality and without fuss or shouting keep vigilant."<sup>3</sup>

Not only India was worried about the situation created by China, but there was strong criticism in the world press of Chinese action in the Indian borderland. The entire non-Communist press in East, South-East and West Asia voiced sympathy for India and condemned Chinese aggressiveness.

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1. India China Conflict, op.cit., pp. 4-5.

2. Hindustan Times, October 29, 1959, 1:2.

3. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 33, No. 19, 28 August 1959, cols. 4796-4801 and 4862-70.

The Western Europe, America and Yugoslavia, all went the same way. Mr. Khrushchev, was also embarrassed and irritated by the Chinese behaviour towards India as the Chinese policy was doing harm to the cause of Communism in Asia. The Soviet Premier declared that the Soviet Union would be happy "if there were no more incidents and if the existing frontier disputes were settled by way of friendly negotiations."<sup>1</sup> He mentioned it in a major policy speech to the Supreme Soviet. The Prime Ministers of the two countries met in April 1960 in view of the deteriorating relations between India and China. Nehru was unable to do much because of the mounting tide of public opinion against any sort of negotiations. Their talks merely confirmed the serious differences in regard to the understanding of even basic facts about the border. However, the two Prime Ministers agreed that officials of the two Governments should meet and examine the relevant documents. Accordingly during the latter half of 1960 the teams of officials held three meetings in Peking, Delhi and Rangoon, spread over three sessions respectively.

The so called "forward policy" was formed in 1961 because Nehru was eager to devise some via-media and take

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1. Hindustan Times, October 31, 1959, and : November 2, 10, 6

action sort of conflict, in order to assuage public opinion. The purpose of this policy was to establish some symbolic posts both in Ladakh and in NEFA. Perhaps, Nehru framed it under pressure from the opposition parties.<sup>1</sup> By the end of the year India established about fifty posts along the border.

Following this China became more and more aggressive. Early in 1962, Chinese troops stepped up their forward patrolling in the Western Sector. In July 1962, Chinese troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwan Valley. On July 26, 1962, the Government of India wrote to the Chinese Government that, as soon as the current tension had ceased, India was prepared to enter into discussions on the basis of the Officials' Report. While votes on preliminary discussions to ease the tension were being exchanged, the Chinese troops, suddenly on September 8, 1962, marched across the well-established and, till then, peaceful boundary in the Eastern Sector, viz., the McMahon Line. Then came October 20, 1962, which is marked by massive attack by China in both the Western and Eastern Sectors of the border, overwhelming the limited Indian frontier posts. The Chinese armies - still described by China as "frontier guards", though they were

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1. See Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul, The Untold Story, (New Delhi, 1967), p. 281.



operating more than a hundred miles beyond the area where they were in 1958 - marched well inside Indian territory, and then, on October 24, Premier Chou En-lai put forward his three point proposals for ceasefire and disengagement.<sup>1</sup> India did not accept these proposals as these amounted to dictating terms to India, and meant that China will keep what they have taken by force, and negotiate with India in regard to the rest of their territorial claims. By accepting them India would have not remained consistent with her national dignity. Therefore, the simple and straight forward counter proposal was made by India, which was that the status quo on the border, as on September 9, 1962, should be restored, and thereafter the two countries should enter into discussions. But Chinese answered by further massive attacks deeper into Indian territory. Then, dramatically, on November 21, they announced their unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal declaration. Accordingly, the Chinese forces withdrew 20 k.m. behind the McMahon Line, which they called "the 1959 line of actual control" in the Eastern Sector, and also 20 k.m. behind their latest aggression in Ladakh,

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1. For details, see Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Notes, Memoranda and letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, October 1962 - January 1963, White Paper No. VIII, p.1.

which they further identified with the so called "1959 line of actual control" in the Western Sector. This left the Chinese in illegal possession of 14,500 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh, including the fruits of their latest aggression in this Sector. India declined to accept these unilateral terms of the aggressor, but stated that she will not interfere with the ceasefire. At the same time, India asked for restoration of status quo ante of 8 September 1962 in all sectors of the boundary as a condition precedent to a mutually-agreed cease-fire. A stalemate ensued as the Chinese rejected this Indian proposal.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile other non-aligned countries had become extremely worried and in order to break the stalemate and to provide a basis for agreed cease-fire arrangements, the representatives of six pro-Asian countries, (Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, U.A.R. and Ghana), at the call of Mrs. Bandarnaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, met at Colombo between 10th and 12th December 1962 and made certain proposals<sup>2</sup>, for ceasefire and resumption of negotiations which became known as Colombo proposals. The essence of the proposals were: (a) that in the East, the Chinese must

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1. India China Conflict, pp. 6-7.

2. For Text of the Proposals See Ibid., pp. 17-18.

withdraw to the McMahon Line and the Indian forces must be allowed to re-occupy their positions right up to that line, (b) in the West also, the Chinese must withdraw 20 kilo meters and the area vacated by withdrawals were to be regarded as de-militarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides until a negotiated settlement of the border. India accepted these proposals in toto. But China while announcing acceptance of the proposals "in principle"; flatly refused to retire from its military positions in the West.<sup>1</sup> Marshal Chen Yi, the Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China, told a correspondent of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation on February 17, 1963, that "the Colombo Proposals are neither a command, nor an arbitration decision. The Chinese Government is not obliged to accept them in toto". Marshal Chen Yi also said: "The Colombo proposals contain contradictions and fallacies in logic."<sup>2</sup>

In a note dated 3 April 1963, India suggested various constructive steps to resolve the problem including international arbitration.<sup>3</sup> After six months, in a note on 9 October 1963 the Chinese rejected the suggestions and accused India of having proposed these steps "to make negotiations impossible

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1. B.K. Acharya, India and China - A Brief Survey, op.cit., p. 13.
  2. Quoted in India-China Conflict, op.cit., p.10.
  3. White Paper No. IX January 1963-July 1963, no. 34-35.

by setting up an array of obstacles".<sup>1</sup> The same note also indicated that China was not interested in the discussions on the basis of the Colombo proposals and categorically refused to submit the dispute either to the International Court of Justice or International arbitration. On 16 October 1963, The Government of India sent a further note expressing the hope that eventually "wiser counsels would prevail and the Chinese Government would revert to the paths of peace."<sup>2</sup> The rejection by China of the various proposals resulted in a long stalemate which continues up to date and the Chinese, still occupy militarily 15,000 sq. miles of Indian territory in Ladakh in the West, while they have retired upto the McMahon Line in the East only.

CHINESE AGGRESSION ON INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES POLICY:

The vital interests of the United States and Communist China clashed when India was attacked by China in 1962. India's interest was in accepting military and material help from wherever it came. The United States extended military aid<sup>3</sup> and India accepted it without aligning herself with the Western bloc. At that time Pakistan and Communist China

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1. White Paper No. X, July 1963-January 1964, pp.8-11.

2. Ibid., p. 18.

3. Department of State statement on November 17, 1962, "U.S. Extends Military Aid to India," D.S.B., vol. XLVII, No. 1223, December 3, 1962, pp. 937-938.

went ahead criticising the acceptance of the United States Military aid by India and the Indian policy of non-alignment.

In spite of the fact that India had gone out of her way to befriend China and had defended and spoken for Chinese rights, in season and out and also that, in courting China we had risked the displeasure of the West but love turned into hate as China had been guilty of bad faith and treacherous conduct. The question arises then why did China suddenly launch an unprovoked, treacherous, massive attack on Indian territory? The nature and the weight of this attack made it clear that it was made only after long and careful planning. By now it has become evident that the reason why Communist China committed aggression against India was that it wanted to secure positions on India's natural frontiers so that it might make India completely vulnerable. In its eyes, India is the only remaining democracy of Asia, and China feels that if India could be humbled and humiliated, it would be easy for her to subjugate the rest of the continent. So the threat from China is not momentary aberration. But it is a planned strategy to impose Communist ideology on unwilling people.<sup>1</sup>

After 1957, the United States became a major factor

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1. Louis Fischer: Russia, America and the World, Bombay 1962, p.155. This was the view of Ashok Mehta, leader of the Socialist Party of India, and a partisan of Nehru's Foreign Policy of non-alignment as quoted by Louis Fisher.

in the rift between India and China because at a time when Communist China adopted a policy of intensifying the struggle against the United States, India moved toward a better understanding with the United States. A gradual change had come over both United States and Indian policies. Prime Minister Nehru realized that the era of rigid polarization in the world was coming to an end; the United States Government was also moving away from Secretary Dulles' view of neutralism as immoral. Though this change was seen already in the last year of the Eisenhower administration, it became marked only after the inauguration of President Kennedy. India was hopeful of the United States following a more liberal policy toward the underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa.<sup>1</sup>

Chinese could not bear this and also the high personal regard, shown during P.M. Nehru's visit to the United States and his first meeting with President Kennedy in November 1961. At the official welcoming ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base, Kennedy linked Nehru with Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Gandhi and described him as "a leader whose example caused not just his own country but all the peoples of the world

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1. Policies toward China View from Six Continents, Edited by L.M. Halpern, 1965, p.209.

to look up to him."<sup>1</sup> Nehru also spoke of Kennedy that he carried "perhaps the greatest responsibility in this world", and added, "so we look up to you and to your country and seek to learn from you",<sup>2</sup> and also that Kennedy stood for peace.

But these mutual tributes did not symbolize in any way the shift from their basic stand points in regard to foreign policy. India remained nonaligned and the United States continued to lead a military and political grouping designed to oppose the spread of Communism. Instead there was greater appreciation of each other's point of view and less annoyance at the differences existing between them.

Against this Peking fell foul of the growing friendship between India and the United States from 1958 onwards, New Delhi and Peking headed in opposite directions. On the one hand the Chinese had concluded that their national interests were not served by a two power-Soviet-American-detente, while on the other Indians felt that they stood to gain by such a development. Peking's interests lay in heightening the tension; New Delhi continued to believe that its interests were better served by a lessening of the tensions.

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1. The Statesman, 8 November 1961.

2. The New York Times, November 7, 1961.

India's nonalignment was an attempt in the direction of better relations with both the United States and the U.S.S.R., a simultaneous approach toward the leaders of the two blocs rather than hostility toward the two blocs or one of the two blocs. But the relations of Communist China with both the United States and the U.S.S.R. deteriorated on the political and ideological levels.

China attacked India, because India's friendship with the United States was evidence of her betrayal to the imperialist camp. The heart of the matter was that this friendship clashed with Peking's pursuit of its own national goals. The Chinese leaders wanted to create a militant, anti-United States front and became sworn enemies of those who tried to cultivate close friendly relations with the United States and soften the struggle. India became suspect because it did not go along with these Chinese plans.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with its plans China also pressed the Soviet Union to heighten the tension and not to flinch from a head-on confrontation with the United States. The Chinese were gravely disturbed by the Soviet attempts at a

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1. Policies toward China: view from six continents,  
Edited by A.M. Halpern, op.cit., p.210.



rapprochement with the United States designed to eliminate or at least to reduce the chances of a world war. The Chinese advocated a "tit for tat" struggle no matter what the consequences. China's firm belief was that only a policy of struggle and not negotiations and accommodation, would help achieve Chinese goals - big power status, a seat in the Security Council, recovery of Taiwan, etc. Though China left no stone unturned to change the course of Soviet Foreign Policy, Premier Khrushchev refused to follow the China way and fulfil the Chinese demands.

India did not fit into the picture which China had drawn. The picture was an "anti-imperialist front" of Afro-Asian countries and such Latin American and Communist-bloc nations as were prepared to go along with it under its leadership and which would function as an independent force in world affairs, independent of as well as hostile to both Washington and Moscow. As India was non-aligned and friendly to both the United States and the U.S.S.R., the non-aligned world appeared hamstrung in Peking's eyes, by India's masterly inactivity. In September 1961 the meeting of the non-aligned nations at Belgrade seemed to provide a fair indication.

The real crisis in India's foreign policy started

with the massive Chinese attack on India during September - November 1962. A full scale war was not regarded as a serious possibility, nor was India prepared for it militarily. It shocked and shook the nation as nothing else had done before. The reason was that neither the government nor its critics had any precise idea of the strength and combat readiness of the Chinese forces on the border. The subsequent Chinese attack demonstrated how faulty our intelligence was and still more vividly how wrong the Government's political assumptions were.<sup>1</sup>

Aware of all these factors and interested in its own world strategy, the United States came atonce to the rescue of India and extended massive military aid against the Chinese aggression. Though India remained non-aligned, the United States did not press India to accept the membership of the Western bloc. India sought military assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and other countries to meet the threat of renewed Chinese aggression which ruled out a policy of isolation.

Communist China has been the great rival of the United States in the Far East as well as in the South-East Asia and to deter it was the major policy objective of the

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1. For the literature on this subject see, Nayar, Kuldip, Between the Lines, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1969, Chapter V, pp.131-215; Kaul, Lt. Gen. B.M., The Untold Story, Chapters IV and V, pp.175-470; Nanporia, N.J., The Sino-Indian Dispute, Bombay, 1963, and Nankekar, D.R., The Guilty Men of 1962, Bombay 1968.

United States. Chinese aggression on Indian territory was the time when the United States could do something so as to influence India and to subjugate Communists.

Previously also the American Military Aid pact with Pakistan in 1954 was to strengthen Pakistan against the spread of Communism, though, obviously Pakistan was interested in its defence against India rather than Communist countries. At that time President Eisenhower offered<sup>1</sup> American military aid to India also but Nehru dismissed<sup>2</sup> the American offer because of India's policy of non-alignment with either of the two blocs. This offer might have increased tension in Asia rather than establishing peace and security. India was against any military pacts then how could she accept the American offer.

As far as the India China border dispute was concerned, the United States had been sympathising with India and offering military assistance. Eisenhower had backed Nehru's China policy and condemned the use of force by China against the borders of India.<sup>3</sup>

Walter Lippmann, the noted American columnist, described

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1. D.S.B., vol. 30 (768), March 15, 1954, pp.400-401.

2. Parliamentary Debates, 1954, vol. I, pt. II, No.12, col. 970.

3. The Times of India, December 3, 1959.

China as the most dangerously expanding power. The highest problem, he said, was to contain China not only on the Indian border but also in other parts of Asia.<sup>1</sup> But Prime Minister Nehru's stand was that "under present circumstances India is not to seek United States aid to resist Chinese aggression".<sup>2</sup> The fact was that India could not anticipate that China would attack India<sup>3</sup> and she would have to accept the United States military aid.

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1. The Hindustan Times, 15th November 1959. Lippmann was answering questions at a reception held under the auspices of the Press Guild of India, Bombay.
  2. The Delhi Hindusthan Standard 13 December 1959.
  3. In an interview with the noted Journalist Taya Zinkin after the Chinese aggression in Ladakh, Nehru said earnestly about China: "They let me down, they deceived me. I had no idea that they would do something which really was not in their own interests. We have been their strongest advocates in Asia, and also at the United Nations. But of course they do not want to be represented at the United Nations, so perhaps we are not so useful to them." Zinkin, Taya, Reporting India, London, 1962, pp.217-18. It was the general feeling that he believed blindly in the slogan Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai. It was not the case. A politician of the status of Nehru, was not so ignorant about this. When Taya Zinkin asked him in 1954, 'Did he really believe that China had no territorial ambitions and believed in coexistence?' He replied, "I do not think that they are ready for expansion. You must remember that they have a lot of work to do in China proper. But in say twenty years' time, when they are strong and modern, then the picture will be quite different and they will probably be a menace'. He went on to say, 'we are far ahead of them in economic terms, in communications and all that, but the thing that worries me is that their rate of progress will be greater than ours.' Ibid., pp. 208-209. Actually Nehru was busy with the economic development of the nation and did not pay much attention to the military-make-up of India.

The State Department of the United States made a detailed study of India's border problem during 1959-60. Its stand was that it trusted India's legal position which is clear from the fact that, while speaking before a news conference on November 12, 1959, the Secretary of State Herter said: "We naturally presume that the claims made by the Indians are entirely valid claims".<sup>1</sup> It was not before the first week of February 1960 that India made a request to the United States for the purchase of Defence stores. The request was conveyed by the Indian Ambassador, M.C. Chagla, to U.S. Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter.

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1. Documents on American Foreign Relations 1959, p.460. "Secretary Herter on November 13 called in the Indian Charge'd'Affairs', D.N. Chatterjee, to clarify any possible misconception regarding the statements he made at his news conference on November 12, concerning the India-China border situation.

"The Secretary made it clear to Mr. Chatterjee that his statements were not meant to imply any condonement by the United States Government of the use of force by the Chinese Communists. In fact, the Chinese Communist actions in this respect are a reflection of the brutal disregard of normal international procedures which have characterised Red Chinese actions for the past decade. They have not hesitated to use aggressive, armed action, including the killing of Indian policemen, in an apparent attempt to establish a de facto position of strength in relation to India. Their actions are wholly abhorrent to the U.S. Government.

"The Secretary also made it clear to Mr. Chatterjee that the United States strongly sympathizes with India's attempts to resolve the present issues with Communist China peacefully." D.S.B., vol. 41 (November 30, 1959), p. 786.

The Administration's assumption was that not only the United States but Russia too would be on Indian side if China extended her aggression.<sup>1</sup>

Senator Kennedy said on May 5, 1960, while speaking before the Economic Growth Committee that American help should be designed to enable India "overtake the challenge of Communist China". He emphasized that India followed a route in keeping with human dignity and individual freedom.<sup>2</sup> Senator Kennedy's view about the border dispute was<sup>3</sup> that "the real battle is not the recent flare-up over Chinese troop movements around disputed boundaries. Nor is it the war of words over China's annihilation of Tibet. The real India-China struggle is equally fierce but less obvious". He had gone deep into the matter and said that it is the struggle between India and China for the economic and political leadership of the East for the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is better", and added that "we want India to win that race with Red China. We want India to be a free and thriving leader of a free and thriving Asia."

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1. Times of India, Delhi, 13 February 1960.

2. The Indian Express, 10 November 1960

3. The Statesman, 12 December 1960.

Thus it is clear that the United States was willing to help India against China.

In January 1961, President Kennedy took the charge of White House and sent Harriman's Mission to New Delhi in March 1961 to know views of Nehru on World problems. John F. Kennedy was a great friend of India and it was during his administration that the Chinese aggression took place in 1962. On the Sino-Indian dispute, Harriman said<sup>1</sup>, "We have made it clear that we are absolutely opposed to the Chinese aggression against India. The Indian officials team has submitted its report and we will study the report and after the completion of our study we will have a clearer view of the situation. The people and the Government of the United States are appalled by the Chinese aggression in Tibet and gravely concerned about the aggressive attitude of the Chinese towards the Republic of India."

In India, Harriman made a very good impression. One of the press comments was "... Mr. Harriman's visit should be regarded in both countries as the beginning of a new chapter in Indo-U.S. relationship in the common quest for peace."<sup>2</sup>

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1. The Hindu, 19 March 1961.

2. The Indian Express, (New Delhi), 21 March 1961, Editorial, "Indo-U.S. Relations".

During his visit to the United States in November 1961 Nehru said that the crisis in Sino-Indian relations could not be resolved till the Chinese vacated the fairly large territory of India which they at the moment occupied. In course of time, he thought, the Chinese revolution would "tone down".<sup>1</sup> but it did not happen. One of the factors, emerged as a result of the Nehru-Kennedy talks, was the realization of India's special position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Americans began to realize that "while world Communism is the objective of the Soviet Union, in the immediate future, the Soviet Union is interested in seeking India build up as a counter-poise to China."<sup>2</sup>

Nehru's point was appreciated in the United States that "Obviously we are not Communists. We do not want a Communist Country in India." Furthermore questioned about his Government's attitude towards the Indian Communist party, he said the Government followed a policy of giving every party a relatively free hand, Civil liberties and the like, "Unless they over step certain limits. Then

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1. The Statesman, 7 November 1961.

2. Ibid., 8 November 1961.



we take action against it whether they are Communists or others."<sup>1</sup> Actually the Americans became confident that India would not go the Communist way and thus they started taking more interest in India and its dispute with Communist China. When asked about the raising up of the question of boundary dispute in the United Nations Nehru said India did not propose to raise the question at the United Nations even if China were admitted to that organization. "I think we prefer to deal with the Chinese Government ourselves."<sup>2</sup>

The noted newspaper, Hindustan Times reported that the United States became so much interested in India that it was ready to provide military equipment at low cost in defence of India against China, if a request was received.<sup>3</sup> And India was assured of the United States support in case of Peking attack on her territory.<sup>4</sup>

Henry Kissinger, Special Assistant to President Kennedy on International Affairs, made it clear during his visit to India in January 1962 that his firm conviction was that

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1. The Hindustan Times, 15 November 1961.

2. Ibid., 12 November 1961.

3. Ibid., 7 December 1961.

4. Times of India, 7 December 1961.

the United States would support India against an invasion from Communist China, because "There would be disaster for the whole world, if we permit Communist China to destroy India."<sup>1</sup> Questioned why his country had not given arms aid to India for vacating Chinese aggression, he said U.S. Military aid was only for use in a general war and not for border disputes. However, he agreed that China not only posed a threat to India, but also to many Western countries, including the United States.<sup>2</sup>

On the question why the United States remained comparatively silent on Ladakh, the U.S. Ambassador in India, Prof. Galbraith, speaking on Indo-U.S. relations at Constitution Club, said that in fact in 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet and Chinese hostility became more manifest, the U.S. Administration had sought the advice of two former ambassadors, Chester Bowles and J.S. Cooper. They had urged "a policy of reticence" as proclamations of United States' support would make the Chinese think that the Cold War had spread to the subcontinent and that the

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1. The Hindustan Times, 7 January 1962.

2. Ibid., 10 January 1962. Later, the U.S. State Department issued a statement as calling Kissinger's views "personal". The Statesman, January 12, 1962. His belief was that Pakistan would not align with China against India. (But it was in 1963 that both countries were aligned). The Hindu, 16 January 1962.

United States was involved with India against them. He went far to say that as a result of this suspicion of Great Power involvement, settlement would be made more difficult all round.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the fact that India had been supporting Communist China on two issues against the United States stand, seat in the United Nations and its recognition by the United States and other countries, the United States Department of State made a statement<sup>2</sup> on November 17, 1962 by which military aid to India was extended and on November 20 President Kennedy issued his statement<sup>3</sup> in this connection.

Harriman, after his 10 day mission to India and Pakistan, told President Kennedy that the conflict between India and Communist China over their 2,400-mile common border would be long and hard and that the United States would have to make major decisions on the degree and nature of military aid to be given to India. Meanwhile the United States would continue the emergency arms aid shipments that started a month ago.<sup>4</sup>

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1. The Hindustan Times, 9 August 1962.
  2. Full Text in D.S.B., vol. XLVII (1223), December 3, 1962, pp. 837-838.
  3. Full Text in Ibid., 10 December 1962, pp. 874.
  4. The New York Times, 4 December 1962.

The American press commented bitterly: "The Chinese Communist attack was complicated and intensified American involvement in India." And also that

"Communist China's objectives are more than territorial. The Chinese also aim at political and economic disruption in India, the erosion of India's special position in the Himalayan border States and an undercutting of India's ties and prestige elsewhere in Asia."<sup>1</sup>

The appearance on the world scene of a dynamic China with an expansionist policy was one of the most important post war world-developments Chester Bowles called it. He said that if China were to attempt to advance into the fertile valleys of South-East Asia, a direct conflict in between China and the Western world would most likely be the result; therefore, 'a counter-balance must be created.' His view was that if India and Pakistan could find an acceptable agreement on Kashmir, the defence against Communist China, he said, would be "a lot easier if those two countries would pull together."<sup>2</sup> Instead Pakistan was among the bitter critics of the United States military

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1. Ibid., 4 April 1963. Editorial "Mr. Bowles to Delhi".

2. The Hindu, 2 May 1963.

aid to India. Its argument was that India would use this military equipment against Pakistan that was why she accepted this military aid, although she had opposed United States military pact with Pakistan in 1954. Pakistan did not realize the emergency in India caused by Chinese aggression.

Discussing Chinese aims, in the invasion of India, President Radhakrishnan, during his visit to the United States, said, "It is not merely a question of imposing military defeat on us, of defeating us on the battle field, but of disrupting our way of life and making people feel that Communist China makes more rapid progress, that democracy is slow and cumbersome."<sup>1</sup> The Hindu<sup>2</sup> wrote editorially, "The Chinese threat to India is a threat to the whole democratic world and the United States, as the world's mightiest democracy, has a special responsibility to stand shoulder to shoulder with India, the world's largest democracy, in facing this challenge."

This is the fact that as a result of the Chinese aggression and the United States military assistance to India, Indo-American relations improved a lot and were very cordial. But India's policy of non-alignment became

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1. The Hindustan Times, 7 June 1963.

2. The Hindu, 7 June 1963. Editorial "The Presidents Agree."

the issue of the attack from various countries and leaders inside India itself. The Christian Science Monitor's Staff correspondent wrote: "It is this 'Chinese presence' which has forced the new Indian-U.S. Relationship. India will henceforth remain 'unaligned' de jure but she has been forcibly aligned, 'defacto' with the West."<sup>1</sup> But actually India was not aligned with the West, India and the United States shared a mutual defensive concern to thwart the designs of Chinese aggression against the Indian subcontinent.

The prevailing mood in India was best reflected by the editor of the Indian Express, who wrote:

"War teaches a country many valuable lessons. One of the useful lessons which Chinese aggression has highlighted is to demonstrate to the Indian people who their real friends and foes are ... To pretend that our policy of non-alignment has not received a jolt by recent events and developments is to continue to live in what the Prime Minister rightly labelled as an "artificial atmosphere of our own creation"... Let the Prime Minister, therefore, give a lead to the country by implementing his own advice that the massive invasion of India by China should make us realise that we were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world."<sup>2</sup>

In one of his own statements Nehru had himself

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1. The Christian Science Monitor, 7 May 1963.
  2. Indian Express, November 1, 1962.

confessed that the invasion "has brought us, made us realise, that we were, shall I say, getting out of touch with realities in the modern world. We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation and we have shocked out of it, all of us, whether it is the Government or the people."<sup>1</sup>

There was another comment from a columnist of the Indian Express, D.R. Mankekar:

"At this stage, it is pointless to blame any particular person or pass the buck. Indeed, who can cast the first stone? For the opposition parties must accept their share of the blame inasmuch as it was they who had goaded the Government into premature action on the northern frontier when it was a fairly well known fact that we were militarily not yet prepared for fruitful action on that border ...

"Yet another, a Dullesian, truth brought home to us in that in this world sharply divided between the Communist and non-Communist blocs, there is no room for neutrals - not when the chips are down.

"With the enemy now fighting right insided our territory, there is no time to lose. We must make up the deficiency in our weapons here and now, and from whatever source possible. When the threat to our freedom is right on our soil it is dangerous quibbling to insist that we shall not incur any country's obligation by accepting military aid and that we would go it alone however difficult the task of repulsing the aggression might be."<sup>2</sup>

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1. Address to State Information Ministers' Conference, New Delhi, October 25, 1962. India, External Affairs, (Ministry of-), Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression, External Publications Division, New Delhi, p.20.
  2. Indian Express, November 1, 1962.

The United States military assistance to India was an unwritten alliance which proved very useful as far as India's defence against China was concerned. The United States Government's initial handling of the crisis on the Himalayan frontiers showed great political skill and diplomatic dexterity and left a deep impression in India. The United States is not interested in whether India is aligned with it or not because the increasing bitterness of the Sino-Soviet dispute and Moscow's open denunciation of the Chinese attack on India knocked the bottom out of the proposition that there could be no neutrality in this sharply divided world.

The United States military aid also affected the Indo-Pakistan relations with regard to Kashmir. Pakistan tried to counter balance the situation created by this aid by putting pressure on the United States so as to make India to solve the Kashmir problem. Certainly the United States got success in initiating direct negotiations between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. Unfortunately, the ministerial talks between the two countries, held during December 1962 and May 1963, failed and no agreement could be reached for the settlement of the problem of Kashmir.<sup>1</sup> After that Pakistan moved towards

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1. For details see Chapter IV, pp.



Communist China for its help and friendship against India and thus giving lesson to the United States.

Communist China has continued border violations. The border agreement between Pakistan and Communist China in 1963 and their open warring of each other have hardened opinion in India and earlier suspicions that Pakistan had never intended to fight Communism as such. Pakistan did so so as to threaten both the United States and India that Communist China may help Pakistan. During Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, the United States stopped assistance to both India and Pakistan and Pakistan used military equipment against India which it got from the United States to deter Communist expansion. Pakistan also blamed India of using the United States military hardware. But the United States did not question Pakistan even about the use of its military weapons by Pakistan against India.

The principal objective of China in respect of India was not only the territorial aggrandisement, obviously there was some strategic advantage gained by China by occupying large areas in Ladakh and by establishing itself deep inside Indian territory. The principal objectives of China, of which the United States was aware, were:

1. To demonstrate to Asia and the world that China was the only power to reckon within Asia and correspondingly

to demolish or weaken India's influence, prestige and economy;

2. To show that the policies of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment followed by India were unsound and transitory and thus to prove the falsity of Khrushchev's thesis regarding the importance of non-aligned countries and finally,

3. To topple Nehru's Government and eventually to establish in India one or more subservient or satellite states. But it was because of the assistance of the United States that the invasion remained only a partial success in so far as it demonstrated to India and other South-East Asian countries that China was a big military power and failed in its aims either of disrupting the Government of India or denigrating the policy of non-alignment. Its refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 5 August 1963, which was signed by 107 Nations of the world weakened its international position still further.

Since the invasion of 1962, China has manifested its global ambitions more clearly. Militarily it continues to threaten India, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Laos, Vietnam and indirectly Malaysia. Ideologically, it competes with Soviet Union. Diplomatically, it flirts, with different degrees of intimacy with Pakistan, Cambodia, Indonesia and

various other countries in Asia, Africa Europe and America. Its final world strategy is to confront the United States of America in Asia and Africa and foment subversion and its own brand of "revolution".

The United States will have to face China without time limit for times to come. The possibility of a peaceful settlement of the border problem has been obstructed by China. Even China is threatening the lives of Indian diplomats and continues to build up its military strength on Indian border. China now has become one of the nuclear powers of the world and now the number is five, as it was on October 16, 1964 that China carried out its first nuclear explosion and has now recently exploded Hydrogen Bomb. By doing so she has flouted the world opinion and increased the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The declaration of Marshall Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister, after China succeeded in detonating a nuclear device in 1965, is noteworthy here: "We are fully prepared against U.S. aggression ... Let the Indian reactionaries, the British imperialists and the Japanese militarists come also with them. Let the Modern (Communist) revisionists act in co-ordination with them from the North. We will still win in the end."<sup>1</sup> In fact the main instrument in the hands of China for solving world problems in war. This is the greatest and gravest challenge to both the super powers - the United States and the Soviet Union.

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1. Peking Review, October 8, 1965. Also see Ranbir Vohra: "China's Hegemonic Ambitions not Abandoned", The Statesman (New Delhi), 26 April 1966.

### CONCLUSION

From above account and analysis of the India - United States relations on particular issues and their foreign policies in general it is obvious - the relations between the two countries have gone through a zig-zag way, sometimes very cordial and sometimes bitter. Despite the facts that the objectives of their foreign policies have been somewhat similar, differences have arisen over the way to implement them. The reason for such differences is not far to seek; the national interests of the two countries differ.

The United States is one of the two major rivals in the cold war world strategy. It is, therefore, committed to defence against Communism in Asia, Europe and elsewhere and is the leader of the Western bloc. India, on the contrary, is an underdeveloped country and is naturally interested in its economic development and in securing its borders with Pakistan and China. Asian solidarity, peace and security are of utmost importance to her. The policy of non-alignment has enabled India to play an important and independent role in international affairs and also to preserve her identity in a sharply divided world, though with a few failures. India is too big, and too proud, to submerge itself totally in a foreign-dominated alliance.

India-United States differences have been mainly on the following issues: military alliances, Kashmir, U.S. military aid Pact with Pakistan, China, Arab-Israel dispute. Now the situation in the world has recently changed beyond recognition from what it was like just after the end of the Second World War. With the changing times, values also change. Values in international politics which were valid during the last two decades have little significance today. There is a thaw in the cold war as old animosities no longer sway people to the same extent. The cold<sup>war</sup> has been frozen. Ideological rigidity on both sides has mellowed into a more sober appraisal of the realities of the world. When the world is moving away from bipolarity, Indian movement toward alignment is not generally considered a realistic course of action and the policy of non-alignment and friendship with both the United States and the Soviet Union should be considered as consistent with India's vital national interests.

Gone are the days when the United States' belief in and policy of military pacts had some meaning. In the present day world, when there is split even in the two blocs and there is better understanding between the two super powers, there is not much sense in regional arrangements for defence and security. Rather there must be cooperative

efforts for world peace and security. The United States should realize that in the past years its policy of military pacts has been denounced by India which aroused great suspicion and distrust in both the countries and added fuel to the Indo-U.S. differences. The Republican Administration in the United States also now seems to have come round the view that there is no need for a regional alliance for Asian peace and security. It is also interesting to find that the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is in favour of such an arrangement.<sup>1</sup> Alignment or non-alignment with the West is often discussed in a vacuum without reference to the situation obtaining in the world today. The advocates of alignment with the West ignore the fact that the United States is hardly eager for India's alignment, rather there is a better appreciation of the policy of non-alignment in the United States which is a sign of better understanding between the two countries. In keeping with her pragmatic approach it would be worth while for the Indian policy makers to review the policy of non-alignment because, as observed by Prof. Bimal Prasad:<sup>2</sup>

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1. U.S. Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating was reported by the Hindustan Times, 30 September 1969, to have said that "U.S. does not favour" the Brezhnev Plan for Asian security if it involved "any military pact among the Asian countries or with the Soviet Union," "and with the United States also. Rather he said: "we are in favour of economic cooperation between various Asian nations". U.S. President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers favour the same view.
  2. Ibid., 4th July 1969, "The Future of Non-alignment".

"The loosening of the military alliance system and the emergence of polycentrism in world politics are factors in favour of, and not against, non-alignment. For they mean that the non-aligned states are no longer under constant pressure to join this bloc or that, as was the case before. The problem faced by non-alignment, therefore, is not that it has ceased to be relevant, but that it has to redefine its priorities."

The United States should accept this fact that its participation in the cold war has brought its involvement in China, Korea, Pakistan, Vietnam and Middle East, which is not considered by Indians in the interest of Asia. Undoubtedly, much of the trouble in South East Asia has been created by the United States policies: of non-recognition of China, U.S. military aid to Pakistan, U.S. presence in South Vietnam, etc. This demands that the Government of the United States should abandon its commitment in Asia and Middle East. Unnecessary interference in the Asian affairs of major powers cannot be considered tolerable.

Kashmir is the major problem in Indian foreign policy. Since independence this problem has been obstructing the way of India's friendly relations with the United States and Pakistan for the last 21 years and no body knows how long Kashmir will remain a sore point between India and Pakistan on one hand/ and an

irritant to the Indo-U.S. relations on the other hand. Perhaps, it would have been solved by now if the United States attitude to this particular issue had not been pro-Pakistan. Most of the responsibility lies with the United States' policies with regard to Kashmir. It could have rather adopted a conciliatory role and thus narrowed the gulf between India and Pakistan. Instead the U.S. military pact with Pakistan gave rise to misconceptions, suspicions, misunderstandings, distrust in India making Kashmir problem more intractable.

Indians are unable to understand - how the U.S.A. - which has been the meeting place of peoples professing different faiths and of diverse racial origin can believe in the two nation theory, based purely on religion. India also is a multi-racial and multi-lingual country. The thinking in the United States has been that Kashmir should go to Pakistan because of its being a Muslim majority state. It seems an over-simplification of the problem of Kashmir and it was impossible to divide India entirely on the basis of religion. The Americans, perhaps, had no knowledge of the fact that partition was confined to the region that constituted the old British India. It had also been made clear by the British Government that the decision about partition referred only to British India and that the



decision of Indian States, if they acceded to either of the states, should be based on geographical contiguity. So in India's view the America's belief in two nation theory is quite wrong.

Why the U.S. has been reluctant to consider the right and obligations of India to defend a State which has lawfully acceded to it, while accepting the unlawful presence of Pakistan in Kashmir. The United States seems to have been lending its support to the Pakistani charge that there had been Indian aggression in Kashmir for the purpose of securing Kashmir's accession by "fraud and violence" and ignoring the cruelty and terror, arson and murder used by the tribal and other invaders in Kashmir. India thinks that, instead the United States should have supported the Indian charge of Pakistani aggression.

It is very difficult for Indians to understand why the Americans gave so much importance to the rights of the British or Turks in Cyprus and on the other hand why they have not recognised the legal rights of India in Kashmir as a constituent state of the Indian Union. The Indian Independence Act should be accepted as it is, and the Security Council has no right to abrogate, to nullify or modify it and it can be altered only by negotiation or

agreement of all the parties viz., the U.K., India and Pakistan or in accordance with its terms. The United States has appeared, obstinately, to have chosen to ignore the legal effects of the Instrument of Accession signed by the then Kashmir ruler, though the accession was made in accordance with the Indian Independence Act of 1947. This does not mention anything like such as conditional accession or the ascertainment of the will of the people before the accession can be made final.

The United States has always been supporting Pakistan's plea for plebiscite in Kashmir. But it ignores the fact that in the world of today, consisting of multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-communal and multi-racial countries, an application of the principle of self determination may lead to political chaos in Asia, Africa and other parts of the world, e.g., in the disintegration of Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Camroon, Thailand, Iran and Iraq. Then, to quote Bansal and Singh<sup>1</sup>, "The world will turn topsy turvy the moment Pakistan's invidious plea for plebiscite in Kashmir is translated into action. It will be a triumph of barbarism over civilization, of despotism over democracy, of mediaevalism over modernism,

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1. Bansal and Singh, Kashmir and other Related Matters, p. 43.

and of religious fanaticism over secularism. Pakistan may rest assured that day will never come."

But now we see a shift in the United States attitude towards the problem of Kashmir which is a bright sign and should be appreciated by the Indian Government and people. There is no hope at present that United States will any more support Pakistan's case on Kashmir in the Security Council as she had done in the past. Instead the United States officials have started to emphasize that the problem should be solved through bilateral negotiations and mutual discussions between the two parties-India and Pakistan. The United States seems to believe that Kashmir problem should be solved, so that there can be friendly relations between India and Pakistan. Then Pakistan would not like to be friendly with Communist China. But the United States ignores one important possibility that other problems may arise as Pakistan thinks otherwise.

Any way Kashmir was, has been, and will be an integral part of India. Pakistan's claims are false. The peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem can only be brought through bilateral and mutual discussions between India and Pakistan themselves. Until and unless the Kashmir problem is solved there will be no peace and security in Asia and

the United States should keep this fact in mind while taking a decision with regard to Kashmir as it involves United States interest also.

The Partition of India gave rise to the problem of Kashmir. India and Pakistan are two Asian countries and very close neighbours (related by ties of blood, language, and even religion). There must be friendship, mutual understanding and good-will between the two countries, instead of enmity, hatred and ill-will. Only then they will be able to do something for themselves and for peace and security in Asia. Otherwise, the more powerful countries would try to make the best use, for their own sake, of their mutual enmity, e.g., Communist China is trying her best to befriend Pakistan against India and one day she may grab both India and Pakistan. The only solution is that the two countries, India and Pakistan, should be on friendly terms and have peaceful relations so that they can become powerful enough to face any enemy on their borders. And certainly, "it will be our effort to work with the international community", said Dinesh Singh<sup>1</sup>, India's External Affairs Minister, "to establish new bonds of friendship and

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1. Speaking before the General Assembly, New York, on October 3, 1969. The Hindustan Times, October 4, 1969.

cooperation and strengthen the ones that exist. I offer to Pakistan the same hand of friendship. Let us work together, step by step to solve our differences, remove the barriers that prevent the people of the two countries to come together to strengthen the age-old ties. We hope we shall receive full cooperation from Pakistan in this."

As far as Indo-American relations are concerned, the U.S. military aid Pact with Pakistan has been till 1965 the most effective irritant in the way of their friendly relations. India's assumption that Pakistan had asked for American arms aid primarily for use against India and not against any of the Communist countries, i.e., the Soviet Union, was proved true and the assurances given by President Eisenhower in 1954 proved quite illusory when American supplied tanks, super-sonic planes, air-to-air missiles and other sophisticated weapons were freely used by Pakistan in its war against India in April as well as in August and September 1965. In vain did India remind the American Administration of these assurances. Many Indians could appreciate that the Americans were hardly in a position effectively to prevent the abuse of the weapons already given to Pakistan as military aid. What irritated them, however, were statements emanating from high American quarters to the effect that both India and Pakistan were

using American weapons. This was another attempt to equate India and Pakistan which annoyed the Indians. India did not use any American military aid against Pakistan. In fact, the type of military aid that was received by India, would have been of little use in the fight against Pakistan. While American military officers were given ample opportunities by India to satisfy themselves on this, Pakistan refused to offer any such facilities to them.<sup>1</sup>

It is very difficult for Indians to believe that with so many American officials - civil and military - living in Pakistan, and having so many sources of information available to them, the American Administration could really have been so ignorant of Pakistani intentions. So the Indians draw the conclusion that the U.S.A. built up and is still helping Pakistan to build up its armed strength knowing fully well that American arms were more likely to be used against India and possibly against Afghanistan than against China, or the Soviet Union. Generally Americans still believe that Pakistan is genuinely anti-Communist and potentially a reliable ally of the U.S.A. in its struggle against Communism. If it is now moving into the arms of China, it is through fear of India

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1. Chakravarty, B.N., India Speaks to America, pp.139-140.

(militarily the strongest country in South Asia), and that the United States of America lost the friendship and goodwill of Pakistan in the wake of the 1965 conflict. Americans still like to believe that once the Kashmir problem is solved Pakistan would join India in the defence of the subcontinent - a belief which Indians cannot share, in view of the clear statements to the contrary by Pakistani leaders. Indian reaction, on the otherhand, is that if the United States of America is willing to be blackmailed by Pakistan that is no doubt its own business, but the United States of America has no right to expect India to pay the price demanded by Pakistan.

Though India realizes that driving Pakistan into the arms of Communist China would not be to her interest either, but yielding to blackmail is not the way to meet this contingent threat. India is going to give neither the Kashmir Valley to Pakistan nor the Aksai Chin to China thereby making Ladakh indefensible.

In fact, it seems ironical that the United States military aid to Pakistan, which was intended to help in containing Communism, should have been used against India. It would indeed be tragic if Pakistan, a NATO ally of the

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1. For details see , Ibid., pp. 135-137.

United States of America, were to use American arms against India, in concert with Communist China.

This has been all because of the fact that India views Pakistan as an immediate and continuing threat to its security and vice-versa while to the United States, national interest has required the containment of Communism (whether in the form of Soviet or Chinese influence) in Asia. Although, now Pakistan is getting military aid both from Communist China and the Soviet Union, and there is every likelihood of American arms being once again supplied to Pakistan (may be on a limited scale and on a commercial basis) there is very little likelihood of India being pressurized to accept a solution which runs counter to her national interest. Besides, as rightly observed by Prof. Venkataramani:

"What Pakistanis failed to realise was that in the game of international politics India would ever remain a greater prize in comparison with Pakistan and that the signing of a treaty with the United States did not represent the beginning of the end of American interest in retaining Indian goodwill."<sup>1</sup>

Though, there have been differences between India and the United States over the issue of non-recognition of

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1. Venkataramani, M.A., "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and course of an uneasy partnership International studies, op.cit., p.120.



Communist China and its seat in the United Nations. It was the Chinese invasion of Indian territory that brought India closer to the United States as it extended immediate military aid to India. The United States is more concerned about India's role in Asia than about the recovery of her lost areas in Ladakh. The United States authorities favour a limited build up for mountain warfare to contain further Chinese aggression. In any way, the United States is not prepared to grant massive military assistance to put Indian military potentials on a level with that of the Chinese. It wants that India should play a central role in the anti-Communist struggle in Southeast Asia, and should adopt a more positive attitude toward United States' moves against Peking. Moreover, it seems that United States' expert opinion favours to dismiss the chances of another Chinese attack in the near future.

But now India has become militarily strong and may defend herself. It is primarily concerned with her territorial integrity and her ability to face China on her frontiers. Her role in Asia and anti-Chinese moves in Southeast Asia are of secondary importance. She is going along with her defence preparations on that assumption and whether China will attack again or not is another matter. The Indian Government should not presume that in case there is another

aggression by China, the United States would immediately come to her rescue.

As far as the India-China border dispute is concerned, it will go long. In India, there is general agreement that she must be well prepared to defend herself and not be caught napping again, and a vigorous programme to strengthen the armed forces is under way. No resistance would be far more resolute and organised should the Chinese attack again. The fact is that, India's refusal to accept Chinese supremacy in Asia has been partly responsible for the Chinese anxiety to expose India's military weakness and there by, her inability to function as a major power in Asia.

India does not want to force the Soviet Union on to the side of Peking through alignment with the West. Soviet willingness to provide economic and limited military assistance is valuable both in reducing the threat from across the Himalayas and in enabling India to play a balancing role against the Chinese desire for hegemony in Asia.

Peaceful co-existence, non-alignment, Afro-Asian solidarity, peace and security have no meaning for militant China. The policy-makers of countries interested in world peace, cannot ignore the world strategy of China. That is why the United States has not recognised China and does not

support its claim for the seat in the United Nations. The thinking in the United States has been that China was and is of extreme importance in relation to the conflict between Democracies and the Kremlin, because China is in the position of a buffer, both geographically and politically, between the peoples of the Pacific area - including Americans - and the main base (Moscow) from which Communist operations are conducted. An anti-Communist China would be at least a barrier - to the advantage of the free peoples. A Communist China may well be a highway by which Soviet influence will move and a base from which Communist armed forces will strike southward and eastward, i.e., toward Australia and toward the United States. Politically, China was and is of importance because she has vast potentialities and she has a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. An anti-Communist China votes there on the American side, while a Communist China would, in all probability, go against America.<sup>1</sup> These two considerations are among the determinants of U.S. China policy.

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1. Goldwin, Robert A. with Lerner, Ralph and Strouzh, Gerald (Ed.), Readings in American Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1959, pp.299-300.

The U.S. policy in China, unlike India, is of containment. There is virtually no line of separation between U.S. policy in China and U.S. Far Eastern Policy. Now it should be noted that a shift has been seen. The United States is trying to improve its ties with Peking and the Soviet Union along with Formosa which have been the determining and unavoidable factors of American foreign policy and diplomacy. The United States, despite the Chinese attitude of hostility towards it, has attempted to maintain and develop a dialogue with the Chinese Communists through talks in Warsaw. But "this has not been easy since the Chinese have declined to discuss, or even acknowledge in some instances, our proposals aimed at bringing about increased contacts and exchanges", announced the new U.S. Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, in his first major foreign policy statement<sup>1</sup> on 27 March 1969. As far as the Sino-Soviet rift increases, the United States tries to improve its relations with Communist China.

India believes that the United States and other countries who have not recognised China should recognize it and it

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1. Text of the statement in Number Sixty-two in a continuing series of American Policy Statements, U.S.I.C., New Delhi, p.21.

should be given its membership in the United Nations. Everywhere in the world the United States the Soviet Union and Communist China are involved. Therefore Communist China should be given its due place. Only then there may be somewhat peaceful, and mutual agreements on the problems of the present day world and especially that of Asia, e.g., Vietnam, West Asia, Formosa and others, as Communist China will have to abide by the rules of international conduct and may change its warlike attitude by which it has threatened all the countries of the world with the objective of world domination.

Indian diplomacy did not reacted wisely during the West Asia crisis in June 1967. It sided with Egypt while the United States was on the side of Israel. Egypt did not support India against Pakistan during Indo-Pakistan war in 1965. India could have taken a neutral stand thus avoiding the vehement Government and public criticism in the United States. Recently at Rabat Summit also, the Indian diplomacy failed, though its stand was justified.

If peace and security are to be had in Asia and the world, the United States should lessen its commitment in Vietnam, West Asia so that power politics may leave these places for free development. The announcement<sup>1</sup> by President

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1. Time magazine's ,(14 December 1969, news weekly) report was quoted by the Hindustan Times, December 16, 1969.

Nixon that by the end of 1971 almost all American troops will be withdrawn except 40,000 from South Vietnam should be welcomed in India.

The United States is one of the two super powers of the world and India is the largest democracy of Asia. Most of the time in the history of their relations they have been on friendly terms. India has received large scale United States economic<sup>aid</sup> and for its national development plans and the United States has played an important role in raising the standard of Indian life through this aid. This is the unchallenged fact that the United States is interested in the economic build up of India because a strong India can speak with strength and affect the decision in international organisations and conferences.

Committed as they are to democratic ideals and the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter, India and the United States both have a stake in peace, development, and higher standards of living. There are no fundamental clashes of national interest but the usual determinants of foreign policy - history, geography, economic resources, etc. - make the policy makers see the world problems differently. What is needed to bring the relations of the two countries to a more even keel is the realisation of the basic unity that

characterizes their political systems and goals of foreign policy rather than the occasional differences that one finds in their handling of a problem. It is, therefore, a welcome development that arrangements have been made for a regular dialogue between the policy makers of the two countries.<sup>1</sup> This could very well lead to a better mutual understanding and friendlier relations between the largest democracy of the East and the most powerful one in the world today.

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1. First Indo-U.S. talks were held at New Delhi from 26 July to 28 July 1968 to discuss matters of common interest. The Indian delegation was headed by Minister of State B.N. Bhagat; the U.S. delegation was led by the then Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. The Statesman, 29 July 1969. Very recently, another round of India-U.S. bilateral talks took place at Washington during 16-17 October 1969. The Indian delegation was led by Foreign Secretary, T.N. Kaul, while the U.S. team was headed by Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson. The Hindustan Times, 18 October, 1969.

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